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The Story of an Operation Stuttgart 28th January 1945 Flipbook PDF
The Story of an Operation Stuttgart 28th January 1945
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WORLD WAR II ROYAL AIRFORCE BOMBER COMMAND ATTACK ON STUTTGART 28TH JANUARY 1945
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BACKGROUND 1. ROYAL AIR FORCE 1.1. PRE WAR ORGANISATION 1.2. EXPANSION DURING THE WAR 1.3. BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AIR TRAINING PLAN 1.4. OTHER TRAINING SCHEMES 1.5. RAF TRAINING PROGRAMME 1.6. OFFICERS VERSUS NON COMMISSIONED OFFICERS 1.7. DEVELOPMENT OF BOMBER COMMAND OPERATIONAL ABILITY 1.8. BOMBING STRATEGY 1.9. LACK OF MORAL FIBRE 2. LUFTWAFFE 2.1. ORGANISATION 2.2. NACHTGAGDERSCHWADER AIRCRAFT 2.3. LUFWAFFE AIRCREW 2.4. TRAINING 2.5. NACHTJAGD (NIGHTFIGHTER) AIRCREW 2.6. METHODOLOGY FOR CLAIMING AERIAL VICTORY 2.7. LUFTWAFFE GRID REFERNCE SYSTEM 3. STUTTGART 3.1.
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1. ROYAL AIR FORCE 1.1. PRE WAR ORGANISATION In 1936, the RAF had been organised into separate Commands by role, a structure which remained throughout the war. These were Bomber, Fighter, Control and Training Commands. Additional wartime Commands were Army Co-operation, to develop air operations in support of ground forces, Balloon, Maintenance and Transport. Each Command was made up of a number of groups, which was itself divided into squadrons. From 1936 onward the aircraft industry received powerful financial aid from the government to enable additional factories to be built to increase production, while many automobile firms turned their works over to the construction of complete aircraft or their components. To provide the crews for the additional aircraft, the RAF Volunteer Reserve and the Civil Air Guard were formed to give training at civilian schools and flying clubs. University air squadrons, the first of which had been formed soon after World War I to teach undergraduates to fly and to encourage them to join the RAF as regular officers, greatly expanded their activities. However, at the start of the war the RAF possessed only 87 squadrons, regular and auxiliary, at home and overseas. 1.2. EXPANSION DURING THE WAR During WW2 the RAF reached a total strength of 1,208,843 men and women. Of these, 185,595 were aircrew. The RAF also had the services of 130,000 pilots from the British Commonwealth and 30,000 aircrew from European allies. During the war the RAF used 333 flying training schools. In all, between 1940 and 1945 the scheme trained out aircrew from Britain (88,022), Canada (137,739), Australia (27,387), South Africa (24,814), Southern Rhodesia (10,033) and New Zealand (5,609). From 1935 to 1945 the number of RAF airfields increased as follows. Year 1935 1940 1945
No. of Airfields 60 280 720
1.3. BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AIR TRAINING PLAN (BCATP) At the start of the WW2, the British Government looked to the Dominions for air training help as the United Kingdom was considered an unsuitable location for air training, due to the possibility of enemy attack, the strain caused by wartime traffic at airfields and the unpredictable weather, so the plan called for the facilities in the Dominions to train British and each other's aircrews. Canada offered particular advantages: its proximity to Britain allowed for easier transportation of men and equipment; Canada had a larger capacity to manufacture aircraft; and Canadian industries had easy access to the U.S. market for aircraft parts. Negotiations regarding joint training, between the th four governments concerned, took place in Ottawa during the first few months of the war. On 17 December 1939, they signed the Air Training Agreement, (originally known as the Empire Air Training Scheme, EATS). The British Commonwealth Air Training Plan was viewed as an incredibly ambitious programme. The 1939 agreement stated that the training was to be similar to that of the RAF. The plan involved a massive construction programme and at its peak at the end of 1943 there were 73 BCATP and 24 RAF flying schools in operation, supplemented by 184 ancillary units The agreement called for the training around 50,000 aircrew each year, for as long as necessary: This included 22,000 aircrew from Great Britain, 13,000 from Canada, 11,000 from Australia and 3,300 from New Zealand. Under the agreement, air crews received elementary training in various Commonwealth countries before travelling to Canada for advanced courses. Training costs were to be divided between the four governments. Under the BCATP 131,533 aircrew were trained at total cost of (in 2020 prices) of approximately £19.25 billion. 1.4. OTHER TRAINING SCHEMES Although the Canadian enterprise was far and away the largest, the British developed other joint overseas training facilities, notably under bilateral arrangements with Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. The concept of the Rhodesian Air Training Group (RATG) was broadly similar to that of the Canadian undertaking. (Over 7,600 pilots and 2,300 navigators were trained by the RATG during the war). Although South Africa (SA) had declared war on Germany in September 1939, they were not prepared to participate actively until they were directly threatened. However, they recognised they Page 5 of 51
needed to build up their own armed forces and were happy to assist with the training of British st personnel. The so-called ‘Van-Brookham’ Agreement was signed on 1 June 1940. This involved RAF training units, transferring lock stock and barrel to SA and operating independently of SAAF schools. These arrangements were formally endorsed with the Joint Air Training Scheme (JATS). During its five-year existence, the JATS turned out a total of 33,347 aircrew including 12,221 SAAF personnel. From June 1941 (six months before the United States entered the war) British aircrew were also trained at civilian operated schools in the United States. The two schemes were known as the Arnold Scheme (which used US airfields and instructors) and British Flying Training Schools (American airfields staffed with civilian instructors, but supervised by British flight officers). 1.5. RAF TRAINING PROGRAMME https://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/research/online-exhibitions/taking-flight/historical-periods/second-world-war-flyingtraining.aspx
In September 1939 trained pilots were urgently needed if the Royal Air Force was to meet its operational commitments. The struggle and success in achieving the required number of pilots was one of the overlooked 'battles' of the war. Time was of the essence, initial revisions to the training programme focused on shortening courses and increasing the capacity for pupils at the flying training schools. This did not work, however, and difficulties arose with the limited amount of equipment available and a shortage of flying instructors. It quickly became apparent through operational experience that the standard of pilot training also had to be improved. It was clear that quality had been sacrificed for quantity, and from 1941 onwards, the training syllabus was reviewed. Changes in operational procedure required additional training and the development of more modern aircraft required a higher standard of flying technique and piloting skills. Further information required on length of training for various aircrew and development during the war. 1.6. OFFICERS VERSUS NON COMMISSIONED OFFICERS At the start of the war the RAF ‘guidelines’ on commissions was up to 50% of pilots and observers, with the proportion of gunners being fixed at 20%. At the Ottawa Air Training Conference (an Allied gathering to renew the BCATP and discuss joint air training problems), in May1942 the Dominions wanted more input on the subject. New Zealand advocated an ultra-conservative approach withholding all commissions until an individual had demonstrated his ability in service. In contrast the Canadians wanted all pilots and observers commissioned, plus 25% of WOp/AGs on graduation and 25% in the field. The compromise was the principles would still be observed with each country deciding on their own numbers. Needless to say British still intended to keep to the quotas; although in the end the system most closely matched the Australian view of commissioning anyone who was considered to deserve it. 1.7. DEVELOPMENT OF BOMBER COMMAND OPERATIONAL ABILITY iwm.org.uk/history/raf-bomber-command-during-the-second-world-war
1939
RAF Bomber Command had 23 operational bomber squadrons, with 280 aircraft. This modest force gave Britain the means to immediately strike back at Nazi Germany, but only against strictly military targets at first. Early raids against warships and airfields were conducted in daylight, but bomber aircraft were easy targets for enemy fighters and losses were heavy. The bombers also flew over Germany at night, but dropped only propaganda leaflets.
1940
After Hitler's invasion of France, the RAF began a night-time bombing campaign against German industry, especially synthetic oil production. But plans to hit specific factories proved impractical as crews invariably failed to identify individual factories and refineries in the darkness. Their bombs were scattered far and wide. Bomber Command lacked the strength at this stage to do any serious damage.
1941
Bomber Command grew in strength, but navigation over blacked-out Europe was still a major problem. Setbacks in the Battle of the Atlantic meant a major effort was needed against German warships and U-boats. German night-fighters and anti-aircraft guns were becoming more effective. Heavy losses caused a slump in morale.
1942
Bomber Command received a new aircraft – the Avro Lancaster – and a new leader – Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris. Accepting that precision bombing was proving impossible, the War Cabinet sanctioned 'area bombing', the targeting of whole cities to destroy both factories and their workers. It was judged necessary to defeat an enemy that seemed on the brink of victory. Harris believed it could win the war and gained much public support when he sent 1,000 bombers against Cologne. Page 6 of 51
1943
New tactics and technology enabled crews to find and hit their targets with increasing precision. An elite Pathfinder Force guided the bombers using coloured marker flares. Major attacks were launched against Germany's industrial heart in the Ruhr valley. Hamburg was devastated by a firestorm. But attempts to knock out Berlin failed. By now the United States Eighth Air Force had joined the RAF in a 'round the clock' offensive.
1944
The combined Allied bomber force began to overwhelm the Germans. American escort fighters shot the Luftwaffe out of the sky. A successful offensive was launched against Germany's vulnerable fuel supplies. Bombers also flew in support of D-Day, softening up coastal defences and hitting railways to block German reinforcements. Enemy troops were carpet bombed in advance of major Allied ground offensives. Harris continued his city attacks, still convinced they would prove decisive.
1945
The bomber offensive reached the peak of its destruction. The RAF alone now had 108 squadrons with over 1,500 aircraft. Raids against oil and communications proved the most effective. Starved of fuel, the German military machine ground to a halt. Industrial cities were pounded to rubble. A record 4,851 tons of bombs were dropped on Dortmund in a single night. Enemy production was massively disrupted, and in some places ceased. Controversially, locations so far untouched were razed to the ground as they rose to the top of the target list. Dresden, Pforzheim and others were consumed by fire
However, RAF Bomber Command, despite its major contribution to the Allied victory and the death of over 55,000 aircrew remains mired in controversy to the present day. 1.8. BOMBING STRATEGY Include more with regard to Bomber Command ‘forced’ change of tactics to support Operation Overload’ and the response when released form this commitment, i.e. industry versus Harris’s belief in the destruction of German industrial cities (to destroy the morale of their citizens). In January 1943 a Conference was held in Casablanca, French Morocco to plan the Allied European strategy for the next phase of World War II. Attended by US President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill it announced to the world that the Allies would accept nothing less than the ‘unconditional surrender’ of the Axis (Germany, Japan etc.) powers. It was agreed to conduct a ‘Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom’ and the British Air Ministry issued the Casablanca directive on 4 February with the object of ‘The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic systems and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened. Every opportunity to be taken to attack Germany by day to destroy objectives that are unsuitable for night attack, to sustain continuous pressure on German morale, to impose heavy losses on German day fighter force and to conserve German fighter force away from the Russian and Mediterranean theatres of war.’ In June 1943, the Pointblank directive was issued which modified the Casablanca directive. Along with the single-engine fighters of the original plan, the highest priority Pointblank targets were the fighter aircraft factories since the Western Allied invasion of France could not take place without fighter superiority. Bombing attacks would be too costly, and D-Day itself would fail, unless Allied air superiority was achieved. Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris was the man in charge of RAF Bomber Command and he had his own view on what his bombers should be doing, namely ‘area attacks’ on German industrial cities. This had been his mantra since taking command in February 1942. Harris only paid lip-service to the Directive, choosing to concentrate on city attacks as before, and ‘Pointblank’ became in effect an American Project. In Harris’s opinion only the systematic degrading of Germany’s entire industrial fabric could achieve decisive results, and assist the invasion, any cessation of attacks would allow German output to recover. Moreover, he believed that his force, trained to operate at night and unable to hit pinpoint targets, would be of little use against tactical targets, and might cause catastrophic casualties among French civilians. During the winter of 1943/44 Harris pressed ahead with his night area attacks concentrating on Berlin. Harris had promised to win the war by wrecking the capital ‘from end to end’. But the results were poor and losses high. Some of the RAF attacks in this period, to cities in the south of Germany associated with aircraft manufacture such as Leipzig and Augsburg, did indeed fit within the framework of the ‘Pointblank’ directive. But whether aircraft, ball bearings or oil, Harris saw no point concentrating on such ‘panacea’ targets, as he described them.
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At the beginning of 1944, with preparations for the invasion of Europe (operation ‘Overlord’) well underway, Allied planners sought to identify suitable objectives for the heavy bomber force. These included the German air force (Luftwaffe) in the west, particularly its fighter aircraft, the rail transport network along which German reinforcements would have to pass, and the German’s defences on the shores of ‘Fortress Europe’. It was surmised that later on, with the troops ashore, the bombers could be called upon by army commanders for use against battlefield objectives. Harris was hostile to having Bomber Command diverted to invasion support but Overlord was too important to let such dissent persist. On 14 April 1944 both RAF Bomber Command and the US Strategic Air Forces in Europe were formally placed under the direction of General Dwight D Eisenhower and Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). The man effectively in charge was Eisenhower’s deputy, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder. On 17 April 1944 the Allied Supreme Headquarters issued a directive which stated the primary mission of the heavy bombers prior to Overlord, namely the destruction of the Luftwaffe’s air combat strength and the disruption of rail communications (Transportation Plan) to isolate the designated invasion area in Normandy. However, Harris was still free to continue attacks on German targets when commitments and the weather permitted. The ‘Transportation Plan’ involved attacks of the rail infrastructure and RAF losses were light and the accuracy of the attacks was good. However, Winston Churchill was worried about loss of life, and insisted that locations where more than 150 French or Belgian casualties might be expected from a single raid were excluded. Sadly, the civilian casualty rate in some cases far exceeded the prescribed limit of 100-150 each. In an address to Parliament on 2nd August 1944 Winston Churchill spoke about the RAF losses. ‘These deeds of the Air Force were not done without losses, which, in killed and in proportion to the number of flying personnel, far exceed those of any other branch of the Services. If we take 1st April as the opening of the air campaign from then till 30th June, over 7,000 men of the Home Command of the RAF alone have been killed or are missing’. Although the railway system was the priority in April and May 1944, there were also attacks on airfields and aircraft factories in France. Again, the accuracy of RAF night attacks was impressive. By June with Allied troops ashore in Normandy and the build-up continuing, the bombers were frequently called upon to assist the ground forces. Targets included enemy troop positions, supply depots and lines of communications. Allied air superiority meant that many of these operations could now take place in daylight. Bomber Command was formally released from its control by Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force in mid-September 1944 and Bomber Command reverted to Air Ministry control, although all future operations were still intended to fit into overall Allied planning and Bomber Command was ordered to remain ready to answer any calls for direct assistance to the ground forces, but this required only a small proportion of its huge strength. How to employ the great potential remaining was the subject of much thought as two different target systems were being considered: Synthetic-oil production
A successful all-out attack on oil would produce obvious benefits; the Germans would be robbed of the ability to wage any form of mobile war on land and the Luftwaffe would be grounded
German transport system
Attacks on communications were supported by the senior Allied commanders fighting in Europe; their success in Normandy and the recent advance to Germany owed much to the successful interdiction campaign by the British and American heavy bombers
A smaller number of people favoured the continued general bombing of German industrial cities. This was believed to be the best way to end the war by many of what might be termed ‘the senior strategists’, the men who held the highest positions in the direction of the Allied war effort. A directive issued on 25 September 1944 showed that the oil school of thought had won. A clear first priority was ‘the petroleum industry, with special emphasis on petrol (gasoline) including storage’. Joint second priorities were the German rail and waterway transport system, tank production and motor-vehicle production. German cities were mentioned much later in the directive for general attack ‘when weather and tactical conditions are unsuitable for operations against specific primary objectives’. These instructions were reinforced on 1 November 1944 in a second directive. Harris made it quite clear that he believed that, because of weather and tactical limitations, Bomber Command would be Page 8 of 51
best employed in continuing to wear down the industrial production of large cities and the spirit of their inhabitants. He still believed that Germany could collapse from within and the Allied armies could be spared the final task of storming the German frontier defences. His interpretations of the directives allowed him to lean generously towards area attacks on German cities, although many of those cities were associated with the oil industry. Bomber Command’s strength was now increasing steadily, numbers of front-line aircraft rose by 50% in 1944, with a particular rush of new Lancaster squadrons being formed in the autumn. Expansion took place in every group. 1 and 5 Groups, equipped with Lancasters, were each able to drop as many bombs as had the whole of Bomber Command two years earlier. The scene was now set for Bomber Command’s operational climax. The German night-fighter force was declining, bomber casualties were falling, bombing accuracy was improving and daylight raids on Germany were resumed before the month of November was out. Several German cities which had so far defied all of Bomber Command’s efforts were now destroyed. Much of the German war industry disappeared underground or to distant locations. Bomber Command then began to run out of large cities to attack and started to strike at smaller, less industrial communities, places like Darmstadt, Bremerhaven, Bonn, Freiburg, Heilbronn, Ulm; many more narrow streets of medieval houses and other cultural landmarks disappeared as well as a vast quantity of ordinary housing. And all the time Harris was sending smaller forces to attack the synthetic-oil refineries and the transportation targets. Approximately 46% of the total tonnage of bombs dropped by Bomber Command in five and a half years of war would be dropped in the remaining nine months from September 1944 to May 1945. 1.9. LACK OF MORAL FIBRE en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lack_of_Moral_Fibre
By early 1940, RAF commanders were concerned that medical officers were removing too many men from flying duty. Detailed guidance was given in the Memorandum on the Disposal of Members of Air Crews Who Forfeit the Confidence of Their Commanding Officers issued in September 1940. This was revised in September 1941, February 1943 and March 1945. Under this procedure, aircrew refusing to fly operations were to be classified as (i) medically fit, (ii) medically unfit on nervous grounds (introduced in 1941) or (iii) medically unfit for other reasons. Aircrew would not be placed in the first two categories if they had been subject to ‘exceptional flying stress’ and to be assigned to category (i), they ‘had to be proved to be lacking in moral fibre’. From February 1943, aircrew on their second tour (30 operations in Bomber Command) could not be classified LMF, though commanders were urged not to publicize this provision. Cases referred were 746 officers and 3,313 non-commissioned officers, of these, 2,726 cases (including 2,337 NCOs) were classified as LMF. A man classified in categories (i) or (ii) would lose his flying badge, ‘to prevent his getting a lucrative job as a pilot in civil life’. The service records of those classified LMF were stamped with large red ‘W’ (for ‘waverer’). Officers would lose their commissions and be refused ground jobs in the RAF, while NCOs would be reduced to aircraftman second class and assigned menial tasks, such as latrine duty, for at least three months. From 1944, men released as LMF could be called for the coal mines or drafted into the army.
2. LUFTWAFFE 2.1. ORGANISATION Geschwader In the Luftwaffe the largest operational unit was the Geschwader. A Geschwader was the equivalent of a RAF Group. Each Geschwader itself would be named according to its purpose; Nachtjagdgeschwader (NJG) was the Nightfighter unit, which typically flew radar equipped heavy fighters such as the Messerschmitt Bf.110 or Ju.88 against Allied bombers. Each Geschwader was assigned an Arabic number, for example Nachtjagdgeschwader 6 (NJG 6). Gruppen Each Geschwader typically contained three Gruppen. Gruppen were independent units that could end up in different theatres of war, but were usually seen fighting together in a similar geographic area. A Gruppe usually occupied one airfield; Gruppen from the same Geschwader typically occupied adjacent airfields. Each Gruppe would have a Stabschwarm (staff swarm) of three aircraft (Stab) and three Staffeln, but later in the war a fourth Staffel was added to fighter units. The Gruppen received Roman numerals as designators – I, II and III, for example, the second Gruppe of
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Nachtjagdgeschwader 6 would be designated II./NJG 6, (the Stabschwarm would be designated Stab II./NJG 6). Staffeln Staffeln was equivalent to an RAF Squadron. A Staffel usually had nine to 12 aircraft; others had as few as five or six aircraft due to losses (in the later years of the war 12 was rarely reached). At full complement each Gruppe had 30–40 aircraft including the Gruppenstab (Group Staff). The Staffeln received consecutive Arabic numbers in the following pattern: Gruppe consisted of Staffel 1, 2, and 3, e.g. 1./NJG 6 etc. Gruppe consisted of Staffel 4, 5, and 6, e.g. 4./NJG 6 etc. Gruppe consisted of Staffel 7, 8, and 9, e.g. 7./NJG 6 etc. A Staffel was divided into three Schwärme (swarms), consisting of four to six aircraft. A fighter Schwarm of four aircraft consisted of two Rotten (packs). As such a fighter Schwarm was equivalent to a section in the RAF. The term Rotte was also used for a formation of two aircraft, consisting of a leader and a wingman. Unit Identification Markings Luftwaffe front line aircraft, other than those belonging to single-engined day fighter or ground attack units, had a code of three letters and one number. For example, Gunther Bahr’s Messerschmitt Bf.110 with the markings 2Z+IH belonged to Nachtjagdgeschwader 6 (2Z, after 08/1943) and served in the first Staffel (H). The ‘I’ was the identification letter of the individual aircraft within the Staffel. (Staffel designation 1./NJG 6). 2.2. NACHTJAGDGESCHWADER AIRCRAFT Messerschmitt Bf.110
The Messerschmitt Bf.110 was a twin-engine Zerstörer (Destroyer, heavy fighter) and fighterbomber (Jagdbomber or Jabo) and was backbone of the Nachtjagdgeschwader throughout the war. At first the three main crew members had no special equipment for night operations and relied on their eyes alone to find enemy aircraft in the dark. Ground-controlled interception began from mid1941 and the 110 began to take its toll on RAF bombers and was soon an aircraft to be feared. The aircraft was improved significantly in this role with the introduction in 1942 of FuG 202 Lichtenstein radar systems and antenna and then Schräge Musik from 1943 (two oblique angle upward firing 20mm cannons that were mounted to fire through holes in the canopy). The Bf 110G-4 was the best equipped version with the FuG 202/220 Lichtenstein radar, Schräge Musik and it had a crew of three (pilot, radio/radar operator and gunner). Junkers Ju.88
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The Junkers Ju.88 was a twin-engined multirole combat aircraft which it became one of the Luftwaffe's most important aircraft. It served as a bomber, dive bomber, night fighter, torpedo bomber, reconnaissance aircraft, a heavy fighter and at the end of the war, as a flying bomb. The G-series fuselage was purpose-built for the special needs of a night fighter, the G-6 versions were equipped with enlarged fuel tanks and often one or two 20 mm MG 151/20 cannons in a Schräge Musik (‘Jazz Music’, i.e. slanted) installation. These guns were pointed obliquely upwards and forwards from the upper fuselage – usually at an angle of 70° 2.3. LUFTWAFFE AIRCREW Aircrew Roles and Rank Abrev. FF B BF BM BS
Role (German) Flugzeugführer Beobachter Bordfunker Bordmechaniker Bordschütze
Role (English) Pilot Observer Wireless Operator Flight Engineer Air Gunner
Abrev. Obw Fw Uffz
Rank (German) Oberfeldwebel Feldwebel Unteroffizer
Rank (English) Flight Sergeant Sergeant Corporal
Luftwaffe Pilots The only two Luftwaffe pilots identified as operational on the 28th/29th January 1945 are Gunther Bahr and Heinrich Schmidt, below are short biographies of their war service BAHR, Günther (DOB: 18.07.21 in Neu-Leegden (or Neu Legden)/Ostpreussen), 15.04.44 Fw. 3./NJG 6 awarded the Ehrenpokal. 01.05.44 transferred to 1./NJG 6 (to 03.04.45). 15.05.44 Fw. awarded the Ehrenpokal. 26.08.44 Fw. 1./NJG 6. 12.09.44 Fw. 1./NJG 6. 01.10.44 Fw. awarded the DKG. 28.03.45 Ofw. Awarded the Ritterkreuz. 01.04.45 promoted to Lt. (Kr.O.). 03.04.45 transferred to 7./NJG 6 (to 01.05.45). 01.05.45 apparently captured. Credited with thirty seven air victories, all but one of these at night. 15.02.62 joined the Bundeswehr. 30.09.75 retired as a Major Schmidt, Heinrich One known victory, a Lancaster WNW of Homberg on 21 July, 1944. A B-24 at Mitterkirchen on 20 August, 1944. A Lancaster of RAF No. 467 Sq., Werk # LM 226 "PO-H", piloted by Flt Lt D.D.Brown, at Darmstadt and another E of Mannheim on 12 September, 1944. A Lancaster bomber of RAF No. 625 Sq. on 14 January, 1945 over the Eifel. His 12th, 13th & 14th victories were scored on either 14 or 15 March, 1945. His R/O in September, 1944, Uffz Kainzmeier. Jager Blatt article. 2.4. TRAINING Although the German Luftwaffe started the war with a cadre of well-trained, even experienced pilots, training was to become one their greatest failings. Up until late 1941 a prospective pilot would spend six months at a recruit training depot for basic training. They would then move to a Fluganwärterkompanie for up to two months before going to an A/B Schule (elementary flying school). If successful the pilot would receive between 100 and 150 hours flying time, their A2 and B2 licences and their Luftwaffenflugzeugfuehrerschein (pilot’s licence) and Flugzeugfuehrerabzeichen (pilot’s wings). They were then sent to their respective specialist training schools, e.g. prospective single seater fighter and dive bomber pilots, twin-engined fighter, bomber and reconnaissance pilots. On completion of training crews went to Ergaenzungseinheiten (operational training units) attached to the various operational Geschwader or Gruppen (groups), to learn the tactical methods peculiar to the operational units they were later to join and to wait until they were required by the front-line units. By the time a fighter or dive-bomber pilot was posted to an operational unit they had received about 13 months training with 150 to 200 flying hours and a bomber or reconnaissance pilot had received 20 months and 220 to 270 hours. By 1942 the Luftwaffe training organisation began to crack under the strain exerted upon it. Up until mid-1941 the comparatively low casualty rates were made good by drawing upon the reserves already available within the service and new trainees. However, significant losses incurred following
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the start of the Russian campaign (June 1941) made it almost impossible for the training organisation to meet the demand. By late 1943 the Luftwaffe had lost most of its original complement of pilots. In the first six months of 1943, Germany lost 1,100 fighter pilots, which was about 60% of the number at the start of the year. It lost another 15 percent in each of July and August. These high pilot losses had disastrous effects. Even if they had been well trained, newer pilots were inexperienced and inevitably sustained more accidents and combat casualties than the pilots they replaced. In February 1944 alone over one thousand Luftwaffe aircraft were lost in accidents, a good proportion of which were ‘considered due to inadequate training. Pilots were now so poorly trained they struggled to cope with engine failures, rough field take-offs or landings, bad weather or heavy cloud cover. Luftwaffe day fighter units suffered debilitating losses at the hands of the better-trained American escort fighter pilots. By early 1944, the Luftwaffe fighter pilot training had been shortened to an average of 160 flight hours. A few weeks later, it was further shortened to only 112 hours. This combined with the conversion of ex-bomber pilots following 20 hours of flying training in fighters resulted in a stream of pilots little able to stand up to the enemy. B flight schools were disbanded, and the pilots were sent into first-line service directly after A schools. The condition for the A2 flight certificate included a basic training of sixty training flights with a total of 15 flight hours. Meanwhile, the average USAAF or RAF fighter pilot's training consisted of 225 flight hours. Inexperience led to continued high attrition of German aircraft and pilots through 1944. Although the training organisation was in disarray, the aircraft industry continued to produce fighter aircraft throughout 1944, by December the Luftwaffe fighter strength was 2,260 operational aircraft, the strongest point of 1944. Additionally, the Luftwaffe had 1,256 night-fighters, 892 dive bombers/ground attack aircraft, and 528 bombers. The German aircraft industry operated above all expectations in 1944 but failed to change the tide of the war. So whilst Germany became healthy with aircraft, they faced severe pilot shortages with under 4,000 pilots trained in 1944. The Luftwaffe flying training organisation received its final death blow with the systematic wrecking of the German synthetic fuel industry by Allied strategic bombers. Aviation fuel production fell so far beneath Luftwaffe requirements so that operations had to be curtailed, resulting in little or no fuel available for training units. So while there were plenty of aircraft there was almost no fuel for training so the Luftwaffe kept sending pilots up to be slaughtered. In the last year of the war the average life expectancy of some Luftwaffe pilots was just 11 hours of flying, barely four sorties, including check and ferry flights. forum.il2sturmovik.com/topic/20584-pilot-training-of-luftwaffe-interested-facts A Chronicle of a Fighter Geschwader in the Battle for Germany, Vols. 1 and 2: September 1944-May 1945. Jean-Yves Lorant ww2-weapons.com/pilot-training-mid-and-late-war/
2.5. NACHTJAGD (NIGHTFIGHTER) OPERATIONS The pinnacle of the Nachtjagd’s successes against Bomber Command came in late March 1944, by August 1944 a rapid collapse had commenced, this was the result of several effects. The loss of advanced early warning systems and operational airfields in Western France and other occupied countries had severely restricted the Nachtjagd’s ability to get in the air early to attack the bomber streams. The shortage of petrol was not only affecting operational unit but also training units. The losses of experienced crews (not only in air battles but as a result of ground attacks on airfields) meant that majority of crews were now young, inexperienced and poorly trained. This resulted in a severe death toll amongst new recruits. To add to these problems was the increasing ability of No. 100 Group to interfere with and jam the Luftwaffe’s extremely complicated communications system. There had been a long battle between No. 100 Group and the Nachtjagd meaning that the task of Nachtjagd radio/radar operators was becoming more and more difficult. This was not helped by then fact that methods of communication between ground controls and fighters were still being developed following the loss of the early warning systems in France. Nightfighter crews had a wide choice of aids including several systems airborne radar and two forms of IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) equipment. They also had a vast range of sources (broadcast on several frequencies) where they might find information that would help them locate and enter a bomber stream. However, RAF jamming was so effective that that nightfighters often had to rely on visual sightings to help them find the bombers. Other visual aids that could be used included Flak fired in set patterns, specific searchlight combinations, searchlight corridors and Beleuchtergruppen (usually Ju.88s flying high above the bomber streams and cities being attacked dropping flares). However, No. 100 Group was becoming more and more knowledgeable about the Nachtjagd techniques, particularly radio and radar systems, so that by late August 1944 the Nachtjagd Page 12 of 51
communications were virtually swamped. Nightfighter successes were now more a result of chance than by organised control, consequently night time Bomber Command losses fell steadily. During January 1945 the main focus of Bomber Command’s was night attacks, although small daylight raids of 150 bombers continued to attack Ruhr targets. During the month approximately 7,300 bombers set out on operations with 134 failing to return. Official Luftwaffe claims for the month were 134, a small improvement on the lean months of September to December 1944. The reason for this improvement was that in late 1944 most bombing attacks had been to short range targets in France or just over the German border, which meant, with the loss of early warning radar stations in France, the nightfighters had little opportunity to attack the bomber stream before they had completed their mission. In January, with the change in Bomber Command strategy, the bomber streams were now mainly attacking targets in Germany which meant it was easier for the nightfighters to locate and penetrate the streams. The operations with the highest losses were deep penetrations, e.g. Hanover, Munich, Leuna, Magdeburg and Zeitz. However the nightfighters paid fro their successes loosing forty seven aircraft. The Other Battle Luftwaffe Night Aces versus Bomber Command. Peter Hinchliffe
2.6. METHODOLOGY FOR CLAIMING AERIAL VICTORIES The Luftwaffe's aerial victory confirmation procedure was based on directive 55270/41 named ‘Confirmation of aerial victories, destructions and sinking of ships’. The directive was first issued in 1939 and was updated several times during World War 2 In theory this approval process for the confirmation of aerial victories was very stringent and required a witness. The final destruction or explosion of an enemy aircraft in the air, or bail-out of the pilot, had to be observed either on guncamera film or by at least one other human witness. The witness could be the German pilot's wingman, another in the squadron, or an observer on the ground. In the 1990s, the release of German archives showed that while in theory the Luftwaffe did not accept a kill without a witness, which was considered only a probable, in practice some units habitually submitted unwitnessed claims and these sometimes made it through the verification process, particularly if they were made by pilots with already established records. In theory the Luftwaffe did not accept shared claims, but it happened. In theory each separate claim should have referred to a particular aircraft, but in practice some victories were awarded to other pilots who had claimed the destruction of the same aircraft. In 1943 the daily OKW communiques of this period habitually overstated American bomber losses by a factor up to two. Defenders of German fighter pilots have always maintained that these were reduced during the confirmation process. But the microfilms prove this not to be the case. Some 80 to 90 percent of the claims submitted were confirmed or found to be "in order" for confirmation up to the time the system broke down altogether in 1945. th
th
On the night of 28 /29 January 1945 the Luftwaffe claimed ten aircraft shot down. Actual RAF losses that night were eleven, nine aircraft missing over Germany, one aircraft missing over France and one aircraft crashed on take-off in Yorkshire. Although the claims against then actual, losses appear to fit it is worthwhile noting that some anti-aircraft units may also have made claims on that evening. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confirmation_and_overclaiming_of_aerial_victories_during_World_War_II
2.7. LUFTWAFFE GRID REFERENCE SYSTEM The name for the Luftwaffe map reference system was ’Gradnetz’ or ’Gradnetzmeldeverfahren’. The system was introduced before WW2, and was in use without major modifications until end of April 1943. The escalation in the number of allied bomber attacks against targets in Germany and German occupied territory made it necessary to modify the system. The result was the introduction of the ’Jagdtrapez’ by the head of the Luftwaffe Intelligence Forces, General der Ln-Truppe Martini. The idea behind the ’Gradnetzmeldeverfahren’ was to develop a system where bases and navigation points could be given a position both in maps prepared by the armed forces but also other available maps. It was based on the Greenwich system, which describe a given position by longitude and latitude, measured in degrees. This meant that the system could be used on all maps, which were made utilizing the widespread Greenwich geographic coordinate system, regardless of scale or projection used when preparing the map. The numbers used to give the position of a certain location using the ’Gradnetzmeldeverfahren’ can be viewed as a short form of the position in full, without a real translation or encoding. The basic division had its base at the 0°-meridian (Greenwich), and had division lines at every 10° longitude. The areas between every tenth degree longitude were limited to the north and south by the 89°, 79°, 69°, 59° etc. degrees latitude. These areas, which were limited by sides measuring ten degrees longitude and latitude were called ’Zusatzzahlgebiete’. Page 13 of 51
In the Jagdtrapez system the northern or southern half of a Zusatzzahlgebiet were called Jagdtrapeze (divisions of 10° longitude and 5° latitude). For example the Netherlands and north western Germany were in Jagdtrapez 05 Ost Süd, normally abbreviated 05 OS. (See map below). The Jagdtrapeze were then subdivided into rectangles called Mitteltrapeze (approximately 35km by 28km), along latitudinal parallels at 0°, 15°, 30°, and 45° and the longitudinal meridians at 0° and 30°these were designated by two letters, increasing regularly in rows from west to east and north to south: AA, AB to AU; BA, BB, to BU; etc. (See map on page 2).
Map showing Mitteltrapeze covering northern Europe ©Les Butler. No web or commercial use without permission
The Mitteltrapeze were then subdivided into nine rectangles called Kleintrapeze (each approximately 9km by 11km), along the latitudinal parallels 5° and the longitudinal meridians 10° apart. The numbering of the Kleintrapeze ran from 1 through 9, with 1 in the upper left corner and 9 in the bottom right corner of the Mitteltrapez Example: Koeln-Butzweilerhof airfield was located at 05 Ost S NO-3; that is, in the north eastern corner of Mitteltrapez NO.
Looking at the map of Stuttgart below the full reference for Stuttgart will be Jagdtrapez 04 Ost Nord; Mitteltrapez AT; Kleintrapez 8. This would be abbreviated to 04ON AT-9. (Note: On the map the broad lines to the north and east of Stuttgart are the borders between O4 ON and 05 OS in the north and 04 ON and 14 ON in the east.
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Map: don-caldwell.we.bs/jg26/gradnertz_3x2.gif Explanation: stormbirds.com/eagles/research/gradnetz/gradnetz.html
3. STUTTGART 3.1.
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OPERATION TO STUTTGART 1. MAP OF BOMBER COMMAND LOSSES ZUFFENHAUSEN, STUTTGART 1.1. DESCRIPTION 1.2. LOSS OF LANCASTER PB638 (P4-E) 1.3. LEGEND 1.4. MAP OF THE RAF BOMBER LOSSES DURING THE OPERATION AGAINST ZUFFENHAUSEN, TH TH STUTTGART ON 28 /29 JANUARY 1945 2. TIMELINE OF BOMBING ATTACK 2.1. DESCRIPTION 3. UNTIMED EVENTS 3.1. DESCRIPTION 4. BOMBER COMMAND LOSSES/COMBATS KORNWESTHEIM, STUTTGART 4.1. DESCRIPTION 4.2. LOSSES 4.3. COMBATS 5. BOMBER COMMAND LOSSES ZUFFENHAUSEN, STUTTGART 5.1. DESCRIPTION 5.2. LOSSES UNITED KINGDOM 5.3. LOSSES OVER GERMANY 6. BOMBER COMMAND COMBATS ZUFFENHAUSEN, STUTTGART 6.1. COMBATS 7. RAF ORDER OF BATTLE ZUFFENHAUSEN, STUTTGART 7.1. DESCRIPTION 7.2. 1 BOMBER GROUP 7.3. 4 BOMBER GROUP 7.4. 6 BOMBER GROUP 7.5. 8 BOMBER (PATHFINDER FORCE) GROUP 7.6. 100 BOMER (SPECIAL DUTIES) GROUP 8. ANTI-AIRCRAFT (FLAK) BATTERIES STUTTGART 8.1. PERSONNEL 8.2. FLAK BATTERY TACTICS 8.3. STUTTGART ANTI-AIRCRFAT POSITIONS 9. BOMBING DECOY SITES, STUTTGART 9.1. WHAT WERE BOMBING DECOYS 9.2. SCHEIN FACILITY LAUFEN (BRAZIL) 9.3. WEILIMDORF FIRE DECOY SITE Page 17 of 51
9.4. OTHER CANOUFLAGE MEASURES
10. VAIHINGEN FLAK BATTERY
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1. MAP OF BOMBER COMMAND LOSSES ZUFFENHAUSEN, STUTTGART 1.1. DESCRIPTION A total of 602 aircraft; 316 Halifaxes, 258 Lancasters, 28 Mosquitoes of 1, 4, 6 and 8 Groups took part and 11 aircraft, 6 Lancasters, 4 Halifaxes, 1 Mosquito were lost. This raid was split into 2 parts, with a 3-hour interval. The first force of 226 aircraft was directed against the important railway yards at Kornwestheim, a town to the north of Stuttgart. The second was against the north-western Stuttgart suburb of Zuffenhausen, where the target is believed to have been the Hirth aero engine factory. The target area was mostly cloud-covered for both raids and the bombing, on sky-markers, was scattered. There are some interesting local reports. Everitt, Chris. The Bomber Command War Diaries. Pen and Sword.
The map overleaf shows details of the known or assumed crash sites of the bombers that were lost during the second attack on Zuffenhausen. In total eight bombers were lost over Germany and one aircraft crashed on take-off in England. NOTE: THE CRASH SITE OF 408 SQUADRON HALIFAX NP746 EQ-E UNKNOWN SO IT IS NOT SHOWN ON MAP, IT IS PSOOSIBLE IT CRASHED CLOSE TO VAIHINGEN FLAK BATTERY. Two aircraft were lost in the first attack on Kornwestheim, one over Germany and the other one crashed in France. The total RAF losses for the night were eleven aircraft. 1.2. LOSS OF LANCASTER PB638 (P4-E) It is not possible to determine why Lancaster PB638 (P4-O) crashed. From the crash site it is clear that it crashed on the outward journey before the final turn to the target. It is more than likely that it was shot down by an enemy aircraft, although some kind of mechanical failure cannot be ruled out. It is known, through Luftwaffe records, that 14 aircraft were sent to intercept the bomber steam and that 10 claims were made (although RAF losses were only 9 aircraft in both attacks). Records of NJG.6 show that they claimed 6 aircraft; it is unknown who claimed the other 4 aircraft as records are not available (although this might change in future as others carry out research). It should be noted that at this time Germany was close to collapse and the maintenance of accurate records was highly unlikely. Also throughout the war Allied and Axis forces often made exaggerated claims of aircraft destroyed. 1.3. LEGEND Aircraft crash site Report of aircraft damaged Gross Sachsenheim airfield Vaihingen Flak Battery Flight path
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1.4. MAP OF THE RAF BOMBER LOSSES DURING THE OPERATION AGAINST ZUFFENHAUSEN, TH TH STUTTGART ON 28 /29 JANUARY 1945
.
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2. TIMELINE OF BOMBING ATTACK 2.1. DESCRIPTION The table below details, in chronological order, what happened on the second attack on Stuttgart th th during the evening of 28 /29 January 1945. It is based on reports from the RAF bombing crews that took part, claims by Luftwaffe pilots and reports from the internet based on research into RAF and Luftwaffe records. The red text highlights reports of attacks on bombers around the time and location where it is thought that Lancaster PB638 crashed. Time
Incident Number
Location
Aircraft
Group
1915
RAF Scampton
Lancaster 153/P4-O PB638
1
1921
Skipton on Swale, Yorkshire
Halifax 424/QB-S LW164
6
2136
49 38N 01 45E
Halifax 424/QB-T MZ356
6
2259
GroßSachsenhe im airfield (16km north west of Stuttgart)
Height
Comments
12000
Lancaster PB638 P4-O took off from RAF Scampton on the following route A – Bases; (B) – Reading; (C) – 49 00N 02 40E; (D) – 49 10N 07 25E; (E)- 49 18N 09 06E – Target; (F) – 48 40N 09 10E; (G) – 48 35N 08 30E; (H) – 49 00N 07 50E; (I) – 48 50N 05 30E; (C) – 49 00N 02 40E; (B) – Reading; (A) – Bases Rendezvous position 49 07N 06 00E, west of Metz, France. (German forces in Metz finally surrendered to th US forces on 13 December 1944). Bomber Command Loss - 424 Squadron Halifax LW164 (S) As the aircraft picked up speed on the runway it entered a swing to the right and then briefly left the ground, almost immediately it then sank back to the ground onto its starboard wing first and exploded. Outward, saw a brilliant flash on the ground which was believed to be an aircraft Between 2259 and 0125 hours seven night fighters of Nachtjagdgeschwader 6 (NJG 6) take off to attack the bomber stream. They claim six victories In total Nachtjagdverbände (Night Fighter Groups) employed 14 night fighters against the Bomber Command attack and claimed 10 aircraft shot down. It is not known who flew the remaining seven sorties and claimed the additional four aerial victories mentioned by the German High Command. This could have been crews from I./NJG 11 or II./NJG 2.
Luftwaffe NJG6
2305
48 57N 09 03E
Bf110 2Z+IH
Luftwaffe 1./NJG6
2320
49 14N 08 09E
Lancaster 103/PM-N RA500
1
Feldwebel Bahr took off from Groß-Sachsenheim airfield in Bf.110 2Z+IH. During the evening Bahr was to claim four abschusse (aerial victories). Crew FF OFw Bahr, BF Fw Rehmer, BS Uffz Riediger (See Luftwaffe section for explanation of Luftwaffe organisation and abbreviations) Enemy Fighter Combat No. 1 Halifax starboard appeared unaware of Me.410 and took no evasive action or replied when Me.410 fired hitting its wing. Our gunners opened fire hitting the Me.410. Halifax and Me.410 passed under aircraft. AIR 14/3227 Raid plots – night January 1945
Almost immediately Ju.88 fired on starboard quarter and both gunners fired. Fighter attacked from port quarter hitting cabin, port main plane and port inner engine. Eventually evaded fighter. AIR 14/3227 Raid plots – night January 1945
2327
1
49 25N 09 00E
4
19500
Aircraft reported falling in flames Location close to the crash site of Lancaster PB638
Page 21 of 51
Time
Incident Number
Location
Aircraft
Group
Height
Comments One Me.110 seen attacking a Lancaster aircraft that was taking evasive action air to air fire seen. Port wing of Lancaster blew up. Aircraft seen to go down in flames and explode on hitting the ground. AIR 14/3227 Air raids – night January 1945.
2
49 17N 08 55E
Halifax 429/AL-A NR196
6
18000
What appears to be a similar incident (same time, location and height) is reported as follows in 429 Squadron ORB. A Me.110 was seen attacking a Lancaster aircraft on the outward journey at 4917N 0855E at 2328 hours, 1800 feet.. Air to air fire was seen but no results. AIR 27/1854 429 Sq. ORB Records January 1945
Location close to the crash site of Lancaster PB638 Luftwaffe Claim No. 1 Oberfeldwebel Ludwig Schmidt of II./NJG 6 claimed a th Lancaster as his 8 victory. Probably flying in a Ju.88G.
2328 Luftwaffe II./NJG 6
Halifax 426/OW-Q NP768
See the section on ‘Luftwaffe Methodology for Claiming Aerial Victories’. Although the location of this claim is unknown it is possible it could have been 426/Q or 153/O
18000
3
49 15N 09 10E
1
20000
4
49 17N 09 02E
1
18000
4
20000
8
18000
2331
49 22N 08 57E
5 6
Lancaster 153/P4-O PB638
49 02N 09 12E 48 40N 09 10E Halifax 425/KW-F NR231
2332
Bomber Command Loss - 426 Squadron Halifax NP768 OW-Q Pilot W/C F.C. Carling-Kelly RCAF stated: ‘The aircraft was shot up in the air at 2328 hours on 28th January, 1945, six minutes from the target’. The Halifax crashed near the Mingolsheim railway station circa 23.28 - 23.35 hours The aircraft crashed in Planquadrat (Luftwaffe Grid Square) ‘US 1’. Aircraft five miles starboard hit by heavy flak crashed on ground Location close to the crash site of Lancaster PB638 Half mile east twin engine aircraft seen firing on Lancaster which caught fire. Twin engine aircraft made second attack on Lancaster which spiralled down through cloud no return fire observed from Lancaster during either attack. Location close to the crash site of Lancaster PB638 Bomber Command Loss - 153 Squadron Lancaster PB638 P4-O Lancaster PB638 crashed into a forest 1/2 km NNE of Michelbach. There were no survivors, the cause of loss is unknown but a night fighter attack is the most likely cause, but this is conjecture and not based on evidence. The aircraft crashed in Planquadrat ‘TS 3’. Based on the location and time of Halifax 426/Q being shot down this is a best guess estimate of the time Lancaster 153/O was shot down. Aircraft hit by flak 5 miles starboard seen in flames to hit ground Air to air tracer seen and aircraft seen to catch fire and disappear into cloud Enemy Flak Damage No. 1 Hit by heavy flak in T/A at 19000 feet, 2332 hours, 155 mph causing hole in Perspex in nose and also bomb doors. AIR 27/1839/2 420 Squadron ORB Records January 1945
Stuttgart
Halifax 432/QO-R NP694
6
18000
Enemy Fighter Combat No. 2 Pilot saw a Ju.88 on starboard, fighter dropped back to the port beam and Mid Upper Gunner fired at point blank range. Tracer hit the fighter, which dived out of view and disappeared. The fighter is claimed as damaged. AIR 27/1861 432 Sq. ORB Appendices
Page 22 of 51
Time
Incident Number
Location
West of Stuttgart
2332
Aircraft
Bf110 2Z+IH
Group
Height
Comments Luftwaffe Claim No. 2 Feldwebel (Sergeant) Gunther Bahr 1. NJG 6 Abschussmeldungen (Air Combat Reports), Handwritten index, states: 23.32h, 4-Mot, (grid square) 'AT' 262nd Abschuss (aerial victory) for NJG 6 (Nachtjagdgeschwader - night fighter wing 6), 24th victory for Ofw. Bahr 2. The handwritten Kriegstagebuch (war diary) of Stab (Staff/HQ) NJG 6 records the same victory claim as: 2330 Uhr (hour), 1 Lancaster, 5600 m über [over] Stuttgart durch (by) Ofw. Bahr der 1./6. 3. Feldwebel Günther Bahr recorded the same victory claims in his Flugbuch [flying logbook] as: 23.32h, Avro Lancaster, W. Obj. (west of target) The difference between the reference numbers of the claims in No. 1 above could be due to the Combat Reports recording the victories in the chronological order that they were finalised.
Luftwaffe 1./NJG 6
See section on ‘Luftwaffe Grid Reference System’ which explains the Luftwaffe system against the grid reference system used by the RAF. Although Gunther Bahr claimed four victories on the night it is highly unlikely that he shot down PB638 for the following reasons. 1. The area where Lancaster 153/O crashed was located before the final turn to the target. Therefore they probably crashed just before or around (depending on which attacking wave they were in) ‘H’ hour at 2330. Taking off at 2305 from Groß-Sachsenheim airfield approximately 50km away from the crash site it is unlikely Bahr could have climbed up to 18,000/20,000 feet and shot down 153/O in the space of 25 minutes. 2. This first claim from Bahr at 2332 hours was in Planquadrat ’AT’, 153/O crashed in Planquadrat ‘TS’ which is at least 38km away. Bahr’s second claim at 2339 was North West of Stuttgart, which again must have been at least 38km away.
2334
7
Stuttgart
6
18500
8
Zuffenhaus en area
4
19000
9
49 20N 08 40E
4
2000
Stuttgart
Halifax 51/TB-R NP963 Lancaster 156/GT-T
8
18000
Unidentified aircraft dived through cloud in flames and exploded on ground Combat between four engine aircraft and two twin engine fighters sighted to port bow up (Heading 177(T)) Two short bursts of tracer fired from dead astern. No fighter seen below. No return fire Enemy Fighter Combat No. 3 ME.410 came in from port quarter opening fire and Captain dived to port. Tracer passed overhead and fighter vanished to starboard quarter. AIR 14/3227 Raid plots – night January 1945
2335 49 11N 08 57E
Halifax 415/6U-C MZ922
6
20000
Rear Gunner saw one Fw.109 approaching from starboard quarter below in a curve up pursuit attack at range of 800 yards. Gunner gave combat manoeuvre corkscrew starboard. The Fw.190 broke off attack at 200 yards going starboard without firing. Rear Gunner did not fire. No claims. AIR 27/1814 415 Sq ORB Appendices
10
Zuffenhaus en area
49 00N 09 10E
Lancaster 576/UL-Y2 NG273
Stuttgart
Lancaster 576/UL-I2 LM227
2336
4
19000
1
20000
Ju.88 sighted crossing from starboard 500 yards away Enemy Fighter Combat No. 4 Twin jet fighter aircraft seen by the Rear Gunner astern, he ordered corkscrew port and opened fire. Enemy aircraft closed in and scored hits on the tailplane, flaps and wireless equipment. No hits and no claim made. AIR 27/2048 576 Sq. ORB Appendices
11
1
18000
Lancaster on fire fell to ground exploded From 156 Squadron ORB it is assumed that this is the incident that was witnessed by 156/I2 Page 23 of 51
Time
Incident Number
Location
Aircraft
Group
Height
Comments
12
Target area
Halifax 429/AL-T LV860
6
18000
Enemy aircraft seen astern in the target area, at 2336 hours 18000 feet, but no action taken.
48 49N 09 10E
Halifax 415/6U-M
AIR 27/1854/1 429 Sq. ORB Records January 1945
6
19000
2336
Enemy Flak Damage No. 2 Arrived over target at 2332. Sky marking flares red with yellow stars seen behind so a complete starboard orbit executed and another run up made. Whilst making this run up at approximately 2336 hours, 19000 feet, 4849N 0910E hit by heavy Flak causing large fire in rear end of fuselage. Bombs released at 23337 hours. It appeared that the crew would have to abandon aircraft so captain ordered crew to put on parachutes. As fire was not spreading very rapidly attempts were made to extinguish it and after one hour and five minutes it was put out. Aircraft landed at Dunsfold. AIR 27/1813/16 415 Sq ORB Records January 1945
48040N 09 05E
Halifax 415/6U-V NR172
6
15000
Enemy Fighter Combat No. 5 ME-210 seen dead astern firing at another aircraft. Enemy then attacked our bomber. Rear Gunner gave Corkscrew Port, opened fire and saw strikes entering cockpit and engine, fighter was seen going down in a spin with smoke pouring from the engines. Rear Gunner claimed fighter destroyed. AIR 27/1814 415 Sq ORB Appendices
13 14 2337
49 00N 09 10E 48 40N 09 00E Stuttgart
4
19000
8
18000
8
18000
Lancaster 156/YG-E
Small aircraft 15 miles ahead seen to catch fire. Continue flying then go down into a spin Exchange of tracer four engine aircraft fell on fire and exploded on the ground Enemy Fighter Combat No. 6 Ju.88 heading 1767 degrees on starboard quarter above - range 6000 yards opened fire enemy aircraft lost through Corkscrew. AIR 14/3227 Raid plots – night January 1945
15
Stuttgart
49 00N 09 18E 2338
100
Lancaster 153/P4-E LM754
1
20000
20000
Believed aircraft seen falling on fire and explosion seen below cloud. Cause not known Enemy Fighter Combat No. 7 Rear Gunner observed an Fw.190 attacking from the port quarter. He immediately opened fire. When corkscrewing to port the enemy aircraft opened fire and pressed home the attack before being lost from view. No claim. Slight damage to Lancaster AIR 27/1031 153 Sq. ORB Appendices
48 40N 09 10E
Lancaster 170/TC-C LM732
1
18000
Enemy Fighter Combat No. 8 Attacked three times by a Ju.88, both gunners fired at the enemy aircraft which did not open fire. When last seen item was emitting smoke from the starboard engine. Claim for damages. AIR 27/1097/1 170 Sq. ORB Summary
Stuttgart
Halifax 426/OW-L NP685
6
16
Zuffenhaus en area
Enemy Fighter Combat No. 9 ME.410 400 yards dead astern. Rear Gunner fired short burst. Enemy aircraft disappeared. No claim AIR 14/3227 Raid plots – night January 1945
Halifax 429/AL-N MZ482
2339
20000
18000
Enemy Flak Damage No. 3 Aircraft sustained small flak hole in the nose Perspex at 2339 over the target. AIR 27/1854/1 429 Sq. ORB Records January 1945
4
18500
ME.109 passed 2000 feet below
Page 24 of 51
Time
Incident Number
Location
WSW of Stuttgart
2340
17 18
2343
Bf110 2Z+IH
Zuffenhaus en area 48 50N 08 30E
2340
2342
Aircraft
Halifax 192/DT-R NR272
Group
Height
Luftwaffe 1./NJG 6
4
19000
100
21000
100
21000
19
Stuttgart
20
48 40N 09 10E
8
18000
21
Stuttgart area
1
19000
22
49 00N 08 00E
6
18000
23
Stuttgart
6
20000
24
Zuffenhaus en
4
20000
25
48 40N 09 00E
6
16000
Halifax 429/AL-J PN367
Comments Luftwaffe Claim No. 3 Feldwebel Gunther Bahr 1. 4-Mot, NW Objekt (north-west of the target). 261st Abschuss for NJG 6, 25th victory for Ofw. Bahr. 2. 2337 Uhr, vermutl. (presumably) Boeing, 5500, über Stuttgart durch Ofw. Bahr der I./6. 3. 23.39h, Avro Lancaster, WSW Obj. (west-southwest of target). Twin engine jet fighter sighted Fw.109 seen at 21000 feet which passed close without action Twin jet engine aircraft seen 4000 to 5000 feet below
Aircraft seen to catch fire after canon strikes from air to air tracer go down and explode on ground Lancaster over Zuffenhausen in combat with ME.410. Lancaster went into spin and disappeared through cloud followed by explosion on ground Four engine aircraft in tight spin leveled at about 4000 feet burst into flames exploded on ground Unidentified aircraft in flames about a mile astern seen to disappear in cloud Aircraft astern hit by flak seen falling with port engines on fire At 4840N 0900Eat 2343 hours, 16000 feet, a large aircraft was seen heading towards the target about 12 miles to starboard and 10 miles from the target. It suddenly burst into flames, spiralled down and shortly after it disappeared into the clouds an explosion was seen on the ground. AIR 27/1854/1 429 Sq. ORB Records January 1945
48 45N 08 11E
Lancaster 460/UV-R PB227
1
19000
2344
Enemy Fighter Combat No. 10 Tracer was fired at the bomber; Mid Upper Gunner sighted Ju.88 port quarter, returned fire with the Rear Gunner who ordered corkscrew port. Rear Gunner fired until the fighter disappeared from view, losing height rapidly in practically vertical dive. The Rear claim of possible damage. AIR 27/1911 460 Sq. ORB Appendices
2345
2346
2346
26
48 45N 09 10E
4
20000
27
48 35N 08 30E
8
18000
28
Stuttgart
6
20000
29
48 40N 09 00E
4
19000
30
Zuffenhaus en area
4
19000
31
Stuttgart
8
18000
8
18000
48 35N 08 30E
Lancaster 405/LQ-M ND437
Air to air tracer seen followed by single engine aircraft falling in flames seen to crash Heading 321 four engine aircraft with port inner engine on fire made a turn on to reciprocal course fell and exploded on ground believed fighter action Single engine aircraft going down in a steep spin giving off long trail of smoke disappeared in cloud Aircraft 15 miles ahead burst into flames continued straight and level for two minutes then dived down into cloud Halifax seen shot down to the west after combat. Two parachutes seen Aircraft seen falling in flames and explode on the ground Enemy Fighter Combat No. 11 ME.410 made feint attack from port beam and continued to starboard beam in a masked position. Mid Upper fired short and long burst observed hits in fuselage. Enemy aircraft went out to port and disappeared. AIR 14/3227 Raid plots – night January 1945
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Time
Incident Number
Location
North of Ludwigsbu rg
48 30N 08 25E
2348
Aircraft
Group
Bf110 2Z+IH
Luftwaffe 1./NJG 6
Lancaster 156/GT-E
8
Height
18000
Comments Luftwaffe Claim No. 4 Feldwebel Gunther Bahr 1. 4-Mot, 'AT 5'. 260th Abschuss for NJG 6, 26th victory for Ofw. Bahr. 2. 2346 Uhr, 1 vermutl. Boeing, 5400, N Stuttgart durch Ofw. Bahr der I./6. 3. 23.46h, Avro Lancaster, über Obj. (over target) Enemy Fighter Combat No. 12 ME.410 on starboard quarter opened fire evasive action taken by Corkscrewing. Enemy aircraft came in twice again on starboard and then on port then starboard again and finally on port quarter. Rear Gunner and Mid Upper Gunner fired. Fighter eventually made off, strikes seen by gunners. AIR 14/3227 Raid plots – night January 1945
2349
32 33
2352
48 30N 08 10E 48 45N 08 00E
8
18000
1
19000
6
18000
34
48 45N 07 50E
35
49 00N 08 40E
Mosquito 157/RS-R TA397
100
15000
36
48 35N 08 20E
Lancaster 576/UL-F2 PB403
1
19500
AIR 27/2047/28 576 Squadron ORB Records. It is assumed that this incident was witnessed by 576/UL-F2
2353
2353
Berneck
37
48 45N 08 03E
38
48 48N 09 00E
2354
2400
East part of Mannheim
4
17000
Luftwaffe Claim No. 5 Hauptmann Gerhard Friedrich of Stab I./NJG 6 st claimed a Lancaster as his 21 victory. It is thought that aircraft could be 300 Squadron Lancaster PB846 (K) Bomber Command Loss - 300 Squadron Lancaster PB846 (K) Crashed at Berneck (on the SE side of the Schwarzwald), about 2 km N from the small town of Altensteig. It is thought that they were probably shot down by the Luftwaffe ace Hptm. Gerhard Friedrich at 2335 hours. Note: Wildbad and Berneck are approximately 11 miles apart Air to air tracer between two aircraft 5 miles astern followed by lower aircraft falling in flames
6
19000
While on the homeward journey cannon and tracer fire were seen but no results were observed
Luftwaffe Stab I./NJG6
South of Wildbad
Lancaster 300/ZN-K PB846
Halifax 429/AL-W NA201
Bf110 2Z+IH
Exchange of fire seen aircraft caught fire and exploded when it hit the ground Aircraft hit heavy flak dived steeply into cloud followed by explosion Saw tracer fire from and unidentified four engine aircraft 10 miles to starboard being fired at by an unidentified aircraft presumed to be a fighter silver in colour. No return fire was seen but one of the aircraft seem to burst into flames and disappeared through cloud and explosion occurred in this area a short while after Saw air to air firing followed by what appeared to be an aircraft on fire diving towards ground no explosion was seen as ground was obscured by cloud Lancaster engaged by single engine enemy aircraft. Lancaster port engine on fire exploded dived and hit ground. Strikes on enemy aircraft observed also its starboard wing on fire
AIR 27/1854/1 429 Sq. ORB Records January 1945
Luftwaffe 1./NJG6
Luftwaffe Claim No. 6 Feldwebel Gunther Bahr 1. 4-Mot, 'UQ - UR'. 259th Abschuss for NJG 6, 27th victory for Ofw. Bahr. 2. 0000 Uhr, 1 vermutl. Liberator, 5400, NW Karlsruhe, Wahrscheinl Abschuss (Wahrscheinliche Abschuss = probable aerial victory) durch Ofw. Bahr. 3. 24.00h, Avro Lancaster, SO Hagen UQ bis UR (south-east of Hagen in grid squares UQ to UR).
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Time
Incident Number
Location
0010
49 03N 07 11E
0012
39
48 52N 06 05E
0012
40
Biblis
Aircraft
Halifax 429/AL-Z MZ872
Group
6
Height
18000
Comments Enemy Fighter Combat No. 13 While on the homeward journey on 29-1-1945 in Halifax Z at 4902N 0711E, 18000 feet at 0100 hours an Me.109 was seen on starboard quarter, Mid Upper Gunner gave the order to corkscrew starboard. Both gunners opened fire, enemy aircraft broke away and was lost to sight. Strikes were seen on its wings but no claim is made. AIR 27/1855 429 Squadron ORB Appendices
8 Mosquito 85/NO-Q
18000
100
What appeared to be aircraft exploding on ground followed by orange/red fire Enemy Fighter Combat No. 14 Single engine aircraft on ground believed to be Fw.190 strikes observed. Claimed one single engine aircraft damaged
3. UNITIMED EVENTS 3.1. DESCRIPTION Below are reports fro RAF bomber crews and the internet of event that occurred on the evening of th th 28 /29 January 1945 with no recorded times. Even though there are no times detailed it is possible to link some of the reports to some of the timed events above. Time
Incident Number
Location
Aircraft
Unknown
Halifax 408/EQ-E NP746
Busnau
Lancaster 460/UV-S ND970
Group
6
Height
Comments Bomber Command Loss -408 Squadron Halifax NP746 EQ-E Crash location unknown. McGovern, the only survivor, later reported that an enemy fighter, possibly an Fw.190, attacked three times Bomber Command Loss – 460 Squadron Lancaster ND970 UV-S Believed to have crashed at Busnau, a suburb south west of Stuttgart. In a statement Flight Sergeant Benbow reported that ‘The aircraft was attacked by Ju.88 fighters near Stuttgart’. Note Busnau is 3km from Vaihingen.
Vaihingen
Lancaster 156/GT-A PB186
Deufringen
Lancaster 405/LQ-U PB650
6
Gueltingen
Halifax 408/EQ-K NP743
6
Halifax 51/TB-T MZ754
4
Bomber Command Loss – 156 Squadron Lancaster PB186 GT-A Believed to have crashed at Vaihingen in the south west suburbs of Stuttgart, possibly between 2332 and 2346 hours. Cause of crash unknown, probably a night fighter Bomber Command Loss – 405 Squadron Lancaster PB650 LQ-U Believed to have crashed at Deufringen, 2km west of Aidlingen. Rear Gunner, sighted two Ju.88s one on each side of the Lancaster, following attack Lancaster fatally stricken Bomber Command Loss - 408 Squadron Halifax NP743 EQ-K Believed to have crashed near the village of Gueltingen. It is possible the aircraft was hit by a night fighter. The aircraft was attacked three times by an Me.109. The Rear Gunner (Sgt R O Fenner, No. 3000547) was killed by what is believed to have been cannon fire and the Navigator was slightly wounded by flak. AIR 27/494/2 51 Squadron ORB Records Jan 1945
Halifax 424/QB-T MZ356
Saw two aircraft shot down near the target, no parachutes seen. AIR 27/1835/24 424 Squadron ORB Records January 1945
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Time
Incident Number
Location
Aircraft
Group
Height
Comments Flak Battery Vaihingen, (situated just south of the Weilimdorf decoy fire site) A newly promoted Flak Leutnant thought with bombs falling all around his position that the raid was directed against the Flak positions. He ignored regulations about conservation of ammunition and shot his entire stock at the radar echoes of the attacking bombers. Two Lancasters and a Halifax crashed in the immediate vicinity, much to the relief of the officer, who had feared a court martial because of his prodigious use of ammunition. Bomber Command War Diaries: An Operational Reference Book 1939-1945 Martin Middlebrook, Chris Everitt
48 44N 09 06E
The location of the Flak battery on the map is an estimate based on research reported on the website identified below. It has been identified in an area between Ernst-Barlach-Weg up to the B14 in south west Stuttgart. fgut.wordpress.com/bauwerke/wk2/militarischeanlagen2/baden-wurttemberg/flakbatterie-s-vaihingen/
It is believed that Lancaster 156/A crashed at Vaihingen and Lancaster 460/S crashed 3km northwest of Vaihingen at Busnau. The crash site of Halifax 408/E is unknown. It is possible that these three aircraft could be the aircraft referred to in the above report.
4. BOMBER COMMAND LOSSES/COMBATS KORNWESTHEIM, STUTTGART TH
4.1. THIS WAS THE FIRST ATTACK ON STUTTGART ON THE EVENING OF 28 /29 1945
TH
JANUARY
The target was believed to be the important railway yards at Kornwestheim, north of the city. A total of 226 aircraft were detailed for the attack which was set for 2030 hours 4.2. LOSSES No. 428 Squadron Lancaster KB770 (D), believed to have crashed 5 miles south of the target, Stuttgart The aircraft was hit by a night fighter. Despite the fact that the air-speed indicator went u/s after take-off the bomber, thanks to excellent work by Kay (pilot) and Stapleford (navigator), reached the target on time and dropped its bombs. Then it was hit by a hail of shells, possibly from a nightfighter fitted with Schrage Musik guns. Survivor F/O Stapleford stated that the aircraft seemed to be struck by hundreds of large shells and the four motors (sic engines?) caught fire immediately and the aircraft went down quickly, F/O Stapleford, with injuries in the hip, leg, knee and hands managed to get his head out of a window (which had been smashed by the cannon shells) and he was sucked out bodily by the slipstream along with F/Sgt Ossington. Both descended by parachute and were taken Prisoners of War. Stapleford and Ossington had both been wounded in the attack on the bomber. Stapleford’s wounds did not spare him a beating at the hands of SS troopers and he was in hospital until released by the Allied victory. Schrage Musik was the German term for upward-firing autocannon that the Luftwaffe mounted in night fighter aircraft during World War II. rcafassociation.ca/heritage/history/fallen-aviators/rcaf-casualties-second-world-war/kaechele-to-korbyl/
No. C888 1895420 J40040 J35935 J95345
Name S/Ldr H L. Kay RCAF Sgt R W. Gullick RAF F/O R. Stapleford RCAF F/O G J. Liney RCAF F/O J W. Blades RCAF P/O F. L Jolicoeur RCAF F/Sgt E. Ossington RCAF
Age 32 31
Buried/Survived Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany (POW) Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany (POW) Page 28 of 51
No. 105 Squadron Mosquito ML923. crash location UNKNOWN. Cause of crash UNKNOWN It was from the first attack that F/Lt MacHardy and F/O Duncan did not return, in the never to be forgotten ‘Z Zebra’. F/Lt Mac Hardy had almost finished his tour and had naturally made many friends on the Station. He was acting as reserve the night he went missing and that makes it more difficult to assess what time things went wrong. AIR 27/828/1 105 Sq ORB Summary January 1945
No. 138688 157337
Name F/Lt G L S McHardy DFC F/Lt G R P Duncan
Age 23 31
Buried/Survived Choloy War Cemetery, France Choloy War Cemetery, France
4.3. COMBATS No. 406 Squadron Mosquito MM745 on High Level Intruder to 4950N 0830E Arrived on target at 1925 hours; patrolling at angels 15. At 2005 hours a contact was made 80 degrees to port and 45 degrees above, which was chased south in a steady climb at full throttle then on 280 degrees closing to 3000 yards. A second contact head on was then obtained but ignored. At 1500 feet a silhouette was obtained and range was closed to 200 feet to identify a Ju.188 (medium bomber) which was interrogated and challenged without response. Dropping back to 200 yards two bursts were fired, causing a large explosion in port engine and fuselage. Enemy aircraft after a port turn, turned on its back and spun down, being seen to hit the ground and explode in position 4834N 0633E. Verified by Sneezy 44 of 151 Squadron. AIR 27/1791/84 406 Sq ORB Records January 1945
5. BOMBER COMMAND LOSSES ZUFFENHAUSEN, STUTTGART 5.1. THIS WAS THE SECOND ATTACK ON STUTTGART ON THE EVENING OF 28TH/29TH JANUARY 1945 The target was believed to be the Hirth Aero Factory in Zuffenhausen which was engaged in making jet aero engines for Heinkel who were the factory owners. (Heinkel used Hirth for development of jet propulsions and subsequent engines were known as Heinkel-Hirth engines). The Bosch ignition plant may also have been a target. A total of 376 aircraft were detailed for the attack which was set for 2330 hours. 5.2. LOSSES UNITED KINGDOM No. 424 Squadron Halifax LW164 (S), accident on take-off. During the evening of 28th January 1945 the aircraft was in the process of taking off from Skipton on Swale airfield to undertake the operational flight to bomb Stuttgart. The runways were clear but the grass around the airfield was covered in snow and there was a shallow bank of snow on the edges of the runways where the snow had been pushed to. As the aircraft picked up speed on the runway in use at 1921hours it entered a swing to the right and then briefly left the ground, almost immediately it then sank back to the ground onto its starboard wing first and exploded. All five airmen at the front of the aircraft and also the mid-upper gunner were killed instantly while the rear gunner was found seriously injured. It was found that the aircraft had probably swung around on hitting the ground and part of the fuselage had crushed into the nose of one of the 2000lb bombs and detonated it in the bomb bay, as the aircraft was probably in the process of swinging around this had flung off the rear of the aircraft away from the blast saving the rear gunner's life. Sgt Tongue, P/O Nicolls, P/O Chatfield and P/O Doyle were involved in an aircraft accident on 15th October 1944, near Stillington. They took-off in 415 Squadron aircraft Halifax NA582 on an operational flight to bomb Duisburg (1005 aircraft). On the homeward leg the Mid Upper and Rear Gunner opened fire on an enemy aircraft but no hits were seen. On their approach to East Moor airfield the aircraft crashed on rising ground two miles north east of Stillington while flying in thick fog, there were no injuries. Tongue, Nicolls, Chatfield and Doyle were transferred to 424 Squadron in December 1944. The remaining four airmen on board when it crashed are all believed to have survived the War
No. C/988 2221300 J/94159
Name W/Cdr E M. Williams RCAF Sgt L. Tongue RAF P/O R. Nicolls RCAF
Age 31 26 28
Buried/Survived Harrogate (Stonefall) Cemetery, England Harrogate (Stonefall) Cemetery, England Harrogate (Stonefall) Cemetery, England Page 29 of 51
J/94103 J/94756 J/18971 J/18476
P/O R. Chatfield RCAF P/O G J. Doyle RCAF F/O W. Fleming RCAF F/O J. Tremblay RCAF
32 23 30
Newport Cemetery, Rhode Island, USA Harrogate (Stonefall) Cemetery, England Harrogate (Stonefall) Cemetery, England (Seriously Injured)
5.3. LOSSES OVER GERMANY No. 460 Squadron Lancaster ND970 (S), believed to have crashed at Busnau, a suburb south west of Stuttgart The aircraft was hit by a night fighter. In a statement Flight Sergeant Benbow reported that ‘The aircraft was attacked by Ju.88 fighters near Stuttgart. The aircraft was damaged. The order to put on chutes and abandon was given and acknowledged. The port wing was burning, and the port engine and aileron was u/s. The aircraft was more or less under a controlled dive. I landed in a forest near Stuttgart. It was freezing and I received frostbite. I walked/crawled to a village and gave myself up. Truman, Field and Symes were POWs. The Germans said that O’Hara and Wilson were killed and that the body of Birt was near the wreck’. ww2talk.com/index.php?threads/in-memoriam-those-air-force-pilots-crews-who-died-on-this-day-in-ww2.18267/page-24
No. A/427892 1894823 A/418318 A/410394 A/437488 A/433473 A/433749
Name F/O Birt P N Sgt Field A Flt Sgt Truman E G Flt Sgt Symes R S Flt Sgt Benbow D R Flt Sgt O'Hara D G Flt Sgt Wilson S G
Age 20
20 20
Buried/Survived Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany (POW) (POW) (POW) (POW) Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany
No. 405 Squadron Lancaster PB650 (U), believed to have crashed at Deufringen, 2km west of Aidlingen. The aircraft was hit by a night fighter. Aircraft took off from RAF Gransden Lodge at 2035 hrs and is. Whilst on the bombing run FS D. A. MacDougall, Rear Gunner, sighted two Ju.88s one on each side of the Lancaster. They tagged along for a time until one dropped back and opened fire. The midupper gunner replied and, according to MacDougall’s report, shot the Jerry down with one engine ablaze. But the Lancaster was also on fire and fatally stricken. Only MacDougall was able to escape; the remainder of the crew were lost. The RCAF Overseas, Volume 3: The Sixth Year, pp 118. Oxford University Press 1949, Toronto
No. J/29601 1057952 R/193951 J/38394 J/95487
Name F/O F H Cummer RCAF Sgt W McCabrey F/Sgt E R Savage RCAF F/O W B Turner RCAF F/Sgt G A Smith RCAF F/Sgt J MacCrae RCAF F/Sgt D A MacDougall RCAF
Age
24
Buried/Survived Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany (KIA) (POW)
No. 426 Squadron Halifax NP768 (Q), fighter, the Halifax crashed near the Mingolsheim railway station circa 23.28 23.35 hours. The aircraft was hit by a night fighter. Pilot W/Cdr F.C. Carling-Kelly RCAF stated, ‘The aircraft was shot up in the air at 2328 hours on 28th January, 1945, six minutes from the target’. Both gunners sighted the enemy aircraft as it attacked from the starboard quarter, and directed evasive action. The enemy aircraft opened fire killing the rear gunner F/O P. Hyde, shattering the pilot’s panel and bomb-aimer’s Perspex, wounding the pilot, the flight engineer and bomb-aimer, and starting fires in the tail and port wing. The controls also appeared to have been damaged as the bomber dived and could not be pulled out. In addition to Hyde, F/O A. L. Evans and FS S. G. Rundle were lost, but the others were able to bail out over the Black Forest. Sgt J. A. Bromley (RAF) walked for three days before the military apprehended him near Karlsruhe. Carling-Kelly and F/O H. J. Dales and F/O D. J. Bird also were captured. Dales, Bird, Hyde and Evans were all on their second tour. The RCAF Overseas, Volume 3: The Sixth Year, pp 117. Oxford University Press 1949, Toronto
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No. C/172 R/216010 J19865 J/18275 2221660 J/58788 J/19131
Name W/Cdr F. Carling-Kelly RCAF P/O S. Rundle RCAF F/O H. Dales RCAF F/O D. Bird RCAF Sgt J. Bromley RAF F/O A L Evans RCAF F/O P. Hyde RCAF
Age 21
24 23
Buried/Survived (POW) Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany (POW) (POW) (POW) Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany
No. 408 Squadron Halifax NP746 (E), crash location UNKNOWN. The aircraft was hit by a night fighter. McGovern, the only survivor, later reported that an enemy fighter, possibly an Fw.190, attacked three times and caused the heavy bomber to climb steeply, apparently out of control. McGovern was hurled backward and stunned. When he came to he was falling through the air. All that night and the next day he lay in the snow before being discovered. The RCAF Overseas, Volume 3: The Sixth Year, pp 118. Oxford University Press 1949, Toronto
No. Name J28593 F/O R M. Wallis RCAF C95228 P/O L J. Collinson RCAF J40372 F/O T. B Little RCAF F/O H. McGovern RCAF 432398 P/O P. Myerson RAAF J93944 P/O T P. Quinn RCAF J93945 P/O R L. Siewart RCAF
Age 20 33 20 20
Buried/Survived Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany (POW) Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany
No. 300 Squadron Lancaster PB846 (K), believed to have crashed at Berneck (on the south east side of the Schwarzwald), about 2 km north from the small town of Altensteig. The aircraft was hit by a night fighter. The aircraft took off from RAF Faldingworth at 1958 hours. It is thought that they were probably shot down by the Luftwaffe ace Hptm. Gerhard Friedrich of Stab I./NJG6 at 2335 hours. Those who died are buried in Durnbach War Cemetery. Flt Lt Zarebski, Polish Air Force (PAF) had made his way to England via Romania and France, going on to fly fighters 308, 303 and 306 Squadrons before converting to twins and a spell at 18 OTU. Ironically, his transfer to Bomber Command was for health reasons! He was born 11 May 1914. No. P/0845 782414 P/2377 P/1779 705689 P/706584 706090
Name Flt Lt Z E Zarebski PAF Flt Sgt J N Gerwatowski PAF P/O R A Paszkowski PAF P/O Z Wesolowski Sgt P Barzdo PAF Sgt K Cymbala PAF Sgt R Mankowski
Age 30 30
25
Buried/Survived Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany (POW) Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany (POW) (POW) Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany (POW)
No. 408 Squadron Halifax NP743 (K), believed to have crashed near the village of Gueltingen. It is possible the aircraft was hit by a night fighter. No. C/89128 1594677 J/35708 J/29718 J/89791 J/95274 J/95275
Name F/O C L. Johnson RCAF Sgt T H. Chandler RAF F/O N G. Baily RCAF F/O J A. O’Brien RCAF P/O J C. Mortley RCAF P/O F. Henry RCAF P/O B E. House RCAF
Age 23 19 31 29 20
Buried/Survived Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany th
F/O C L Johnson was involved in a training accident in the Lake District on 17 October 1944. Posted to th 408 Squadron on 4 October he was flying Halifax NP745 on a cross country exercise the aircraft began to suffer the effects of icing over its control surfaces. Unable to control the aircraft the pilot ordered the crew to bail out. All crew successfully baled out before the aircraft crashed between Penruddock and Page 31 of 51
Motherby. Although all the crew initially survived then accident the Navigator F/O J E Freeman J39402 later died in hospital. In addition to Johnson (4 Ops), P/O Chandler (1 Op), P/O Mortley (No Ops), P/O Henry (3 Ops) and P/O House (2 Ops) were also involved in the accident. http://www.yorkshire-aircraft.co.uk/aircraft/lakes/np745.html
No. 156 Squadron Lancaster PB186 (A), believed to have crashed at Vaihingen in the south west suburbs of Stuttgart, possibly between 2332 and 2346 hours. Cause of crash unknown, probably a night fighter. The aircraft took off from RAF Upwood at 2020 hours. All are buried in the local Friedhoff, since when their bodies have been removed to Durnbach War Cemetery. F/LT Freeman and P/O Kaviza were just beginning their second tours. No. J/85875 2202497 J/28953 151844 1802925 1604157 J/95377
Name Flt/Lt J H Freeman RCAF Sgt R Breaks F/O D Watson RCAF F/O N P Hibbert DFC Flt Sgt J G Shaw Flt Sgt J R Wood Flt Sgt J F Kaviza RCAF
Age 26 19 21 21 20
Buried/Survived Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany
No. 153 Squadron Lancaster PB638 (O), crashed at Michelbach, near Mosbach. Cause of crash unknown, probably a night fighter. Aircraft took off from RAF Scampton at 1925 hrs. All are buried in Durnbach War Cemetery. The London Gazette, issued 11 December 1945, carried news of Sgt Jenkinson's award. No. 176235 1826262 1603839 1549302 1567899 1684124 989177
Name F/O O M C Jones DFC Sgt P R Jenkinson DFM Flt Sgt J F Dormer Flt Sgt E W Fletcher Flt Sgt J W Milburn Flt Sgt J Coles Flt Sgt H Ferguson
Age 32 23 29 21 22 22 23
Buried/Survived Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany
6. BOMBER COMMAND COMBATS ZUFFENHAUSEN, STUTTGART 6.1.
COMBATS No. 103 Squadron (Combat No. 1) Lancaster RA500 (PM-N) Observed Halifax 500 yards starboard beam with a Me.410 dead astern closing in to attack, it appeared quite unaware of its position took no evasive action and made no reply to a long burst from the Me.410 which apparently entered its wing. Our Rear Gunner opened fire followed by the Mid Upper Gunner, hits were observed in the mainplane of the Me.410. The Halifax turned to port with the Me.410 still following and passed under aircraft. AIR 14/3227 Raid plots – night January 1945
Almost immediately a Ju.88 was on the starboard quarter opening fire at 600 yards and both gunners fired. The Ju.88 broke away port quarter down and then was in again from port quarter opening fire at 600 yards scoring hits on the cabin, the port main plane and the port inner engine. Two more approaches were made by the Ju.88 but it was eventually evaded and the turn made on to the last leg down to the target. AIR 14/3227 Raid plots – night January 1945
No. 432 Squadron (Combat No. 2) Halifax NP694 (QO-R) On the bombing run about two minutes before dropping the bombs the Pilot saw a Ju.88 on starboard bow above. The fighter passed over and ahead of the bomber, dropped back to the port beam where the Mid Upper Gunner fired a burst of 200 rounds at point blank range100 yards. The
Page 32 of 51
tracer was seen by the Mid Upper Gunner and the Engineer to hit the fighter, which immediately dived out of view to port quarter down and was not seen again. The fighter is claimed as damaged. AIR 27/1861 432 Sq. ORB Appendices
No.156 Squadron (Combat No. 3) Lancaster (GT-T) ME.410 came in from port quarter slightly above. Opened fire from 4/500 yards gave burst and Captain dived aircraft to port. Enemy tracer passed overhead then vanished after passing to starboard quarter. AIR 14/3227 Raid plots – night January 1945
No. 576 Squadron (Combat No. 4) Lancaster NG273 (UL-Y2) The enemy aircraft was first seen by the Rear Gunner astern level at 500 feet and appeared to be a twin jet fighter aircraft. The Rear Gunner ordered corkscrew port and opened fire and as the enemy aircraft closed in it opened fire at 300 feet scoring hits on the tailplane, flaps and wireless equipment, breaking away on the starboard beam up. No hits were seen and no claim is made. AIR 27/2048 576 Sq. ORB Appendices
No. 415 Squadron (Combat No. 5) Halifax NR172 (6U-V) Aircraft attacked by ME-210 twin-engined fighter. The Rear Gunner F/O W. F. Griffiths, who received the DFC for the night’s work, coolly withheld his fire while he directed his captain in the necessary avoiding action. Enemy aircraft seen at 1000 yards dead astern firing at another aircraft. Enemy then turned slightly and getting into position to attack our bomber. Approximately 600 yards Rear Gunner gave Corkscrew Port. Opened fire at approximately 400 yards. Closed at 300 yards. Rear Gunner saw strikes entering cockpit and engine of enemy aircraft. Then fighter was seen to go down in a spin with smoke pouring from the engines Rear Gunner claims fighter destroyed. AIR 27/1814 415 Sq ORB Appendices
No. 156 Squadron (Combat No. 6) Lancaster (YG-E) Ju.88 heading 1767 degrees on starboard quarter above - range 6000 yards opened fire enemy aircraft lost through Corkscrew. AIR 14/3227 Raid plots – night January 1945
No. 153 Squadron (Combat No. 7) Lancaster LM754 (P4-E) As our Lancaster was commencing its bombing run, the Wireless Operator reported contact with a suspicious aircraft on Fishpond, flying port quarter and at a range of 1000 yards. Half a minute later Rear Gunner observed an enemy aircraft which he identified as an Fw.190 attacking our Lancaster from the port quarter up, at a range of 250 yards. Rear Gunner immediately opened fire and our Lancaster corkscrewed to port. When our Lancaster was in the initial dive of the corkscrew the enemy aircraft opened fire. The Lancaster Pilot observed tracer from the enemy aircraft passing over the starboard mainplane. Enemy aircraft pressed home the attack and commenced the breakaway at a range of 50 yards passing over the Lancaster from port quarter to starboard bow and was lost from view. During the whole attack, the Mid Upper Gunner failed to observe the enemy aircraft and this was unable to take advantage of a comparatively easy target. No claim. Slight damage to our aircraft. Hole in the fuselage. Rudder controls jammed. Fixed aerial U/S. Fishpond warning before and during attack AIR 27/1031 153 Sq. ORB Appendices
No. 170 Squadron (Combat No. 8) Lancaster LM732 (TC-C) Homeward. 170/TC-C was attacked three times by a Ju.88 south of the target area and both Mid Upper and Rear Gunners had a ‘go’ at the enemy aircraft which did not open fire. When last seen the enemy aircraft was going off emitting smoke from the starboard engine. It is not possible to credit the grew with more than a claim for damages, but it is interesting to note that 150/L (NG359) saw a Page 33 of 51
Ju.88 at the same time and place and 170/M (PB752) reported an aircraft going down in flames and which exploded in the air at the same position but two minutes later. AIR 27/1097/1 170 Sq. ORB Summary
No. 425 Squadron (Combat No. 9) Halifax NP685 (OW-L) ME.410 400 yards dead astern. Rear Gunner fired short burst. Enemy aircraft disappeared. No claim AIR 14/3227 Raid plots – night January 1945
No. 460 Squadron (Combat No. 10) Lancaster PB227 (UV-R) The first indication of attack was trace being fired at the bomber. The Mid Upper Gunner immediately sighted a Ju.88 at 300 yards range on the fine port quarter slightly above. He returned fire and was joined by the Rear Gunner who ordered corkscrew port. The Ju.88 ceased firing when the Rear Gunner returned fire, closing at 150 yards, and broke away port quarter down, on breakaway the Rear Gunner held the fighter in the GGS (Gyro Gun Sight), and fired continuously until the fighter disappeared from view, losing height rapidly in practically vertical dive. The Rear Gunner claims hits and in his opinion the fighter seemed to be out of control, and makes a claim of possibly damaged. Throughout the attack the Rear Gunner fired on the Ju.88 by means of GGS. AIR 27/1911 460 Sq. ORB Appendices
No. 405 Squadron (Combat No. 11) Lancaster ND437? (LQ-M) Heading 321. ME.410 made feint attack from port beam and below. Continued on to starboard beam. Remained there at masked position. Mid Upper fired short burst and he moved out another 300 yards to approximately 6/800 yards. Mid Upper gave him a long burst observed hits in fuselage. Rear Gunner also fired but could not get enough deflection. He came back underneath immediately below us went6 out to port and disappeared. AIR 14/3227 Raid plots – night January 1945
No. 156 Squadron (Combat No. 12) Lancaster (GT-E) ME.410 heading 331 degrees on starboard quarter range 800 yards - opened fire evasive action taken by Corkscrewing. Enemy aircraft came in twice again on starboard and then on port then starboard again and finally on port quarter. Rear Gunner gave burst after gun unfroze on third attack and afterwards Mid Upper Gunner gave some bursts. Enemy aircraft eventually made off - strikes seen by gunners. AIR 14/3227 Raid plots – night January 1945
No. 429 Squadron (Combat No. 13) Halifax MZ872 (AL-Z) While on the homeward journey on 29/01/1945 in Halifax Z at 4903 0711E, 18.000 feet at 0010 hours an Me.109 was seen on starboard quarter up on the curve of pursuit ay 300 yards range. The Mid Upper Gunner gave the order to corkscrew starboard. Both gunners opened fire at 250 yards firing 200 rounds each. The enemy aircraft broke away to port quarter down and was lost to sight. Strikes were seen on its wings but no claim is made. AIR 27/1855 429 Squadron ORB Appendices
No. 85 Squadron Combat No. 14) Mosquito (Q) F/Lt Mellows and F/Lt Drew observed three single engined aircraft on Biblis airfield (10 miles north of Stuttgart) and for the lack of airborne opponents came down and attacked from 1000 feet. Strikes were observed on one of the aircraft, which was claimed as damaged, and they left amid a hail of well-intentioned but ill directed light flak. AIR 27/706/25 85 Squadron ORB Records Jan 1945
Page 34 of 51
7. RAF ORDER OF BATTLE, ZUFFENHAUSEN, STUTTGART 7.1. DESCRIPTION It is believed that the main target for this second attack on Stuttgart was the Hirth Aero Engine factory which was producing jet propelled engines. 7.2. 1 BOMBER GROUP Battle Orders th
On 28 January No. 1 Group was instructed to provide 145 aircraft out of a total of 337 aircraft of 1, 4 and 6 Groups plus PFF aircraft that would attack the target. Lancasters from 12, 100, 101, 103, 150, 153, 166, 170, 300, 460, 576 and 626 squadrons were detailed to attack in three waves spread between ‘H’ and ‘H’ = 9, 43 aircraft in the first wave, 43 aircraft in the second wave and 43 aircraft in the third wave. The time of attack ‘H’ Hour was 2330 hours. The aim of the raid was to ‘destroy built up area and industries in area of aiming point which includes jet engine and ignition component factories’. The crews were told Crews are to bomb only on markers tonight and not to bomb on instruments(*this includes H2S) owing to the location of two POW camps some 5 miles north of the target. This instruction does not preclude the use of H2S for checking the position of the target and as many H2S photographs as possible are to be taken at the time of release. There is no alternative target and if markers are not seen crews are to return with their bombs H2S was the first airborne, ground scanning radar system. It was developed to identify targets on the ground for night and all-weather bombing
No fighter cover was provided The bomb load was one 4,000lb HC bomb and twelve 500lb ANM64 mines. The aiming point would be marked with Red TIs and the release point with skymarking flares Red/Yellow stars starting at ‘H’ minus 3. Other Pathfinders aircraft would keep the aiming point marked with Green TIs and the release point would be marked with skymarking flares Green/Red stars. Summary of Operations Detailed Took Off Successful ‘A’ Abortive OET (Over enemy target) Abortive NOET (Not over enemy target) Missing
150 Lancasters 148 Lancasters 138 Lancasters 3 Lancasters 4 Lancasters 3 Lancasters
Successful ‘A’ TOT (Time over Target) 2331 – 2348 Hours. 18000 to 20000 feet ‘… PFF were about three minutes late and it appeared that a few aircraft had already commenced bombing before they arrived. Release point flares were dropped at 2330 hours but these were sparse and rather scattered. Release point marking increased during the attack and though bombing was not highly concentrated a good coverage over target area was made. Large explosion were seen at 2328 hours, 2334 hours, 2337 hours and 2342 hours, and several crews reported incendiaries burning north of the main bombing concentration. Du to cloud cover assessment of results is not possible. Ground defences were slight heavy flak in barrage decreasing as the attack developed. Only two aircraft were hit. There was some fighter activity in the target area and four aircraft were engaged in combat, one of which claims to have damaged a Ju.88 which was seen to spiral down emitting smoke and flames. Missing 1. 460/S 2. 153/O 3. 300/K
F/O Birt F/O Jones O M C F/Lt Zarebski
(14) (29) (7)
nd
2 Wave st 1 Wave nd 2 Wave
Page 35 of 51
Squadron
12
No. Aircraft
6
Aircraft Type
Lancaster
Comments Six aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart and they took-off from RAF Wickenby between 1950 hours and 2000 hours. Bombing carried out between 2332 hours and 2343 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘10/10ths cloud cover over the primary and as a result the bombing was done on sky marking provided by PFF. A visibility check was therefore impossible. Pending daylight photographic cover results cannot be assessed. Ground defences were negligible and no fighters seen’. AIR 27/169/1 12 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/169/2 12 Squadron ORB Records January 1945
100
12
Lancaster
Twelve aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart and they took-off from RAF Grimsby between 1940 hours and 2005 hours. Bombing carried out between 2333 hours and 2341 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘… the primary objective was a factory engaged in the production of jet propelled aircraft fighters … Bombing was entirely on sky markers and it was impossible to assess the success or otherwise of the attack. Opposition was slight … One of our aircraft, F/Lt Ellitt, was slightly damaged (starboard inner engine hit at 2330 hours) by heavy flak and returned home on three engines. No trouble with fighters was reported by any of our crews. From our angle not one of our most successful raid’. AIR 27/798/1 100 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/798/2 100 Squadron ORB Records January 1945
101
18
Lancaster
Eighteen aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart and they tookoff from RAF Ludford Magna between 1936 hours and 2003 hours. Bombing carried out between 2330 hours and 2345 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘18 aircraft on operations. Lancaster :(LL829) ‘J’ abandoned the mission over target ‘GEE’ (radio navigation system) u/s’ AIR 27/804/1 101 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/804/2 101 Squadron ORB Records January 1945
103
16
Lancaster
Sixteen aircraft detailed for the attack on Stuttgart but only fifteen took off from RAF Elsham Wolds between 1934 hours and 2001 hours, F/O Bakers aircraft developed engine trouble and was cancelled. Bombing carried out between 2333 hours and 2340 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘… the target area was covered by 9/10ths fairly thin cloud … Only one crew bombed on TIs, the remainder used Wanganui flares (target marking by blind-dropped sky markers when ground concealed by cloud). There was very little flak but fighters were active. F/O Hart (PD281) ‘O’ was attacked once (time unknown) and hit by cannon fire, and F/Lt Newman (RA500) ‘N’ twice attacked (2320 hours) whilst [preparing to bomb. This resulted in the loss of two engines but the pilot skilfully brought the aircraft back to the country, landing at Manston. All of the other aircraft returned and landed safely without incident’. AIR 27/817/1 103 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/817/2 103 Squadron ORB Records January 1945
150
17
Lancaster
Seventeen aircraft detailed for the attack on Stuttgart but only sixteen aircraft were able to get airborne and they took-off from RAF Hemswell between 1907 hours and 1942 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘(D) (F/O Groves) a new aircraft, due to unserviceability was unable to take off … 10/10ths cloud was experienced and through ground markers were used it was necessary for sly markers to be laid before bombing was successful. Due to cloud it was difficult to assess results though several crews reported explosions and fire burning through the cloud. Little enemy opposition was experienced, no fighters seen. All crews back to base safely. AIR 27/1013/9 150 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/1013/10 150 Squadron ORB Records January 1945
Page 36 of 51
Squadron
153
No. Aircraft
17
Aircraft Type
Lancaster
Comments Seventeen aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart and they tookoff from RAF Scampton between 1920 hours and 1955 hours. Bombing carried out between 2334 hours and 2340 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘… an attack on the Marshalling Yards at Zuffenhausen. … The majority of crew bombed on Release Point Flares. Enemy defences consisted of slight to moderate heavy flak, no searchlights were encountered and fighter activity was on a moderate scale. Crews were of the opinion that the attack had been fairly successful, although not a successful as it would have been in clear conditions. One aircraft (LM550) ‘O’ flown by F/Lt Wheeler was abortive and one aircraft (PB638 ‘O’) flown by F/O O M C Jones failed to return. Another aircraft flown by Sq/Ldr Rippingdale (LM754) ‘E’ was engaged in combat with and enemy fighter (2338 hours). None pf the crew were injured. AIR 27/1029/25 153 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/1029/26 153 Squadron ORB Records January 1945 AIR 27/1031 153 Squadron ORB Appendices
166
10
Lancaster
Ten aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart and they took-off from RAF Kirmington between 1930 hours and 2010 hours. Bombing carried out between 2334 hours and 2337 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘… 10/10ths cloud prevailed at the time of bombing. Crews had to bomb on sky markers and were unable to see any results as the target was totally obscured. F/O Jenkins in ‘L’ (NG136) arrived rather late and has to abandon the mission over the target area as the markers were extinguished. Enemy opposition took the form of slight to moderate heavy flak and some fighter activity was reported. None of our aircraft was in trouble and all returned successfully to base after a disappointing sortie’. AIR 27/1089/50 166 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/1089/51 166 Squadron ORB Records January 1945
170
18
Lancaster
Ten aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart but only nine took-off from RAF Hemswell between 1920 hours and 1955 hours. Bombing carried out between 2333 hours and 2345 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘… ‘P’ (ND658) was the only one which failed to take off having taxied off the perimeter track and become bogged in a hole which was concealed by the snow. ‘W’ (PB728) F/O Close unfortunately returned early … Opposition on the whole was only slight to moderate heavy flak, with no searchlights. Taken all round there was not very much evidence of fighter activity but one or two crews did report air tracer and or three sightings of enemy aircraft. F/O Baxter (LM732) ‘C’ was attacked three times by a Ju.88 south of the target area and both the Mid Upper Gunner and Rear Gunner had a ‘go’ at the enemy aircraft which did not open fire. When last seen the enemy aircraft was going off emitting smoke from the starboard engine, It is not possible to credit the crew with more than a claim for damage, but it is interesting to note that 150/L saw a Ju.88 at the same time and place and 170/M reported an aircraft going down in flames which exploded in the air at the same position but two minutes later. AIR 27/1097/1 170 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/1097/2 170 Squadron ORB Records January 1945
300
4
Lancaster
Four aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RAF Faldingworth between 1959 hours and 2001 hours. Bombing carried out between 2338 hours and 2339 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘… (PB722) ‘J’ captained by P/O Janczur was abortive, GEE being u/s. Aircraft (PB846) ‘K’ captained by F/Lt Zarebski was missing ... Two crews were successful. Target was Stuttgart’. AIR 27/1658/30 300 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/1658/31 300 Squadron ORB Records January 1945
460
12
Lancaster
Twelve aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RAF Binbrook between 1936 hours and 2002 hours. Bombing carried out between 2331 hours and 2341 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘There was little to see of results except a whitish glow below cloud. ‘R’ (PB227) F/O Whitmarsh had combat with a Ju.88 (2334). One of our aircraft failed to return, ‘B’ ND970 F/O Birt and crew. There was also one abortive sortie, ‘M’ (ND677) F/O Hando, due to unsatisfactory H2S (airborne, ground scanning radar system) and GEE. AIR 27/1658/30 460 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/1658/31 460 Squadron ORB Records January 1945 AIR 27/1911 460 Squadron ORB Appendices
Page 37 of 51
Squadron
576
No. Aircraft
15
Aircraft Type
Lancaster
Comments Fifteen aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RAF Fiskerton between 1937 hours and 2000 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘… The attack opened three minutes late … No results of bombing could be observed; the attack according to reports seemed to be reasonably concentrated. One good red or orange explosion occurring at 2339. A moderate heavy flak barrage we encountered decreasing as the attack developed, with a light predicted flak on the run in to bomb. Night fighters were active, ‘F2’ PB403 (F/O Sowerbutts) reports seeing one our aircraft shot down and single engined enemy aircraft with its starboard wing on fire (2353). No final result was seen. ‘I2’ LM227 (F/O Dalziel) reported one bomber bursting into flames and exploding on the ground (2336). ‘K2’ PD363 (F/O Paley) sighted one Ju.88 but was not close enough to engage. F/Lt Thieme in ‘Y2’ NG273 was attacked by a jet propelled enemy aircraft (2336). The Rear Gunner, Sgt Crouch opened fire to which the enemy aircraft replied. Evasive action was taken and the attacking aircraft broke away, Upon examination Y2 was found to have been holed port main frame, flap and tail plane and the port aerial lost. None of the crew were injured’. AIR 27/2047/27 576 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/2047/28 576 Squadron ORB Records January 1945 AIR 27/2048 576 Squadron ORB Appendices
626
6
Lancaster
Six aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RAF Wickenby between 1941 hours and 2001 hours. Bombing carried out between 2332 hours and 2336 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘The original call on the Squadron for six aircraft for bombing was later increased to fourteen du e to doubtful serviceability of another airfield, and fourteen aircraft were detailed in case of need. Finally the Squadron was only asked to provide the original six aircraft … Neither fighters nor flak were encountered’. AIR 27/2145/29 576 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/2145/30 576 Squadron ORB Records January 1945
7.3. 4 BOMBER GROUP Battle Orders Check No. 4 Group Battle Orders at the National Archives for details. Halifaxes from 51, squadrons were ordered to attack Stuttgart, 43 aircraft in the first wave, 43 aircraft in the second wave and 43 aircraft in the third wave. Summary of Operations Check No. 4 Group ORB at the National Archives for details. Squadron
No. Aircraft
Aircraft Type
10
51
19
Halifax
Comments Not necessarily on Stuttgart Raid Nineteen aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RAF Snaith between 1940 hours and 2016 hours. Bombing carried out between 2333 hours and 2346 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘… Over the target flares were reported a bursting very high and owing to strong winds were soon scattered, neither were they well maintained. A number of fires were visible through the cloud but the general opinion is that the attack lacked concentration. A few scattered fighter flares were reported between the Rhine and the target on the outward journey and one combat was observed over the target area without result. (MZ754) ‘T’ F/O Brayshaw was attacked three times by an Me.109. The Rear Gunner (Sgt R O Fenner, No. 3000547) was killed by what is believed to have been cannon fire and the Navigator was slightly wounded by flak (MP963) ‘R’ reported two short bursts of tracer fired, no tracer seen AIR 27/494/1 51 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/494/2 51 Squadron ORB Records January 1945
76 77 78 158
Not necessarily on Stuttgart Raid Not necessarily on Stuttgart Raid Not necessarily on Stuttgart Raid Not necessarily on Stuttgart Raid Page 38 of 51
Squadron
No. Aircraft
Aircraft Type
Comments Not necessarily on Stuttgart Raid Not necessarily on Stuttgart Raid Not necessarily on Stuttgart Raid Not necessarily on Stuttgart Raid Not necessarily on Stuttgart Raid
346 347 466 578 640
7.4. 6 BOMBER GROUP Battle Orders Check No. 6 Group Battle Orders at the National Archives for details. Halifaxes from 408, 415, 420, 424, 425, 426, 427, 429, and 432 squadrons were ordered to attack Stuttgart, 45 aircraft in the first wave, 45 aircraft in the second wave and 45 aircraft in the third wave. Summary of Operations Check No. 6 Group ORB at the National Archives for details. Squadron
408
No. Aircraft
16
Aircraft Type
Halifax
Comments Sixteen aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RAF Linton on Ouse between 1922 hours and 2014 hours. Bombing carried out between 2331 hours and 2341 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘… Two aircraft however failed to return from this operation and nothing has been heard off or from either of these two crews. … Both crews will be sadly missed by all personnel in the squadron. … No results from ground markers observed. Some crews forced to orbit aa marking appeared to be somewhat late, Incendiaries and bomb flashes were observed which appeared to be well grouped. Two explosions reported at 2334.5 hours and one fairly large explosion at 2335.6 hours. Defence consisted of very light flak bursting between 14 to 20,000 feet generally below bombing height. No combats reported although some fighter activity took place over the target’. AIR 27/1798/25 408 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/1798/26 408 Squadron ORB Records January 1945
Fifteen aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RCAF East Moor between 1934hours and 1952 hours. Bombing carried out between 2329 hours and 2343 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘All our aircraft returned safely from last night’s attack against Stuttgart. One of our aircraft returned early CAN/J.36972 F/O L P Minkler and crew due to a failure of oxygen equipment. Squadron Leader W/C Ball led 15 aircraft into fray and good results reported. AIR 27/1813/15 415 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/1813/16 415 Squadron ORB Records January 1945
415
15
Halifax
(MZ922) ‘C’ F/O Hyland, Rear Gunner saw one Fw.109 approaching from starboard quarter below in a curve up pursuit attack at range of 800 yards. Gunner gave combat manoeuvre corkscrew starboard. The Fw.190 broke off attack at 200 yards going starboard without firing. Rear Gunner did not fire. No claims. AIR 27/1814 415 Sq ORB Appendices
(NR172) ‘V’ S/L Brown, enemy aircraft (ME-210) first seen 1000 yards dead astern firing at another aircraft. Enemy then attacked our bomber. Rear Gunner gave Corkscrew Port, opened fire and saw strikes entering cockpit and engine, fighter was seen going down in a spin with smoke pouring from the engines. Rear Gunner claimed fighter destroyed. AIR 27/1814 415 Sq ORB Appendices
420
14
Halifax
Fourteen aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RCAF Tholthorpe between 1921 hours and 2015 hours. Bombing carried out between 2331 hours and 2338 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘Two aircraft made abortive sorties. F/Lt Shotton swung off the runway on take-off, ending up on the taxi-track and too badly shaken up to take off again. F/Sgt Bishop returned early with the port outer engine u/s which would have made him late on target. All other aircraft successfully attacked the primary target’. AIR 27/1826/23 420 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/1826/24 420 Squadron ORB Records January 1945
Page 39 of 51
Squadron
424
No. Aircraft
8
Aircraft Type
Halifax
Comments Eight aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RCAF Skipton on Swale between 1918 hours and 1919 hours. Bombing carried out between 2337 hours and 2338 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘The Squadron was ordered to detail 8 aircraft for an attack tonight. All preparations were completed and take off started on schedule. Two aircraft successfully took off. The third aircraft with (LW164) ‘S’, CAN.C.588 W/C K M Williams AFC and crew was on the runway just taking off when the aircraft blew up, (W/C E M Williams was understudying the Commanding Officer). This prevented the balance of the aircraft taking off. All crew members were instantly killed except for the Rear Gunner (F/O Tremblay J/18476) who was seriously injured and rushed in to hospital’. AIR 27/1835/23 424 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945
(MZ356) ‘T’, W/C Marshall, ‘one twin engined and one single engined enemy aircraft was sighted in the target area, no action was taken. Saw two aircraft shot down near the target, no parachutes seen. At position 4938N 0145E at 2136 hours saw a brilliant flash on the ground which may have been an aircraft’. AIR 27/1835/24 424 Squadron ORB Records January 1945
425
14
Halifax
Fifteen aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RCAF Tholthorpe between 1934 hours and 1952 hours. Bombing carried out between 2329 hours and 2343 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘Fourteen aircraft attacked the primary. Aircraft NR273 ‘X’ (F/O Perrier) was abortive over enemy territory, returned from target area. Lost en route and unable to each target in time to bomb … It is difficult to assess the raid due to cloud but it is reported that a good glow was seen below … Heavy flak was only slight to moderate barrage, principally6 low with some widely scattered over a height band of 17/20000 feet. No searchlights in evidence. A few fighter flares seen on the first and second legs out of the target. No combat took place and no claim is made. NR231 ‘F’, (F/O McHale), hit by heavy flak in T/A at 19000 feet, 2332 hours, 155 mph causing hole in Perspex in nose and also bomb doors. AIR 27/1839/1 420 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/1839/2 420 Squadron ORB Records January 1945
426
16
Halifax
Sixteen aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RCAF Linton on Ouse between 1905 hours and 1950 hours. Bombing carried out between 2332 hours and 2340 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘Sixteen aircraft took off commencing at 1905 hours and carried out a raid on Stuttgart (Zuffenhausen). CAN/J.10741 F/Lt E T Garrett flying aircraft NP808 ‘E’ was an early return due to failure of an engine which prevented him from climbing to height. CAN/C178 W/C F C Carling-Kelly Squadron Commanding Officer failed to return from this operation (NP768 ‘Q’). All other aircraft were diverted, thirteen landing at Ridgewell and one landing at Cheveston. AIR 27/1843/1 426 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945
F/O Whipple (NP685) ‘L’, was attacked by an Me.410, there was no claim or damage, ‘just after bombing forced to corkscrew to port due to enemy fighter’. AIR 27/1843/2 426 Squadron ORB Records January 1945
427
16
Halifax
Sixteen aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RCAF Leeming between 1927 hours and 2005 hours. Bombing carried out between 2334 hours and 2355 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘All aircraft got away to good start … One aircraft ‘B’ MR171 was an early return and landed at Linton on Ouse. Engine failure … The target marking appeared somewhat late. Then backers up were late ... A good stream of aircraft was maintained both into and out of the target area. In view of the cloud cover and assessment of the raid is impossible. Flak was slight to moderate mostly in barrage form’. AIR 27/1847/1 427 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/1847/2 427 Squadron ORB Records January 1945
Page 40 of 51
Squadron
429
No. Aircraft
15
Aircraft Type
Halifax
Comments Fifteen aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RCAF Leeming between 1918 hours and 1919 hours. Bombing carried out between 2337 hours and 2338 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘Fourteen aircraft successfully bombed the primary; the remaining aircraft was late over target and did not bomb due to the absence of markers … crews reported a concentrated glow of fires was reflected on the cloud as well as the glow of TIs. A good stream of aircraft was maintained both into and out of the target area. An assessment of the raid cannot be given in view of cloud cover over the target. Aircraft ‘Z’ (MZ872) piloted by P/PO W Fikis (Can J/88425) was attacked by an enemy Me.109 at 4903N 0711E at 0100 hours, 18,000 feet while on the homeward journey. The Halifax corkscrewed to starboard and both gunners opened fire at 250 yards firing 200 rounds each. The enemy aircraft broke off to port quarter below and was lost. No claim is made’. (NR196) ‘A’, F/Lt Robb (Can J/5118), at 2328 hours an Me.110 was seen attacking a Lancaster. Air to air fire was seen but no results. (LV860) ‘T’, F/O Humphries (Can J/14047), at 2336 hours observed enemy aircraft but no action was taken. (MZ482) ‘N’, F/O Jones (Can J/26131), at 2339 hours sustained small flak hole in nose Perspex. (PN367) ‘J’, F/Lt Creeper (Can J/8382), at 2343 hours reported large aircraft heading towards target exploded, 12 miles to starboard and 10 miles from target, disappeared in cloud and explosion was seen on ground. (NA201) ‘W’, F/Lf Charlton (Can J/14047), at 2354 reported cannon and tracer fire but no result observed. AIR 27/1854/1 429 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/1854/2 429 Squadron ORB Records January 1945 AIR 27/1855 429 Squadron ORB Appendices
Halifax
432
429/S ‘set course to make up for time lost due to high winds 429/T ‘late on target due to incorrect met winds Fifteen aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RCAF East Moor between 1910 hours and 1933 hours. Bombing carried out between 2333 hours and 2342 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘All took off and returned to diversion bases. All aircraft attacked the primary target and bombed by sky markers. PFF were late arriving over target. Flak was slight to moderate and enemy aircraft were active but no combat was claimed. AIR 27/1860/41 432 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/1860/42 432 Squadron ORB Records January 1945
15
(NP694) ‘R’, P/O McGuire (Can J/89084) reported combat with enemy. ‘On the bombing run about two minutes before dropping bombs the pilot saw a Ju.88 on starboard bow above. The fighter passed over and ahead of the bomber, dropped back to port beam where the Mid Upper Gunner fired a burst of 200 yards (sic, ‘rounds’) at point blank range 100 yards. The tracer was seen by the Mid Upper Gunner to hit the fighter, which immediately dived out of view to port quarter down and was not seen again. The fighter is claimed as damaged’. AIR 27/1861 432 Squadron ORB Appendices
7.5. 8 BOMBER (PATHFINDER FORCE) GROUP Battle Orders Check No. 8 Group Battle Orders at the National Archives for details. Lancasters and Mosquitoes from105, 156, 405 squadrons were ordered to attack Stuttgart. Summary of Operations Check No. 8 Group ORB at the National Archives for details. Squadron 7 35
No. Aircraft
Aircraft Type
Comments Not necessarily on Stuttgart Raid Not necessarily on Stuttgart Raid
Page 41 of 51
Squadron
No. Aircraft
105
Aircraft Type
Mosquito
109 128 139 142
156
8
Lancaster
162 163
405
11
Lancaster
Comments Eleven aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RCAF East Moor between 1910 hours and 1933 hours. Bombing carried out between 2333 hours and 2342 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘ ML923 (105) reported missing, unknown Not necessarily on Stuttgart Raid Not necessarily on Stuttgart Raid Not necessarily on Stuttgart Raid Not necessarily on Stuttgart Raid Eleven aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RCAF East Moor between 1910 hours and 1933 hours. Bombing carried out between 2333 hours and 2342 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘ 156/E reported two combats with enemy 156/T reported combat with enemy PB186 (A) reported missing, probably fighter Not necessarily on Stuttgart Raid Not necessarily on Stuttgart Raid Eleven aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RCAF East Moor between 1910 hours and 1933 hours. Bombing carried out between 2333 hours and 2342 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘ 2006, 2038 ND437 (M) reported combat with enemy PB650 (U) reported missing, fighter Not necessarily on Stuttgart Raid Not necessarily on Stuttgart Raid Not necessarily on Stuttgart Raid Not necessarily on Stuttgart Raid Not necessarily on Stuttgart Raid
571 582 608 635 692
7.6. 100 BOMBER (SPECIAL DUTIES) GROUP Battle Orders Check No. 100 Battle Orders at the National Archives for details. Mosquitoes from 85, 157, 192 squadrons were ordered to carry out special duties to support the bombers to Stuttgart. Summary of Operations Check No. 100 Group ORB at the National Archives for details. Squadron
No. Aircraft
Aircraft Type
23
85
Mosquito
141
157
169 171
3
Mosquito
Comments Not necessarily on Stuttgart Raid Eleven aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RCAF East Moor between 1910 hours and 1933 hours. Bombing carried out between 2333 hours and 2342 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘ 85/Q reported combat with enemy Not necessarily on Stuttgart Raid Eleven aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RCAF East Moor between 1910 hours and 1933 hours. Bombing carried out between 2333 hours and 2342 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘ TA391 (N), high level intruder duties TA993 (C), high level intruder duties TA397 (R) observed air to air firing and aircraft diving towards ground Not necessarily on Stuttgart Raid Not necessarily on Stuttgart Raid
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Squadron
No. Aircraft
Aircraft Type
Comments Eleven aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RCAF East Moor between 1910 hours and 1933 hours. Bombing carried out between 2333 hours and 2342 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘
192
4
Halifax
NR272 (R) reported twin jet engine aircraft seen 4000 to 5000 feet below MZ342 (B) Telemetering on the 200 – 250 Mc/s band NR272 (R) Centimetre search on the 3000 – 3600 Mc/s band NR180 (S) Search on the 60 – 110 Mc/s band for enemy AI signals NP970 (T) Search the 130 – 170 Mc/s band for Jadgschloss transmissions AI, airborne interception radar. Jadgschloss a German early warning and battle control radar. A related system, Jagdhütte, was used for control of the Luftwaffe's own night fighters.
Eleven aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RCAF East Moor between 1910 hours and 1933 hours. Bombing carried out between 2333 hours and 2342 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘ 192
3
Mosquito
DZ410 (K) Jam enemy AI with Piperack and to record enemy radio telephony (R?T) and wireless telephony (W?T) signals DZ491 (N), as DZ410 above DZ617 Search for 400 – 500 low frequency Wurzburg transmissions Piperack, airborne jamming radar carried by lead aircraft that produced a cone of jamming behind it Wurzburg, ground based gun laying radar used by Flak Batteries
Not necessarily on Stuttgart Raid Not necessarily on Stuttgart Raid Not necessarily on Stuttgart Raid Not necessarily on Stuttgart Raid Not necessarily on Stuttgart Raid Not necessarily on Stuttgart Raid
199 214 223 239 462 515
8. ANTI-AIRCRAFT (FLAK) BATTERIES STUTTGART 8.1. PERSONNEL At the start of the war the Luftwaffe Flak units were a very substantial part of the Luftwaffe's total force of around 1.5 million men, it is estimated that between one third and two thirds of Luftwaffe Forces were in Flak units. However, as the war progressed and the tide turned against Germany more of the regular soldiers were withdrawn for front line action. This meant that the ‘gaps’ on the Home Front had to be filled by others, mainly soldiers not fit for active duty, members of the German Home Guard and foreigners (prisoners of war etc.). th
Due to the rapidly decreasing numbers on 25 January 1943, the "Ordinance on the Military Aid Service of German Youth in the Air Force" was issued, whereby the regular Wehrmacht soldiers were replaced by anti-aircraft helpers. Whole classes of children were assigned to serve on antiaircraft positions, including 15 year olds. It is estimated there were around 20,000 schoolchildren aged 15 to 17 who fought against the increasingly large bomber forces in the last two years of the war, led by older soldiers. While the official term for these children was Luftwaffenhelfer (HJ), the term more commonly used was ‘Flakhelfer’ (female: Flakhelfer). School continued parallel to military service, barrack instead of classroom, in the mornings the teachers tried to teach the children, in the evening they defended the city. At Christmas we played under the Christmas tree railroad, in January we were moved in - to the parents' horror. th
The work was extremely dangerous, for example on 29 July 1944, the fourth of four consecutive nights of attack, a British bomber dropped an air mine over a command centre at Degerloch, eight 15 rd and 16 year-old child soldiers and ten soldiers died. On 3 August there was a massive air raid, in which 23 young air force helpers were killed. 8.2. FLAK BATTERY TACTICS German flak gunners employed three methods of fire control against heavy bombers. Continuously Pointed Fire
This relied on good visual or gun-laying radar acquisition of the bomber formation. Shells were placed directly in front of the lead aircraft in the formation, giving a continuous pattern of bursts along Page 43 of 51
the bombers course. When the bombers moved out of range the next batteries took over. This was the most dangerous and accurate form of heavy anti-aircraft fire. Predicted Concentration Fire
This was less effective. It was used at night, through cloud cover or when radar information was of minimal quality. The system needed the bomber formation to fly straight band level for about 90 seconds in order to achieve success. A master command post directed the fire of several batteries at the same time. A prediction was made of the bomber flight path and batteries fired shells to strike the point of prediction at then given time. Then new prediction would be calculated and a new concentration shells slavoed.
Barrage Fire
This was the least effective measure, use at night or when cloud prevented a good visual sighting. It was designed to put as much flak as a possible into a certain area of the sky ‘the box’; this was usually just outside the expected bomb release line of the incoming formation. If properly places the bomber crew had no option but to fly through it. German Flak Defences vs Allied Heavy Bombers: 1942–45, Donald Nijboer, pp 61-62
Bind and Confuse
The Germans used a large number of searchlights. Although the searchlights were not particularly successful in illuminating high-flying bombers, they were used to produce dazzle or glare to blind and confuse the bomber aircrews. The main searchlights used were 60cm and 150cm-diameter parabolic glass reflectors. Dazzle and glare made locating targets difficult and lessened the accuracy of bombing, and keeping beams direct on an Allied plane helped defending fighters approach the plane unobserved. Heavy searchlights usually used sound locators to find bombers, while light searchlights relied on picking up targets by means of search patterns. warfarehistorynetwork.com/2016/06/15/german-antiaircraft-defenses
8.3. FLAK GUNS Flak worked by using fuses to set off explosive ordnance. There were two types, a timed fuse which, after so many seconds, would detonate the shell, the other was a barometric fuse which was triggered (by measuring air pressure) when a certain altitude was reach. The explosive ordinance was made up of a high explosive compound that was ignited by the fuse. The explosive compound would either operate on its own or be paired with other designs to increase the effectiveness of the shell versus certain targets. Some shells would have built in sleeves, fragment shards, ball bearings or rails that would all be propelled by the blast of the war head. Other shells were incendiary, the explosive would contain things like barium nitrate or phosphorous; with the aim of basically tossing super-hot fire within an area of the aircraft in order to burn it. Flak was a very effective defence system. In 1944 Flak accounted for 3,501 American planes destroyed, 600 less than planes lost to enemy fighters in the same period. German Flak accounted for 50 of the 72 RAF bombers lost over Berlin on the night of 24th March 1944. An incredible 56 bombers were destroyed or crippled by flak during a B-17 raid on Merseburg in November 1944. The Flak 8.8-36 gun was considered one of the most successful guns of the Second World War. About a third of the US bombers shot down were the responsibility of the Flak. At the beginning of the war in 1939 there were almost 2,500 8.8 cm flak 18 and 36. A further development in 1942 was the 8.8 cm Flak 41 from "Rheinmetall", which was initially only produced in a so-called "pilot series" of 44 pieces. Their range increased to 20,000 m, the height to 14,860 m, the rate of fire to 20-25 rounds / min. and the muzzle velocity to 1,000 m / s. In the course of the war the bombers flew higher and higher, soon the 8.8 cm flak was no longer sufficient and was replaced by heavier calibers. Nevertheless, the 8.8 cm cannon remained in use throughout the war and was also used to defend against tanks and to fire at ground targets. So-called distance measuring devices or command devices were used to calculate the altitude of the opposing aircraft. These targets were telescopes equipped with numerous prisms, through which the flight height could be calculated by crossing the viewing angles of the prisms. A unit of the Eisenbahnflak was stationed at Hasenberg. The proximity of the mock system to Weilimdorf, Wolfbusch and Korntal also led to bombs landing in residential areas. The most serious attack on Weilimdorf on January 28, 1945 was caused by the activity of the mock facility. The anti-aircraft battery Weilimdorf was again directly in the hail of bombs during this attack. In addition to explosive bombs, hundreds of stick fire bombs fell. There was one death and 15 injuries. Several barracks were destroyed again. Page 44 of 51
8.4. STUTTGART HEAVY ANTI-AIRCRAFT POSITIONS (AS OF 1944) Location
Battery no.
Armament
radar
Sulzgries
3s/436
6 x 8.8 cm
Yes
Cheeks
1s/436
4 x 10.5 cm
Yes
Luginsland
2s/436
6 x 8.8 cm
Yes
Weilimdorf/Hausen
2s/241; 3s/460 (Bofors)
6 x 8.8 cm
Yes
Gerlingen (Doppelb.)
3s/460
12 x 8.8 cm
Yes
Degerloch
New installation.
6 x 8.8 cm
Yes
Stammheim
3s/241
6 x 8.8 cm
Yes
Birch head
4s/241; 3s/241
4 x 10.5 cm
Yes
Forging
4s/436
6 x 8.8 cm
Yes
Kornwestheim/Gleisd.
4s/241
12 x 8.8 cm
Yes
Feuerbach
New installation.
4 x 8.8 cm
Yes
Killesberg/Mühlbachhof
Staff z, BV/436
4 x 8.8 cm
Yes
Vaihingen
6 x 8.8 cm
Yes
4 x 8.8 cm
No
Real things
7s/241; 4s/460 1s/460; 5s/436 5s/460 Hei 206 XII
6 x 8.5 cm
No
Korntal
Hei 206
6 x 8.8 cm
Yes
Haydn
Doggenburg
Hei/RAD anti-aircraft gun
4 x 8.8 cm
Yes
Sillenbuch
6s/241; 2/906
4 x 8.8 cm
Yes
Light Anti-Aircraft Gun Positions Location
Unit
Gun type
Command post
Hirth works
III/4/54
3 x 4 cm
Keller Hirth
Porsche plant
III/1/54
3 x 3.7 cm
Basement, old work
Neuwirtshaus
III/2/54
3 x 3.7 cm
Bunker embankment
Werner and Pfleiderer
III/5/54
3 x 4 cm
Basement in the factory
Bosch Feuerbach
II/5/54
3 x 2 cm
Siegelbergstollen
Foehrich, Feuerbach
IV/5; I/54
3 x 2 cm four
Earth bunker
Norma works
III/2/858
3 x 3.7 cm
Norma Keller
Mahle and Eckard
II/3/858
3 x 2 + 2 x 3.7
Factory air. room
Freight depot
I/5/54
3 x 4 cm
?
Burgholzhof
IV/2/858 3 x 2 cm four
Assmann/Stocker
?
2 x 2 cm
?
Cannstatt Viaduct
Hey Flak
3 x 3.7 cm
Towers
Cheeks
III/2/858
3 x 2 cm
LS basement
Cannstatter Wasen
IV/2/858 3 x 2 cm four
Barrack bunker
Daimler Benz
I/2/858
2 x 4 cm
High level
Maschinenfabr.Essl.
V/2/858
3 x 3.7 cm
?
Untert Mönchberg
2/858
3 x 3.7 cm
Linden School UT
Uhland height
3/858
2 x 3.7 cm
turret
Central Station
2/4/54
1 x 2 cm
tower
Rotebühl barracks
I/54
1 x 2 cm
High level
Banzhalde Feuerb.
Hei23/VII
3 x 4.0 cm
Kornwestheim Bahnh.
Hei30/VII
3 x 3.7 cm
Pragsattel Bunker
?
3 x 3.7 cm
tower
Hotel Schönblick
?
2 x 3.7 cm
tower
Hasenberg
?
2 x 2.0 cm
Collection building Feu
3 x 2.0 cm
Waldschenke Leibniz high school
The flak was part of the active air defence system in Stuttgart, the heavy anti-aircraft positions were mostly set up on the hills around Stuttgart. The light anti-aircraft positions such as the 20mm and 37mm guns for protection against low-flying aircraft were installed on exposed buildings or separately built anti-aircraft towers Page 45 of 51
(made of wood). These included the Tagblattturm and the Bahnhofsturm. The Flak ring was feared by the Allied Air Force. The heavy anti-aircraft gun with its 88mm guns was able to record considerable kills. An anti-aircraft battery usually consisted of 6 heavy anti-aircraft guns of caliber 8.8 cm or 10.5 cm installed in firing positions, in the Braunschweig area also partially Soviet anti-aircraft guns drilled to 8.8 cm. Double batteries comprised a total of 12 heavy anti-aircraft guns. Each battery was equipped with its own command structure, with optical (e.g. command device 36 or 40 or Beute-Malsi) electronic means of target finding (e.g. FuMG 62 " Würzburg " 39 T AD or later also FuMG 64 " Mannheim " 41 T) . The even more powerful radar devices such as " Würzburg-Riese " were used more for fighter guidance. The "Freya" radar systems were used for long-range reconnaissance deep into the enemy territory. By 1944, Stuttgart was defended by 11 heavy (88 mm) and 38 light (20 mm to 40 mm) anti-aircraft gun batteries. There was also a Luftwaffe fighter base south of the city at Echterdingen. The landmark Observation Tower Burgholzhof was used by anti-aircraft spotters during raids. The Pragstattel Flakturm stands just north of central Stuttgart along a busy highway, decorated with signage, and the bullet-shaped Winkel Towers built around the city also remain.
9. BOMBING DECOY SITES STUTTGART 9.1. WHAT WERE BOMBING DECOYS Bombing decoys were used to confuse enemy aircraft as to the location of their target. The decoys were sophisticated and required a lot of manpower. They were also very effective, ensuring that the enemy bombs fell away from military and civilian targets. The decoy system consisted of up to four types: 1. 2. 3. 4.
Dummy aerodromes. Dummy factories and buildings. Diversionary. Simulations of urban lighting
9.2. SCHEIN FACILITY LAUFEN (‘BRAZIL’) Stuttgart was extremely vulnerable to bombing attacks as it was not only an important hub in the rail network but also a prominent industrial centre. Important industrial targets included the Bosch plant which made generators and injection pumps, SKF ball-bearing plant, Hirth (Heinkel) engineering factory, various Daimler-Benz factories which made aero-engines, marine engines, cylinder camshafts and valve for military vehicles. A bombing decoy site called "Brazil" was constructed 15 miles north of Stuttgart between Lauffen am Neckar and Nordheim. The bend of the Necker River was similar to that at Bad Cannstatt (location of the second largest rail station in Stuttgart). In order to support the authenticity, a train station was built with brick walls, straw mats and slatted frames, flashes of lights simulated the of overhead tram conductors, dummy gas boilers were also built. It has been suggested that the site was defended by up to 35 searchlights and 50 Flak guns; however this is unlikely. The operating team (Luftwaffe Command Laufen) consisted of a sergeant and twelve men. They marked fires after bombs were dropped to distract bombers from their main target. rd
Laufen was bombed for the first time on 23 August 940, an attack before Stuttgart itself experienced th th its first attack, the actual target was Karlsruhe. Another attack on 12 /13 October destroyed around 40 houses in Lauffen, this led to deep resentment amongst the locals who thought they were being sacrificed to protect urban facilities in Stuttgart. In 1941 alone 1,500 fragmentation bombs and about 100 explosives bombs were dropped in Lauffen. However, with the advent of radar systems (and being 15 miles north of Stuttgart), the system was no longer effective as a bombing decoy and was dismantled in 1943, it was estimated that the site had ‘intercepted’ around forty air raids destined for Stuttgart. In total there were thirty seven attacks on Lauffen throughout the war, twenty attacks before the plant was dismantled. Many of the bombs dropped in fields and caused little or no damage to buildings and people. Laufen experienced its worst attack in 1944, at a time when the facility had long been dismantled. 9.3. WEILIMDORF FIRE DECOY SITE In 1943, after the introduction of RAF Pathfinder Forces (PFF) to mark target areas, the Germans developed new measures to mislead the attackers. In the autumn 1943, a fire decoy system was built in the Stuttgart suburb of Weilimdorf. The facility was designed to induce the attacking bombers to drop the bombs on the decoy site which only contained uninhabited and undeveloped areas of the city. This system was only really effective at night, in contrast to the mock system in Laufen, and to ensure it remained secret camouflage measures such as branches and nets were used during the day to hide it from reconnaissance flights. Page 46 of 51
To simulate the RAF target indicators (TIs) dropped by the PFF bombers the decoy installation would fire rockets, of the same colour as the TIs, into the sky. The rockets which were called SSR were about two meters long and reached a height of about 2000 meters, from where they slowly floated down on parachutes, thereby having a similar appearance to the target indicators. Combat instructions stated that the rockets should only be fired in suitable weather/wind direction and not over-illuminating the area, especially with yellow or white light bombs, so that the attackers did not recognize the deception. The idea was to confuse the bomber stream with two target areas where they could drop their bombs. In order to make the decoy site even more realistic, decoy fires were established, the aim being to simulate burning buildings caused by incendiary bombs and encourage the bombers to drop their bomb load on the decoy site. These decoy fires consisted of corrugated iron gratings (approximately 1m x 2.5m) which were strung together on concrete pyramids. On the grates lay tar soaked wood, special tar briquettes, demolition wood and other combustible materials. The fires were started with the briquettes as they didn’t create too much smoke. It was important that the fires on the ground were clearly visible to the aircraft and also they were not so bright that the deception was recognisable. These fire spots were spread over the entire area of the decoy system. Any bomb damage in or around the decoy system was often filled in immediately after the attack in order to give enemy reconnaissance pilots as little clues as possible about the previous night's attack. Fireworks feigned explosions to contribute to the effectiveness of the decoy site. RAF bomber target markers were called ‘Christmas trees’ in Germany and were imitated by the SSR rockets. fgut.wordpress.com/bauwerke/wk2/militarische-anlagen2/baden-wurttem http://www.schutzbauten-stuttgart.de/
9.4. OTHER CAMOUFLAGE MEASURES Other Decoy Sites In addition to the Laufen decoy site and the Weilimdorf fire decoy site, there were false airfields in Maichingen/Böblingen, in the Struttal near Betzenried/Göppingen, on the Jagstwiesen, Möckmühl/Heilbronn, between Etzlinsweiler and Fessbach/Landkreis Öhringen. Landing strips for the aircraft were simulated by night landing lights. Nebulisation Stuttgart's topographic location provided an opportunity for nebulisation, where an area would be covered in ‘fog’ to disguise the target areas. The first chemical used was Chlorosulfonic acid, however an exercise in the Neckar valley in April 1942 had serious consequences as it caused severe damage to vegetation, killing of fish as the chemicals dripped into rivers and corrosion of metal parts in some industries. In September 1942 the exercise was repeated with a new chemical, ammonium chloride, with the result that corrosion and vegetation damage no longer occur. In an exercise in October 1942 forty seven fog sources were used to cover the valley basin with a thick veil of fog. Towards the end of 1942 and early 1943 the number of fog machines were increased. The last attack where nebulisation th was effective was on 20 December 1942. However, despite the fogging, Stuttgart was still ‘visible’ to the bombers due to the new radar technology. Nebulisation was therefore no longer effective as camouflage and was discontinued. Demolition of towers th
After an air raid on 11 March 1943, the 37-meter-high observation tower on Hasenberg blown up along with the Degerloch lookout tower. Shot down Allied pilots had said that these towers served as a guide. In truth, the towers were meaningless as guides for the bombers as the new radar system offered the possibility for exact localisation without visual observation. Draining of the Max Eyth See Page 47 of 51
The lake was pumped empty at the beginning of the war and covered with camouflage nets, to ensure bomber pilots one less opportunity to locate Stuttgart (the Neckar River already provided a good indication). Plans for Camouflage Painting of Buildings Buildings were painted so they blended in with the local topography of the surrounding area. From the air, the Stuttgart gas boiler was camouflaged to look like a hill with buildings, the roofs of the airport buildings were integrated into the surrounding fields, industrial buildings should became residential buildings.
The Stuttgart gas boiler with camouflage painting
10. VAIHINGEN FLAK BATTERY It is thought that the Vaihingen battery was initially built as a dummy system to deceive enemy aircraft about the strength and locations of German air defences. It was equipped with dummy guns made from tree trunks; it may also have included devices for firing false anti-aircraft fire. As part of a regrouping of the flak defences in Stuttgart, it was made operational at the beginning of 1943 and increased the firepower of the heavy anti-aircraft gun on the southeast flank of Stuttgart between. Regroupings were common in anti-aircraft guns during the war. The batteries used in positions changed several times. Despite the increasing threat to the large cities from air raids, the Luftwaffe and Wehrmacht repeatedly viewed flak at home as a reserve for the front. For example, at the start of the African campaign, several batteries were moved from the Stuttgart area to the North African desert. In 1943 there were 3 batteries in Vaihingen, each with six th heavy 88mm calibre guns (Flakbatteries 7./s.241, (7 heavy antiaircraft battery 241 – stationary), 1./s.460 and 4./s.460). The 7./s.241 guns were withdrawn in March 1944 and the 4./s.460 guns moved to Auschwitz (to protect the chemical plants not the concentration camp) in July 1944. The 1./s.460 guns (six 88mm Flak 37 cannons) remained in Vaihingen until the end of the war. This withdrawal of batteries to the east or west fronts, including entire batteries in some cases, created a vacuum in the defences which the Allied airmen could operate freely. If the reports about the Flak Leutnant on the Vaihingen Flak Battery are correct then from reports of known crash sites it is likely that Lancaster 156/A which crashed at Vaihingen and Lancaster 460/S which crashed 3km north-west of Vaihingen at Busnau are the two Lancasters. There are no other crash sites reported in the area, so it is possible that the ‘Halifax’ could be Halifax 408/E.
Page 48 of 51
AFTERMATH 1. ROYAL AIR FORCE 1.1. Notifying Next of Kin 1.2. Captured Aircrew 1.3. Locating War Graves 2. STUTTGART 2.1. Aftermath of the Operation 2.2. Number of Allied bombing attacks on Stuttgart 2.3. Rebuilding Stuttgart 3. DID BOMBING WIN OR SHORTEN THE WAR 3.1.
Page 49 of 51
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1. ROYAL AIR FORCE 1.1. Notifying Next of Kin 1.2. Captured Aircrew 1.3. Locating War Graves
2. STUTTGART 2.1. Aftermath of the Operation 2.2. Number of Allied bombing attacks on Stuttgart 2.3. Rebuilding Stuttgart
3. DID BOMBING WIN OR SHORTEN THE WAR 3.1.
Page 51 of 51