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Spring Offensive Flipbook PDF
Spring Offensive
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Spring Offensive: Introduction and Preparations. The 1918 Spring Offensive, or Kaiserschlacht ("Kaiser's Battle"), also known as the Ludendorff Offensive, was a series of German attacks along the Western Front during the First World War, beginning on 21 March 1918. The Germans had realised that their only remaining chance of victory was to defeat the Allies before the United States could fully deploy its resources. The German Army had gained a temporary advantage in numbers as nearly 50 divisions (A division is a large military unit or formation, usually consisting of between 10,000 and 25,000 soldiers) had been freed by the Russian withdrawal from the war with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. There were four German offensives, codenamed Michael, Georgette, Gneisenau, and Blücher-Yorck. Michael was the main attack, which was intended to break through the Allied lines, outflank the British forces (which held the front from the Somme River to the English Channel) and defeat the British Army. Once that was achieved, it was hoped that the French would seek armistice terms. The other
offensives were subsidiary to Michael and were designed to divert Allied forces from the main offensive effort on the Somme. No clear objective was established before the start of the offensives and once the operations were underway, the targets of the attacks were constantly changed according to the battlefield situation. Once they began advancing, the Germans struggled to maintain the momentum, partly due to logistical issues. The fast-moving stormtrooper units could not carry enough food and ammunition to sustain themselves for long, and the army could not move in supplies and reinforcements fast enough to assist them. The Allies concentrated their main forces in the essential areas (the approaches to the Channel Ports and the rail junction of Amiens). Strategically worthless ground, which had been devastated by years of conflict, was left lightly defended. Within a few weeks, the danger of a German breakthrough had passed, though related fighting continued until July. The German Army made the deepest advances either side had made on the Western Front since
1914. They re-took much ground that they had lost in 1916-17 and took some ground that they had not yet controlled. Despite these apparent successes, they suffered heavy casualties in return for land that was of little strategic value and hard to defend. The offensive failed to deliver a blow that could save Germany from defeat, which has led some historians to describe it as a pyrrhic victory ( a victory that inflicts such a devastating toll on the victor that it is equal to defeat). In July 1918, the Allies regained their numerical advantage with the arrival of American troops. In August, they used this and improved tactics to launch a counteroffensive. The ensuing Hundred Days Offensive (The Hundred Days Offensive was a series of massive Allied offensives which ended the First World War. Beginning with the Battle of Amiens on the Western Front, the Allies pushed the Central Powers back, undoing their gains from the Spring Offensive) resulted in the Germans losing all of the ground that they had taken in the Spring Offensive, the collapse of the Hindenburg Line, and the surrender of Germany that November. German preparations
The German High Command—in particular General Erich Ludendorff, the Chief Quartermaster General—has been criticised by military historians for the failure to formulate sound and a clear strategy. Ludendorff privately admitted that Germany could no longer win a war of attrition, yet he was not ready to give up the German gains in the West and East. Although Ludendorff was unsure whether the Americans would enter the war in strength, he decided to launch an offensive. The German government and Hindenburg were not a party to the planning process. Eventually, it was decided to launch Operation Michael at the hinge between the French and British armies as it was a line of least resistance as the British and French armies were weak in the sector. The constant changing of operational targets once the offensive underway gave the impression the German command had no coherent strategic goal. Any capture of an important strategic objective, such as the Channel ports, or the vital railway junction of Amiens would have occurred more by chance than by design.
Tactical change The German army had concentrated many of its best troops into stormtrooper units, trained in infiltration tactics to enter and bypass enemy front line units, leaving these strong points to be "mopped-up" by follow-up troops. The stormtrooper tactic was to attack and disrupt enemy headquarters, artillery units and supply depots in the rear areas, as well as to occupy territory rapidly. Each major formation "creamed off" its best and fittest soldiers into storm units; several complete divisions were formed from these elite units. This process gave the German army an initial advantage in the attack, but meant that the best formations would suffer disproportionately heavy casualties, while the quality of the remaining formations declined as they were stripped of their best personnel to provide the storm troops. The Germans also failed to arm their forces with a mobile exploitation force, such as cavalry, to exploit gains quickly. This tactical error meant the infantry had to keep up an exhausting tempo of advance.