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CONCORDIA JOURNAL Volume 29
October 2003
Number 4
CONTENTS EDITORIALS Editor’s Note ........................................................................ A Faculty Statement ............................................................. Theological Potpourri ........................................................... Theological Observers ............................................................
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ARTICLES The Beginnings of the Papacy in the Early Church Quentin F. Wesselschmidt ........................................................ 374 Antichrist?: The Lutheran Confessions on the Papacy Charles P. Arand .................................................................. 392 The Papacy in Perspective: Luther’s Reform and Rome Robert Rosin ........................................................................ 407 Vatican II’s Conception of the Papacy: A Lutheran Response Richard H. Warneck ............................................................. 427 Ut Unum Sint and What It Says about the Papacy: Description and Response Samuel H. Nafzger ............................................................... 447 Papacy as a Constitutive Element of Koinonia in Ut Unum Sint? Edward J. Callahan ............................................................... 463 HOMILETICAL HELPS .................................................................. 483 BOOK REVIEWS ............................................................................... 506 BOOKS RECEIVED ........................................................................... 518 INDEX ............................................................................................. 520
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Editorial Editor’s Note On May 25, 1995, Pope John Paul II issued Ut Unum Sint, his encyclical letter in which he reaches out to non-Roman churches to enter into ecumenical dialogue for the sake of achieving the unity that Christ prayed for in His high priestly prayer in John 17:20-21. Since the papacy has been one of the major points of division between the Roman Catholic Church and other denominations from the sixteenth century, the pope seeks dialogue on this topic as well as in other areas of disagreement. In light of this invitation, this issue of Concordia Journal is devoted to articles on the Roman papacy. The papacy and its claims of primacy are reviewed in historical and confessional terms to see whether there are any changes in Rome’s understanding of the papacy that might make it acceptable to Lutherans. In the first article, Dr. Quentin F. Wesselschmidt examines the development of the Roman church’s claims of papal primacy and Petrine succession in the early centuries of the church’s history. When and why these claims developed, as well as how these claims were received or resisted by the churches outside of Rome, must be taken into account in any reconsideration of the papacy. In the second article, Dr. Charles P. Arand reexamines the view of the Lutheran reformers and the Lutheran Confessions that the pope is the antichrist. He investigates why and how that view may still be appropriate today and whether other issues are involved. One must consider the historical context of the Confessions and the concerns of their authors in any reappraisal of the pope being the antichrist. Two other factors that must be taken into account are eschatology and the two kinds of righteousness. In the third article, Dr. Robert Rosin looks at the papacy in light of the Lutheran Reformation and notes that the papacy was not the main target of Luther’s reform efforts, but it was an issue that could not be ignored. Any reexamination of the papacy must take into account post-Reformation Lutheranism, Tridentine thought, and nineteenth-century theologians’ views on Luther and the papacy. In the fourth article, Dr. Richard H. Warneck calls attention to the views of the papacy as reinforced by the Second Vatican Council. In spite of some of the liberalizing tendencies of Vatican II, the papacy remains the “single monolithic entity in Roman Catholicism.” Therefore, any dialogue with Rome must deal with the papacy. In the fifth article, Dr. Samuel H. Nafzger reviews the content of Ut Unum Sint and offers a Lutheran response. He suggests that before the issue of the papacy can be taken up, changes need to be made in the encyc354
lical and its understanding of the doctrine of the church. In the sixth article, Rev. Edward J. Callahan addresses the question of whether the role of the papacy in the ecumenical movement as envisioned by John Paul II in Ut Unum Sint makes the papacy acceptable to nonCatholic Christians. Even though the pope makes a strong case for unity among all Christians, Lutherans and will not find his understanding of unity in line with the unity for which we pray the Holy Spirit to grant to the church. John Paul II has been a very active and congenial pope with enough charisma to have made the papacy a household name and a subject of interest to non-Catholics. He is liked and respected well beyond his own denominational circles and has urged Christian positions regarding many contemporary social issues that win the applause of most traditional Christians. Yet, the papacy must be considered in terms of its long history and contemporary Catholicism’s position on it. We hope that our readers will find these articles informative and beneficial. Quentin F. Wesselschmidt
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A Faculty Statement Unfinished Work The Yankee Stadium event of September 23, 2001, and the ensuing controversy in The Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod have raised a host of questions for Synod. Among them is the vital question concerning the future policy of Synod. How should Missouri Synod Lutherans relate to people of non-Christian religions? Should Missouri Synod pastors be encouraged to participate in inter-religious events or not? Why or why not? If so, how should they participate? What kinds of presence would be deemed God-pleasing and helpful? Although the Dispute Resolution Panel has rendered an official decision on the charges brought against Pastor David Benke, we do not believe that the issues raised by the event have been satisfactorily addressed. Furthermore, some conclusions have been drawn which may be confusing or misleading. In particular, we do not believe that the Synod has currently in place a well-articulated statement of theology and practice pertaining to participation or non-participation in various kinds of public events with representatives of non-Christian religions. Specifically, the CTCR document, “The Lutheran Understanding of Church Fellowship” with the response, which was commended by the 2001 Synodical convention (Resolution 3-07A), deals only with inter-Christian fellowship issues and does not have in view situations of religious pluralism such as that which took place at Yankee Stadium. The CTCR on February 18, 2003, has also expressed the same opinion: “Section V, B. does not explicitly address the issue of ‘offering a prayer by an LCMS pastor in a “civic event” in which prayers would also be offered by representatives of non-Christian religions.’”1 All of this is to say that the Synod still has unfinished work in determining how best to be church in a religiously pluralistic nation and world. We believe that the discussion can best take place in a dispassionate way among those who were not “combatants” during the recent controversy with a vested interest in determining winners and losers. We look forward to the results of the CTCR’s ongoing work regarding the issue of participation in civic events and the definition of civic event. Moreover, we as a faculty stand ready to assist the Synod in developing and articulating responsible Christian approaches to the challenges facing us in the changing religious landscape of America. In addition to past contributions made in the Concordia Journal and Theological Symposia, we at Concordia Seminary 1 To see the CTCR response to the DRP questions, dated February 18, 2003, go to the following web site address: http://www.lcms.org/president/statements/ on_disputedecision.asp
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have recently offered a collection of essays entitled “Witness and Worship in Pluralistic America.” We hope that others will contribute their insights as well. Consensus on such a complex issue comes only after much study, discussion, and debate, sometimes extending over the course of many years. Concordia Seminary Faculty
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Theological Potpourri Report on the ELCA’s Conference of Teaching Theologians This past August, I was invited to attend the 2003 Conference of Teaching Theologians of the ELCA, held in Milwaukee immediately after that church body’s national convention in the same city. The attendees at this conference comprised essentially theologians from the ELCA in teaching positions at various academic institutions, including seminaries, colleges and universities of the denomination, and non-affiliated institutions, both public and private alike. In addition, several bishops were present, and a representative from a Reformed body and I were invited as guests to observe (the Reformed observer was not able to be present). I represented the Concordia Journal at this event, and I am pleased to say that my days there were time well spent, indeed—especially since the topic, “The Promise and Challenges of a Lutheran Hermeneutic,” is something near and dear to my heart. The conference format was not novel: plenary presentations and small group discussions intertwined. The papers in plenary were well prepared, and the topics and format in the small groups were well conceived and effectively carried out. (Mercifully, there were no reports from small groups back to the plenary, which is always a lowlight of any conference.) In fact, if one ignored a few half-hearted runs at the concept of the third use of the law on a couple of occasions, it would have been hard to tell that one was not at a gathering of LCMS teaching theologians. Toward the end of the conference I was asked—and it was gracious of the organizers to do this—if I, as an invited observer, wished to provide any reaction to what had transpired. I was happy to do so. Subsequently, a number of attendees asked for a write-up of my remarks, which I was able to provide. Below is a copy of that write-up, which represents about 90% of what I presented orally. There are also some additions for clarification and to provide bibliographical references. We have room to talk. Toward a Distinctive Lutheran Hermeneutic Introduction: The ELCA Conference of Teaching Theologians was wellconceived and well-executed. The papers were well-prepared and provide a basis for coming to grips with the distinctions of a Lutheran hermeneutic. I. Pragmatics and Semantics Steve Carlson’s paper, “Luther and Scripture” (8/17/03) highlighted the issue of the impact of Scripture. His paper contained the following clauses: 358
“the content of Scripture magnifies sin”; “Scripture condemns”; “Scripture puts us to death and revivifies.” Such words focus our attention on the issue of pragmatics and its relation to semantics, i.e., the impact of a text vs. the meaning or sense of a text1 (cf. Mark Powell’s point that there are “different philosophical concepts of what constitutes ‘meaning’”2 [8/18/03]). Carlson was supported by Kit Kleinhans (8/18/03), who spoke of Scripture being holy “because of its use.”3 She also highlighted the importance of asking how a text “exposes” our sinfulness and “comforts” us. It is a Lutheran distinctive to embrace both the semantics/meaning of a text and the pragmatics or impact of a text. (Indeed, Lutherans have been “ahead of the curve” in recognizing impact, in speaking of various “uses” of the Law [which are various impacts, not meanings of the Law]). It is also a Lutheran distinction to tend to privilege pragmatics/impact. The problem is to keep both meaning and impact, semantics and pragmatics, together. In my opinion, the LCMS has a tendency to get out of balance in the direction of semantics, becoming fascinated with inerrancy and the surety of meaning. When this happens, the address of the text tends to get lost. The ELCA, by contrast, has a tendency to get out of balance in the other direction, pragmatics, so that, e.g., questions of the nature of Scripture are answered by discussing not what it is, but what it does. (Cf. the point made by Kleinhans concerning the ordering of articles regarding Scripture in the ELCA constitution, viz., that only after speaking of the “generativity” of the text is there a discussion of Scripture being normative.) When pragmatics becomes over-dominant, the message of the text tends to become overwhelmed.4 II. Gospel and Scripture Scott Hendrix’s tour through Luther (8/17/03) highlighted issues related to the relationship between the Gospel and Scripture. Luther says, e.g., “...the gospel itself is our guide and instructor in the scriptures.”5 How tricky this relationship is, can be seen in the penetrating questions of Hank Langknecht to Kit Kleinhans after her presentation: “How do we know Christ and how do we know that the Scriptures point to Christ?” 1 For a basic introduction, see James W. Voelz, What Does This Mean?: Principles of Biblical Interpretation in the Post-Modern World 2nd ed., St Louis: Concordia, 1997, 275-292. 2 “Polyvalence in Interpretation - And Questions Raised for Interpretive Exegesis.” He noted that meanings may be understood as “a cognitive message to be passed from author to reader, or an affective or emotive response produced in readers through the experience of receiving the text.” 3 “What Ought We Look for and Expect in Scripture?” 4 In this repect, it will be interesting to see what happens in coming years as passages such as Romans 1, dealing with the matter of homosexuality, are considered by the ELCA. 5 Scott Hendrix, “The Interpretation of the Bible according to Luther and the Confessions, or, Did Luther Have A (Lutheran) Hermeneutics?,” section 2, Scripture and Gospel (A Brief Instruction on What to Look For and Expect in the Gospels, 1522) 2.
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Here we see an example of the question of the relationship between a notion of content and a document which is an authoritative source and norm—their relationship in the hermeneutical spiral.6 Lutherans affirm both the Gospel and Scripture and distinctively keep them together. It is also a Lutheran distinction to tend to privilege the Gospel over Scripture.7 We may note that the early church understood this problem as it developed the regulae fidei (localized proto-creeds).8 These represented content, just as Scripture represented authoritative document. Both were apostolic (the regulae were not “drawn from” Scripture) and both were kept together. The regulae were statements of the faith congruent with the contents of the Scriptures, plus they were lenses to view and keys to unlock these same Scriptures, and thus could be privileged. In the words of Robert Wall, “The [regulae] were statements of core theological affirmations, which might continue to serve the church as criteria for assessing the coherence of one’s interpretation of Scripture.”9 Lutherans have used the terms “formal” and “material” principle to describe the distinction between content and authoritative source, but a new article soon to be published by Erik Heen10 shows how slippery and recent these terms are. We must be very careful in using them. The problem is to keep both content and authoritative document together. If Scripture, seen to be “sola” (and understood as totally selfinterpreting), wipes out content as a hermeneutical key, exegesis becomes idiosyncratic.11 Dispensational millenialism is a good example of this error. If Gospel as content wipes out Scripture as source and norm, the incarnated specifics of God’s revelation are lost (and systemticians take over the world!). It is my opinion that Gospel/content can also be seen as a community principle because the Gospel and/or regulae have existence apart from the Scriptures, and are handed down by the people of God as the community of faith. 6 It is never a hermeneutical circle, always a spiral, for understanding grows as the interpretive process proceeds. 7 This distinguishes us from fundamentalists, who believe the Gospel because they believe the Bible. Lutherans believe the Bible because they believe the Gospel. 8 Robert S. Wall, “Reading the Bible from within Our Traditions: The ‘Rule of Faith’ in Theological Hermeneutics” in Between Two Horizons: Spanning New Testament Studies and New Testament Theology, ed. Joel B. Green and Max Turner, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000, especially 89, 101-102. 9 Wall, “The ‘Rule of Faith’ in Theological Hermeneutics”, 89. See also Frances Young (The Making of Creeds, London: SCM, 1991, 91), who says that the early church regarded the creedal statements as “a normative overview, as ‘apostolic’ and as the standard to which appeal was to be made when controversy about the content or interpretation of scripture arose.” For a placement of this issue in the general hermeneutical discussion, see James W. Voelz, “Reading Scripture as Lutherans in the Post-Modern Era,” Lutheran Quarterly 14 (2000): 318-320. 10 “The Distinction ‘Material / Formal Principles’ and it Use in American Lutheran Theiology,” Lutheran Quarterly (Autumn 2003). 11 I would thus plead for an understanding which is “sola apostolica,” embracing both the apostolic regulae and the apostolic Scriptures. Sola Scripture is essentially a polemical formulation directed against the Roman Catholic teaching magisterium.
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III. Personal Experience Personal experience is also key. Hendrix brought this out in his discussion of Luther, especially in the notion that theology and experience belong together, and that the Word is rich when studied under pressure (Anfechtungen).12 Paul Rorem confirmed the point in his reaction paper (8/ 17/03). This is not hard to imagine, if pragmatics is part of the picture (for, by its very nature, pragmatics concerns the impact of the meaning of a text upon a personal subject). But reader-oriented criticisms (e.g., readerresponse, various post-structuralist approaches) lead us to understand that it is a factor in the semantic/meaning enterprise, as well. A distinctively Lutheran hermeneutic is also existential. This allowed Luther to privilege the book of Romans over James (as the Roman Church did not), and it allows us to listen and learn from Mark Powell’s experiences with Russian and Tanzanian interpreters (who hear Biblical stories from their own, personal social location). The problem with the existential factor is that we must make sure that we listen to other personal readings of the text (such as those in Russia and Tanzania). The self is in community. We must also listen to those who experienced the text in the past. The community is not only in the present. (G. K. Chesterton once said that the saints of the past must not be disenfranchised “just because they happen to be dead.”) And, we must be sure to actually listen to the text. Points I, II, and III, then, may be interrelated to create the following diagram of a distinctively Lutheran hermeneutic: Pragmatics -------------------------------------------------------Content/Gospel Community Semantics Authoritative Text
Self
IV. Two Further Observations A. General/Sacred Hermeneutics Too much of our discussion at the Teaching Theologians Conference has focused on sacred hermeneutics—principles for interpreting Scripture 12 These points were made orally in the discussion of his first text, under the first heading, “Scripture and the Reformation Discovery” (The Interpretation of the Bible According to Luther, 1).
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as the Word of God/as containing the Word of God. But the devil is in the details of general hermeneutics, the majority of the time. Take, e.g., the “canon within a canon” issue. This was a much discussed topic in our first plenary discussion (8/17/03), and also in the paper by Richard Perry13 (8/18/ 03). All literature or bodies of literature has this issue. Ask anyone who is reading the works of Derrida! B. General Geist The LCMS and the ELCA differ in some ways in Geist. Erik Heen gave a very fair historical assessment in his essay “The Interpretation of the Bible Among Lutherans in the 20th Century” (8/17/03). He noted that the forerunner church bodies of the ELCA valued the renaissance in Luther studies in the ’60s more than the LCMS, while the LCMS valued the insights of 17th century orthodoxy more than ELCA-predecessor theologians. We can, in addition, note that ELCA theologians value and privilege the Augustana over the Formula of Concord in the Book of Concord, while LCMS theologians tend to value and privilege the Formula over the Augustana.14 This leads me to observe that the ELCA is, to create an analogy to literature and music, “romantic” in its temperament, while the LCMS is more “classical.” The former values the early, the fresh, and the direct, while the latter values the mature, the studied, and the considered. Which is, generally, correct is hard to say, but it certainly is true that macrotendencies of groups or organizations are most powerful, yet their influence generally remains undetected and unarticulated. James W. Voelz
13
“What Sort of Claim Does the Bible Have Today?” One can, e.g., see this in discussions of the unity of the church as one observes the uses made of AC VII and FC X. 14
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Theological Observers Five Things You Should Not Say at Funerals As a young pastor in the early 1980s, I learned pretty quickly that you hear things said at funerals that (strictly speaking) were not true. The deceased was often described as the kind of person who “never turned away anyone in need” or who “would give anyone the shirt off his back” or who was “always a loving and patient husband.” Recognizing quickly the need to “translate” comments made during times of intense emotional strain, I also learned that it was probably a grim thing when the best that was said about the dead person was “Oh, he was a real character all right!” As a not-as-young pastor now in the early years of the twenty-first century, I still hear at funerals things said about the dead Christian that are not true. The problem is that I hear them said by the pastor, as part of his sermon. These are things which, strictly speaking, are not true. More importantly, these are things which, theologically speaking, are not true. And so we ought not to say them. Because ultimately, statements such as the ones highlighted below downplay the real meaning of death, and they diminish the great hope of resurrection that is God’s answer in Christ to the reality of death. The following are things that should not be said at funerals. First: “Bob has received the crown of righteousness, and he has heard the Lord say, ‘Well done, good and faithful servant’.” No, actually, he hasn’t— not yet. The phrase “crown of righteousness” comes from 2 Timothy 4:8 where Paul confidently asserts as he looks forward to his own death, “Finally, the crown of righteousness is being stored up for me, which the Lord, the righteous Judge will award to me on that day—and not only to me, but also to all who have loved his appearing.” The crown of righteousness is awarded on the Last Day, at the Final Judgment. Until that day— it is stored up and waiting to be awarded (see also 1 Peter 5:4). The Lord’s commendation, “Well done,” comes from the Parable of the Talents (Matt. 25:14-30), a parable that also refers to the Judgment Day. The final verdict on each Christian’s service is not given until the final accounting takes place–when the Master returns after a long journey (Matt. 25:14, 19; see also 1 Cor. 3:10-15). Second: “Margaret has now entered into eternal life.” There is no Biblical support for a statement like this–this is not, in fact, a Christian The “Theological Observer” serves as a forum for comment on, assessment of, and reactions to developments and events in the church at large, as well as in the world of theology generally. Since areas of expertise, interest, and perceptions often vary, the views presented in this section will not always reflect the opinion of the editorial committee. CONCORDIA JOURNAL/OCTOBER 2003
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thing to say. Standing on its own, such an utterance can also have the double effect of both diminishing the significance of Holy Baptism and effectively eliminating the creedal hope of “the resurrection of the dead, and the life of the age to come.” As John 5:24ff. tells us, eternal life has already begun for all who hear Jesus’ words and believe the Father who sent Him. Whatever else might be said about the condition of the believer’s soul when death tears it away from the believer’s body, this event cannot and must not be called “entrance into eternal life.” To say such a thing is to imply that the body is not destined to participate in eternal life! Third: “John has gone to his eternal home.” This utterance contains an echo of a Biblical way of speaking, but it is terribly misleading. In 2 Corinthians 5:1-10, Paul is dealing with the prospect of death, the hope of the resurrection body, and how these matters interrelate. His primary hope concerns the resurrection body that will be given to him and to all believers “so that what is mortal may be swallowed up by life” (2 Cor. 5:4; cf. 1 Cor. 15:53f.). Until he puts on that dwelling, Paul and all believers groan, along with the whole creation (2 Cor. 5:4; cf. Rom. 8:22-23). The gift of the Holy Spirit, however, is the “bridge” between this mortal existence and that immortal, resurrection life–the Spirit is the “guarantee” of final inheritance and life (2 Cor. 5:5). So, life is lived in this tension. Until the gift of the resurrection body, one must be “home” somewhere and “away” from something. Currently, Paul is “home in the body” and “away from the Lord” (2 Cor. 5:6). If he had to choose, he would rather be “away from the body” and “home with the Lord,” something that he elsewhere describes as an existence that is “far better” (Phil. 1:23). But this does not mean that the bodiless existence of the soul is “our eternal home.” If one were going to specify the location of our “eternal home,” the closest approximation would be where we are now—in God’s creation! As creatures, this creation is rightly our home. Spoiled by sin, however, the creation awaits renewal—our eternal home is in need of renovation, purging, restoration. A Christian who dies most certainly is, in some important sense, “at home with the Lord.” But at death, the believer does not go to his or her eternal home—not yet. Fourth: “Julia is with the Lord now forever.” This, too, implies that the resurrection of the body is an afterthought, an add-on, something that isn’t very important. The blessed condition of the dead believers is rest, paradise, a being “with the Lord”—but it will not always be that way. Our dogmatic theologians have rightly called the condition of the soul apart from the body the “interim state.” It is a “between” kind of existence. It is not the existence that will characterize eternal life. Things will change on the Last Day also for the dead–they will be raised and in that condition, “we will always be with the Lord” (1 Thess. 4:17). Fifth: “This is not a funeral—it’s Craig’s victory celebration!” This is perhaps the most objectionable of all—and it is patently false, as even many unbelievers instinctively know. It is true, of course, that when a 364
Christian dies, he is now “out of danger”—he can no longer be tempted. In addition, when tragic and prolonged physical or mental suffering precede the death of a Christian, there can be great relief and release for both the deceased and for those who loved him and have cared for him. But who could even imagine saying that a funeral is a “victory” when it’s the funeral of a child, or of a young mother, or of a colleague and friend struck down in the midst of a vigorous and productive life? As a matter of fact, the death even of a Christian is always and only a sign that sin has not yet fully been abolished by the Lord Jesus Christ; the last enemy has not yet gone under His feet. As a matter of fact, death (which does not separate the deceased from the love of God in Christ) does separate the deceased from those who love him. Funerals are not victory celebrations. They are funerals. The grief is, in light of the Gospel, never grief without hope (1 Thess. 4:13). But it is still, ever and rightly—grief. For only on the Last Day will death be swallowed up in…victory (1 Cor. 15:54). Why do we say things at funerals that we should not say? Perhaps it’s the desire to bring “complete” comfort to those who mourn. I suspect that there is also at work a skewed anthropology that views a person as essentially a “soul.” So, when we think of a person’s future, we think only of the future of his soul, but not of the blessed future of his body. But my real guess would be that such mis-speaking at funerals occurs because we have lost a real appreciation for the true and great Biblical hope of the parousia of Jesus at the consummation of the age (see my essay “Regaining Biblical Hope: Restoring the Prominence of the Parousia,” Concordia Journal 27 [October 2001]: 310-322). When the second coming plays no functional role in one’s working theology, it will not show up in funeral sermons. When the theological understanding of death as the enemy is hidden behind clichés that are not true, then there is less opportunity for speaking the Good News. When the pastor, even though he believes that it will happen, is not himself actually looking for and longing for the return of Christ—then he will say at funerals things that he should not say. And he will not deliver the fulness of the Gospel. For that is what a pastor should say at a funeral—the Good News. The Law is there, staring everyone in the face—death. And the sermon should speak explicitly of sin and its effects and its manifestations—including the death of this Christian brother or sister. And one can also proclaim the Biblical message about the soul of the dead Christian—the soul is “with Christ,” or “at rest,” or “in Paradise.” These are all Biblical ways of speaking, and they can offer true Christian comfort. But in the face of death the pastor must proclaim the Good News of God’s solution to sin and all its effects. And God’s solution for bodily death is bodily resurrection! The resurrection of Jesus is the first fruits of the final resurrection on the Last Day—and this is very good news indeed for all who are in Christ Jesus. The redeeming act of Jesus of Nazareth encompasses and overcomes all guilt now, and His deeds for us will overturn CONCORDIA JOURNAL/OCTOBER 2003
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the death of our bodies and restore us and all who trust Him to our rightful home in the new heavens and the new earth. This hope is realistic, in that it allows death in Christ to be death—no more, but certainly no less. And this hope is true, because it is centered in Christ Jesus and looks only to Him who is the same yesterday in our life, today in our death…and forever in the resurrection of the body and the life everlasting. This is what we should say at funerals. Jeff Gibbs
What Luther Meant Two pieces in the July Concordia Journal (232-234, 235-239) provide helpful clarification that Luther’s statement in the Large Catechism, II, 66, does not at all commit confessional Lutherans to the idea that Turks (Muslims), Jews, and pagans have faith in the one, true God and worship Him with such faith. Neither the German nor the Latin versions of the Catechism have a definite article with “one, true God.” (He is speaking about what others may say about deity.) Both pieces (at 232 and 239) assert that pagans cannot be said to believe in and worship the one, true God. Beyond that, two points of analysis are seen in both pieces. (1) The Large Catechism passage uses a concessive (“although”) clause, i.e., a clause that grants a point which nevertheless does not invalidate the main assertion. This concessive clause is (in the Latin translation): “Although they merely believe that God is one and true, and call upon Him [as such].” This employs Dr. Nordling’s useful observation that tantum (merely, only) is best understood as modifying the verbs. (Presumably the same can be said of the nur of the German version). This concessive clause serves the purpose of making the point that the non-Christians, regardless of what their belief and worship may be, do not know God’s attitude toward them of love and blessing. (2) The antecedents of “they” in the concessive clause need not include all the groups listed by Luther: “All who are outside this Christian people, whether heathen, Turks, Jews, or false Christians and hypocrites” (Kolb/Wengert). Here the CJ pieces are not exact. Page 233 leaves it undecided whether “they” refers only to false Christians and hypocrites, or also includes Jews and Turks (but not pagans) as those who believe in and worship one, true God (even if it is false worship). In either case, it is certain that the non-Christians do not know the divine attitude toward them. But page 238 definitely opts for excluding Jews and Muslims as well as pagans, since all have a “fictive God,” “what they merely believe is the true God.” Footnote 17 on page 239 also excludes the rest of the list, viewing the concessive clause as contrary-to-fact with “they” not referring to any actual non-Christian and (I suppose) expressing a paradox about correct doctrine and saving faith. While greatly appreciating these efforts, one does wonder if a broader 366
look at Luther’s writings and use of language might not be helpful for further clarification. Such a look does yield the information that Luther sometimes speaks of non-Christians “believing” and “worshiping” God in some sense. For example, he says that the heathen of Romans 1:20 “do not believe for a theological reason but a human one” (WA 39, 1, 180) and that Jews and Turks “boast against us Christians that they believe in the one God, the Creator of heaven and earth” (WA 54, 67-67). He is referring to natural knowledge of God, which the unregenerate mind may have and which is widespread in the world (e.g., WA 19, 205; 24:640). He observes that some pagans, like Aristotle, even conclude that there is one God (WA 21, 510-11). We may note that in the Large Catechism passage (II, 66) “one, true God” is accusative in German without the preposition “in” and is part of indirect discourse in Latin. It is easy to understand this as referring to knowledge about God’s existence and oneness, which pagans, etc., can also have. But Luther always insists that only personal faith in God and trust in Christ is true, right knowledge of God (WA 14, 16), and that is certainly his theme in the Large Catechism passage. Similarly, Luther can speak of the non-Christian’s worship of God, as part of the natural knowledge of God, just as the Apology says that the natural man can “talk about God and offer God acts of worship with external works” (XVIII, 4). But he says that there are two kinds of worship (anbeten– the actual word used for worship in our Large Catechism passage at II, 66). These are outward worship and inward, spiritual worship, which is faith in the Savior. The first can express the second, but the first without the second is not true, right worship at all (AE 36:290-93; St. L. 22:1119). Just as Luther holds that the natural knowledge of God is not true and right knowledge, he speaks of “worship” of God which is not true worship. In the confusion of religions in the world, it is, “properly speaking, idolatry, when we ourselves give God a form and invest God with some sort of religious worship which He Himself has not instituted” (WA 25, 128). The Jews who opposed Christ in John 6 had a “vain service of God” (Gottesdienst), which was not the “true, eternal, and unending service of God” (WA 33, 28). “Therefore it is not enough and cannot be called a worship of the true God, if we worship Him as the Mohammedans and Jews and the whole world without God’s Word and faith boast—that they worship the only God, who made heaven and earth” (WA 22, 376). In Luther’s view, non-Christian thinking replaces the true God with an idol, an invention of unbelief and the unregenerate mind. Because the focus of religious awareness in the non-Christian religions is seriously distorted, the non-Christian offers acts of worship to God which in actual practice always replace Him with these idols and inventions. Thus he says: For the Turk says he adores the God who made heaven and the earth. The Jew says the same. But because both deny that this King is the Son of God, they not only wander away from God, but CONCORDIA JOURNAL/OCTOBER 2003
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also adore an idol of their own heart. For they invent a god such as they wish to have, not as God has revealed Himself (AE 12:84). Therefore it is of no avail to Jews, Turks, and heretics to feign great religious zeal and to boast of their belief in the one God…. For if you were to ask such a saintly Jew, Turk, or heretic whether he believes that this one God, Creator of heaven and earth…really is a Father and has a son in the Godhead outside of creation, he would be horrified in his great holiness and would regard this as frightful blasphemy…. Consequently they have no God, except that they fabricate their own god and creator…” (AE 15:314-316). The Turk does the same thing; in his worship he names and has in mind the true God who created heaven and earth. So also do the Jews, Tartars, and now all unbelievers. Nevertheless, with them it is all idolatry (AE 35:271). According to Luther, the idol that becomes the object of worship and religious adherence cannot be identified with the true God. For example, it is not right to say that the Muslim God is the true God. The Muslim God is the God described in the Quran (Allah) and worshipped according to the Quran. This is a god who does not have a son and is angry with all who say that he does. It does not befit the majesty of Allah that he should take unto himself a son (Quran 19:35). The Christians say: The Messiah is the son of Allah. That is their saying with their mouths. They imitate the saying of those who were unbelieving of old. Allah himself fights against them. How perverse are they (Quran 9:30)! The Muslim God is definitely a god who is not the Messiah. They are surely infidels who say: Lo! Allah is the Messiah, son of Mary (Quran 5:72). In short, this is not the God in whom Christians put their faith, and believers in Christ cannot join in worship and prayer with the devotees of the Muslim God. We conclude this study of the Large Catechism, II, 66, by pointing out that if we do understand Luther here to be referring to the non-Christian “believing” and “worship” which he describes in other places, the major point remains the same: none of this non-Christian activity is saving faith or the worship of one reconciled to God. The non-Christian activity may 368
express an awareness of the supreme being, but that is another matter. It should be added that in Luther’s discussions of non-Christian religion, he does not divorce the issue of the Biblical trinitarian identification of God from the issue of a person’s recognition of the divine attitude of grace. It is true that the recognition of the trinitarian identification of God is not by itself Gospel faith, but it is not unrelated to it, as Luther points out in the quotations above. The Gospel proclaims the love of the Father made known in His beloved Son for the salvation of sinners and His gifts of His Son and His Spirit (John 3:16; Matt. 28:19; etc.). Luther has these themes in mind as he concludes his explanation of the Creed in the Large Catechism (Part II). This trinitarian Gospel is the message Christian evangelists and missionaries endeavor to connect with the many points of contact and common moral concerns to be found in Islam, Judaism, etc. Thomas Manteufel
The Hemeneutical Naiveté of the Supreme Court The cross-burning case (Virginia vs. Black) before the Supreme Court late last year has reopened interest in freedom of speech, especially because of the comments of Justice Clarence Thomas. In addition to the importance of the specific case, however, the entire issue should bring to our attention the fact that our courts deal with laws and situations with a curious and serious interpretive naiveté. They seem to have little knowledge of the field of semiotics, which is the theory of signs and how they both convey meaning and function—signs not only in documents (e.g., words and sentences) but also in life (e.g., concrete actions and things). First, the justices seem to have no conscious awareness of the difference between semantics and pragmatics. The former concerns itself with the meaning of a sign, e.g., the meaning of a word or an action in a given context, while pragmatics deals with its impact, e.g., whether the meaning conveyed constitutes a warning, a threat, a promise, etc. Now, these are not the same categories and the difference between them is not trivial. If we are guaranteed freedom of speech in the United States of America, are we guaranteed both freedom of expression of meaning and freedom of intent of impact? Deputy solicitor general Michael R. Dreeben has apparently sensed the distinction I am urging, because, according to Jonah Goldberg (“Court case illustrates the curious convolution of our First Amendment” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, December 18, 2002, C19), he has argued that “historically burning the cross was not expression but ‘akin to a threat to put somebody in fear of bodily harm’ and therefore ‘is not protected by the First Amendment.’” Indeed. Justice Thomas, according to Goldberg, replied with these words: “‘My fear is you are actually understating the symbolism of and effect of the burning cross.’” Here is precisely the distinction I am suggesting (though Thomas does not distinguish them): symbolism = CONCORDIA JOURNAL/OCTOBER 2003
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semantics and effect = pragmatics. Note how Thomas is said to have continued: “‘There was no communication…It was intended to cause fear…’” (emphasis added). The question now becomes: What is the relationship between the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and pragmatics? Does this amendment cover the pragmatics of discourse and action, i.e., its impact, whether intended or actual (though this distinction is still another matter!)? In my view, solicitor Dreeben has it right. But here is a second point, which elsewhere I have called “entailment.” When nouns are related to verbal ideas, e.g., as “sale” is to selling and as “speech” is to speaking, they are much more difficult and complex to interpret than are nouns which denote simply things, e.g., “grass,” “tree,” “street.” In fact, an entire sentence is usually concealed in them along with the modifiers associated with them. For example, the phrase “shoe sale” conceals something like “(a given store) is selling shoes (at lower prices).” Who is doing the selling and at what price must be determined from context. Now, the same is true with the phrase “freedom of speech.” This conceals a sentence along the lines of “We are free to speak about X.” The problem in our current context is not the definition of the words “freedom” and “speech.” Rather, it is the identity of the X in the sentence above! Goldberg points this out when he says that virtual pornography seems to be protected by current court interpretations, while ability to criticize political candidates (because of campaign finance reform) is not. In other words, it’s a problem of entailment. Surely our country’s founders had in mind the following entailment/concealed sentence in the First Amendment: “We are free to speak about political matters.” It’s not a stretch to think that they did not have in mind: “We are free to speak about adults having sex with children and infants.” The entailment of a word like “speech” is unexpressed in the Constitution, probably because it was assumed “to be self-evident” (which today it is not). And you thought that the kind of issues you considered in hermeneutics class were of concern only to pastors and professors who wrestle with the “non-contemporary,” authoritative texts of the sacred scriptures! James W. Voelz
On Competence and Integrity in the Life and Work of the Church During the past two years, Dr. David Benke’s participation on September 23, 2001, with spiritual leaders of both Christian and non-Christian faiths in a civic prayer service at Yankee Stadium has elicited a great deal of discussion. At the heart of the controversy are important matters of doctrine and practice. Our concern in this “Observer,” however, is that in the 370
“resolution” of the case, there is the appearance, at least, of mishandling of Missouri Synod’s theological statements, an observation based upon careful study and assessment of evidence available to the synod at large. Because integrity in the use of documents—especially those which cite God’s Word and principles normed by that Word—is critical for the life of the Synod, we offer the following appraisal and appeal. Following a meeting in the spring of 2002 to deal with complaints about his participation, Dr. Benke was put on suspended status by Dr. Wallace Schulz, second vice president of Synod, who had adjudicated the charges of unionism and syncretism and violations of the synodical Constitution and of the First and Second Commandments. When Dr. Benke challenged the suspension, the case went to a Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP), with Dr. Schulz named as the complainant and Dr. Benke as the respondent. Dr. Schulz grounded his case against Dr. Benke’s actions on scriptural, confessional, and synodical constitutional principles; the respondent rested his position principally on church polity, i.e., a synodical resolution, ecclesiastical supervision, and opinions regarding same by the Commission on Constitutional Matters (CCM). The DRP rendered their decision on April 10, 2003, exonerating Dr. Benke and basing their decision for the respondent primarily on Res. 3-07A of the 2001 synodical convention, a resolution that “commended” two fellowship documents: a thorough, formal “Study” and a less formal “Report” of district discussions of the “Study.” Although the DRP decision is final and will not be appealed, it was fatally flawed by misinterpretation and mishandling of the documentary evidence. As noted, the respondent preferred to focus on church polity as the key issue. Even if that point were to be conceded, it is now clear that the polity was violated. Dr. Benke, his ecclesiastical supervisor (the president of Synod), and the DRP claim that Dr. Benke’s participation at Yankee Stadium was permitted by the “Cases of Discretion” section in the “Report” of the Commission on Theology and Church Relations (CTCR) commended by Res. 3-07A. This, despite the fact that the commended “Report” and “Study” deal only with church fellowship, i.e., religious relationships with other Christians. They say nothing about “discretion” to participate in civic religious events involving non-Christians. At least as important as the violation of polity was the faulty nature of the DRP process itself. Consider the following: During the dispute resolution process, the CCM directed the DRP to the CTCR for interpretation of the content of the fellowship documents commended by Res. 3-07A. The DRP complied, posing a convoluted question: “Would offering a prayer by an LCMS pastor in a ‘civic event’ in which prayers would also be offered by representatives of non-Christian religions [cf. Yankee Stadium] be in and of itself a violation of the paragraph under ‘Section V point B. Cases of Discretion’ in the CTCR document ‘The Lutheran Understanding of Church Fellowship’ [i.e., the “Report” commended by Res. 3-07A]…?” (Did they
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mean to ask if it permitted offering a prayer in such circumstances? That’s the obvious conclusion in their published decision.) The CTCR replied “No,” because “Section V, B. does not explicitly address the issue of offering a prayer by an LCMS pastor at a ‘civic event’ in which prayers would also be offered by representatives of non-Christian religions. The CTCR is presently considering assignments with respect to this issue….”1 That is, the paragraphs dealing with discretion neither prohibit nor permit such participation. They simply do not apply, and they cannot be used to justify participation. It is apparent that the DRP ignored this most relevant response of the CTCR to their own question. In fact, they did not so much as refer to it in their published report. Indeed, the DRP’s decision quotes liberally from CCM Opinion 02-2294 on Res. 3-07A but stops precisely before the final sentence in which the CCM directs the DRP to query the CTCR about the content of the commended fellowship documents.2 Furthermore, contrary to the clear meaning of the CTCR’s response, the DRP’s decision inexplicably states (Fact 12) that Res. 3-07A3 “not only does apply, but is the very basis for [Dr. Benke’s] participation” at Yankee Stadium, thus exonerating him from any culpability in the matter. Can it be said of precisely the same content in the same document that it “does not explicitly address” and that it “does apply” to, even serves as “the very basis for,” participation in the same event? What is one to think? Finally, before the DRP’s decision was released to the Synod (and the CTCR’s response also became available), the web site of Dr. Benke’s parish (St. Peter’s Brooklyn, NY) had already published a novel interpretation of the CTCR’s response, claiming that the CTCR had replied, “YES…as far as the Missouri Synod is concerned the Bible and the rulebook say the same thing: It’s OK to Pray!”4 Had those words been the response of the CTCR, surely they would have been cited 1 The full text of the DRP’s question to the CTCR and the CTCR’s response may be found as Exhibit C at http://www.lcms.org/president/statements/on_disputedecision.asp Evidence of the DRP’s ignoring of the response may be found in Exhibit A of the same document. 2 The full text of the DRP’s decision is at http://www.lcms.org/president/ disputedecision.asp See especially p. 5, no. 12 for the DRP’s contradictory rationale based on Res. 3-07A. On page 9, the ellipses at the end of no. 20 represent the omitted words from CCM Opinion 02-2294 (Jan. 20-21, 2003), directing the DRP to consult the CTCR: “Regarding interpretation of the content of ‘The Lutheran Understanding of Church Fellowship’ and the response, such questions should be directed to the Commission on Theology and Church Relations.” (The full text of Opinion 02-2294 may be found at http://www.lcms.org/ ccm/min012003.pdf ) Also relevant in the context is CCM Opinion 02-2309 of the same date, which states that “when an ecclesiastical supervisor discovers error in his counsel, it is incumbent upon that supervisor to correct or amend it. The member should then be held to consider the corrected counsel. Failure to consider such amended admonition could form the basis for disciplinary action as provided in Article XIII.” 3 In the DRP decision, “Res. 3-07A” in effect refers to the CTCR “Report” commended by it— specifically the section entitled “Cases of Discretion.” 4 See http://www.stpeter-brooklyn.org/yes_oktopray.html
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prominently in the DRP’s decision. Again, what is one to think of such actions? Especially disturbing in the procedure is the evident mishandling of written documents, a type of mishandling seen before in our Synod. (See, for example, the description in section C. Historical Concerns of the “Dissenting Opinion on the Service of Women in Congregational and Synodical Offices”—CTCR, 1994.5) Such mishandling of documents is fraught with peril: It renders the written word meaningless and impotent, turning it into a waxen nose which may be employed when rhetoric is suited to an agenda and ignored or modified when it is not. We can neither condone nor ignore, especially in the church, any debasing of our ability to communicate effectively, fairly, and honestly with one another. Continued meaningful theological discussion is predicated upon, at the very least, integrity and competence in the use of documents and language. David O. Berger and James W. Voelz
5 The text for the Dissenting Opinion may be found at http://www.lcms.org/ctcr/docs/ pdf/dissent.pdf
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Articles The Beginnings of the Papacy in the Early Church Quentin F. Wesselschmidt Introduction In his recent book, Upon This Rock: St. Peter and the Primacy of Rome in Scripture and the Early Church, Stephen K. Ray, a convert from the Baptist faith to Roman Catholicism, set out to substantiate his new church’s claims for Petrine succession and papal primacy. His main interest seems to be the need to establish unquestioned authority of the pope in the church. In the Introduction, he acknowledges that there is little direct support for papal claims in the early church and resorts to the argument from silence as the basis for his case. In referring to the early fathers, he says, “never is there a flat-out denial of the Petrine primacy or the primacy of Rome. This is a silence that speaks volumes!”1 There is no doubt that silence can, on occasion, be a valid argument, but it seems a very specious argument in this case since there were no early claims for Petrine succession and primacy of the Roman episcopacy–these develop over the first several centuries. So why should one expect a denial of what was not asserted? This argument seems analogous to examining sermons written several decades ago, before Roe vs. Wade, increased cohabitation of unmarried couples, and the gay and lesbian agenda and concluding that, since there were relatively few sermons written against these offenses to Scripture and the Christian faith, the church was in favor of them. One speaks out against those things which have become problems. When some of these papal claims began to be made, they did meet with some resistence or non-acceptance. If the Roman Catholic Church’s claims for papal primacy are correct, it would seem that there should be solid proof that such can be supported by Scripture and substantiated from the records of the early church. Indisputable evidence should exist for the various pillars on which claims of 1 Stephen K. Ray, Upon This Rock: St. Peter and the Primacy of Rome in Scripture and the Early Church (San Francisco: Ignatius Press [Modern Apologetics Library], 1999), 12 (emphasis original).
Dr. Quentin F. Wesselschmidt is Professor of Historical Theology and Chairman of the Concordia Journal Editorial Committee at Concordia Seminary in St. Louis, MO. 374
papal primacy are built, namely, the presence and apostolic ministry of Peter in Rome, Petrine succession of all subsequent bishops in Rome, monepiscopacy in the Roman church from the beginning, capable individuals with leadership ability and unquestioned doctrinal orthodoxy, and general acceptance of the primacy of the Roman bishop by the rest of the church both East and West. As we shall see, there is no absolute certitude on any of these points. In actuality, papal primacy developed over time in the tradition of the church and was then read back into the earlier period. While not critical to the issue at hand, it should be noted that the term “pope” is of later derivation and that Rome has no exclusive claim to the title. The term “pope” is derived from the Greek word BVBB"H (pappa), which is a diminutive form of B"JZD (father).2 The term was popularly used for any senior or leading member of a local Christian congregation. The term was not used of the bishop in Rome until the ninth century. Today it is still used of village priests in Greek Orthodox churches.3 Petrine Ministry and Succession in Rome All claims of papal primacy are built upon the premise that Peter had traveled to and had carried on an apostolic ministry in the church in Rome. However, not everyone agrees with that claim. For instance, Nicholas Cheetham, in Keepers of the Keys: A History of the Popes from St. Peter to John Paul II, acknowledges that there is no solid evidence of Peter ever having been in Rome and resorts to later tradition to support the Roman Catholic Church’s claims for Peter’s presence and activity in Rome: We have little or no idea of his [Peter’s] whereabouts and movements during the years preceding the Neronian persecution. Apart from the mysterious reference to Babylon (usually taken to mean Rome) at the end of the first Epistle of Peter there is no reference in any strictly contemporary writings to his presence in the capital. The lack of any concrete evidence of the later stage of his life and of his relationship with Paul at the time of the latter’s residence at Rome is very puzzling. Many scholars, from Marsilius of Padua (1326) onwards, have questioned whether he was in Rome at all; others, such as the Protestant Harnack and the unbeliever Renan, have seen no reason to deny his presence there. If it was just a legend, along with the story of his martyrdom, the origin and meaning of the papacy would of course be invalidated. What surely matters is the strength of the tradition, handed down from the early days of Christianity in Rome and fortified rather than 2
The diminutive form of a word is often used to express endearment. Nicolas Cheetham, Keepers of the Keys: A History of the Popes from St. Peter to John Paul II (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1983), 8. 3
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weakened by modern scholarship and archaeology, that both the Apostles lived and were martyred in the city. It is irrelevant that the tradition later became encrusted with legend. In its original and simple form it leaves no room for doubt that the leaders of the early Roman Christians were Peter and Paul and that they both lost their lives, the former by crucifixion and the latter, as befitted a Roman Citizen, by decapitation, in the reign of Nero. Thirty or forty years afterwards there were plenty of Christians alive who had seen and spoken with the Apostles. They did not bother, however, to record facts and dates for a posterity they did not believe would ever exit.4 It must be granted that there are some attestations to Peter having been in Rome and having founded the church there, but they are later assertions. Dionysius of Corinth claims that Peter was martyred in Rome, and Irenaeus says that Peter and Paul preached and founded the church in Rome.5 There is no list of Roman bishops in a Petrine succession until the end of the second century when Irenaeus lists the successors of Peter in his Against Heresies, no doubt with an interest in establishing a teaching authority in the church as a counter-balance to the Gnostics’ claim of a secret gnosis.6 About the same time, Hegesippus, considered by some to have been the father of church history, wrote his Memoirs, which have been lost except for some excerpts in Eusebius’ Church History. Whether or not Hegesippus compiled a list depends on the translation of the words, (g(`:g