TESTER The Story of an Operation Stuttgart 28th January 1945 Flipbook PDF

TESTER The Story of an Operation Stuttgart 28th January 1945

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WORLD WAR II ROYAL AIRFORCE BOMBER COMMAND ATTACK ON STUTTGART 28TH JANUARY 1945

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BACKGROUND 1. ROYAL AIR FORCE 1.1. PRE WAR ORGANISATION 1.2. EXPANSION DURING THE WAR 1.3. BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AIR TRAINING PLAN 1.4. OTHER TRAINING SCHEMES 1.5. RAF TRAINING PROGRAMME 1.6. OFFICERS VERSUS NON COMMISSIONED OFFICERS 1.7. DEVELOPMENT OF BOMBER COMMAND OPERATIONAL ABILITY 1.8. BOMBING STRATEGY 1.9. LACK OF MORAL FIBRE 2. LUFTWAFFE 2.1. ORGANISATION 2.2. NACHTGAGDERSCHWADER AIRCRAFT 2.3. LUFWAFFE AIRCREW 2.4. TRAINING 2.5. NACHTJAGD (NIGHTFIGHTER) AIRCREW 2.6. METHODOLOGY FOR CLAIMING AERIAL VICTORY 2.7. LUFTWAFFE GRID REFERNCE SYSTEM 3. STUTTGART 3.1. HISTORY 3.2. NAZI GERMANY

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1. ROYAL AIR FORCE 1.1. PRE WAR ORGANISATION In 1936, the RAF had been organised into separate Commands by role, a structure which remained throughout the war. These were Bomber, Fighter, Control and Training Commands. Additional wartime Commands were Army Co-operation, to develop air operations in support of ground forces, Balloon, Maintenance and Transport. Each Command was made up of a number of groups, which was itself divided into squadrons. From 1936 onward the aircraft industry received powerful financial aid from the government to enable additional factories to be built to increase production, while many automobile firms turned their works over to the construction of complete aircraft or their components. To provide the crews for the additional aircraft, the RAF Volunteer Reserve and the Civil Air Guard were formed to give training at civilian schools and flying clubs. University air squadrons, the first of which had been formed soon after World War I to teach undergraduates to fly and to encourage them to join the RAF as regular officers, greatly expanded their activities. However, at the start of the war the RAF possessed only 87 squadrons, regular and auxiliary, at home and overseas. 1.2. EXPANSION DURING THE WAR During WW2 the RAF reached a total strength of 1,208,843 men and women. Of these, 185,595 were aircrew. The RAF also had the services of 130,000 pilots from the British Commonwealth and 30,000 aircrew from countries over run by the Nazis. During the war the RAF used 333 flying training schools. In all, between 1940 and 1945 the scheme trained out aircrew from Britain (88,022), Canada (137,739), Australia (27,387), South Africa (24,814), Southern Rhodesia (10,033) and New Zealand (5,609). From 1935 to 1945 the number of RAF airfields increased as follows. Year 1935 1940 1945

No. of Airfields 60 280 720

1.3. BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AIR TRAINING PLAN (BCATP) At the start of the WW2, the British Government looked to the Dominions for air training help as the United Kingdom was considered an unsuitable location for air training, due to the possibility of enemy attack, the strain caused by wartime traffic at airfields and the unpredictable weather, so the plan called for the facilities in the Dominions to train British and each other's aircrews. Canada offered particular advantages: its proximity to Britain allowed for easier transportation of men and equipment; Canada had a larger capacity to manufacture aircraft; and Canadian industries had easy access to the U.S. market for aircraft parts. Negotiations regarding joint training, between the th four governments concerned, took place in Ottawa during the first few months of the war. On 17 December 1939, they signed the Air Training Agreement, (originally known as the Empire Air Training Scheme, EATS). The British Commonwealth Air Training Plan was viewed as an incredibly ambitious programme. The 1939 agreement stated that the training was to be similar to that of the RAF. The plan involved a massive construction programme and at its peak at the end of 1943 there were 73 BCATP and 24 RAF flying schools in operation, supplemented by 184 ancillary units The agreement called for the training around 50,000 aircrew each year, for as long as necessary: This included 22,000 aircrew from Great Britain, 13,000 from Canada, 11,000 from Australia and 3,300 from New Zealand. Under the agreement, air crews received elementary training in various Commonwealth countries before travelling to Canada for advanced courses. Training costs were to be divided between the four governments. Under the BCATP 131,533 aircrew were trained at total cost of (in 2020 prices) of approximately £19.25 billion. 1.4. OTHER TRAINING SCHEMES Although the Canadian enterprise was far and away the largest, the British developed other joint overseas training facilities, notably under bilateral arrangements with Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. The concept of the Rhodesian Air Training Group (RATG) was broadly similar to that of the Canadian undertaking. (Over 7,600 pilots and 2,300 navigators were trained by the RATG during the war). Although South Africa (SA) had declared war on Germany in September 1939, they were not prepared to participate actively until they were directly threatened. However, they recognised they Page 5 of 108

needed to build up their own armed forces and were happy to assist with the training of British st personnel. The so-called ‘Van-Brookham’ Agreement was signed on 1 June 1940. This involved RAF training units, transferring lock stock and barrel to SA and operating independently of SAAF schools. These arrangements were formally endorsed with the Joint Air Training Scheme (JATS). During its five-year existence, the JATS turned out a total of 33,347 aircrew including 12,221 SAAF personnel. From June 1941 (six months before the United States entered the war) British aircrew were also trained at civilian operated schools in the United States. The two schemes were known as the Arnold Scheme (which used US airfields and instructors) and British Flying Training Schools (American airfields staffed with civilian instructors, but supervised by British flight officers). 1.5. RAF TRAINING PROGRAMME https://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/research/online-exhibitions/taking-flight/historical-periods/second-world-war-flyingtraining.aspx

In September 1939 trained pilots were urgently needed if the Royal Air Force was to meet its operational commitments. The struggle and success in achieving the required number of pilots was one of the overlooked 'battles' of the war. Time was of the essence, initial revisions to the training programme focused on shortening courses and increasing the capacity for pupils at the flying training schools. This did not work, however, and difficulties arose with the limited amount of equipment available and a shortage of flying instructors. It quickly became apparent through operational experience that the standard of pilot training also had to be improved. It was clear that quality had been sacrificed for quantity, and from 1941 onwards, the training syllabus was reviewed. Changes in operational procedure required additional training and the development of more modern aircraft required a higher standard of flying technique and piloting skills. Further information required on length of training for various aircrew and development during the war. 1.6. OFFICERS VERSUS NON COMMISSIONED OFFICERS At the start of the war the RAF ‘guidelines’ on commissions was up to 50% of pilots and observers, with the proportion of gunners being fixed at 20%. At the Ottawa Air Training Conference (an Allied gathering to renew the BCATP and discuss joint air training problems), in May1942 the Dominions wanted more input on the subject. New Zealand advocated an ultra-conservative approach withholding all commissions until an individual had demonstrated his ability in service. In contrast the Canadians wanted all pilots and observers commissioned, plus 25% of WOp/AGs on graduation and 25% in the field. The compromise was the principles would still be observed with each country deciding on their own numbers. Needless to say British still intended to keep to the quotas; although in the end the system most closely matched the Australian view of commissioning anyone who was considered to deserve it. 1.7. DEVELOPMENT OF BOMBER COMMAND OPERATIONAL ABILITY iwm.org.uk/history/raf-bomber-command-during-the-second-world-war

1939

RAF Bomber Command had 23 operational bomber squadrons, with 280 aircraft. This modest force gave Britain the means to immediately strike back at Nazi Germany, but only against strictly military targets at first. Early raids against warships and airfields were conducted in daylight, but bomber aircraft were easy targets for enemy fighters and losses were heavy. The bombers also flew over Germany at night, but dropped only propaganda leaflets.

1940

After Hitler's invasion of France, the RAF began a night-time bombing campaign against German industry, especially synthetic oil production. But plans to hit specific factories proved impractical as crews invariably failed to identify individual factories and refineries in the darkness. Their bombs were scattered far and wide. Bomber Command lacked the strength at this stage to do any serious damage.

1941

Bomber Command grew in strength, but navigation over blacked-out Europe was still a major problem. Setbacks in the Battle of the Atlantic meant a major effort was needed against German warships and U-boats. German night-fighters and anti-aircraft guns were becoming more effective. Heavy losses caused a slump in morale.

1942

Bomber Command received a new aircraft, the Avro Lancaster, and a new leader Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris. Accepting that precision bombing was proving impossible, the War Cabinet sanctioned 'area bombing', the targeting of whole cities to destroy both factories and their workers. It was judged necessary to defeat an enemy that seemed on the brink of victory. Harris believed it could win the war and gained much public support when he sent 1,000 bombers against Cologne. Page 6 of 108

1943

New tactics and technology enabled crews to find and hit their targets with increasing precision. An elite Pathfinder Force guided the bombers using coloured marker flares. Major attacks were launched against Germany's industrial heart in the Ruhr valley. Hamburg was devastated by a firestorm. But attempts to knock out Berlin failed. By now the United States Eighth Air Force had joined the RAF in a 'round the clock' offensive.

1944

The combined Allied bomber force began to overwhelm the Germans. American escort fighters shot the Luftwaffe out of the sky. A successful offensive was launched against Germany's vulnerable fuel supplies. Bombers also flew in support of D-Day, softening up coastal defences and hitting railways to block German reinforcements. Enemy troops were carpet bombed in advance of major Allied ground offensives. Harris continued his city attacks, still convinced they would prove decisive.

1945

The bomber offensive reached the peak of its destruction. The RAF alone now had 108 squadrons with over 1,500 aircraft. Raids against oil and communications proved the most effective. Starved of fuel, the German military machine ground to a halt. Industrial cities were pounded to rubble. A record 4,851 tons of bombs were dropped on Dortmund in a single night. Enemy production was massively disrupted, and in some places ceased. Controversially, locations so far untouched were razed to the ground as they rose to the top of the target list. Dresden, Pforzheim and others were consumed by fire

However, RAF Bomber Command, despite its major contribution to the Allied victory and the death of over 55,000 aircrew remains mired in controversy to the present day. 1.8. BOMBING STRATEGY Include more with regard to Bomber Command ‘forced’ change of tactics to support Operation Overload’ and the response when released form this commitment, i.e. industry versus Harris’s belief in the destruction of German industrial cities (to destroy the morale of their citizens). In January 1943 a Conference was held in Casablanca, French Morocco to plan the Allied European strategy for the next phase of World War II. Attended by US President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill it announced to the world that the Allies would accept nothing less than the ‘unconditional surrender’ of the Axis (Germany, Japan etc.) powers. It was agreed to conduct a ‘Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom’ and the British Air Ministry issued the Casablanca directive on 4 February with the object of ‘The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic systems and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened. Every opportunity to be taken to attack Germany by day to destroy objectives that are unsuitable for night attack, to sustain continuous pressure on German morale, to impose heavy losses on German day fighter force and to conserve German fighter force away from the Russian and Mediterranean theatres of war.’ In June 1943, the Pointblank directive was issued which modified the Casablanca directive. Along with the single-engine fighters of the original plan, the highest priority Pointblank targets were the fighter aircraft factories since the Western Allied invasion of France could not take place without fighter superiority. Bombing attacks would be too costly, and D-Day itself would fail, unless Allied air superiority was achieved. Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris was the man in charge of RAF Bomber Command and he had his own view on what his bombers should be doing, namely ‘area attacks’ on German industrial cities. This had been his mantra since taking command in February 1942. Harris only paid lip-service to the Directive, choosing to concentrate on city attacks as before, and ‘Pointblank’ became in effect an American Project. In Harris’s opinion only the systematic degrading of Germany’s entire industrial fabric could achieve decisive results, and assist the invasion, any cessation of attacks would allow German output to recover. Moreover, he believed that his force, trained to operate at night and unable to hit pinpoint targets, would be of little use against tactical targets, and might cause catastrophic casualties among French civilians. During the winter of 1943/44 Harris pressed ahead with his night area attacks concentrating on Berlin. Harris had promised to win the war by wrecking the capital ‘from end to end’. But the results were poor and losses high. Some of the RAF attacks in this period, to cities in the south of Germany associated with aircraft manufacture such as Leipzig and Augsburg, did indeed fit within the framework of the ‘Pointblank’ directive. But whether aircraft, ball bearings or oil, Harris saw no point concentrating on such ‘panacea’ targets, as he described them.

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At the beginning of 1944, with preparations for the invasion of Europe (operation ‘Overlord’) well underway, Allied planners sought to identify suitable objectives for the heavy bomber force. These included the German air force (Luftwaffe) in the west, particularly its fighter aircraft, the rail transport network along which German reinforcements would have to pass, and the German’s defences on the shores of ‘Fortress Europe’. It was surmised that later on, with the troops ashore, the bombers could be called upon by army commanders for use against battlefield objectives. Harris was hostile to having Bomber Command diverted to invasion support but Overlord was too important to let such dissent persist. On 14 April 1944 both RAF Bomber Command and the US Strategic Air Forces in Europe were formally placed under the direction of General Dwight D Eisenhower and Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). The man effectively in charge was Eisenhower’s deputy, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder. On 17 April 1944 the Allied Supreme Headquarters issued a directive which stated the primary mission of the heavy bombers prior to Overlord, namely the destruction of the Luftwaffe’s air combat strength and the disruption of rail communications (Transportation Plan) to isolate the designated invasion area in Normandy. However, Harris was still free to continue attacks on German targets when commitments and the weather permitted. The ‘Transportation Plan’ involved attacks of the rail infrastructure and RAF losses were light and the accuracy of the attacks was good. However, Winston Churchill was worried about loss of life, and insisted that locations where more than 150 French or Belgian casualties might be expected from a single raid were excluded. Sadly, the civilian casualty rate in some cases far exceeded the prescribed limit of 100-150 each. In an address to Parliament on 2nd August 1944 Winston Churchill spoke about the RAF losses. ‘These deeds of the Air Force were not done without losses, which, in killed and in proportion to the number of flying personnel, far exceed those of any other branch of the Services. If we take 1st April as the opening of the air campaign from then till 30th June, over 7,000 men of the Home Command of the RAF alone have been killed or are missing’. Although the railway system was the priority in April and May 1944, there were also attacks on airfields and aircraft factories in France. Again, the accuracy of RAF night attacks was impressive. By June with Allied troops ashore in Normandy and the build-up continuing, the bombers were frequently called upon to assist the ground forces. Targets included enemy troop positions, supply depots and lines of communications. Allied air superiority meant that many of these operations could now take place in daylight. Bomber Command was formally released from its control by Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force in mid-September 1944 and Bomber Command reverted to Air Ministry control, although all future operations were still intended to fit into overall Allied planning and Bomber Command was ordered to remain ready to answer any calls for direct assistance to the ground forces, but this required only a small proportion of its huge strength. How to employ the great potential remaining was the subject of much thought as two different target systems were being considered: Synthetic-oil production

A successful all-out attack on oil would produce obvious benefits; the Germans would be robbed of the ability to wage any form of mobile war on land and the Luftwaffe would be grounded

German transport system

Attacks on communications were supported by the senior Allied commanders fighting in Europe; their success in Normandy and the recent advance to Germany owed much to the successful interdiction campaign by the British and American heavy bombers

A smaller number of people favoured the continued general bombing of German industrial cities. This was believed to be the best way to end the war by many of what might be termed ‘the senior strategists’, the men who held the highest positions in the direction of the Allied war effort. A directive issued on 25 September 1944 showed that the oil school of thought had won. A clear first priority was ‘the petroleum industry, with special emphasis on petrol (gasoline) including storage’. Joint second priorities were the German rail and waterway transport system, tank production and motor-vehicle production. German cities were mentioned much later in the directive for general attack ‘when weather and tactical conditions are unsuitable for operations against specific primary objectives’. These instructions were reinforced on 1 November 1944 in a second directive. Harris made it quite clear that he believed that, because of weather and tactical limitations, Bomber Command would be Page 8 of 108

best employed in continuing to wear down the industrial production of large cities and the spirit of their inhabitants. He still believed that Germany could collapse from within and the Allied armies could be spared the final task of storming the German frontier defences. His interpretations of the directives allowed him to lean generously towards area attacks on German cities, although many of those cities were associated with the oil industry. Bomber Command’s strength was now increasing steadily, numbers of front-line aircraft rose by 50% in 1944, with a particular rush of new Lancaster squadrons being formed in the autumn. Expansion took place in every group. 1 and 5 Groups, equipped with Lancasters, were each able to drop as many bombs as had the whole of Bomber Command two years earlier. The scene was now set for Bomber Command’s operational climax. The German night-fighter force was declining, bomber casualties were falling, bombing accuracy was improving and daylight raids on Germany were resumed before the month of November was out. Several German cities which had so far defied all of Bomber Command’s efforts were now destroyed. Much of the German war industry disappeared underground or to distant locations. Bomber Command then began to run out of large cities to attack and started to strike at smaller, less industrial communities, places like Darmstadt, Bremerhaven, Bonn, Freiburg, Heilbronn, Ulm; many more narrow streets of medieval houses and other cultural landmarks disappeared as well as a vast quantity of ordinary housing. And all the time Harris was sending smaller forces to attack the synthetic-oil refineries and the transportation targets. Approximately 46% of the total tonnage of bombs dropped by Bomber Command in five and a half years of war would be dropped in the remaining nine months from September 1944 to May 1945. 1.9. LACK OF MORAL FIBRE en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lack_of_Moral_Fibre

By early 1940, RAF commanders were concerned that medical officers were removing too many men from flying duty. Detailed guidance was given in the Memorandum on the Disposal of Members of Air Crews Who Forfeit the Confidence of Their Commanding Officers issued in September 1940. This was revised in September 1941, February 1943 and March 1945. Under this procedure, aircrew refusing to fly operations were to be classified as (i) medically fit, (ii) medically unfit on nervous grounds (introduced in 1941) or (iii) medically unfit for other reasons. Aircrew would not be placed in the first two categories if they had been subject to ‘exceptional flying stress’ and to be assigned to category (i), they ‘had to be proved to be lacking in moral fibre’. From February 1943, aircrew on their second tour (30 operations in Bomber Command) could not be classified LMF, though commanders were urged not to publicize this provision. Cases referred were 746 officers and 3,313 non-commissioned officers, of these, 2,726 cases (including 2,337 NCOs) were classified as LMF. A man classified in categories (i) or (ii) would lose his flying badge, ‘to prevent his getting a lucrative job as a pilot in civil life’. The service records of those classified LMF were stamped with large red ‘W’ (for ‘waverer’). Officers would lose their commissions and be refused ground jobs in the RAF, while NCOs would be reduced to aircraftman second class and assigned menial tasks, such as latrine duty, for at least three months. From 1944, men released as LMF could be called for the coal mines or drafted into the army.

2. LUFTWAFFE 2.1. ORGANISATION Geschwader In the Luftwaffe the largest operational unit was the Geschwader. A Geschwader was the equivalent of a RAF Group. Each Geschwader itself would be named according to its purpose; Nachtjagdgeschwader (NJG) was the Nightfighter unit, which typically flew radar equipped heavy fighters such as the Messerschmitt Bf.110 or Ju.88 against Allied bombers. Each Geschwader was assigned an Arabic number, for example Nachtjagdgeschwader 6 (NJG 6). Gruppen Each Geschwader typically contained three Gruppen. Gruppen were independent units that could end up in different theatres of war, but were usually seen fighting together in a similar geographic area. A Gruppe usually occupied one airfield; Gruppen from the same Geschwader typically occupied adjacent airfields. Each Gruppe would have a Stabschwarm (staff swarm) of three aircraft (Stab) and three Staffeln, but later in the war a fourth Staffel was added to fighter units. The Gruppen received Roman numerals as designators – I, II and III, for example, the second Gruppe of

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Nachtjagdgeschwader 6 would be designated II./NJG 6, (the Stabschwarm would be designated Stab II./NJG 6). Staffeln Staffeln was equivalent to an RAF Squadron. A Staffel usually had nine to 12 aircraft; others had as few as five or six aircraft due to losses (in the later years of the war 12 was rarely reached). At full complement each Gruppe had 30–40 aircraft including the Gruppenstab (Group Staff). The Staffeln received consecutive Arabic numbers in the following pattern: Gruppe consisted of Staffel 1, 2, and 3, e.g. 1./NJG 6 etc. Gruppe consisted of Staffel 4, 5, and 6, e.g. 4./NJG 6 etc. Gruppe consisted of Staffel 7, 8, and 9, e.g. 7./NJG 6 etc. A Staffel was divided into three Schwärme (swarms), consisting of four to six aircraft. A fighter Schwarm of four aircraft consisted of two Rotten (packs). As such a fighter Schwarm was equivalent to a section in the RAF. The term Rotte was also used for a formation of two aircraft, consisting of a leader and a wingman. Unit Identification Markings Luftwaffe front line aircraft, other than those belonging to single-engined day fighter or ground attack units, had a code of three letters and one number. For example, Gunther Bahr’s Messerschmitt Bf.110 with the markings 2Z+IH belonged to Nachtjagdgeschwader 6 (2Z, after 08/1943) and served in the first Staffel (H). The ‘I’ was the identification letter of the individual aircraft within the Staffel. (Staffel designation 1./NJG 6). 2.2. NACHTJAGDGESCHWADER AIRCRAFT Messerschmitt Bf.110

The Messerschmitt Bf.110 was a twin-engine Zerstörer (Destroyer, heavy fighter) and fighterbomber (Jagdbomber or Jabo) and was backbone of the Nachtjagdgeschwader throughout the war. At first the three main crew members had no special equipment for night operations and relied on their eyes alone to find enemy aircraft in the dark. Ground-controlled interception began from mid1941 and the 110 began to take its toll on RAF bombers and was soon an aircraft to be feared. The aircraft was improved significantly in this role with the introduction in 1942 of FuG 202 Lichtenstein radar systems and antenna and then Schräge Musik from 1943 (two oblique angle upward firing 20mm cannons that were mounted to fire through holes in the canopy). The Bf 110G-4 was the best equipped version with the FuG 202/220 Lichtenstein radar, Schräge Musik and it had a crew of three (pilot, radio/radar operator and gunner). Junkers Ju.88

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The Junkers Ju.88 was a twin-engined multirole combat aircraft which it became one of the Luftwaffe's most important aircraft. It served as a bomber, dive bomber, night fighter, torpedo bomber, reconnaissance aircraft, a heavy fighter and at the end of the war, as a flying bomb. The G-series fuselage was purpose-built for the special needs of a night fighter, the G-6 versions were equipped with enlarged fuel tanks and often one or two 20 mm MG 151/20 cannons in a Schräge Musik (‘Jazz Music’, i.e. slanted) installation. These guns were pointed obliquely upwards and forwards from the upper fuselage – usually at an angle of 70° 2.3. LUFTWAFFE AIRCREW Aircrew Roles and Rank Abrev. FF B BF BM BS

Role (German) Flugzeugführer Beobachter Bordfunker Bordmechaniker Bordschütze

Role (English) Pilot Observer Wireless Operator Flight Engineer Air Gunner

Abrev. Obw Fw Uffz

Rank (German) Oberfeldwebel Feldwebel Unteroffizer

Rank (English) Flight Sergeant Sergeant Corporal

Luftwaffe Pilots The only two Luftwaffe pilots identified as operational on the 28th/29th January 1945 are Gunther Bahr and Heinrich Schmidt, below are short biographies of their war service BAHR, Günther (DOB: 18.07.21 in Neu-Leegden (or Neu Legden)/Ostpreussen), 15.04.44 Fw. 3./NJG 6 awarded the Ehrenpokal. 01.05.44 transferred to 1./NJG 6 (to 03.04.45). 15.05.44 Fw. awarded the Ehrenpokal. 26.08.44 Fw. 1./NJG 6. 12.09.44 Fw. 1./NJG 6. 01.10.44 Fw. awarded the DKG. 28.03.45 Ofw. Awarded the Ritterkreuz. 01.04.45 promoted to Lt. (Kr.O.). 03.04.45 transferred to 7./NJG 6 (to 01.05.45). 01.05.45 apparently captured. Credited with thirty seven air victories, all but one of these at night. 15.02.62 joined the Bundeswehr. 30.09.75 retired as a Major Schmidt, Heinrich One known victory, a Lancaster WNW of Homberg on 21 July, 1944. A B-24 at Mitterkirchen on 20 August, 1944. A Lancaster of RAF No. 467 Sq., Werk # LM 226 "PO-H", piloted by Flt Lt D.D.Brown, at Darmstadt and another E of Mannheim on 12 September, 1944. A Lancaster bomber of RAF No. 625 Sq. on 14 January, 1945 over the Eifel. His 12th, 13th & 14th victories were scored on either 14 or 15 March, 1945. His R/O in September, 1944, Uffz Kainzmeier. Jager Blatt article. 2.4. TRAINING Although the German Luftwaffe started the war with a cadre of well-trained, even experienced pilots, training was to become one their greatest failings. Up until late 1941 a prospective pilot would spend six months at a recruit training depot for basic training. They would then move to a Fluganwärterkompanie for up to two months before going to an A/B Schule (elementary flying school). If successful the pilot would receive between 100 and 150 hours flying time, their A2 and B2 licences and their Luftwaffenflugzeugfuehrerschein (pilot’s licence) and Flugzeugfuehrerabzeichen (pilot’s wings). They were then sent to their respective specialist training schools, e.g. prospective single seater fighter and dive bomber pilots, twin-engined fighter, bomber and reconnaissance pilots. On completion of training crews went to Ergaenzungseinheiten (operational training units) attached to the various operational Geschwader or Gruppen (groups), to learn the tactical methods peculiar to the operational units they were later to join and to wait until they were required by the front-line units. By the time a fighter or dive-bomber pilot was posted to an operational unit they had received about 13 months training with 150 to 200 flying hours and a bomber or reconnaissance pilot had received 20 months and 220 to 270 hours. By 1942 the Luftwaffe training organisation began to crack under the strain exerted upon it. Up until mid-1941 the comparatively low casualty rates were made good by drawing upon the reserves already available within the service and new trainees. However, significant losses incurred following

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the start of the Russian campaign (June 1941) made it almost impossible for the training organisation to meet the demand. By late 1943 the Luftwaffe had lost most of its original complement of pilots. In the first six months of 1943, Germany lost 1,100 fighter pilots, which was about 60% of the number at the start of the year. It lost another 15 percent in each of July and August. These high pilot losses had disastrous effects. Even if they had been well trained, newer pilots were inexperienced and inevitably sustained more accidents and combat casualties than the pilots they replaced. In February 1944 alone over one thousand Luftwaffe aircraft were lost in accidents, a good proportion of which were ‘considered due to inadequate training. Pilots were now so poorly trained they struggled to cope with engine failures, rough field take-offs or landings, bad weather or heavy cloud cover. Luftwaffe day fighter units suffered debilitating losses at the hands of the better-trained American escort fighter pilots. By early 1944, the Luftwaffe fighter pilot training had been shortened to an average of 160 flight hours. A few weeks later, it was further shortened to only 112 hours. This combined with the conversion of ex-bomber pilots following 20 hours of flying training in fighters resulted in a stream of pilots little able to stand up to the enemy. B flight schools were disbanded, and the pilots were sent into first-line service directly after A schools. The condition for the A2 flight certificate included a basic training of sixty training flights with a total of 15 flight hours. Meanwhile, the average USAAF or RAF fighter pilot's training consisted of 225 flight hours. Inexperience led to continued high attrition of German aircraft and pilots through 1944. Although the training organisation was in disarray, the aircraft industry continued to produce fighter aircraft throughout 1944, by December the Luftwaffe fighter strength was 2,260 operational aircraft, the strongest point of 1944. Additionally, the Luftwaffe had 1,256 night-fighters, 892 dive bombers/ground attack aircraft, and 528 bombers. The German aircraft industry operated above all expectations in 1944 but failed to change the tide of the war. So whilst Germany became healthy with aircraft, they faced severe pilot shortages with under 4,000 pilots trained in 1944. The Luftwaffe flying training organisation received its final death blow with the systematic wrecking of the German synthetic fuel industry by Allied strategic bombers. Aviation fuel production fell so far beneath Luftwaffe requirements so that operations had to be curtailed, resulting in little or no fuel available for training units. So while there were plenty of aircraft there was almost no fuel for training so the Luftwaffe kept sending pilots up to be slaughtered. In the last year of the war the average life expectancy of some Luftwaffe pilots was just 11 hours of flying, barely four sorties, including check and ferry flights. forum.il2sturmovik.com/topic/20584-pilot-training-of-luftwaffe-interested-facts A Chronicle of a Fighter Geschwader in the Battle for Germany, Vols. 1 and 2: September 1944-May 1945. Jean-Yves Lorant ww2-weapons.com/pilot-training-mid-and-late-war/

2.5. NACHTJAGD (NIGHTFIGHTER) OPERATIONS The pinnacle of the Nachtjagd’s successes against Bomber Command came in late March 1944, by August 1944 a rapid collapse had commenced, this was the result of several effects. The loss of advanced early warning systems and operational airfields in Western France and other occupied countries had severely restricted the Nachtjagd’s ability to get in the air early to attack the bomber streams. The shortage of petrol was not only affecting operational unit but also training units. The losses of experienced crews (not only in air battles but as a result of ground attacks on airfields) meant that majority of crews were now young, inexperienced and poorly trained. This resulted in a severe death toll amongst new recruits. To add to these problems was the increasing ability of No. 100 Group to interfere with and jam the Luftwaffe’s extremely complicated communications system. There had been a long battle between No. 100 Group and the Nachtjagd meaning that the task of Nachtjagd radio/radar operators was becoming more and more difficult. This was not helped by then fact that methods of communication between ground controls and fighters were still being developed following the loss of the early warning systems in France. Nightfighter crews had a wide choice of aids including several systems airborne radar and two forms of IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) equipment. They also had a vast range of sources (broadcast on several frequencies) where they might find information that would help them locate and enter a bomber stream. However, RAF jamming was so effective that that nightfighters often had to rely on visual sightings to help them find the bombers. Other visual aids that could be used included Flak fired in set patterns, specific searchlight combinations, searchlight corridors and Beleuchtergruppen (usually Ju.88s flying high above the bomber streams and cities being attacked dropping flares). However, No. 100 Group was becoming more and more knowledgeable about the Nachtjagd techniques, particularly radio and radar systems, so that by late August 1944 the Nachtjagd Page 12 of 108

communications were virtually swamped. Nightfighter successes were now more a result of chance than by organised control, consequently night time Bomber Command losses fell steadily. During January 1945 the main focus of Bomber Command’s was night attacks, although small daylight raids of 150 bombers continued to attack Ruhr targets. During the month approximately 7,300 bombers set out on operations with 134 failing to return. Official Luftwaffe claims for the month were 134, a small improvement on the lean months of September to December 1944. The reason for this improvement was that in late 1944 most bombing attacks had been to short range targets in France or just over the German border, which meant, with the loss of early warning radar stations in France, the nightfighters had little opportunity to attack the bomber stream before they had completed their mission. In January, with the change in Bomber Command strategy, the bomber streams were now mainly attacking targets in Germany which meant it was easier for the nightfighters to locate and penetrate the streams. The operations with the highest losses were deep penetrations, e.g. Hanover, Munich, Leuna, Magdeburg and Zeitz. However the nightfighters paid fro their successes loosing forty seven aircraft. The Other Battle Luftwaffe Night Aces versus Bomber Command. Peter Hinchliffe

2.6. METHODOLOGY FOR CLAIMING AERIAL VICTORIES The Luftwaffe's aerial victory confirmation procedure was based on directive 55270/41 named ‘Confirmation of aerial victories, destructions and sinking of ships’. The directive was first issued in 1939 and was updated several times during World War 2 In theory this approval process for the confirmation of aerial victories was very stringent and required a witness. The final destruction or explosion of an enemy aircraft in the air, or bail-out of the pilot, had to be observed either on guncamera film or by at least one other human witness. The witness could be the German pilot's wingman, another in the squadron, or an observer on the ground. In the 1990s, the release of German archives showed that while in theory the Luftwaffe did not accept a kill without a witness, which was considered only a probable, in practice some units habitually submitted unwitnessed claims and these sometimes made it through the verification process, particularly if they were made by pilots with already established records. In theory the Luftwaffe did not accept shared claims, but it happened. In theory each separate claim should have referred to a particular aircraft, but in practice some victories were awarded to other pilots who had claimed the destruction of the same aircraft. In 1943 the daily OKW communiques of this period habitually overstated American bomber losses by a factor up to two. Defenders of German fighter pilots have always maintained that these were reduced during the confirmation process. But the microfilms prove this not to be the case. Some 80 to 90 percent of the claims submitted were confirmed or found to be "in order" for confirmation up to the time the system broke down altogether in 1945. th

th

On the night of 28 /29 January 1945 the Luftwaffe claimed ten aircraft shot down. Actual RAF losses that night were eleven, nine aircraft missing over Germany, one aircraft missing over France and one aircraft crashed on take-off in Yorkshire. Although the claims against then actual, losses appear to fit it is worthwhile noting that some anti-aircraft units may also have made claims on that evening. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confirmation_and_overclaiming_of_aerial_victories_during_World_War_II

2.7. LUFTWAFFE GRID REFERENCE SYSTEM The name for the Luftwaffe map reference system was ’Gradnetz’ or ’Gradnetzmeldeverfahren’. The system was introduced before WW2, and was in use without major modifications until end of April 1943. The escalation in the number of allied bomber attacks against targets in Germany and German occupied territory made it necessary to modify the system. The result was the introduction of the ’Jagdtrapez’ by the head of the Luftwaffe Intelligence Forces, General der Ln-Truppe Martini. The idea behind the ’Gradnetzmeldeverfahren’ was to develop a system where bases and navigation points could be given a position both in maps prepared by the armed forces but also other available maps. It was based on the Greenwich system, which describe a given position by longitude and latitude, measured in degrees. This meant that the system could be used on all maps, which were made utilizing the widespread Greenwich geographic coordinate system, regardless of scale or projection used when preparing the map. The numbers used to give the position of a certain location using the ’Gradnetzmeldeverfahren’ can be viewed as a short form of the position in full, without a real translation or encoding. The basic division had its base at the 0°-meridian (Greenwich), and had division lines at every 10° longitude. The areas between every tenth degree longitude were limited to the north and south by the 89°, 79°, 69°, 59° etc. degrees latitude. These areas, which were limited by sides measuring ten degrees longitude and latitude were called ’Zusatzzahlgebiete’. Page 13 of 108

In the Jagdtrapez system the northern or southern half of a Zusatzzahlgebiet were called Jagdtrapeze (divisions of 10° longitude and 5° latitude). For example the Netherlands and north western Germany were in Jagdtrapez 05 Ost Süd, normally abbreviated 05 OS. (See map below). The Jagdtrapeze were then subdivided into rectangles called Mitteltrapeze (approximately 35km by 28km), along latitudinal parallels at 0°, 15°, 30°, and 45° and the longitudinal meridians at 0° and 30°these were designated by two letters, increasing regularly in rows from west to east and north to south: AA, AB to AU; BA, BB, to BU; etc. (See map on page 2).

Map showing Mitteltrapeze covering northern Europe ©Les Butler. No web or commercial use without permission

The Mitteltrapeze were then subdivided into nine rectangles called Kleintrapeze (each approximately 9km by 11km), along the latitudinal parallels 5° and the longitudinal meridians 10° apart. The numbering of the Kleintrapeze ran from 1 through 9, with 1 in the upper left corner and 9 in the bottom right corner of the Mitteltrapez Example: Koeln-Butzweilerhof airfield was located at 05 Ost S NO-3; that is, in the north eastern corner of Mitteltrapez NO.

Looking at the map of Stuttgart below the full reference for Stuttgart will be Jagdtrapez 04 Ost Nord; Mitteltrapez AT; Kleintrapez 8. This would be abbreviated to 04ON AT-9. Page 14 of 108

(Note: On the map the broad lines to the north and east of Stuttgart are the borders between O4 ON and 05 OS in the north and 04 ON and 14 ON in the east.

Map: don-caldwell.we.bs/jg26/gradnertz_3x2.gif Explanation: stormbirds.com/eagles/research/gradnetz/gradnetz.html

3. STUTTGART 3.1. HISTORY Stuttgart in southwestern Germany sits astride the Neckar River, in a forested vineyard-and-orchard setting in historic Swabia. Stuttgart lies between the Black Forest to the west and the Swabian Alps to the south. There were prehistoric settlements and a Roman fort in the area of Bad Cannstatt (a suburb), but Stuttgart itself originated as a Stuotgarten, a Gestüt, or stud farm, set up about 950. A wine industry developed, and Stuttgart received civic rights after passing to the counts of Württemberg in the 13th century. It became the principal residence of the counts about 1320, and after 1482 it was successively the capital of the Württemberg county, duchy, kingdom, and state. Prosperity in the 16th century was followed by a decline during the Thirty Years’ War (1618–48) and the French invasions of Louis XIV (1681–84), from which it did not recover until the Industrial Revolution in the 19th century caused rapid expansion. Stuttgart is purported to be the location of the automobile's invention by Karl Benz and then industrialized by Gottlieb Daimler and Wilhelm Maybach in a small workshop in Bad Cannstatt that would become Daimler-Motoren-Gesellschaft in 1887. As a result, it is considered to be the starting point of the worldwide automotive industry and is sometimes referred to as the 'cradle of the automobile'. In the year prior, Robert Bosch had opened his first "Workshop for Precision Mechanics and Electrical Engineering" in Stuttgart. During World War 1, the city was a target of air raids. In 1915, 29 bombs struck the city killing four soldiers, injuring another 43 and killing four civilians. The next major air raid on Stuttgart occurred 15 September 1918, when structural damage caused house collapses that killed eleven people. At the end of the First World War, November revolutionaries stormed the Wilhelmpalais to force King Wilhelm II to abdicate. Under pressure from the revolutionaries, Wilhelm II eventually abdicated and the Free State of Württemberg was established as a part of the Weimar Republic, and Stuttgart was declared its capital. In 1919, a new constitution was ratified. In 1920, Stuttgart temporarily became the seat of the German National Government when the administration fled from Berlin from the Kapp Putsch. 3.2. NAZI GERMANY Hitler attained power in March 1933, after the Reichstag adopted the Enabling Act of 1933 in that month, giving expanded authority. President Paul von Hindenburg had already appointed Hitler as Chancellor on 30 January 1933 after a series of parliamentary elections and associated backroom Page 15 of 108

intrigues. The Enabling Act, when used ruthlessly and with authority, virtually assured that Hitler could thereafter constitutionally exercise dictatorial power without legal objection. In 1933 the Gestapo were detaining and torturing political dissidents and the city was being used for the transit of Nazi prisoners of conscience o concentration camps. The next year the Nazi regime began the arrests and deportation of Stuttgart's Jewish inhabitants, beginning with the entire male Jewish population of Stuttgart, to the police-run prison camp at Welzheim or directly to Dachau. Other Jews from around Württemberg were brought to Stuttgart and housed in the ghetto. Between 1941 and 1945, more than 2,000 Jews from all over Württemberg were deported to Theresienstadt, Auschwitz, and the ghettos at Riga and Izbica. Of them, only 180 held in Internment survived the] Holocaust. Stuttgart, like many of Germany's major cities, was savaged throughout the war by Allied air raids. For the first four years of the war, successful air raids on the city were rare because of the capable defence of the city by Wehrmacht ground forces, the Luftwaffe, and artificial fog (nebulisation). With the war increasingly turning against the Third Reich, more and more troops were pulled from the defence of the city in 1943 to fight on the Eastern Front. In 1944, the city centre was entirely in ruins due to British and American bombers that could now more easily attack the city. The heaviest raid took place on 12 September 1944, when the Royal Air Force, dropping over 184,000 bombs, including 75 blockbusters, levelled Stuttgart's city centre, killing 957 people in the resulting firestorm. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stuttgart

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OPERATIONS

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THIS PAGE LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK

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OPERATION No. 1 12TH AUGUST 1944 - BORDEAUX 1.

BOMBER COMMAND OPERATIONS 1.1. Forêt De Montrichard 117 aircraft – 95 Halifaxes, 16 Lancasters, and 6 Mosquitoes – of 6 and 8 Groups attacked a fuel dump, which was soon covered by a thick pall of smoke. No aircraft lost. 1.2. U-Boat Pens 68 Lancasters of 1 Group and 2 Mosquitoes of 5 Group attacked pens at Brest, La Pallice and Bordeaux without loss. A U-boat was believed to have been hit at La Pallice. 8 Mosquitoes of 100 Group provided a fighter escort. 1.3. 1 Wellington flew an RCM sortie RCM –Radio Counter Measures

2.

BORDEAUX SUBMARINE BASE Originally used as a submarine base by the Italians in the summer of 1941, the decision was taken by the German Navy to build a submarine pen (a type of submarine base that acts as a bunker to protect submarines from air attack) in Bordeaux, and construction work began in September of that year. By January 1943 the first German U-boats were stationed there and the base went on to th become the home of supply boats, mine-layers, torpedo transports and the 42-strong 12 Flotilla of very long-range U-boats. Some of the longest voyages of the war set out from Bordeaux, including a 225-day patrol that was completed in October 1943. The base was one of five built by the Germans on the Atlantic coast for U-boats during the Second World War. In November 1942 a famous British Commando raid (whose participants became known as the Cockleshell Heroes) was made on Bordeaux Harbour. Of the 12 commandos involved only four made it to Bordeaux and only two survived. Whilst only 6 ships were partly damaged it became a huge propaganda boost at a time when things were not going particularly well for the British.

U-boat facilities first became a bombing priority in March 1941 and again during the Combined Bomber Offensive. The bunkers did not suffer as much as their surroundings until August 1944 when a new type of bomb was used against them, the ‘Tallboy’ a medium capacity 12.000 lb bomb. Weighing over 5 tons it could only be carried by the Lancaster bomber. (As an example of its destructive power in the attack on the Saumur tunnel on 8–9 June 1944 the bombs passed straight through the hill and exploded inside the tunnel 60ft (18m) below the surface). The Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) was an Allied offensive of strategic bombing during World War II in Europe. The primary portion of the CBO was against Luftwaffe targets which was the highest priority from June 1943 to 1 April 1944

3.

166 SQUADRON th

On 12 August 1 Group Bomber Command HQ issued orders to 166 Squadron to prepare 11 Lancaster Bombers to make a daylight attack on oil storage installations at Bordeaux. (In total 30 Lancaster’s from 1 Group would take part in the raid). The time of the attack ‘H’ Hour was set for 1500 hours and crews were instructed that ‘on account of the small number of aircraft involved it was of greatest importance to be on time at the target, even to the extent of arriving early, in which case an orbit should be made’.

As this was a daylight raid on the coast of France fighter cover was provided; a squadron of Spitfires from 11 Group outwards for part of the trip with 6 to 12 Mosquitoes of 100 Group taking over for the raid. Each aircraft was loaded with six 2000lbs Armour Piercing (AP) bombs. The bombing of the target was controlled by Pathfinders marking the aiming point, Yellow Target Indicators (TIs) and a Master Bomber giving aiming instructions. The Pathfinders were target-marking squadrons. They located and marked targets with flares, which a main bomber force could aim at, increasing the accuracy of their bombing. The role of the Master Bomber was to ensure the bombers dropped their bombs in the right place; he would be over the target area for the whole a raid. Target Indicators were flares used to provide an easily seen visual aiming point for the following bombers to aim at. Target Indicators were available in various colours, and during a raid bomb aimers would be instructed by the Master Bomber to drop their bombs on the target indicators of a specified colour. Marker aircraft carried different colours should the initial target indicators be dropped off target. Page 19 of 108

The first target indicators could be cancelled over the radio by the Master Bomber and the Marker crews instructed to drop new target indicators of a different colour, until the correct aiming point was correctly marked.

Taking off from Kirmington at approximately 1115 hours the trip was largely over the sea and liberated France and the escort of fighters meant that no trouble was experienced until the actual target area was reached were the aircraft were engaged by heavy flak and no fewer than six of them sustained flak damage of a minor nature. Bombing at first was reported as rather scattered but a good concentration was eventually built up though little in the way of results was seen. 1 Group Operational Record Book (ORB) recorded that of the 30 aircraft that took part in the raid 28 managed to drop their bomb load over the target area although ‘it is not yet clear which attacked the submarine pens and which the oil storage. Dust and smoke obscured the target area to some extent and observation of the results was difficult, but it is believed that the weight of the attack was on the submarine pens and the oil storage. It was observed that a large warehouse near the pens was burning well’

In his flying log Teddy recorded taking off at 1120 with a daylight flying time of 7 hours 5 minutes and reported ‘Submarine pens bombed visually’. The squadron ORB recorded that the crew ‘Bombed at 1511 hours from 12,000 feet on Yellow TIs, target area was partially covered by smoke; bombing seems quite concentrated, smoke increased as the target area was left’.

4.

AIRCRAFT MISSING No aircraft were missing

5.

AFTERMATH The raid was probably a quiet introduction to operations for the crew; however, this could not be said nd th about the 2 Op on the 14 August which was to have some very tragic consequences.

6.

166 SQUADRON ORDERS th

13 August

3 aircraft took part in an attack on Faliase taking off at 0015 hours. All aircraft returned safely.

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OPERATION No. 2 14TH AUGUST 1944 - FONTAINE LE PIN 1.

OPERATION TRACTABLE, NORMANDY, FRANCE Following their breakout through the German defences the US Army was moving quickly in Britany to the west, to the south and to Paris to the east. The Allies noticed that a trap was being formed in Normandy, potentially encircling several tens of thousands of German soldiers close to Falaise. Anglo-Canadian forces were closing in on Faliase while the Americans headed towards Argentan. If the Allies succeeded in making their junction between Falaise and Argentan, all the Germans still to the west of this line (belonging to Group B commanded by General von Kluge) would be taken prisoners, a total of some 150,000 men. Operation ‘Tractable’ was a major Canadian operation in Normandy designed to break through the German defensive perimeter to reach Falaise. Like its predecessor, Operation ‘Totalize’, ‘Tractable’ was to employ heavy bombers to augment the firepower available to the troops. The use of heavy bombers in a tactical role was a relatively new task for the strategic force and required precise targeting to destroy and disrupt the enemy positions. The strategic bomber force, British and American, had made significant contributions to the land battle in Normandy, but there had been mistakes, most notably during Operation ‘Cobra’ when the th American 8th Air Force had twice bombed their own troops on 24/25 July causing 136 deaths and an additional 621 casualties. th Maybe as a foretaste of things to come on the night of 13/14 August, a Canadian officer lost his way while moving between divisional headquarters. He drove into German lines and was promptly killed. th The Germans discovered a copy of the Battle' orders on his body. As a result, the 12 SS Panzer Division placed the bulk of its remaining strength along the Allies' expected line of approach.

2.

FONTAINE LE PIN (NEAR TO FALIASE) For Operation ‘Tractable’, the medium bombers of US 2 Group, 2nd Tactical Air Force were to bomb German gun, mortar and tank positions along the start line immediately prior to the ground attack commencing. This was to be followed by a large attack by Bomber Command against German positions on the right flank of the Canadian attack, timed to commence two hours after the start of the advance. This bombing was intended ‘to destroy or neutralize enemy guns, harbours, and defended localities on the right flank and to prevent any enemy movement from this area to the area of the attack’.

3.

BOMBER COMMAND 3.1. 14/15 August 1944 Normandy Battle Area 805 aircraft – 411 Lancasters, 352 Halifaxes, and 42 Mosquitoes – attacked 7 German troop positions facing the 3rd Canadian Division, which was advancing on Falaise. 2 Lancasters lost. Brest 155 Lancasters and 4 Mosquitoes of 5 Group made two separate attacks on ships in Brest harbour. The Clémenceau and the cruiser Gueydon were both hit and were believed left sinking in ‘safe’ positions which would not hinder Allied use of the port when American troops took possession. The Allied forces were anxious to capture a good port to which supplies and reinforcements for the land battle could be brought in directly from the United States. 2 Lancasters were lost. 1 Wellington flew an RCM sortie. Total effort for the day: 965 sorties, 4 aircraft (0.4%) lost. 3.2. 14/15 August 1944 Minor Operations 32 Mosquitoes to Berlin, 2 to Sterkrade oil plant and 2 to St-Trond airfield, 1 RCM sortie, 8 Halifaxes and 6 Lancasters minelaying off Biscay ports, 4 aircraft on Resistance operations, 7 OTU sorties. No losses. Page 21 of 108

RCM –Radio Counter Measures Operational Training Unit (training unit to prepare crews for operations)

4.

166 SQUADRON On 14th August 1 Group Bomber Command HQ issued orders to 166 Squadron to prepare 11 Lancaster Bombers to make a daylight attack on German lines at Fontaine le Pin (near to Faliase). (In total 130 Lancaster’s from No. 1 Group would take part in the raid. Total number of aircraft involved was 710 aircraft plus 40 Lancasters from the Pathfinder Force (PFF)). There were 7 target areas in total and the aim was to destroy enemy armoured forces in support of nd an attack by the 2 Army. Teddy’s aircrew were ordered to attack the target known as ‘Aiming Point 25’ which was at Fontaine le Pin, with the time of the attack ‘H’ Hour at 1530 hours. The bomb load was nine 1000lb General Purpose (GP) bombs, four 1000lb Semi Armour Piercing (SAP) bombs and four 500lb GP bombs. The bombing of the target was controlled by ground marking, Mosquito aircraft were to mark each aiming point with Red TIs, whilst other PFF aircraft would keep the aiming points marked with Yellow and Green TIs. A Master Bomber would also direct bombing on each aiming point. Aircrews also received the following specific instructions Under no circumstances whatsoever are any bombs to be dropped after 1600 hours. Our own troops will be 2,000 yards from the aiming points to the north east and west. The utmost accuracy of bombing is therefore essential and under no circumstances may bombs be dropped unless crews are certain of the correct markers. Crews are to adhere implicitly to the instructions issued by the Master Bomber. In particular if the code word for abandon mission is given crews are to obey it instantly. A smoke screen is being placed to the north east of the target but is due to cease at 1300 hours. The smoke should clear by 1400 hours crews are to be informed of this.

At 1315 hours the 11 aircraft set off to take part in the attack on the German defended localities and troop concentrations in the Canadian Sector of the Normandy Battlefield. Weather conditions were good although as the aircraft approached the target area the sky was covered by thick smoke up to 7,000 feet. As a result the average bombing height was only 3,000 feet and even then ground detail was almost obliterated and crews had to bomb on markers. Defences at the target area were nil but some light flak was encountered and one aircraft sustained damage to bomb doors, fuselage and hydraulics. Apart from that no trouble was experienced and all crews successfully carried out their mission. 1 Group Operational Record Book (ORB) reported that of the 101 aircraft that took part in the raid 100 managed to drop their bomb load over the target area. It also said ‘The aircraft detailed to attack on aiming point 25 (Fontaine Le Pin) report having been able to see the smoke resulting from earlier attacks rising up to 6,000 feet before they reached the French coast … The smoke made observation of ground detail very difficult but over 50% of the crews were able to see TI’s which they bombed.’

In his flying log Teddy recorded taking off at 1330 hours with a daylight flying time of 4 hours and reported ‘Army support, tank concentrations bombed’. The squadron ORB recorded that the crew Bombed at 1534 from 2,500 feet on red TI, target area was a mass of smoke. Large column of black smoke with red base was seen. Good combination of bombing.

5.

AIRCRAFT MISSING 5.1. Aircrew Missing (14 men) 103/R 300/A

F/L Bartlett F/L Rembinski

(20 Ops) nd (4 Ops, 2 tour)

5.2. Aircraft Crashed 550/V (PD208) crashed at 1702 hours from about 4,000 feet at Wansford some 7 miles W of th Peterborough, Northamptonshire, there were no survivors. The crew were on their 4 operation F/Sgt J Hough Age 30 Sgt H Hindle Age Unknown Sgt A W Tucker F/Sgt E Moody F/Sgt J B Lake (Australian) Sgt G A Thomson Sgt E J Walsh

(Buried Burnley Cemetery) (Buried Accrington Cemetery)

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6.

AFTERMATH The Operations Records Books (ORBs) of both 1 Group and 166 Squadron were both quite upbeat about the operation, 1 Group reported ‘the bombing, although possibly not so concentrated as that on the Northern aiming point, was nevertheless reported as having been well in the target area. Before the target became completely obscured by smoke, bombs were seen bursting in the village of Fontaine Le Pin and several fires were started.’

And 166 Squadron reported Owing to the smoke which covered the target area only some of the photographs showed ground details, but these indicated that the attack fell in the right place and that a good concentration of bombing was achieved

Both reports failed to mention the events detailed below. Though the air support was largely a success a number of aircraft mistakenly bombed short, hitting units of First Canadian Army. In total, over 150 Allied soldiers were killed and 241 wounded by the short bombing. Though it had little impact on the outcome of ‘Tractable’, there were a number of investigations launched to understand why the short bombing occurred. The RAF investigation considered the bombing phases PhaseTime (hours) 1 2 3 4

1441 to 1459 1514 to 1518 1514 to 1520 1532 to 1538

Location

Aiming Pont No.

Near St. Aignan Near St. Aignan Near the Quarry at Haut Mesnil Near the Quarry at Haut Mesnil

22 and 23 28 28 25

Teddy’s aircraft was involved in the bombing run in phase 4, which resulted in the bombing of th Canadian troops from 12 Field Regiment Canadian Artillery. Of the 26 aircraft that ‘attacked’ the quarry Teddy’s aircraft was the fifth to drop their bomb load. The report noted This (Phase 4 bombing) was started by aircraft ‘J’ of 460 (RAAF) Squadron. The air bomber of this aircraft claims that he saw through the smoke of previous bombing what he thought were red target indicators burning on the ground ‘which he had previously seen cascading’. At the same time, another aircraft of the same squadron also bombed what he claimed to have been yellow markers. This target was bombed by a total of 26 aircraft of No.1 Group.

An understanding of what it was like on the ground can be found in this extract from the book by Lt. th th Col. T. J. Bell M.C.) ‘Into Action with the 12 Field.’ (The 12 Field Regiment Royal Canadian Artillery, who were sheltering in Haut Mesnil Quarry). One hour and ten minutes of death and destruction - and from our own support. It was almost unbelievable and the time seemed interminable. Many prayers were offered that day – not for life itself but that the end might come quickly. The agony of suspense was terrifying and escape impossible. The air after each stick was dropped, would be filled with flying debris and between waves the ammunition from dumps and blazing vehicles was exploding in every direction. The whole area of the quarry was raging inferno and yet strange to relate the dividing line of the bombing th th rd rd between the 11 , 16 and 43 Batteries was as clean as the cut of a knife. Not that the 43 felt safe but they were able to watch Lancasters come in and literally blow their brother Batteries to bits - at least it seemed so at the time. They were only four hundred yards from the target and yet could only watch: any action was impossible. An Auster air OP (observation plane) eventually put in an appearance and did its best to divert the bombers from us but it was only the last wave that was actually led from our area. There was so much smoke and dust after the first few waves had passed that even decisive features on the ground had ceased to exist for orientation and from what we could gather the bombers were bent only on dropping their bombs in the same area as their predecessors. Our toll, when it was over, was thirteen dead and fifty-three wounded to say nothing of the vehicles th th and guns. The gun position and Wagon Lines of the 16 and the Wagon Lines of the 11 Batteries rd th were hit the hardest while the 43 escaped untouched. The 16 lost practically all of their vehicles th and trailers and most of their guns were damaged. The 11 suffered thirty-three vehicle casualties and it was a miracle that no more lives had been lost. Now we knew how the Germans stood it and the answer was going to ground. Unless a bomb scored a direct hit on a slit trench you were comparatively safe. It was a dreadful experience and the morale of the Regiment was at a low ebb following the raid. The Medical Officer performed miracles in his RAP (Regimental Aid Post) in one of the tunnels and many casualties from the other Units passed through his hands.

Though it is impossible to state precisely how many casualties it caused, a return prepared at th Headquarters First Canadian Army on 15 August showed totals of 65 killed, 241 wounded and 91 then missing. Many of the missing were certainly killed. Canadian artillery regiments east of th Hautmesnil suffered heavily, for example 12 Field Regiment RCA having 21 killed and 46 wounded, Page 23 of 108

the Royal Regiment of Canada six killed and 34 wounded. The Poles also had serious losses, th reporting 42 killed and 51 missing as of 15 August. Air Chief Marshal Arthur Harris, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief of Bomber Command, issued a th report on 25 August which contains the official RAF post-mortem on the reasons for the accidental bombing. 1. Using heavy bombers, at short notice, for a task for which they are not trained. 2. The limitations of a Lancaster where the bomb aimer, unused to, not well trained or suited to the task, is the only crew member with an adequate view of the ground for piloting by map reading. 3. The use of coloured pyrotechnics by the ground troops and red verey fired from some aircraft imitated yellow and red TIs confusing bomber crews and in some cases confirming the view that they were on the correct target 4. The Army’s requirement to bomb the targets in the reverse order to that made desirable by the wind direction, resulting in heavy smoke over the target area and poor visibility. As a result of the investigation the following action was taken. Two Pathfinder Force crews relinquished their Pathfinder badges and the acting ranks, consequent upon Pathfinder employ, were reposted to ordinary crew duties. Squadron and Flight Commanders personally implicated relinquished their Commands and subsequent acting rank and were reposted for ordinary crew duty. All crews implicated were ‘starred’ as not to be employed within thirty miles forward of the bomb line until reassessed after further experience on targets outside the operational area of our own troops. A request was made by Harris that suitable action be taken with regard to the failure to warn Bomber Command of the yellow flares commonly in use to mark Allied troops; with regard to the mistaken action of the Auster pilots; and with regard to the deplorable and largely untrue Press stories permitted to emanate through RAF and Army controlled sources in France There is no record of what happened to Teddy’s aircrew after the investigation or any record of what they felt. It can only be assumed that action No. 3 from the report was relevant to them. That probably didn’t have much impact as shortly afterwards Eisenhower, after several friendly fire incidents, decided not to employ strategic bombers on tactical targets again. The incident was witnessed by war correspondents and was widely reported particularly in Canada. Ironically many of the bombers who committed the error were from the Canadian 6 Bomber Group, so it was in the interests of both the British and Canadians to hope the story went away. It was just another tragedy brought about by the fog of war. th

As for the immediate impact on Teddy and his crew, at 0948 hours the next morning, the 15 , they rd were airborne again on their 3 Op. Harris stated in the official report ‘Air bombers as a whole are by no means of outstanding intelligence. They are in the main selected as such because, although passing other standards for aircrew, they are the least likely to make efficient pilots or navigators’.

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OPERATION No. 3 - LE CULOT AIRFIELD 15TH AUGUST 1944 1.

BOMBER COMMAND th

1.1. 15 August 1944 Luftwaffe Night-Fighter Airfields 1,004 aircraft – 599 Lancasters, 385 Halifaxes, 19 Mosquitoes, 1 Lightning – attacked 9 airfields in Holland and Belgium in preparation for a renewed night offensive against Germany. Visibility was perfect and all raids were considered successful. 3 Lancasters lost. 1 Wellington flew an RCM sortie. 1.2. 15/16 August 1944 Minor Operations 32 Mosquitoes to Berlin, 8 to Venlo airfield and 9 to various Ruhr targets, 1 RCM sortie, 7 Mosquito patrols, 6 Halifaxes minelaying off La Pallice. No aircraft lost. 2.

LE CULOT AIRFIELD Beauvechain Air Base was a pre-World War II Belgian Air Force military airfield established in 1936 as ‘Le Culot Airfield’. It was captured during the Battle of Belgium by the invading German th Wehrmacht on 10 May 1940. Le Culot did not host any operational units until November 1943, when it was used as part of Operation Steinbock, a late war German operation carried out by the Luftwaffe between January and May 1944 against targets in southern England, mainly in and around the London area during the night. Operation Steinbock attacks from Le Culot continued until the end of July 1944, the last largescale aerial bombing operation against England. Afterwards only the V1 cruise missiles and V2 ballistic rockets were used for hitting the British Isles.

3.

166 SQUADRON th

On 15 August 24 166 Squadron were instructed to prepare 24 aircraft for an operation on Le Culot airfield in North Belgium for an operation targeting Le Culot airbase in north Belgium. (In total 101 Lancasters from 1 Group participated in the raid) The attack was timed ‘H’ Hour for 1200 hours; crews were given the following instructions ‘if the markers cannot be seen or the target identified visually, bombs may be dropped on any airfield seen in the vicinity. In no circumstances are bombs to be dropped on anything but an airfield’. ‘the importance of setting course from the rendezvous dead on time and track is to be stressed particularly as on this occasion neither 1 Group force will be led by ‘Leading Formations’. ‘Leading Formations’ are not being used owing to the large number of adjacent targets which are being bombed at the same time. There will in fact be Bomber Command aircraft flying on similar routes on either side of the routes for our targets. Independent an accurate navigation by each aircraft is essential’.

As this was a daytime operation fighter escort was provided by four squadrons (48 aircraft) of Spitfires of 11 Group. The airbases were also patrolled by a Fighter Squadron of Thunderbolt aircraft th from US 8 Airforce who also made low flying attacks on the airbases following the bombing raids. Each aircraft was loaded with nine 1000lb GP bombs, four 1000lb SAP bombs and four 500lb GP bombs. PFF aircraft would mark the aiming points marked with Red TIs. A Master Bomber would also direct bombing on each aiming point. After taking off at 0940 hours the conditions over the target were excellent and the PFF markers were well placed. A heavy concentration of bombing was achieved with both runways being cratered and the rest of the airfield heavily damaged. There was moderate heavy flak over the target area and several aircraft sustained minor damage. All aircraft returned to base safely. 1 Group ORB reported that a total of 101 Lancaster bombers were detailed to take part in the attack from 1 Group, 101 took-off and 100 successfully attacked the target. It also said Bombing is reported to have been accurately concentrated … a large explosion is reported from the fuel storage and southern tip of the airfield. There was moderate but very accurately predicted heavy flak defending the target area and 13 aircraft sustained some damage. En route ground defences at Brussels and Antwerp were very active.

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In his flying log Teddy recorded taking off at 0948 hours with a daylight flying time of 3 hours and 45 minutes and reported ‘Night fighter drome bombed’. The squadron ORB recorded that the crew ‘Bombed at 1205 hours from 16.000 feet on Red TIs as ordered by the Master Bomber, god concentration of bombs on aiming point, fuel dump in west dispersal believed on fire’.

4.

AIRCRAFT MISSING No aircraft were missing.

5.

AFTERMATH Around 10,000 V-1s were launched at England, 2,419 going to London, with 6,184 dead and 17,981 injured (4,261 V-1s were destroyed by fighters, anti-aircraft fire and barrage balloons). The V-1 flying bomb (German: Vergeltungswaffe 1 ‘Vengeance Weapon 1’]) also known to the Allies as the buzz bomb, or doodlebug was an early cruise missile and the only production aircraft to use a pulsejet for power. The V-1 was the first of the so-called ‘Vengeance weapons’ series (V-weapons or Vergeltungswaffe) deployed for the terror bombing of London.

Around 1,402 V-2s were launched at England, 1,358 going to London, with 2,754 dead and 6,523 injured. The V-2 (German: Vergeltungswaffe 2, ‘Retribution Weapon 2’), was the world's first long-range guided ballistic missile. The missile, powered by a liquid-propellant rocket engine, was developed during the Second World War in Germany as a ‘vengeance weapon’, assigned to attack Allied cities as retaliation for the Allied bombings against German cities.

More V-1s and V-2s were launched on Antwerp, in Belgium than London, more than 8,000 people died in almost 9,000 V-impacts. th

th

Teddy’s next operation, his 4 Op would be on the 16 August, his third in three days.

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OPERATION No. 4 16TH AUGUST 1944 - STETTIN 1.

BOMBER COMMAND th

1.1. 16 August La Pallice 25 Lancasters and 1 Mosquito of 5 Group to attack the U-boat pens found the target was cloudcovered and only 3 aircraft bombed. 1 Wellington RCM sortie was flown. No aircraft lost. th

th

1.2. 16 /17 August Stettin 461 Lancasters attacked the port and industrial areas. 5 Lancasters lost. Kiel 348 aircraft – 195 Lancasters, 144 Halifaxes and 9 Mosquitoes. 3 Halifaxes and 2 Lancasters lost. This raid was only partially successful. Support and Minor Operations 145 aircraft from training units on diversionary sweep over the North Sea, 23 Mosquitoes to Berlin, 5 to Deelen airfield and 3 each to Dortmund, Kamen and Sterkrade, 33 RCM sorties, 47 Mosquito patrols, 89 aircraft minelaying in the Baltic and in Kiel Bay and 4 in the River Gironde, 24 OTU sorties, 6 aircraft lost, 3 Halifaxes minelaying in Kiel Bay and 2 Lancasters off Swinemünde and 1 OTU Wellington. Total effort for the night: 1,188 sorties, 16 aircraft (1.3%) lost. 2.

STETTIN In January of 1940, the Nazis decided to make Pomerania on the southern shore of the Baltic Sea ‘Judenfrei’ (free of Jews). The Jews of Stettin (spelled "Szczecin" in Polish) became the first group of Pomeranian Jews expelled to Lublin in Poland. Those deported included intermarried families and families which had converted to Christianity from Judaism, most were long time German families who were highly assimilated into German society. During the early February 1940 approximately 1,300 Stettin Jews were woken by the Nazis and transported by train to the Lublin area. They were forced to march between 26 and 30 km to Lublin in weather below 20 degrees Fahrenheit, in snow 22 inches deep and at least 70 people died along this march. Living conditions on Lublin ere extremely poor and many died in the towns where they had been sent. Others were later sent on to death camps. During World War 2, Stettin was a major centre of weapons industry (including the car production Stoewer). 65% of Stettin's buildings and almost all of the city centre, seaport, and industry were destroyed during the Allied air raids in 1944, and heavy fighting between the German and Soviet th armies (26 April 1945).

3.

166 SQUADRON th

On 16 August 24 166 Squadron were instructed to prepare 18 aircraft for an operation on Stettin (code name ‘Sewin’), 8 aircraft were to drop mines in Stettin Bay and 10 aircraft were to attack Stettin (A total of 414 aircraft were involved in the attack on Stettin) th

The attack was timed ‘H’ Hour for 0100 hours on 17 August with the aim ‘to cause maximum damage to the target area’, the crews were given the following instructions The attack on Sewin is being co-ordinated with another attack … and a spoof bullseye to suggest a triple routed attack … to reduce the effectiveness of the enemy’s long range warning organisation and increase the diversionary power of the spoof bullseye. Bullseye were training exercises which involved mock raids and were also used to test ground defences The German night air defence system was called Kammhuber Line by the Allies. Established in July 1940 by Colonel Josef Kammhuber it consisted of a series of control sectors equipped with radars and searchlights and an associated night fighter. Each sector would direct the night fighter into visual range with target bombers.

As this was a night attack no fighter cover was provided the aircraft would have to defend themselves against Luftwaffe nightfighters and hope they wouldn’t be hit by Flak. Page 27 of 108

Each aircraft was loaded with one 2,000lb High Capacity (HC) bomb and twelve 500lb ‘J’ type cluster bombs. PFF aircraft would mark the exact aiming point with Green and Red salvoes backed up with Red TIs. A Master Bomber would also direct bombing on the aiming point. Incendiary cluster bombs were bombs that ejected small (e.g. 4lb) bomblets that were designed to spread over a wide area and start multiple fires

At take-off at 2110 hours the weather was good, but after crossing the Dutch coast cloud built up to nearly 10/10ths until the Baltic was reached. The bombing aircraft consisted mostly of new crews and they had a good route and good conditions. Large explosions were seen in the target area and fires were visible for over 50 miles on the return journey. On the return journey ‘I’ flown by P/O Jones and crew were engaged by a JU-88 which their Rear Gunner clamed as damaged. All aircraft successfully completed their missions and returned safely to base. 1 Group ORB reported that a total of 137 Lancaster bombers were detailed to take part in the attack from 1 Group, 134 took-off and 131 successfully attacked the target. It also said Many fires were started from both in the centre of the town and the north east of the town and streets are reported to have been clearly visible in the light of the burning incendiaries … ground defences in the target area consisted of only slight to moderate HF (heavy flak) ... there was little activity by night fighters on the outward route and they were only in evidence in the target area ... several of our aircraft were engaged in combat on the return route over Denmark. In all seven combats are reported. In one of these a JU.88 is claimed as damaged

In his flying log Teddy recorded taking off at 2100 with a night time flying time of 8 hours and 20 minutes and reported ‘1 JU.88 probably destroyed’. The squadron ORB recorded that the crew Bombed at 0106 from 17,500 feet on glow of fires. Only glow of flares could be seen at time of bombing but just after break in cloud enabled the fires to be seen over the whole target area

4.

AIRCRAFT MISSING Nothing was heard from the following aircraft after take-off 625/U 576/B2

5.

P/O Charlick (5 Ops) P/O Watts (13 Ops)

4th Wave 2nd Wave

COMBAT REPORT The crew filled in a Combat Report detailing an attack by a JU-88 aircraft. The location was close to Slagelse, a town in Denmark located in west Zealand about 100 km southwest of Copenhagen. The Junkers JU-88 was a Luftwaffe twin-engined multirole combat aircraft. The plane was designed as a so-called Schnellbomber (fast bomber) that would be too fast for fighters of its era to intercept. Like a number of other Luftwaffe bombers, it served as a bomber, dive bomber, night fighter, torpedo bomber, reconnaissance aircraft and heavy fighter and at the end of the war, as a flying bomb

Homeward bound from an attack on Stettin and about 10 to 15 miles off track due to failure of GEE and H2S the Rear Gunner (R/G) of Lancaster ‘I’ of 166 Squadron sighted a JU.88 at approximately 500 yards silhouetted against cloud and apparently attacking another bomber, although no tracer fire was observed. The R/G and Mid Upper Gunner (M/U) opened fire almost simultaneously whereupon the enemy aircraft (E/A) banked and came in to attack ‘Item’ opening fire at about 450 yards closing to 350 yards as the Lancaster corkscrewed to port. Both gunners continued to fire bursts into the E/A who broke away down very steeply in the direction of the port beam at about 300 yards. Hits were observed on the E/A but no damage was observed. The E/A was burning a nose light (not very bright) which went out just before breakaway. No damage or hits sustained by the Lancaster. (Although the two gunners didn’t observe any damage to the JU-88 they claimed they hit and damaged the aircraft). GEE was a radio navigation system that measured the time delay between two radio signals to produce a fix, with accuracy in the order of a few hundred metres at ranges up to about 350 miles (560 km) H2S (see below) The corkscrew manoeuvre or barrel roll was designed to present the bomber to the fighter in a manner that the fighter could line up for an attack and at the moment the attack began the direction and altitude of the bomber would be violently changed through a series of direction and altitude changes. The diagram shows the ‘corkscrew’ manoeuvre assuming an attack from the starboard side. It would be reversed if the attack came from port.

Page 28 of 108

On the same evening another Lancaster from 166 Squadron claimed they had destroyed a JU.88 whilst returning from the mine laying operation in Stettin Bay. They reported they were attacked at 0300 hours over the North Sea west of Denmark, about 160 miles west of the position where Teddy’s aircraft was attacked. The Rear Gunner reported a JU.88 approaching fast from astern and slightly below their aircraft, after ordering corkscrew port he opened fire and saw smoke and flames from both engines. After firing another burst he noticed the JU.88 break away on fire and go down in an almost vertical dive well alight. 6.

AFTERMATH th

In August of 1944, Stettin experienced the climax of night raids. The raid on the night 16/17 was the first with over 460 British four-engine Avro Lancasters; a Polish ‘compulsory worker’ remembered the air raid ‘Bombs began falling. The hail of bombs, ugly, whistling, destroying and incendiary. We know (sic) right away that the main aim of air raid was not the city centre, but the harbour and the port district, shipyards and the closest region of the city centre. The results of the action were shocking. The old city became the most smashed. All buildings in this area were worn out. The church of Saint Jacob was damaged and the terrains of today’s streets Odzieżowa, Czesława as well as the building round the Lotników square. Jakub Ciechanowski, Szczecin, Target Stettin: The Allied Air Forces over Stettin 1940–1945

Reports from Stettin stated that 1,508 houses and 29 industrial premises were destroyed and 1,000 houses and 26 industrial premises badly damaged. 5 ships in the harbour (totalling 5,000 tons) were sunk and 8 ships (15,000 tons) were seriously damaged. 1,150 people were killed and 1,654 were injured; 33 of the dead and 72 of the injured were German soldiers. August 16, 1944 (Wednesday). Operation No, 21 - Stettin One 2,000 pound and twelve J type 500 pound incendiary clusters Hung about for a daylight (raid) until noon then they changed it to a night effort. Boy what a long way – Stettin – Germany’s biggest Baltic port. Two thousand miles approximately (its eighty miles past Berlin). We went to five degrees east under 1,000 feet, climbed to 16,000 to cross Denmark, then on the way south again we climbed to as high as we could get to bomb (in our case 19,800 as we got iced up). After going through the target - dived at 240 mph 1,500 feet per minute to 6,000 feet all the way to nine degrees forty minutes east at 6,000 then down to 3,500 to well past the coast then down to 1,000 for return journey. GEE went U/S about 100 miles out so used H2S where possible – winds were bad and timing all off (also courses) but we bombed a minute early - bombed a TI just barely visible through cloud and found it about one and a half miles short of main attack – we were in cloud right until the edge of the target. We weren’t the only ones. U/S Unserviceable, or unusable However though the attack was scattered it was scattered evenly and the attack did some good.

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At Peenemunde on the way in I saw more flak than I’ve ever seen in my career, but we were on the outskirts of it and the target was not much better – just barrage stuff. Peenemunde - German town located on the island of Usedom just off the Baltic coast directly north of Berlin – during the war there was an important V rocket testing and development facility located here, hence the heavy flak defences The target was well lit up with searchlights – there must have been a hundred or more! The Window had them baffled though and they were pretty aimless. Window - Strips of tinfoil jettisoned in large numbers from planes to cloud enemy radar Barrage - Enemy fire which is designed to fill a volume or area, rather than aimed at a specific target Saw two chops (planes shot down) – one right before the target and one about halfway to Denmark (said to be a night fighter). Trip was just over eight hours – what a stooge! Bob (his bomb aimer) celebrated his birthday at midnight – that’s three of my boys who have celebrated birthdays on an op! Finished the meal about 7:30 a.m. and we (i.e. Tony K, Ed Chatterton and myself) went in and played a game of billiards until nine, then picked up our mail and then back to bed (stupid, eh?). Extract from the WW2 War Diary of Bruce Johnston, 115 Squadron

After three operations in three days Teddy and his crew would now have some respite, although this th time wasn’t wasted as his flying log records that on the 18 August (taking off at 1330 hours) they flew for 3 hours and 5 minutes ‘Y’ cross country’ which probably refers to cross country training flight using H2S radar. H2S was the first airborne, ground scanning radar system. It was developed to identify targets on the ground for night and all-weather bombing. This allowed attacks outside the range of the various radio navigation aids like Gee or Oboe, which were limited to about 350 kilometres (220 mi). It was also widely used as a general navigation system, allowing landmarks to be identified at long range. th

th

Teddy’s next Op his 5 had to wait until the 26 August th

th

On the 16 August till the 18 August Bomber Command conducted a Court if Inquiry into the th ‘friendly’ bombing incident that occurred on the 14 . The court identified that from photographic evidence 77 aircraft had been involved. They admitted that it would be impractical to interview all crews so they selected 15 aircrews for interview (presumably the ones that they thought were most th involved). The report was finally issued on 25 August. Although only one operation took place during this period it might be a fair assumption that Teddy and his crew may have been ‘suspended’ from operations pending the outcome of the investigation.

7.

166 SQUADRON ORDER th

18 aircraft stood by for operations but no further instructions were received

th

16 aircraft detailed to attack the oil refineries at Reime. All aircraft returned safely

th

Squadron stood down from operations

th

Squadron stood down from operations

st

A target was received and 11 aircraft detailed but the operation was cancelled early afternoon

17 August 18 August 19 August 20 August 21 August 22

nd

August

A target was received and 26 aircraft were detailed but the operation was cancelled shortly before take off

rd

Squadron stood down from operations

th

A target was received and 26 aircraft detailed for operations. Crews were briefed and at their aircraft ready for take-off when the operation was cancelled

th

26 aircraft took off at 1950 hours to attack Russelsheim. All aircraft returned safely

23 August 24 August 25 August

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OPERATION No. 5 26TH AUGUST 1944 - KIEL 1.

BOMBER COMMAND 1.1. 26/27 August 1944 Kiel 372 Lancasters and 10 Mosquitoes of 1, 3 and 8 Groups, 17 Lancasters lost, (4.6% of the Lancaster force). The Pathfinder marking was hampered by smoke-screens but the local report tells of a very serious raid with heavy bombing in the town centre and surrounding districts and widespread fires fanned by a strong wind. Königsberg 174 Lancasters of 5 Group to this target, which was an important supply port for the German Eastern Front. The route to the target was 950 miles from the 5 Group bases. Photographic reconnaissance showed that the bombing fell in the eastern part of the town but no report is available from the target, (now Kaliningrad in Lithuania). 4 Lancasters lost. Support and Minor Operations 108 training aircraft on a diversionary sweep to Normandy, 21 Mosquitoes to Berlin, 13 to Hamburg and 12 to five other targets, 19 RCM sorties, 70 Mosquito patrols, 30 Lancasters and 15 Halifaxes minelaying off Danzig and Kiel, 7 aircraft lost – 5 Lancaster minelayers, 1 Mosquito RCM aircraft and 1 Mosquito Serrate aircraft. Total effort for the night: 844 sorties, 28 aircraft (3.3%) lost.

2.

KIEL During the Second World War, Kiel remained one of the major naval bases and shipbuilding centres of the German Reich, there was also a slave labour camp for the local industry. The town was where Germany’s deadly ‘Wolf Pack’ of submarines was born, and the city became a major U-boat base and production centre. The U-boat menace made Kiel a high-priority target for Allied bombers, Kiel was heavily bombed by the Allies during the Second World War. The bombing destroyed more than 80% of the remaining old town, 72% of the central residential areas, 83% of the industrial areas and 167,000 people were homeless. In June 2010 Major Tony Hibbert, 92, was given the Great Seal of Kiel by Germany's UK Consul in a ceremony at Trebah Gardens near his home in Cornwall. The award was in recognition of Major Hibbert's role in taking the port city of Kiel, an operation which prevented the advancing Russian army from marching into Denmark. On May 1 1945, six days before the ceasefire in Europe Major Hibbert was given the order to go with 500 commandos to 'take Kiel, hold it and stop the Russians'. The British had discovered that the Russians had decided to break the Yalta agreement and take Denmark. The port of Kiel was an essential part of this plan. Major Hibbert led his commandos on the operation to seize the port and force the surrender of the Nazis in Denmark. Success meant that the western allies captured a swathe of Germany's Baltic coast and stopped the Russian advance.

3.

166 SQUADRON th

On 26 August 24 166 Squadron were instructed to prepare 19 aircraft for an operation on Kiel. 1 Group would supply 176 aircraft out of a total of 300 aircraft plus Pathfinder Force (PFF) aircraft. The attack was timed for 2310 hours; crews were given the following instructions All crews are to be reminded that correct time interval must be allowed before releasing the 4lb incendiaries to avoid a repetition of the recent incendiary undershooting. Attention is drawn to the decoys situated south south west of the town where dummy TIs with weaker colours may be expected. Crews are to be warned to check their ETA at the target as frequently as possible especially after leaving the last turning point before the target. Decoy bombing sites were dummy sites set up by the Germans (simulating potential targets) to try to get the bombers to bomb areas away from the main cities and towns. A similar practice carried out by the British. For example a decoy bombing site was constructed at Siddick to try to lure German bombers away from bombing Workington Docks and the steelworks etc.

As this was a night time raid no fighter cover was provided.

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The bomb load was one 1,000lb HC (high capacity) bomb, one hundred and eight 30lb incendiaries, one thousand and sixty five 4lb incendiaries and ninety 4lb incendiaries. The aiming points were marked with large salvoes of mixed Red and Green TIs and kept marked with Red TIs. The aircraft took off at 2000 hours. The weather conditions were good over both the routes and target, PFF marking was described as accurate and plentiful. There was moderate to intense heavy flak and light flak with searchlight co-ordination. One aircraft was engaged in fighter combat, two aircraft suffered minor damage from flak and another aircraft suffered damage believed to have been caused by bombs falling from another aircraft. On the return journey considerable difficulty was experienced from electrical storms, however all aircraft returned safely having successfully attacked the primary target. Although early bombing was slightly scattered a good concentration was soon achieved and many fires were reported with large explosions. A heavy pall of smoke hung over the target area and the general opinion was that the raid had been very successful. 1 Group Operational Record Book (ORB) reported that of the 176 aircraft that took part in the raid 167 managed to drop their bomb load over the target area. Total bomb load dropped by the 167 aircraft (approximately half of the total number of aircraft on the raid) was, 167 x 4,000lb bombs, 48 x 500lb bombs, 172,141 x 4lb incendiaries, 17,839 x 4lb ‘X’ type incendiaries and 16,266 x 30lb bombs. It also said Many impressive fires were gaining hold and merging into general conflagration as our crews left and the glow could be seen for 100 miles or so on the homeward route. A moderate to intense flak barrage was experienced at the target and numerous searchlights. Ten of our aircraft sustained some flak damage in the target area, one at Flensburg, one at the enemy coast out. Some fighters were present as 12 of our aircraft had combats, 4 on the outward route, 4 in the target area and 4 on the homeward route No claims made

In his flying log Teddy recorded taking off at 2100 with a daylight flying time of 5 hours 40 minutes there were no comments. The squadron ORB recorded that the crew Bombed at 2319 hours from 18,000 feet on centre of Red TIs burning on ground, a very good concentration of fires and a considerable amount of smoke over the whole target area. A concentrated attack.

4.

AIRCRAFT MISSING 4.1. Aircraft Missing (36 men) 625/K 100/P 576/J2 12/A 12/C

P/O Curleas P/O Hutchins P/O Linklater F/O Taylor F/O Louty P/O Atkinson

(1 Op) (10 Ops) (17 Ops) (2 Ops) (26 Ops) (Nil)

rd

3 Wave rd 3 Wave st 1 Wave st 1 Wave rd 3 Wave

P/O Atkinson is recorded as ‘Nil’ operations. I suspect that he was flying ‘Second Dickie’ with F/O Louty. This was where a new and inexperienced pilot would fly with an experienced crew acting as nd 2 pilot on an operational sortie prior to taking their own crew on operations. (It was in effect their first ‘operation’ but they weren’t credited with it).

4.2. Outstanding 550/N crash landed in the Humber, crew safe 5.

AFTERMATH A local report told of a very serious raid with heavy bombing in the town centre and surrounding districts and widespread fires fanned by a strong wind. The Rathaus (Town Hall) was completely burnt out and many other public buildings were destroyed or seriously damaged. A large public shelter, the Waisenhof bunker, was cut off by fire but the report does not say whether the people inside were eventually rescued. 134 people were killed and 1,002 were injured. th

th

The next time Teddy would take to the air would be on the 29 August on his 6 Op. 6.

166 SQUADRON ORDERS th

Squadron stood down from operations

th

Squadron stood down from operations

27 August 28 August

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OPERATION No. 6 - STETTIN 29TH AUGUST 1944 1.

BOMBER COMMAND 1.1. 29/30 August 1944 Stettin 402 Lancasters and 1 Mosquito of 1, 3, 6 and 8 Groups, 23 Lancasters lost, 5.7% of the force. This was a successful raid hitting parts of Stettin which had escaped damage in previous attacks. Königsberg 189 Lancasters of 5 Group carried out one of the most successful 5 Group attacks of the war on this target at extreme range. Only 480 tons of bombs could be carried because of the range of the target but severe damage was caused around the 4 separate aiming points selected. Bomber Command estimated that 41% of all the housing and 20% of all the industry in Königsberg were destroyed. There was heavy fighter opposition over the target and 15 Lancasters, 7.9 % of the force, were lost. Support and Minor Operations 93 training aircraft on a diversionary sweep over the North Sea, 53 Mosquitoes bombing Berlin, Hamburg and 4 other targets, 35 RCM sorties, 49 Mosquito patrols, 31 Lancasters and 12 Halifaxes minelaying off Baltic ports, 8 aircraft on Resistance operations. 2 OTU Wellingtons from the sweep and 1 Lancaster minelayer lost. Total effort for the night: 873 sorties, 41 aircraft (4.7%) lost.

2.

STETTIN For the second time in the month of August Stettin was the main target for Bomber Command. Still th th suffering from the effects of the raid on 16 /17 August Stettin was once again to suffer significant damage. Allied air raids in 1944 and heavy fighting between the German and Soviet armies destroyed 65% of Stettin’s buildings and almost all of the city centre, the seaport and local industries. Polish Home Army intelligence assisted in pinpointing targets for Allied bombing in Stettin. The city itself was covered by the Home Army’s ‘Bałtyk’ structure and Polish resistance infiltrated Stettin’s naval yards. Other activities of the resistance consisted of smuggling people to Sweden. After World War 2, the Allies moved the Polish-German border to the west of the Oder-Neisse line. Most of Pomerania, including Stettin and the Oder mouth, was eventually given to Poland. The German inhabitants of Stettin first fled from the city and it was virtually deserted after being captured th by Soviet army on 26 April 1945. The city was settled with the new inhabitants from every region of Poland and Stettin was renamed Szczecin.

3.

166 SQUADRON On 29th August 166 Squadron were instructed to prepare 19 aircraft for an operation on Stettin. 1 Group would supply 189 aircraft out of a total of 344 aircraft plus Pathfinder Force (PFF) aircraft. The attack was timed for 0200 hours; crews were told then aim of the raid was ‘To destroy the town’ they were also told that If weather conditions permit crews are to make a timed run from a suitable landmark or by H2S (an airborne, ground scanning radar system used to detect targets on the ground) in order to avoid the risk of bombing decoys. ETA at the target is to be carefully worked out be navigators and to be used as a check for bombing

As this was a night raid there was no fighter cover. The bomb load was one 4,000lb HC bomb, sixty 30lb incendiaries, five hundred and ninety 4lb incendiaries and seventy 4lb ‘X’ incendiaries. The aiming points were marked with large salvoes of mixed Red and Green TIs and kept marked with Red TIs The squadron took off at 2050 hours, Stettin was chosen as it was believed the Germans were supplying about 75% of the supplies to the Russian front from Stettin. The route chosen was a long one but this was to keep the aircraft away from known defended areas as much as possible. Visibility was good en route but over the target area crews had to bomb below cloud cover at 14,000 feet. Opposition at the target was only moderate heavy and light flak with a good deal of searchlight coordination, one aircraft being ‘coned’ on the run up. Some night fighter activity was reported and ‘E’ Page 33 of 108

flown by F/O Jones and crew was twice engaged by an Fw.190, No definite claim can be made but smoke was seen coming from the enemy aircraft as the engagement was broken off. Coned was when one searchlight, often radar controlled, picked up an aircraft all of the others in the target area would swing onto that aircraft, thus ‘coning’ it - then the flak would be ‘poured into the cone’.

Many fires were seen burning and although a number of HE’s (high explosives) were seen falling short of the target … it would appear that the object of the attack, to eliminate Stettin, was achieved. Unfortunately, ‘S’ flown by F/O Dunton and crew failed to return. With this sortie F/Ls Graham and Holmes and crew completed their first operational tour (30 operations). 1 Group Operational Record Book (ORB) reported that of the 189 aircraft that took off 167 successfully bombed the target. It also said that Flares provided good visibility, and marking is described as punctual and accurate, with the main concentration slightly to the north east of the aiming point. Good bombing on the markers followed and surrounding built up area was soon well alight. Fierce fires with smoke up to 14,000 feet are reported and a notable explosion was observed at 0207. Fire glow was seen from a considerable distance on the homeward route. A decoy to the north of the town attracted only very slight bombing. Enemy fighters were active, particularly on the approach over Denmark, and 24 of our aircraft had combats, 14 on the outward rote, 5 in the target area and 5 on the homeward route. Claims are 1 Me.110, 1 Fw.190 destroyed and a He.177 and two Fw.190’s damaged. Messerschmitt Me 110 was a twin-engine Zerstörer (Destroyer, heavy fighter) and fighter-bomber (Jagdbomber or Jabo) Focke-Wulf Fw 190 Würger (Strike) was a German single-seat, single-engine fighter aircraft Heinkel He 177 Greif (Griffin) was a long-range heavy bomber

In his flying log Teddy recorded taking off at 2100 with a night time flying time of 9 hours 40 minutes he reported ‘Two combats with Fw.190 both probable’. The squadron ORB recorded that the crew Bombed at 0205 hours from 17,000 feet on Red TIs, Red TIs seemed accurately placed with bombing well concentrated around them, very large explosion seen at 0207 hours. A very good attack.

4.

AIRCRAFT MISSING 4.1. 1 Group Aircraft Missing (105 men) were 460/F2 F/O Humphries 460/E/2 F/O Aldred 103/B F/L Forbes P/O Gorak 103/D F/O Nixon 576/WE F/O Thieme 166/S F/O Dunton 101/W F/L Stewart P/O Pocock 101/D P/O Piprell 101/F F/O Foster 12/H F/O Spurrs 626/B2 P/O Hawkes F/O McPhail 300/M F/L Wesik 300/R P/O Lupton 300/W F/O Jones 550/C W/O Ansell

(9 Ops) (8 Ops) (29 Ops)

nd

2 Wave rd 3 Wave nd 2 Wave nd

(7 Ops) 2 Wave nd (6 Ops) 2 Wave nd rd (1 Op, 2 Tour) 3 Wave (25 Ops) (11 Ops) (4 Ops) (3 Ops) (24 ops)

2 wave st 1 Wave

(Nil Ops) (1 Ops) (6 Ops) (14 Ops)

1 Wave rd 3 Wave rd 3 Wave nd 2 Wave

nd

st

It is reasonable to assume that P/O Gorak, P/O Pocock and F/O McPhail were flying ‘Second Dickie’, st prior to their first ‘Op’ and F/L Wesik was flying on his 1 ‘Op’ 4.2. 166 Squadron had one aircraft missing Lancaster S (PD261) F/O Dunton, F K Sgt Murray, G Sgt Davis, T H Sgt Harding, R E (Australian) F/S Powers, D K (Australian) Sgt Carey, J J Sgt Peake, J H

Age 22 Age 27 Age 22 Age 19 Age 20 Age Unknown Age 22

(Died, buried Poznan, Poland) (Died, buried Poznan) (Died, buried Poznan) (Died, buried Poznan) (Died, buried Poznan) (Died, buried Poznan) (Died, buried Poznan) Page 34 of 108

th

F/O Dunton and his crew were posted into 166 Squadron on 26 August 1944 and he was flying on nd the first Op of his 2 Tour, at the age of 22. (His first tour was probably with a different crew). Normal practice at the time was to fly 30 Operations and then to have a break, normally with a posting to Training Command to instruct new crew, before commencing a second tour. Between March 1943 and the early summer of 1944 aircrew might have expected to fly 30 ‘Ops’ in a period of 3 to 5 months depending on the weather conditions and operational requirements. They would then expect to do around six months in Training Command. This raises the question as to when, and how old was, Dunton when he flew his first Op. It is likely that the aircraft was shot down by a Nightfighter flown by one of the following three pilots Lt Kurt Welter, Hptm Rudolf Altendorf or Oblt Scholl who all had claims in the Stettin area between 0155 and 0212 hours.

5.

COMBAT REPORT As mentioned earlier Teddy and his crew reported two contacts with enemy aircraft as follows. 5.1. First contact At 0052 hours whilst on the outward journey the aircraft was attacked by a Fw.190. The E/A (enemy aircraft) was first sighted on the starboard quarter above the Mid Upper Gunner at a range of 550 yards and as it came into the attack he opened fire and ordered a corkscrew to starboard. The E/A opened fire almost simultaneously but as it closed in, both gunners (Mid Upper Gunner and Rear Gunner) observed much smoke issuing from the nose of the E/A and when at a range of 300 yards the Rear Gunner opened fire (120 rounds in total) and the Mid Upper Gunner then opened up (120 rounds in total) until the E/A broke away in a steep dive to the fine starboard quarter. It continued to dive with thick smoke pouring from the nose until it finally disappeared beneath the haze and it was not seen again. No damage was sustained by the Lancaster and the E/A is claimed as probably destroyed. Both gunners claim hits. If an aircrew did not see an E/A actually destroyed (e.g. crash into the ground/sea or blow up in midair) they would claim it as ‘possibly’ or ‘probably’ destroyed. Dictionary definitions refer to ‘probable’ as something that is likely to be done, or to be true; and ‘possible’ as something that can be done or to be true. Therefore a ‘probable’ claim means they are more confident that the E/A was destroyed against a ‘possible’ claim.

5.2. Second contact At 0210 hours shortly after bombing when still over the target area, the Wireless Operator (W/Op) sighted a Fw.190 on the starboard quarter flying on a parallel course at about 600 yards. The Rear Gunner fired a short burst at the E/A which broke away to the starboard quarter level, disappeared from view, and was not seen again. Almost immediately a second E/A was seen by the Rear Gunner, on the port quarter above at a range of 450 yards and coming in to attack. The Rear Gunner ordered a corkscrew to port and fire at the E/A which returned fire at 40 yards. The Rear Gunner continued to fire (200 rounds in total) until the breakaway at 250 yards but the E/A ceased fire at 300 yards when the Rear Gunner observed smoke pouring from the nose and the cockpit of the E/A, which dived to astern below and disappeared from view, It was not seen again and the Rear Gunner claims it as a probably destroyed. Damage was not sustained by the Lancaster. 6.

AFTERMATH The result of the air raid was spectacular, allied pilots saw a hurricane of fire, temperatures reached a thousand degrees and pavements burnt on streets. The lack of oxygen caused by this type of storm resulted in the death of nearly a thousand people located in undergrounds of the Castle of the Pomeranian Dukes. Even debris of bombs on the Oder River burnt. (It was the effect of the use of the benzol bombs whose content overflowed to the River causing the river fires). Numbers that underline the scale of destruction, show that the bombers dropped 2,200 bombs, 100,000 incendiary bombs and 12,000 containers of a liquid incendiary. A German report stated that 1,569 houses and 32 industrial premises were destroyed and that 565 houses and 23 industrial premises were badly damaged. A ship of 2,000 tons was sunk and 7 other ships (totalling 31,000 tons) were damaged. 1,033 people were killed and 1,034 people were injured. Roman Łyczywek, a barrister, who in 1945 began to work in Polish Szczecin (Stettin), wrote: ‘Influence of the heavy bombs and the use of aerial mines was incredible. On long sections of streets one could see the demolition of houses. Only a modest outline of building under mass of bricks does not look could be seen (sic).’ st

th

The next time Teddy would take to the air would be on the 31 August on his 7 Op. 7.

166 SQUADRON ORDERS th

30 August

Squadron stood down from operations. Page 35 of 108

OPERATION No. 7 - AGENVILLE 31ST AUGUST 1944 1.

BOMBER COMMAND 1.1. 31 August 1944 V-2 Rocket Stores 601 aircraft – 418 Lancasters, 147 Halifaxes, 36 Mosquitoes – to attack 9 sites in Northern France where the Germans were believed to be storing V-2 rockets. 8 of the sites were found and bombed. 6 Lancasters lost. Coastal Battery 65 Halifaxes of 6 Group and 5 Pathfinder Mosquitoes bombed the Île de Cezembre battery near St-Malo. 1 photographic Mosquito accompanied the raid. The bombing force flew at 3,000 ft or less over the undefended targets and achieved a good bombing concentration. 1 Halifax lost. 31 August/1 September 1944 Minor Operations 42 Mosquitoes to Düsseldorf, 6 to Cologne and 6 to Leverkusen, 3 RCM sorties, 21 Mosquito patrols, 24 aircraft on Resistance operations, 2 Mosquitoes lost, 1 each from the Cologne and Leverkusen raids.

2.

AGENVILLE Agenville was a V-2 rocket storage site

3.

166 SQUADRON st

On 31 August 24 166 Squadron were instructed to prepare 10 aircraft for an operation on Agenville. 1 Group would supply 150 aircraft to attack three targets (including Agenville) with the aim to ‘Block access to tunnels’. The attack was timed for 1515 hours; crews were given the following instructions) These targets are ‘V-2’ dumps and it is of paramount importance that their use is denied to the enemy and the importance of really accurate bomb aiming is to be stressed to all crews. It is realised that cloud conditions may make this task very hard and therefore the Master Bomber may order the mainforce to orbit the target area and wait for a convenient gap in the clouds through which accurate bombing can be done. The Master Bomber’s orders are to be obeyed implicitly. Under no circumstances are aircraft to descend below cloud to bomb. If the Master Bomber orders the mission to be abandoned bombs are to be brought back.

As this was a daylight raid a strong fighter cover was provided by Spitfires over the target and there were also some Mustang IIIs present Mustang III was the British designation for the Merlin powered North American Mustang P-51B and P-51C, an American long-range, single-seat fighter and fighter-bomber

The bomb load was thirteen 1,000lb General Purpose (GP) bombs and four 500lb GP bombs. The aiming points were marked by Mosquitoes using Red TIs other PFF aircraft dropped Green and Yellow TIs throughout the attack which was controlled by a Master Bomber. The de Havilland DH.98 Mosquito was a British twin-engine shoulder-winged multi-role combat aircraft, it was unusual in that its frame is constructed mostly of wood. It was nicknamed The Wooden Wonder, or ‘Mossie’

The squadron was ordered to take part in two operations against flying bomb sites, 10 aircraft to Agenville and another 10 aircraft to St. Roiquier The aircraft targeting Agenville took off at 1310 hours but the operation was marred by bad weather conditions. Heavy icing conditions were encountered on the way to the target and in the target area there was a great deal of cloud at bombing height. Most crews managed to see the Pathfinder markers but as these were scattered a satisfactory concentration of bombing was not achieved. One aircraft was engaged by accurate heavy flak and no fewer than 9 of them sustained damage. The Flight Engineer of ‘A’ sustained injury to his leg and chest and the Bomb Aimer was temporarily blinded in one eye. … the raid can only be assessed as very disappointing. ‘M’ flown by F/O Tutty and crew and ‘I’ flown by F/O Elliott and crew failed to return. 1 Group Operational Record Book (ORB) reported that of the 52 aircraft that took off 47 successfully bombed the target. It also said that Page 36 of 108

Marking generally appears to be somewhat scattered and the main weight of bombing is reported as falling to the north of the aiming point. A few crews however … claim to have seen sticks of bombs falling across the target area. The general opinion however, is that the attack was scattered and no great concentration was achieved. Slight to heavy flak over the target with much heavier opposition to the North West was encountered, and thirteen of our aircraft sustained damage.

In his flying log Teddy recorded taking off at 1320 with a daylight flying time of 3 hours and 30 minutes and reported ‘V2 site bombed’. Crew comments from squadron ORB records Bombed at 1526 hours from 9,000 feet on Red TIs

4.

AIRCRAFT MISSING 4.1. 1 Group Aircraft Missing (29 men) were 103/T 166/M 166/I 550/V

F/O Ryerse F/O Tutty F/O Elliott W/C Sissley P/O Siddall (RNZAF)

(16 Ops) (17 Ops) (19 Ops) nd (5 Ops, 2 Tour) (2 Ops)

Nothing was heard from the above aircraft with the exception of 105/T who sent SOS fixes at 1537, 1539 and 1541 hours, the last of which placed him off Cayeux (on the coast of northern France). Nothing has been heard since The crew of 550/V (NF962) piloted by P/O Siddall (Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF)) on just their second operation crashed killing all on board. Flying with them was Wing Commander Sissley th who had been flying the 5 operation of his second tour in a mentoring role to the new crew.

4.2. 166 Squadron had two aircraft missing Lancaster 166/M (ND 635) F/O Tutty, E B Sgt Butcher, R D Sgt Kirkby, G J

Age Unknown Age Unknown Age Unknown

F/O Wallis, D A F/O Pleasance, D Sgt Letten, L

Age Unknown Age Unknown Age 22

Sgt Alderson, W C

Age 19

(Survived, evaded capture) (Survived, evaded capture) (Survived, Prisoner of War (POW), Stalag Luft 7) (Survived, POW, Stalag IX-C) (Survived, POW, Stalag Luft I) Died, buried St. Riquier British Cemetery, northern France) (Died, buried St. Riquier in a joint grave with Sgt Letten)

Lancaster 166/I (NE 170) F/O Elliott, F D (Canadian) Sgt Comley, J H F/S Oliphant, M I (Canadian)

Age Unknown Age Unknown Age Unknown

Sgt Linton, N W L F/O Melville, R B (Canadian)

Age Unknown Age 28

F/S Canning, G M F/Sgt Rhodes, K G

Age 19 Age Unknown

(Survived, evaded capture) (Survived, evaded capture) (Survived, captured on landing, handed over to nd the Gendarmerie on 2 September, liberated th 4 September) (Survived, evaded) (Died, buried Fillievres British Cemetery, northern France) (Died, buried Fillievres British Cemetery) (Died, buried Fillievres British Cemetery)

After suffering damage over the target area NE170 turned for the shortest route back across the Channel but crashed near to Hesdin in northern France. Three of the crew were killed whilst the other four manged to evade capture and return home. Stalag Luft 7 was a Luftwaffe prisoner-of-war camp located in Bankau, Germany (now Poland). The camp was opened on 6 June 1944, for RAF NCO flying crews. On 19 January 1945, 1,500 prisoners marched out of camp in bitter cold. On 8 February they reached Stalag III-A located about 52 km (32 mi) south of Berlin near Luckenwalde, which already held 20,000 prisoners, consisting mainly of soldiers from Britain, Canada, the U.S. and Russia. As the Russians approached Stalag III-A guards fled the camp leaving the prisoners to be liberated by the Red Army on 22 April 1945. Stalag IX-C was a German prisoner-of-war camp for Allied soldiers in World War II, its headquarters located near Bad Sulza and sub-camps spread over a wide area. The camp was opened in February 1940 to hold Polish soldiers from the German invasion of Poland. On 29 March 1945 the camp was evacuated and the POWs were forced to march eastwards in advance of the American offensive.

Page 37 of 108

For some the march lasted four weeks before being freed by U.S. Army units. Those left in the camp were freed by troops of U.S. 3rd Army. Stalag Luft I was a German World War II prisoner-of-war (POW) camp near Barth, Western Pomerania, Germany, for captured Allied airmen. The presence of the prison camp is said to have shielded the town of Barth from Allied bombing. About 9,000 airmen were imprisoned there when it was liberated on the night of 30 April 1945 by Russian troops. The camp was opened in 1941 to hold British officers, but was closed in April 1942, when they were transferred to other camps. It was reopened in October 1942, when 200 RAF NCOs from Stalag Luft III were moved there. On 30 April 1945, the prisoners were ordered to evacuate the camp in the face of the advancing Soviet Red Army, after negotiations between senior POW officer and the camp commandant it was agreed the guards would go, leaving the POWs behind. The next day, the first Soviet troops arrived

5.

AFTERMATH As the bombing was scattered and not concentrated it can be assumed that the damaged caused by the attack was limited. Footnote British actor Donald Pleasance (film credits included appearing as Dr. Samuel Loomis in John Carpenter's horror film Halloween (1978), as POW forger Colin Blythe in the film The Great Escape (1963), as an old-school German general involved in a plot to kill Adolf Hitler in the film In The Night of the Generals (1967), as Lucifer in the religious epic The Greatest Story Ever Told (1965)) was in 166 Squadron Lancaster ND 635 which was reported missing after the raid. In December 1939 he had initially refused conscription into the British Armed Forces, registering as a conscientious objector, but changed his stance in autumn 1940, after the attacks upon London by the Luftwaffe, and volunteered with the Royal Air Force. He served as a wireless-operator with 166 Squadron. th ND 635 was shot down (on their 17 operation) during the attack on Agenville and he was captured and imprisoned in the German prisoner-of-war camp Stalag Luft I, where he produced and acted in plays. th

st

th

This was Teddy’s 7 Op since his 1 Op on the 12 making August a very busy introduction into th fighting in the war. The month of September would see very little respite starting with his 8 Op on rd the 3 September (five years to the day since the declaration of war). 6.

166 SQUADRON ORDERS st

15 aircraft were detailed for operations but cancelled owing to adverse weather conditions

nd

15 aircraft were again laid on but the operation was cancelled owing to weather

1 September 2 September

Page 38 of 108

OPERATION No. 8 – GILZE RIJEN 3RD SEPTEMBER 1944 1.

BOMBER COMMAND rd

1.1. 3 September Airfields 675 aircraft – 348 Lancasters, 315 Halifaxes and 12 Mosquitoes carried out heavy raids on 6 airfields in Southern Holland. All raids were successful and only 1 Halifax was lost from the Venlo raid. 2 Mosquito Ranger patrols and 1 RCM sortie were flown without loss. 2.

GILZE RIJEN Gilze Rijen was a military airbase in the south of Netherlands. In 1940, the airfield came under heavy th th attack from the German Luftwaffe, who later took control of the base between 10 and 12 May 1940. They expanded it for their own use by constructing a huge air base complex that was largely completed by the end of 1940. During the war, it was one of the most important bomber and night fighter bases in the West While in German hands during the Second World War, the airfield came under frequent attack from allied forces until the liberation of the south of the Netherlands, after which the Royal Air Force took control of the airfield.

3.

166 SQUADRON rd

On 3 September 166 Squadron were instructed to prepare 15 aircraft for an operation on an airfield at Gilze Rijen. 1 Group would supply 200 aircraft for targets at Gilze Rijen and Eindhoven airfields (100 for each target) plus Pathfinder Force (PFF) aircraft. The aim of the attack was to ‘Crater Runways’. They were also warned that four other targets (100 aircraft at each target) were being attacked by 4, 5 and 6 Groups at the same time as 1 Group targets. Time of the attack ‘H’ hour was 1730 hours and the time over the target was to be ‘H’ to ‘H’ + 6 mins with the aircraft spread evenly over this period. They were also given the following special briefing note In order to ensure that the bomber stream is as compact as possible aircraft are to fly by the centre, i.e. those aircraft who see that the majority of other aircraft in the stream are on the port side are to pull in slightly to port and similarly those with the most aircraft on the starboard side are to pull into starboard. Aircraft are also to close up until they are spaced out on track approximately 400 yards behind the aircraft in front. It is intended to use this method of achieving concentration on track on operations of deep penetration. Opinions of selected captains are required as to the degree of concentration obtained on this operation. Bomber Stream The bomber stream was a saturation attack tactic developed to overwhelm the night time German aerial defences of the Kammhuber Line. The Kammhuber Line consisted of three layers of zones of about 32 km long (north–south) and 20 km wide (east–west). In each zone there were two German night fighter aircraft receiving ground-directed guidance from their own Himmelbett controller within each zone. The RAF estimated the number of bombers likely to be lost to enemy night fighters and flak, and how many would be lost through collisions. Minimising the former demanded a densely packed stream, as the controllers could only direct a maximum of six potential interceptions per hour, and the flak gunners could not concentrate on all the available targets at once. A typical bomber stream of 600 to 700 aircraft was on average 8 or 10 miles broad, and 4,000 to 6,000 feet deep. The tactic proved successful and was used until the last days of the war, when centrally-organised German air defences had ceased to exist.

Although this was a daylight raid there was no mention of fighter cover. The bomb load was thirteen 1,000lb MC bombs and four 500lb GP bombs. The aiming points were marked with Red TIs and kept marked with Yellow TIs with a Master Bomber in attendance. After two days of cancellations 15 aircraft took off at 1540 hours. On climbing through cloud most aircraft found it necessary to come down again on account of heavy icing. Fortunately the weather cleared at the Dutch Coast to about 5/10ths and all crews were able to bomb on the intersection of two runways as instructed. The target was fairly heavily defended by heavy flak but it diminished in intensity and only one aircraft sustained minor damage. Crews reported that the aerodrome was well covered with bomb craters. Page 39 of 108

All aircraft successfully bombed the primary target but only six were able to affect a landing at base, the remainder having to be diverted owing to bad weather conditions. 1 Group Operational Record Book (ORB) reported that of the 99 aircraft that took off 95 successfully bombed the target. It also said that Due to early arrival most crews found it necessary to orbit the target … at 1726 the Master Bomber gave the order to bomb on the Red TIs and when these were obscured by smoke at 1731 they bombed on Yellow TIs. Sticks of bombs were seen to straddle the aiming point and the triangle formed by the runways just north of the aiming point … one crew claim to have seen their bombs fall on three aircraft parked on the north eastern disposal point … the great majority of reports point to a most successful attack having been achieved ... fourteen of our aircraft sustained damage. No enemy fighters were seen.

In his flying log Teddy recorded taking off at 1500 with a daylight flying time of 4 hours he recorded ‘Airfield bombed’. The squadron ORB recorded that the crew Bombed at 17.28 hours from 11,000 feet virtually on intersection of runways

4.

AIRCRAFT MISSING There were no aircraft missing

5.

AFTERMATH rd

th

th

There are some reports on the success of raids on the 3 , 4 , and 5 of September rd

3 Air attack, four aircraft destroyed on the ground. th

4 Low-level attack, one aircraft destroyed or damaged on the ground. th

th

4 /5 Vital infrastructure demolished and the base evacuated by the Luftwaffe. th

th

The next time Teddy and his crew took to the air was for his 9 Op on the 8 September 6.

166 SQUADRON ORDERS th

Squadron stood down from operations

th

21 aircraft were detailed for and attack on Le Havre taking off at 1550 hours. All aircraft returned safely

th

A further attack on enemy fortifications (at Le Havre) was carried out by 21 aircraft taking off at 1655 hours. All aircraft returned safely

4 September 5 September 6 September

I suspect that Teddy and his crew were not involved in the above two operations following th the ‘friendly fire’ bombing at Faliase on 14 August. th

7 September

23 aircraft were detailed for operations but instructions for taking off were not received and crews were standing by

Page 40 of 108

OPERATION No. 9 – LE HAVRE 8TH SEPTEMBER 1944 1.

BOMBER COMMAND 1.1. 8 September 1944 Le Havre 333 aircraft – 304 Lancasters, 25 Mosquitoes and 4 Stirlings – of 1, 3 and 8 Groups attempted to bomb German positions but the weather was bad, with a low cloud base, and only 109 aircraft bombed, with indifferent results. 2 Lancasters lost. The 4 Stirlings on this raid, all from 149 Squadron based at Methwold, were the last Bomber Command Stirlings to carry out a bombing operation. It is believed that Stirling LK 396, piloted by Flying Officer J. J. McKee, an Australian, was the last Stirling to bomb the target. 2 Hudsons carried out Resistance operations without loss. The Short Stirling was a British four-engined heavy bomber of the Second World War. It has the distinction of being the first four-engined bomber to be introduced into service with the Royal Air Force The Lockheed Hudson was an American-built light bomber and coastal reconnaissance aircraft built initially for the Royal Air Force shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War and primarily operated by the RAF thereafter. Opened in June 1939 RAF Silloth was mainly used for training aircrew for Coastal Command. The Solway Firth was renamed Hudson Bay by the locals due to the number of Lockheed Hudson aircraft (estimated at around 90) which crashed in the bay resulting in many fatalities. After the War Silloth was used for scrapping aircraft and in 1954 a group of Lancaster bombers arrived to film some of the outdoor scenes for the famous Dambusters film.

2.

LE HAVRE Le Havre was the most important of the Channel Ports and second only to Marseilles amongst French ports for tonnage capacity, having 8 miles of quays capable of receiving ocean-going ships. Le Havre was captured by the Germans in May 1940. Very soon, the Germans began a massive expansion of the harbour, including a large bunker for their R boats (in German Räumboote). Le Havre was assigned a major role in the anticipated invasion of England and the German garrison peaked at 40.000 men. As the war progressed, Le Havre's role became increasingly defensive and a massive number of anti-aircraft guns were placed around the city. The R boats (Räumboote in German) were a group of small naval vessels built as minesweepers for the Kriegsmarine (German navy)

In the summer of 1943, as part of the city's defence, the Germans began construction of a coastal battery, Marineküstenbatterie Vasouy, which was designed to protect Le Havre from attack from the western flank (the English Channel). 3.

166 SQUADRON th

On 8 September 166 Squadron were instructed to prepare 25 aircraft for an operation on German troop positions at Le Havre, a total of 280 aircraft plus PFF would take part in the attack. The aim of the attack was to ‘destroy guns, pill boxes, strong points, troops, mines and ammunition’. Time of attack ‘H’ hour for 166 Squadron was 0830 hours; time over target was to be ‘H’ to ‘H’ +5. The following instructions were given to aircrews The Canadian troops are within 3,000 yards of the aiming points. It is absolutely essential that crews bomb their detailed aiming point and only their detailed aiming point. Bombing must be done only by visual identification or at the TIs as directed by the Master Bomber provided that the TIs have been identified beyond doubt as being in the correct area. In no circumstances are crews to bomb wildly or at the smoke only. Crews are to keep a careful look out for flares Yellow or for Yellow smoke. Either of these will indicate forward position of our troops. If cloud obscures the target on the run up or if the bombing run is otherwise made difficult crews are to make a wide left hand orbit so as to make another run on the heading of the track laid down. Crews are not to bomb on any other heading. Crews are forbidden to bomb if The bombsight is found to be unserviceable There is any doubt about the certainty of hitting the correct aiming point If the target area is obscured by smoke and if unable to see any TI in the correct area If by ‘H’ +15 crews have not bombed bombs are to be brought back under all the above circumstances Page 41 of 108

Bomb doors are to be opened 20 miles short of the target and left open until after bombing. The Navigator’s master bomb switch is to be switched ‘on’ when the bomb doors are open to allow for any faulty release and the then switched ‘off’ again. The master switch is not to be switched on again until ETA target minus 30 seconds. ETA is to be calculated from the last good GEE (a radio navigation system) fix.

There was no fighter cover provided The bomb load was thirteen 1,000lb GP bombs and four 500lb GP bombs. The aiming point was marked with Green TIs and Red TIs with a Master Bomber in attendance. The 25 aircraft which had been detailed the previous day (but eventually stood down) took off at 0649 hours for another attack on German positions at Le Havre. The sortie proved very disappointing as all aircraft were instructed to abandon the mission by the Master Bomber. Three aircraft jettisoned their bombs and the remainder brought their bomb load back to base. This was the third consecutive attack on enemy positions at Le Havre in four days. The first attack on th th the 5 was considered to be highly successful, the second on the 6 was less successful due to poor weather conditions and the third phase of aircraft were ordered by the Master Bomber to abandon the th mission. The third attack was planned for the 7 but instructions for take-off were not received although crews were standing by.

1 Group Operational Record Book (ORB) reported that of the 60 aircraft that took off only 5 successfully bombed the target. It also said that Aircraft approaching the target area received instructions to stay at ordered height … at 0830 they were told to orbit as the target had not been marked … at no time however was the target area sufficiently free from cloud for crews to be able to bomb accurately … only five were able to identify the markers. The accuracy of these is confirmed by the five aircraft who bombed from 2/3,500 feet between 0832 and 0845 … Instructions were heard to abandon mission, this instruction being carried out by the reminder of the force

In his flying log Teddy recorded taking off at 1500 (which contradicts the Squadron ORB which states take-off at 0640) with a daylight flying time of 4 hours he recorded ‘Mission abandoned due to bad weather’. The squadron ORB had no crew comments 4.

AIRCRAFT MISSING No aircraft were missing

5.

AFTERMATH th

According to Teddy’s last letter home on 28 January 1945 he was stuck on 28 Ops. For this to be true this Op must have counted towards his total even though they returned with their full bomb load. (It was normal practice for an Op only to ‘count’ if the photograph from the aircraft showed the bombs dropping over the target area). It can only be assumed that the Op’ was counted’ as five aircraft actually dropped their bomb load. th

th

The next time Teddy and his crew were airborne was his 10 Op on 10 September 6.

166 SQUADRON ORDERS th

9 September

Squadron stood down from operations

Page 42 of 108

OPERATION No. 10 – LE HAVRE 10TH SEPTEMBER 1944 1.

BOMBER COMMAND 1.1. 9/10 September 1944 Monchengladbach (Munich) 113 Lancasters and 24 Mosquitoes of 5 and 8 Groups carried out a devastating raid on the centre of this target without loss. Minor Operations: 39 Mosquitoes to Brunswick and 6 to Steenwijk, 22 RCM sorties, 30 Mosquito patrols. No aircraft lost. 1.2. 10 September 1944 Le Havre 992 aircraft, 521 Lancasters, 426 Halifaxes, 45 Mosquitoes, attacked 8 different German strong points. Each target was separately marked by the Pathfinders and then accurately bombed. No aircraft lost. 8 RCM and 24 Resistance sorties were flown without loss. 1.3. 10/11 September 1944 Minor Operations 47 Mosquitoes attacked Berlin, 11 RCM sorties, 24 Mosquito patrols and 2 Lancasters minelaying off Texel. No aircraft lost.

2.

LE HAVRE Heavily bombed at the end of the Second World War, Le Havre is one of the most disaster stricken towns in Europe. The toll taken after the country was liberated was significant, out of 160 000 inhabitants, 5 000 were killed and 80 000 rendered homeless; the whole 150 hectares of the historic centre were devastated, 12 500 buildings destroyed. Tending to the destruction became a national priority for France, Auguste Perret was enlisted as the lead architect and the city was to be built anew in a massive project that began in 1945 and finished in 1964

3.

166 SQUADRON th

On 10 September 166 Squadron were instructed to prepare 25 aircraft for an operation on German troop positions at Le Havre, a total of 200 aircraft from 1 Group plus Lancasters and Mosquitoes from PFF would take part in the attack in two waves (Bentley I and Bentley II). Additionally the following aircraft were attacking adjacent targets (codenames ‘Alvis’ and ‘Buick’) Alvis 1 Alvis 2 Alvis 3 Alvis 4 Buick 1 Buick 2

100 aircraft from 4 Group 100 aircraft from 4 group 100 aircraft from 5 Group 128 aircraft from 3 Group 100 aircraft from 6 Group 100 aircraft from 6 Group

Time of attack ‘H’ hour for 166 Squadron was to be advised by telephone (it was approximately 1850 hours from post bombing reports); time over target was to be ‘H’ to ‘H’ +8. The following instructions were given to aircrews Our forward troops will be 3,000 yards from the target areas and the necessity for extreme accuracy of aim is to be impressed upon all crews at briefing. Yellow flares or yellow smoke if visible will indicate the forward positions of our troops and crews are to be warned at briefing to keep careful look out for them. It is absolutely essential that crews bomb the aiming points detailed and none other. Bombing must be done only by visual identification or at the TIs as directed by the Master Bomber and provided the TIs are seen to be in the correct area. Under no circumstances are crews to bomb wildly or at smoke only. If they are able to identify the aiming point with certainty they may bomb without waiting for a PFF marker. If cloud obscures the target on the run up or the bombing run otherwise obstructed crews are to carry out a complete left hand repeat orbit and make another run on heading or the track laid down. They are not to bomb any other heading. Crews are forbidden to bomb if The bombsight is found to be unserviceable There is any doubt about the certainty of hitting the correct aiming point Page 43 of 108

If the target area is obscured by smoke and if unable to see any TI in the correct area If by ‘H’ +10 minutes they have not bombed In any of the above conditions bombs are to be brought back Bomb doors are to be opened 20 miles short of the target and left open until after bombing. The Navigator’s master bomb switch is to be switched ‘on’ when the bomb doors are open to allow for any faulty release and the then switched ‘off’ again. The master switch is not to be switched on again until ETA target minus 30 seconds. ETA is to be calculated from the last good GEE (a radio navigation system) fix.

It was also reinforced that Crews are to be warned the PFF will not, repeat not, drop any Yellow markers. Yellow markers will be used by the Army to indicate the presence of our own troops.

Although a daylight raid no fighter cover was provided Bomb load was thirteen 1,000lb GP bombs and four 500lb GP bombs. Initially aiming points were marked with Green TIs followed by Red TIs, with a Master Bomber giving aiming instructions. 1 Group Operational Record Book (ORB) reported that of the 200 aircraft that took off to attack in two waves (100 aircraft in Bentley I and 100 aircraft in Bentley II) 199 successfully bombed the target. It also said that at aiming point Bentley II The first markers dropped are reported to have overshot by 700 yards and the Master Bomber was heard instructing crews to undershoot these Red TIs. Other more accurate markers were dropped … the bombing was again reported to have been well concentrated, although there are reports of a few sticks overshooting … the aiming point was again obscured by smoke … there are reports of a large orange explosion in the vicinity of the aiming point. Some crews attacking in the later stages were forced to make an orbit owing to being unable to identify the aiming point which had been obscured by smoke on their first run up

25 aircraft from 166 Squadron took off at 1645 hours for a daylight attack on Le Havre (aiming point Bentley II) in support of Allied land forces. Weather conditions were more favourable than on the previous occasion and crews had no difficulty in identifying ground detail or PFF markers. Opposition was nil, both from the ground and air, and very concentrated attack developed. Photographs showed that a great weight of bombs fell in the target area and several large explosions were reported, with smoke rising to 4,000 feet. In his flying log Teddy recorded taking off at 0630 (which contradicts the Squadron ORB which says take off 1645) with a daylight flying time of 4 hours 15 minutes he recorded ‘Troop support’. The squadron ORB recorded that the crew Bombed at 1900 hours from 10,000 feet, visually and on Red TIs.

4.

AIRCRAFT MISSING No aircraft were lost

5.

AFTERMATH rd

In August, the Germans had ordered the evacuation of civilians, but a great majority remained. On 3 September the Allied Forces suggested surrender, the Germans rejected it and the first corps of the British Army led by General Crocker surrounded the city. th

On 5 September a total of 348 British bombers dropped 1,820 explosive bombs and 30,000 incendiaries over the south-west of the city flattening the city centre. th

On 6 September 1,458 tons of explosive bombs and 12,500 incendiaries were dropped on the eastern part of the city. French civilians described the raids th

At 1810 (6 September), I happen to stand at the window; I see people running, shouting: ‘they’ve thrown a rocket; they’re going to bomb us!’ So I grab the ever ready suitcases, close the door and go down to the cellar. The bombs are raging on. We all wonder what will become of us. All of a sudden, a red light fills the cellar, an explosion shakes the whole building, stones fly in the corridor, we cannot breathe for the thick dust, mixed with the smell of sulphur. I think my last hour is come. A bomb has fallen on the furnished house opposite, 10 metres away from us, all in ruin, and three people lying under it all. The street is a mass of rubble; the fires are getting worse. 15 people are buried under the block at n° 61. In my home everything is shattered, it is unbelievable. The doors are gone, the furniture is gone, there are bricks and all sorts of fragments. I find human fragments in my room. Time passes, daylight is fading, and Jean has not returned….. From the sea to the Town Hall from Rue Bellanger, all of Saint Joseph district, the whole rue de Paris are ruined and on fire. A disaster has certainly happened…. Françoise P. When the British troops entered Le Havre they got a subdued welcome. No-one had expected such bombings. Not a soul here who had not lost one or several of his family because of the bombs. Page 44 of 108

Doctor François Périer There were more than a thousand alerts and we only had seven or eight vans, motor pumps and two big turntable ladders. The worst was the disaster in September. We worked twelve days and twelve nights without going to bed, fighting sleep and dejection with alcohol, wine or Marie Brizzard (a liqueur). Bernard Vatinel

On September 12th, the Anglo-Canadian army entered the city and the Germans surrendered. On September 18th, the American army arrived at Le Havre and used the port as their sixteenth port. On October 7th, General De Gaulle visited Le Havre: ‘To Le Havre injured for the sake of France, but alive! And which will be great!’ th

th

Teddy’s and his crew were to return to action 2 days later on the 12 September on their 11 Op. 6.

166 SQUADRON ORDERS th

11 September

A target was received and 25 aircraft detailed, but the operation was cancelled in the afternoon

Page 45 of 108

OPERATION No. 11 - FRANKFURT 12TH SEPTEMBER 1944 1.

BOMBER COMMAND 1.1. 12 September 1944 Synthetic Oil Plants 412 aircraft – 315 Halifaxes, 75 Lancasters and 22 Mosquitoes of 4, 6 and 8 Groups attacked plants at Dortmund, Scholven/Buer and Wanne-Eickel. The Dortmund raid was particularly successful, but smoke-screens prevented observation of results at the other targets. 7 aircraft were lost, 3 Lancasters and 1 Halifax from the Wanne-Eickel raid and 2 Halifaxes and 1 Lancaster from the Scholven raid. Münster 119 Halifaxes of 4 Group and 5 Pathfinder Lancasters carried out the first raid by RAF heavies on Münster since June 1943. 2 Halifaxes were lost. Minor Operations 9 RCM sorties, 2 aircraft on Resistance operations. No losses. Resistance movements during World War II occurred in every occupied country by a variety of means, ranging from non-cooperation to propaganda to hiding crashed pilots and even to outright warfare and the recapturing of towns

1.2. 12/13 September 1944 Frankfurt 378 Lancasters and 9 Mosquitoes of 1, 3 and 8 Groups attacked Frankfurt on the last major RAF raid of the war against Frankfurt. 17 Lancasters lost, 4.5% of the Lancaster force. Stuttgart 204 Lancasters and 13 Mosquitoes of 1 and 5 Groups attacked Stuttgart. 4 Lancasters lost. Support and Minor Operations 138 training aircraft on a diversionary sweep over the North Sea, 29 Mosquitoes to Berlin and 6 to Steenwijk, 31 RCM sorties, 81 Mosquito patrols, 12 Halifaxes minelaying in Oslo harbour. 2 Halifaxes were lost, 1 from the diversionary sweep and 1 from the minelaying operation. Total effort for the night: 901 sorties, 23 aircraft (2.6%) lost. 2.

FRANKFURT Frankfurt am Main, literally ‘On the Main’ River, in western Germany, was the mid-19th century capital of Germany (it was annexed by Prussia in 1866, ending its status as a free city). Once integrated into a united German nation, it developed into a significant industrial city and hence a prime target for Allied bombing during the war. That bombing began as early as July 1941, during a series of British air raids against the Nazis. In March 1944, Frankfurt suffered extraordinary damage during a raid that saw 27,000 tons of bombs dropped on Germany in a single month. Consequently, Frankfurt’s medieval Old Town was virtually destroyed (although it would be rebuilt in the postwar period, replete with modern office buildings).

3.

166 SQUADRON th

On 12 September 166 Squadron were instructed to prepare 26 aircraft for an operation on Frankfurt. 1 Group would supply 200 aircraft out of a total of 320 aircraft plus Pathfinder Force (PFF) aircraft. The time of attack ‘H’ hour was 2300 hours; crews were told the aim of the raid was ‘To complete destruction of the town’ they were also told that The attention of all crews is to be drawn to the position of the bomb line and they are to be warned that only in extreme emergency are bombs to be jettisoned to the west of that line and in such circumstances they must be jettisoned ‘safe’.

Fighter cover was not provided for this night time attack. Bomb load was one 4,000lb High Capacity (HC) bomb, fourteen 500lb clusters of 4lb incendiaries and 2 Small Bomb Containers (SBC) containing sixty 4lb ‘X’ type incendiaries. Initially the attack Page 46 of 108

would be opened with long sticks of flares in the target area; the aiming point would then be marked with large salvoes of mixed Red and Green TIS and kept marked with Red TIs Incendiary cluster bombs were bombs that ejected small (e.g. 4lb) bomblets that were designed to spread over a wide area and start multiple fires th

On the night of the 12 26 aircraft were detailed to attack the already battered city of Frankfurt. One aircraft abandoned the mission owing to intercom failure and ‘R’ flown by F/O Watkins and crew failed to return, the remaining 24 being primary (target). All aircraft took off in good time (at 1740 hours), in good weather conditions which prevailed over the target. Opposition from enemy defences was moderate, consisting of flak up to 14/16,000 feet, with slight fighter activity. Six sightings of enemy aircraft were reported one which developed into a combat. PFF markings were described as very accurate and plentiful and bombing was well concentrated across markers. Many large fires were seen with a large orange explosion in the target area. On interrogation crews considered that the attack had been very successful. 1 Group Operational Record Book (ORB) reported that of the 198 aircraft that took off 185 successfully bombed the target. It also said that Crews report that most markers fell just south of the marshalling yards and bombing was well concentrated … A good fire area quickly developed and a dense pall of smoke rose to about 5,000 feet. The glow from the target could be seen for 100 miles or more on the homeward route. Several notable explosions were observed. There was slight light flak and moderate accurate heavy flak to 15/18,000 feet in the target area and six of our aircraft sustained some damage. Also two aircraft were hit at Worms and in the Darmstadt area. Searchlights were numerous, some coning, but in the main operating independently. Crews believed searchlights were co-operating with fighters who were active and with whom our aircraft had sixteen combats, five on the outward route, six in the target area and five on the homeward route. It was observed that fires were at Darmstadt were still burning from the previous night’s attack. 576/X2 was continuously coned by searchlights and after evasive action bombed what he believed to be the target, but which afterwards he concluded to be Mains from its position in relation to the markers he saw at Frankfurt after bombing.

In his flying log Teddy recorded taking off at 1750 with a night flying time of 7 hours and 55 minutes he recorded ‘Town and railway marshalling yard bombed’. The squadron ORB recorded that the crew Bombed at 2300 hours from 18,000 feet on centre of mixed Green and Red TIs, flares and TIs well concentrated and bombing well within the target area, fires were visible as far as the Luxemburg/French frontier on the return journey

4.

AIRCRAFT MISSING 4.1. 1 Group Aircrew Missing (45 men) were 625/H

P/O Cornish P/O Poyton 625/N F/L Banks 100/F P/O Cole P/O Brown 576/D2 F/O Aldridge 166/E F/O Watkins 626G F/O Thorpe F/O Bolderston

nd

(14 Ops)

2 Wave

(14 Ops) (15 Ops

1 Wave PFF Supporter

(25 Ops) (13 Ops) (30 Ops)

PFF Supporter nd 2 Wave nd 2 Wave (This was the crew’s last scheduled Op)

st

Nothing was heard from any of these aircraft after take-off 5.

166 Squadron had one aircraft missing Lancaster E (NF974) F/O Watkins Sgt Morganstein F/Sgt Barr F/Sgt Carson (Canadian) Sgt Maitland F/Sgt McCahon (Canadian) F/Sgt Walker (Canadian)

Age 21 Age 20 Age 21 Age 22 Age 22

(Died, commemorated Runnymede Memorial) (Died, commemorated Runnymede Memorial) (Died, commemorated Runnymede Memorial) (Died, commemorated Runnymede Memorial) (Died, commemorated Runnymede Memorial) (Survived, Prisoner of War (POW), Stalag Luft 7) (Survived, POW, Stalag Luft 7)

The aircrew that were killed and have no known grave are commemorated on the Runnymede Memorial in Surrey.

Page 47 of 108

Stalag Luft 7 was a Luftwaffe prisoner-of-war camp located in Bankau, Germany (now Poland). The camp was opened on 6 June 1944, for RAF NCO flying crews. On 19 January 1945, 1,500 prisoners marched out of camp in bitter cold. On 8 February they reached Stalag III-A located about 52 km (32 mi) south of Berlin near Luckenwalde, which already held 20,000 prisoners, consisting mainly of soldiers from Britain, Canada, the U.S. and Russia. As the Russians approached Stalag III-A guards fled the camp leaving the prisoners to be liberated by the Red Army on 22 April 1945.

6.

AFTERMATH A local report stated that the raid occurred when many of the city’s firemen and rescue workers were away working in Darmstadt. The bombing caused severe destruction in the western districts of the city, which contained many industrial premises. Property damage was extensive and a troop train was hit at the West Station. A total of 469 people were killed, including 172 inside a public shelter in the Bockenheim district, the 2-metre-thick concrete side wall of which was blown in by a high-explosive bomb. The last fires were th not extinguished until the evening of the 15 . The next entry in the Frankfurt diary, for mid-September, says that members of the Hitler Youth, the Reichsarbeitsdienst (a labour service) and the Organisation Todt were being sent to work on the strengthening of the Westwall (Siegfried Line) fortifications, a sign that Allied troops were approaching the German homeland. Bombing of Frankfurt by the Allies of World War II killed about 5,500 residents and destroyed the largest medieval city centre in Germany. The German authorities have calculated that around 15% of the bombs dropped during World War II failed to explode, and more than 2,000 tons of unexploded weaponry are found each year. th

th

Teddy and his crew returned to operational flying on 16 September with their 12 Op 7.

166 SQUADRON ORDERS th

Squadron stood down from operations

th

A target was received and 14 aircraft detailed, but the operation was cancelled just after lunch

th

Squadron stood down from operations

13 September 14 September 15 September

Page 48 of 108

OPERATION No. 12 – STEENWIJK 16TH SEPTEMBER 1944 1.

BOMBER COMMAND 1.1. 15/16 September 1944 Kiel 490 aircraft – 310 Lancasters, 173 Halifaxes and 7 Mosquitoes of 1, 4, 6 and 8 Groups. 4 Halifaxes and 2 Lancasters lost. Support and Minor Operations 164 aircraft on a diversionary sweep over the North Sea, 27 Mosquitoes to Berlin, 9 to Lübeck and 8 to Rheine airfield, 34 RCM sorties, 56 Mosquito patrols, 68 Halifaxes and Lancasters minelaying near Oslo, in the Kattegat and in the River Elbe. 5 aircraft lost – 3 Mosquitoes and 1 Stirling of 100 Group and 1 Mosquito from the Berlin raid. Total effort for the night: 856 sorties, 11 aircraft (1.3%) lost. 1.2. 16 September 1944 Minor Operations 9 aircraft on RCM flights, 2 Mosquitoes on Ranger patrols, 14 Stirlings and 4 Hudsons on Resistance operations. No aircraft lost. 1.3. 16/17 September 1944 Operation Market Garden Bomber Command’s main operations were in support of the landings by British and American airborne troops at Arnhem and Nijmegen which took place the following morning. 200 Lancasters and 23 Mosquitoes of 1 and 8 Groups bombed the airfields at Hopsten, Leeuwarden, Steenwijk and Rheine, and 54 Lancasters and 5 Mosquitoes of 3 and 8 Groups bombed a Flak position at Moerdijk. 2 Lancasters lost from the Moerdijk raid. Minor Operations 29 Mosquitoes to Brunswick and 4 to Dortmund, 14 RCM sorties, 29 Mosquito patrols. 1 Mosquito lost from the Brunswick raid.

2.

STEENWIJK In October 1942 the Germans started building an airfield at Havelte (Steenwijk) as it was decided there was a gap between the airfields of Leeuwarden and Twente. The airfield was constructed using prisoners and forced labour, at one time a total of 5,600 Dutch worked on the construction of the airfield. By August 1944 it was clear that the airfield was fully operational and Bomber Command commenced attacks on the airfield in September 1944.

3.

166 SQUADRON th

On 16 September 166 Squadron were instructed to prepare 26 aircraft for an operation on Steenwijk-Havelte airfield. A total of 50 aircraft would attack this target. More aircraft from 1 Group would attack three other airfields at Rheine (50 aircraft), Leeuwarden (50 aircraft) and Hopsten (50 aircraft). Additionally Pathfinder Force (PFF) aircraft would be at all four targets to identify the aiming points. The time of attack ‘H’ hour was 2345 hours; crews were told the aim of the raid was ‘To crater runways’ As this was a night time attack no fighter cover was provided The bomb load was twenty 500lb GP bombs and the aiming point was to be marked with Red TIs. th

On the night of 16 September the Squadron detailed 26 aircraft to attack the airfield of SteenwijkHavelte in Holland. Taking off at 2125 hours weather throughout the trip was very good. There was no cloud and visibility was very good. All aircraft bombed the primary target and returned safely to base. PFF marking was described as well-placed and very accurate. Opposition was very slight consisting mainly of slight heavy predicted flak in the target area. Bombing was well concentrated and the crews were of the opinion that the attack was very successful. Page 49 of 108

1 Group Operational Record Book (ORB) reported that of the 50 aircraft that took off 50 successfully bombed the target. It also said that Excellent weather conditions were again experienced en route and in the target area. The marking commenced punctually but the TIs are reported to have been in two separate groups some distance apart with the more northerly group more accurately placed. It would appear most aircraft bombed the northern set of markers and in consequence the main weight of the attack fell in the target area with a slight tendency to undershoot. The concentration of bombing in the marked area is reported to have been excellent. No opposition from either ground or air defences was encountered. A total of 536 x 500lb MC bombs and 460 x 500lb GP bombs were dropped on the target. (222 tons)

In his flying log Teddy recorded taking off at 2130 with a night flying time of 4 hours, he recorded ‘Night fighter drome bombed’. The squadron ORB recorded that the crew Bombed at 2345 hours from 13,500 feet on centre of concentration of Red TIs, bombing was well concentrated across the markers. A very good attack.

4.

AIRCRAFT MISSING 4.1. No aircraft were lost

5.

AFTERMATH The runway of Havelte was temporarily put out of action, four weeks later, the runway was operational again In the book "Steenwijk in ’40-’45" W. Bakker describes: ‘In front of the formations flew the Pathfinders; these marked the airfield by means of their flares. Hereafter the mighty formations of bombers followed that only had to drop their bombs within the designated area to know that they hit the target. This time the airfield was indeed hit hard. Two years of hard work had come resolutely to an end. A moonscape was the only thing that remained.’

On the 18th September Teddy and crew flew on a fighter affiliation and ‘Y’ bombing training flight. Fighter affiliation was a simulation exercise with RAF fighters acting as ‘enemy’ fighters. Evasive techniques such as Corkscrew would have been practiced. This was a relatively dangerous exercise, with many aircraft and aircrew losses reported. rd For example, on 23 September 1944 Lancaster PB512 took off at 1042 hours from Little Stoughton on fighter affiliation exercise, entered a diving turn at 8000ft and failed to recover before hitting the ground 4 miles East of North Weald airfield, where it exploded on impact at 1132 hours, all on board killed. F/O Shirley W L, RNZAF. Sgt Evans D C F/O Hill F D F/Lt DLT Smith D L T F/O Birch G J F/Sgt Mitchel C J, RAAF. LAC Alston W A G Y’ cross country’ probably refers to cross country training flight using H2S radar. H2S was the first airborne, ground scanning radar system. It was developed to identify targets on the ground for night and all-weather bombing. rd

th

Teddy and his crew returned to operational flying on 23 September with their 13 Op. 6.

166 SQUADRON ORDERS th

In the afternoon of the 17 September 1944 the Squadron detailed 13 aircraft to attack a gun site at Biggekirke. All aircraft returned safely

th

Squadron stood down from operations

th

Squadron stood down from operations

th

In the afternoon of the 20 September 1944 the Squadron detailed 23 aircraft to attack German positions at Sangatte. All aircraft returned safely

st

Squadron stood down from operations

17 September 18 September 19 September 20 September 21 September 22

nd

September

th

th

Squadron stood down from operations

Page 50 of 108

OPERATION No. 13 - NUESS 23RD SEPTEMBER 1944 1.

BOMBER COMMAND 1.1. 22/23 September 1944 9 RCM sorties and 5 Mosquito Intruder patrols were flown without loss. 1.2. 23 September 1944 Walcheren 50 aircraft – 34 Halifaxes, 10 Mosquitoes, 6 Lancasters – of 1 and 6 Groups carried out a good attack on the Domburg coastal batteries without loss. One particularly large explosion was seen. Minor Operations: 6 RCM sorties, 2 Mosquitoes on Ranger patrols, 5 Hudsons on Resistance operations. No losses. 1.3. 23/24 September 1944 Neuss 549 aircraft – 378 Lancasters, 154 Halifaxes, 17 Mosquitoes of 1, 3, 4 and 8 Groups. 5 Lancasters and 2 Halifaxes lost. Dortmund–Ems Canal 136 Lancasters and 5 Mosquitoes of 5 Group to bomb the canal at a point near Ladbergen, north of Münster. 14 Lancasters, more than 10% of the Lancaster force, were lost. Unster/Handorf Airfield 113 aircraft – 107 Lancasters, 5 Mosquitoes, 1 Lightning – of 5 Group carried out a supporting raid on the local German night-fighter airfield just outside Münster. Minor Operations 38 Mosquitoes to Bochum and 6 to Rheine night-fighter airfield, 31 RCM sorties, 45 Mosquito patrols. No aircraft lost. Total effort for the night: 923 sorties, 22 aircraft (2.4%) lost.

2.

NEUSS Neuss is a city in North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany. It is located on the west bank of the Rhine opposing Düsseldorf. It is situated in the Ruhr Region, which during WW2 was the main centre of Germany's coal, iron and steel production. The bombing of the Ruhr in 1940–1944 caused a loss of 30% of plant and equipment (compared to 15 to 20% for German industry as a whole).

3.

166 SQUADRON rd

On 23 September 166 Squadron were instructed to prepare 24 aircraft for an operation on Marshalling Yards at Neuss. A total of 510 aircraft would attack this target, consisting of 204 aircraft st nd from 1 Group in the 1 Wave, 160 Lancasters from 3 Group in the 2 Wave and 150 Halifaxes from rd 4 Group in the 3 Wave. The time of attack ‘H’ hour was 2120 hours; crews were told the aim of the raid was ‘to destroy town’, the crews were also told The attention of all crews is to be drawn to the location of Inner Artillery Zones (IAZs) (a ring of protected air defences) on and near the route and they are to be warned to adhere to their ordered track and height to avoid being engaged by our own troops Crews are to be warned that the aiming point will be moved about 1,000 yards to the NNW at approximately ‘H’ plus 7. If TIs are seen falling in this direction at about this time crews are to aim at these TIs

There was no fighter cover as this was a night time attack The bomb load was eight 1,000lb GP bombs, four 1,000lb Semi Armour Piercing (SAP) bombs and four 500lb MC bombs, the target would initially be marked with Red TIs followed by Green TIs Taking off at 1830 hours 24 aircraft were detailed for an attack on the Marshalling Yards at Neuss. Unfortunately two, flown by Pilot Miller and crew and Pilot Officer Davies and crew failed to return. One aircraft flown by S/Ldr Rippingdale and crew was attacked in the target area by enemy fighter. In the ensuing combat our aircraft sustained damage to the fuselage, mainplanes, starboard inner Page 51 of 108

engine and rear turret. The rear turret was completely shattered and the Rear Gunner Sgt Hallett R T sustained fatal injuries. 21 of our aircraft attacked the primary target. Take off was early in good weather conditions and all aircraft took off safely. Weather conditions en route and over the target were very bad and 10/10ths cloud was encountered, crews reported that the PFF marking was very scattered, some of our aircraft were unable to locate the TI markers and bombed on fires, but the majority bombed on TIs successfully. Very little fighter activity was encountered and heavy flak in the target area was very moderate. The results of this raid are very difficult to assess, owing to weather and lack of PFF marking. On the whole it was a very disappointing raid for our crew. 1 Group Operational Record Book (ORB) reported that of the 204 aircraft that took off 183 successfully bombed the target. It also said that Owing to weather conditions crews found identification difficult in the absence of skymarking and were only able to bomb the glow of markers seen through the cloud and it is reported that the glow covered a fairly compact area … others were unable to identify and accordingly bombed Dusseldorf on positive identification … in the prevailing conditions it is difficult to give an assessment of the results of the raid. There was moderate predicted heavy flak up to 16,000 feet in the target area and seven of our aircraft sustained some damage. Some enemy fighters were present in the target area where seven of our aircraft were engaged in combat and one on the homeward routs. One aircraft claims a JU.88 destroyed.

In his flying log Teddy recorded taking off at 1845 with a night flying time of 5 hours 20 minutes, he recorded ‘Bombed through 10/10 cloud’. The squadron ORB recorded that the crew Bombed at 2121 hours from 18.000 feet on glow of Red TI, markers were very scattered, large explosion seen at 2123 hours. Glow of fires could be seen 60 miles away on the return journey

4.

AIRCRAFT MISSING 4.1. 1 Group Aircraft Missing (35 men) were 576/L2 166/G 166/D 101/B 12/O

F/O Durant F/O Miller F/O Davies F/O Mackie F/O Bambraugh

(15 Ops) (26 Ops) (16 Ops) (21 Ops) (6 Ops)

Nothing was heard of from the above aircraft after take-off with the exception of 101/B which was seen to collide with another aircraft at the rendezvous point over Clacton at 2008 hours, two bodies recovered from the wreckage 4.2. 166 Squadron had two aircraft missing Lancaster G (ME289) F/O Miller R W (Canadian) Sgt Adams W A

Age 24

F/O Harding L W (DFC)

Age Unknown

W/O Watson R W (Australian) Sgt MacDonald A H Sgt Roberts J E

Age 23

F/Sgt Scott J K (Canadian)

Age 29

(Survived, Prisoner of War (POW), Stalag Luft III) (Died, buried Reichswald Forest War Cemetery, Germany) (Died, buried Reichswald Forest War Cemetery) (Survived, evaded capture) (Survived, POW, Stalag Luft 7) (Died, commemorated Runnymede Memorial, Surrey) (Died, commemorated Runnymede Memorial)

Lancaster D (LM722) F/O Davies J G Sgt Caston C L F/O Cameron F Sgt Rollinson A F/Sgt Dillon J M (Australian) Sgt Ward R B F/Sgt Leigh R

Age 31 Age 20 Age 22 Age 21 Age 29 Age Unknown Age 19

(Died, commemorated Runnymede Memorial) (Died, commemorated Runnymede Memorial) (Died, commemorated Runnymede Memorial) (Died, commemorated Runnymede Memorial) (Died, commemorated Runnymede Memorial) (Died, commemorated Runnymede Memorial) (Died, commemorated Runnymede Memorial)

No wreckage has ever been located for this aircraft; one assumption could be that it crashed into the North Sea either on the outward or homeward journey.

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The aircrew that were killed and have no known grave are commemorated on the Runnymede Memorial in Surrey. Stalag Luft 7 was a Luftwaffe prisoner-of-war camp located in Bankau, Germany (now Poland). The camp was opened on 6 June 1944, for RAF NCO flying crews. On 19 January 1945, 1,500 prisoners marched out of camp in bitter cold. On 8 February they reached Stalag III-A located about 52 km (32 mi) south of Berlin near Luckenwalde, which already held 20,000 prisoners, consisting mainly of soldiers from Britain, Canada, the U.S. and Russia. As the Russians approached Stalag III-A guards fled the camp leaving the prisoners to be liberated by the Red Army on 22 April 1945. Stalag Luft III was a Luftwaffe-run prisoner of war camp which held captured Allied air force personnel. The camp was established in March 1942 in the German province of Lower Silesia near the town of Sagan (now Żagan, Poland). The site was selected because its sandy soil made it difficult for POWs to escape by tunnelling. It is best known for two escape plots by Allied POWs. The first one in 1943 became the basis of a fictionalised film, The Wooden Horse (1950). The second breakout was, the so-called Great Escape (again made into a fictionalised film) in March 1944. Of 76 escapees, 73 were captured and only 3 escaped. Of the 73 captured, 50 were executed on the orders of Hitler.

Also Lancaster E (PD242) th

Lancaster PD242 was flown by Teddy and his crew on Op No. 6 to Stettin on 29 August when they were involved in two combats with German fighters.

S/Ldr Rippingdale F W Sgt Taylor R C P/O Howling H L Sgt Cridge F W F/O Edwards C I Sgt Lewington D Sgt Hallett

th

(Posted 153 Squadron, 7 October 1944) th (Posted 153 Squadron, 7 October 1944) th (Posted 153 Squadron, 7 October 1944) (Tour expired October 1944) (Posted 153 Squadron, 7th October 1944) (Posted 153 Squadron, 7th October 1944) (Died, buried Chichester Cemetery)

Aged 19

Bombed at 2122 hours from 16,000 feet. Bombs were released immediately following an attack by a Ju.88 whilst our aircraft was on its bombing run. Rear Gunner killed, Navigator and Wireless Operator wounded and aircraft extensively damaged. Enemy aircraft claimed as destroyed. Successful landing made at Manston rd

th

At 2121 hours on the night of 23 /24 September 1944 Lancaster ‘E’ was on the outward journey when two minutes prior to reaching the target area the Rear Gunner (R/G) sighted a Ju.88 coming in to attack from the port quarter down (range N/A). He immediately ordered a corkscrew to port and opened fire at the same time. Almost simultaneously the enemy aircraft (E/A) returned fire and continued to close rapidly and although the Lancaster continued to corkscrew it was struck by many canon shells and extensive damage was caused. When the E/A was dead astern the Mid Upper Gunner (MUG) opened fire with a long burst bur by this time the R/G had become silent and had ceased firing. The MUG saw his own trace entering the nose of the E/A which continued to close in firing all the time but when at a range of 100 yards it exploded in mid-air. The effect of the explosion was witnessed by the Bomb Aimer, Engineer and Pilot. The Lancaster lost 8,000 feet during the whole of the action and was by this time well in the target area but the Pilot had jettisoned his bombs at 15,000 feet whilst being attacked. It was found later that the R/G had been killed and the Navigator and Wireless Operator wounded. The E/A is claimed definitely destroyed. The Pilot claimed that had it not been for the R/G’s early warning damage to the crew and aircraft might have been much worse. The Rear Gunner displayed both courage and skill and fought until he was silenced by the E/A.

Sgt Cridge the Navigator was hit in the face, left arm and body by an exploding cannon shell. Despite being in poor shape and great pain Cridge remained at his post to assist the Pilot in safely getting the aircraft back to RAF Manston. S/Ldr Rippingdale was recommended for the Distinguished Service Order (DSO) and Sgt Cridge for the Conspicuous Gallantry Medal (CGM). The citation announcing the awards in the London Gazette th 10 November 1944 stated This officer and airman were pilot and navigator respectively of an aircraft detailed to attack Neuss one night in September, 1944. When nearing the target the aircraft was attacked by a fighter. The fight ended with the destruction of the enemy aircraft which exploded in the air. The bomber had sustained much damage. The midupper and rear turrets were wrecked, the gunner of the latter being killed. The wireless apparatus, many of the pilot's instruments and much navigational equipment were rendered useless. The hydraulic gear was put out of action, making it impossible to operate the bomb doors mechanically. Even so Squadron Leader Rippingale calculated that if the bombs were released their weight would force open the bomb doors. He gave the order and the bombs fell. A course was set for home and finally an airfield was reached and a safe landing made. In hazardous circumstances, Squadron Leader Rippingale displayed exceptional skill, inspiring leadership and Page 53 of 108

great courage. Sergeant Cridge also proved himself to be a brave and devoted member of aircraft crew. In the fight he was wounded in the face, arm and the body by fragments of a cannon shell. His first thought was to give his captain all the assistance of which he was capable. Although in great pain and suffering from the loss of blood he navigated the aircraft home with much skill.

5.

AFTERMATH A short local report only says that 617 houses and 14 public buildings were destroyed or seriously damaged, and that 289 people were killed and 150 injured. th

th

Teddy’s 14 and last Op in September was on 25 , although it didn’t turn out as expected 6.

166 SQUADRON ORDERS th

24 September

Squadron stood down from operations

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OPERATION No. 13X – CALIAS (ABANDONED) 25TH SEPTEMBER 1944 1.

BOMBER COMMAND 1.1. 25 September 1944 Calais 872 aircraft – 430 Lancasters, 397 Halifaxes, 45 Mosquitoes – were again sent to bomb German defensive positions but encountered low cloud. Only 287 aircraft were able to bomb, through breaks in the cloud. No aircraft lost. Petrol-Carrying 70 Halifaxes of 4 Group started a series of flights to carry petrol in jerricans from England to airfields in Belgium, in order to alleviate the severe fuel shortage being experienced by Allied ground forces. 4 Group would fly 435 such sorties during an 8-day period. Each Halifax carried about 165 jerricans, approximately 750 gallons of petrol, on each flight. The total amount of petrol lifted during the period was approximately 325,000 gallons, about the same amount of fuel that the Halifaxes themselves consumed. No aircraft were lost during these operations.

Minor Operations 4 RCM, 5 Hudsons on Resistance operations. No losses. Total effort for the day: 951 sorties, no losses. 1.2. 25/26 September 1944 Minor Operations 48 Mosquitoes to Mannheim and 4 to a chemical factory at Höchst, just west of Frankfurt, 3 RCM sorties, 30 Mosquito patrols. 1 Mosquito lost from the Mannheim raid. 2.

CALAIS Calais was virtually razed to the ground during WW2. In May 1940, it was a key objective of the invading German forces and became the scene of a last-ditch defence which diverted a sizable amount of German forces for several days immediately prior to the evacuation of Allied forces at Dunkirk. During the ensuing German occupation it was very heavily fortified as it was generally believed by the Germans that the Allies would invade at that point. It was also used as a launch site for V1 flying bombs and for much of the war the Germans used the region as the site for railway guns used to bombard the south-eastern corner of England. Calais was very heavily bombed and shelled in a successful effort to disrupt German communications and persuade them that the Allies would target the Pas-de-Calais for invasion (rather than Normandy). The town, by then largely in ruins, was laid th siege to and was liberated by General Daniel Spry's 3rd Canadian Infantry Division between 25 st th September and 1 October 1944. On 27 February 1945 Calais suffered a last bombing raid, this time by British bombers who mistook the town for Dunkirk, which was at that time still occupied by German forces. After the war there was little rebuilding of the historic city and most buildings were modern ones.

3.

166 SQUADRON th

On 25 September 166 Squadron were instructed to prepare 27 aircraft for an operation on enemy defences at Calais. A total of 203 aircraft plus PFF aircraft would attack two targets in the Calais area (102 aircraft to aiming point ‘One Baker’ and 101 aircraft to aiming point ‘Two Able’). The time of attack ‘H’ hour was 0840 hours for ‘Two Able’ and 0900 hours for ‘One Baker’; crews were told the aim of the raid was ‘to destroy town’, the crews were also told Great care is to be taken to ensure bomb aiming. Ground speed will be high therefore crews must be warned to take particular care not to overshoot. Our troops are within 2,000 yards of the aiming point. Up to two bombing runs may be made to ensure accuracy. A right hand orbit of the target is to be made. Bombs are to be aimed visually for preference. Otherwise at the TIs as directed by the Master Bomber provided these are seen to be in the correct area. Under no circumstances are bombs to be dropped if The bombsight is unserviceable

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The target is obscured by smoke and the TIs referred to by the Master Bomber are not visible (crews are not to aim at the smoke) If crews are not certain that the TIs are in the correct area The Navigators master switch is to be left ‘on’ throughout the operation Bomb doors are to be opened at least 5 miles out to sea and left open for orbiting if necessary until after releasing bombs. Crews are to be warned that they will be flying over their own troops when orbiting. No single and salvo after bombing check is to be carried out over the target. Visual check is to be carried out as usual. Crews are to watch for Yellow flares or Yellow smoke which, if visible, will denote forward positions of our troops. They may also use pink panels intermixed with the Yellow panels

Even though it was a daylight flight there was no fighter cover The bomb load was nine 1,000lb MC bombs, four 1.000 Semi Armour Piercing (SAP) bombs and four 500lb MC bombs, the aiming point was initially marked with Green TIs and then Red TIs on the instructions of a Master Bomber. The Squadron was detailed for an early morning attack on the German occupied Channel Port of Calais. Take off was at 0710 hours on the morning and 27 aircraft got off in a very good time, but weather conditions en route to the target were very bad and when the target area was reached the cloud was 10/10ths. Under these circumstances the Master Bomber, in view of the known proximity of our own troops had no option but to order the whole force to bring their bombs back. Altogether a very disappointing sortie. 1 Group Operational Record Book (ORB) reported that of the 201 aircraft that took off 201 aircraft aborted the attack over enemy target. It also said that Perfect weather was encountered along the route as far as the south coast. Thence onwards across the Channel to the target there was 10/10hs low stratus with tops to 2/2,500 feet … although several TIs were seen to go down these were quickly obscured … crews were next instructed to orbit and after some discussion between the Master Bomber and his deputy, the latter of whom descended to 800 feet and was still in cloud, the order to abandon mission was given … Opposition from ground defences consisted of slight light flak, one of our aircraft sustained damage.

In his flying log Teddy recorded taking off at 1000 (conflicts with the Squadron ORB which says 0710 hours) with a daylight flying time of 4 hours 45 minutes, he recorded ‘Abandoned mission. The squadron ORB recorded Mission abandoned over target area on instruction of Master Bomber

4.

AIRCRAFT MISSING 4.1. No aircraft were lost

5.

AFTERMATH Even though the aircraft had abandoned the attack over the target area the Op was not ‘counted’ as no bombs were dropped. This must have been particularly disappointing for aircrews as they had still been exposed to the risk of enemy fire. Consequently the number of Ops credited to Teddy’s crew remained at 13. rd

On the 3 October Teddy and his crew were airborne for just short of an hour to carry out an ‘Air Test’ th

th

Teddy would finally fly his 14 Op on the 5 October th

Aircrews were normally allowed one week leave every six weeks. Teddy flew his first Op on 12 rd August so his first six weeks finished on or around the 23 September. It is quite possible that th nd between 26 September and 2 October Teddy and his crew were on 7 days leave. Imagine as a 21 years old you have in the last six weeks flown your first 14 Ops against the enemy. You have inadvertently bombed some of your own troops, been attacked by enemy aircraft, flown through the terror of searchlights and flak and flown thousands of miles over enemy territory at constant threat of attack. You then spend presumably a week at home with your parents and siblings. How do you adjust? Try to act normally? Appease family concerns? Deflect questions on ‘what’s it like’? We can only imagine the kind of emotional turmoil aircrews went through on leave not only trying to act ‘normal’ but knowing that this might be the last time they see everyone.

6.

166 SQUADRON ORDERS th

26 September

A further daylight attack on Calais, in support of our land forces was staged for the th 26 September 1944, and 26 aircraft from this Squadron taking off at 0950 hours took part. All aircraft returned safely

Page 56 of 108

th

The Squadron was again detailed for a further attack in Calais in support of our th land forces and 18 aircraft were detailed for an early morning attack on 27 September 1944 taking off at 0850 hours. All aircraft returned safely

th

The Squadron was again detailed to provide operations12 aircraft for a further th attack on the heavily attacked French port of Calais on the morning of 28 September taking off at 0800 hours. All aircraft returned safely

th

A target was received and 17 aircraft detailed, but the operation was cancelled just after lunch

th

Squadron stood down from operations

27 September

28 September

29 September 30 September st

18 aircraft were detailed for operations but the order was cancelled later in the day

nd

The Squadron was detailed for operations and 17 crews were standing by but no order to take off was received

rd

The Squadron provided 17 aircraft to take part in an attack (taking off at 1235 hours) designed to breach the sea wall at Westkapelle and flood the island of Walcheren. All aircraft returned a safely

th

Squadron stood down from operations

1 October 2 October 3 October

4 October

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OPERATION No. 14 - SAARBRUCKEN 5TH OCTOBER 1944 1.

BOMBER COMMAND 1.1. 4/5 October 1944 Minor Operations 6 Mosquitoes to Pforzheim and 5 to Heilbronn, 4 RCM sorties, 36 Mosquito patrols, 47 Lancasters and 31 Halifaxes minelaying off Oslo and in the Kattegat, 15 aircraft on Resistance operations. 4 aircraft were lost: 1 Mosquito from the Heilbronn raid and 2 Lancasters and 1 Halifax from the minelaying operations. 1.2. 5 October 1944 Wilhelmshaven 227 Lancasters and 1 Mosquito of 5 Group attempted to bomb Wilhelmshaven through 10/10ths cloud. 18 Lancasters did not join in the main attack but bombed a group of ships seen through a break in the cloud over the sea. 1 Lancaster lost. Minor Operations 5 RCM sorties, 5 aircraft on Resistance operations. No losses. 1.3. 5/6 October 1944 Saarbrücken 531 Lancasters and 20 Mosquitoes of 1, 3 and 8 Groups on the first major RAF raid to this target since September 1942. 3 Lancasters lost. Minor Operations 20 Mosquitoes to Berlin and 26 to 5 other German targets, 36 RCM sorties, 47 Mosquito patrols, 10 Halifaxes minelaying off Heligoland and 9 Mosquitoes of 8 Group minelaying in the Kiel Canal. No aircraft lost.

2.

SAARBRUCKEN The area known as ‘Saar’ is close to the French border and became a French province in 1684 and went back and forth under French or some other rule for years to come after that, until Napoleon Bonaparte’s defeat in 1815 when most of it was ceded to Prussia. After the end of the First World War, Saarland was placed under the administration of the League of Nations and for 15 years was its own political entity with its own currency and stamps. Then in 1935, the locals voted overwhelmingly to be part of the Third Reich with more than 90% support in a referendum. Saarbrücken was the industrial, commercial, and cultural centre of the great Saar coal-mining region. Iron and steel were the most important industries; it was also an important road and rail junction.

3.

166 SQUADRON th

On 5 October 166 Squadron were instructed to prepare 30 aircraft for an operation on Marshalling Yards at Saarbrucken. A total of 243 aircraft were detailed from 1 Group to take part in the attack plus PFF aircraft. The time of attack ‘H’ hour was 2030 hours; crews were told the aim of the raid was ‘to destroy rolling stock and block the Marshalling Yard’, the crews were also told rd

The target area is approx. 20 miles away from the front line of the American 3 Army. Any crews who are in doubt of the identity of the target are not to drop their bombs. Any crews who have to jettison bombs are to ensure that they are well away from the front line before doing so.

No fighter cover was provided Bomb load was one 4,000lb HC bomb and fourteen 4lb incendiary cluster bombs and target was marked with large salvoes of mixed Red and Greed TI and kept marked with Red TI throughout the attack. A total of 30 aircraft were detailed to attack Saarbrucken but ‘A2’ had to be withdrawn at the last minute owing to the rear turret being unserviceable. Taking off at 1800 hours the operation was carried out in fair weather conditions with 5 to 7/10ths cloud on route which cleared as the target area Page 58 of 108

was reached. PFF markers were well concentrated and an excellent concentration of bombing was built up. Moderate heavy flak to about 15/16,000 feet was encountered and slight fighter activity. ‘H’ flown by Flight Lieutenant French and crew had a sharp tussle with Fw.190 on the homeward route but the enemy disappeared when our Rear Gunner opened fire. Many large explosions were reported in the target area which was described as being a mass of fire and all crews returned safely, well satisfied with the raid. 1 Group Operational Record Book (ORB) reported that of the 239 aircraft that took off 225 successfully bombed the target. It also said that A force of 239 Lancasters from this Group took off for a night attack on Saarbrucken. Owing to weather conditions at their bases, the majority of our aircraft landed away … Illuminating flares, well positioned, were seen at 2223 hours, followed by cascading Red and Green TIs and visibility being good crews were able to report that the markers were accurate … A good concentration of bombing ensured and a large fire soon developed. Several big explosions … a particularly spectacular one occurred at 2245 hours, from which smoke rose to 12,000 feet. By conclusion of the attack the town was well ablaze and the glow could be seen up to 100 miles on the homeward route. A decoy was noticed to be very active four to five miles north east of the target. There was moderate accurate heavy flak between 14,000 and 17,000 feet, no searchlights, and reports of some enemy fighters. Reports so far show that two of our aircraft had inconclusive combats in the target area and make no claims.

In his flying log Teddy recorded taking off at 1700 hours with a night flying time of 6 hours, he recorded ‘Diverted to Halesworth’. The squadron ORB recorded that the crew Bombed at 2239 hours from 13,000 feet on centre of Red TIs. Target area was a mass of fires with large red explosion at 2242 hours giving off huge column of greyish smoke

For some reason Teddy completed this Op with another crew in a Lancaster flown by Sq/Ldr Rippon. The Order of Battle states that Teddy was the Air Bomber (AB) presumably replacing the ‘regular’ AB Sgt Gulliver, although in the Squadron ORB it states that Sgt Gulliver was also in the aircraft. I think it is nd highly unlikely that Gulliver was on the Op as the aircraft was also carrying a 2 Pilot and there would have been limited space to accommodate a crew of nine. (It is highly likely the ORB entry was incorrect). I can only assume that somehow Gulliver was unable to complete the Op and Teddy was drafted in as a replacement. His normal crew did not participate in this Op so he would have been available. This raises the question of how this would have played out if Teddy had achieved his 30 Op tour one before his crew. Would he have been released or would he have wanted to remain with the crew (or ordered to st stay with the crew) to complete a 31 Op to fit in with the rest of the crew

4.

AIRCRAFT MISSING 4.1. 1 Group Aircrew Missing (7 men) were 101/A

P/O Mason

(2 Ops)

Nothing was heard from this aircraft after take-off. 5.

AFTERMATH th

At the request of the American Third Army, the RAF massively raided Saarbrücken on 5 October in order to destroy supply lines, especially the railway. The 531 Lancasters and 20 Mosquitos achieved these goals, but lost 3 Lancasters. The bombing was accurate and severe damage was caused in the main town area north of the River Saar, the area through which the main railway lines ran. Damage was particularly severe in the Altstadt and Malstatt districts. 5,882 houses were destroyed and 1,141 were seriously damaged. 344 people were killed; a figure which suggests that much of the population may have been evacuated from this town, which was situated right on the Siegfried Line. The RAF raided Saarbrücken at least 10 times. Often employing area bombing, they used a total of at least 1,495 planes to attack Saarbrücken, killing a minimum of 635 people and heavily damaging more than 8,400 buildings, of which more than 7,700 were completely destroyed, thus dehousing more than 50,000 people

As a result of bad weather Teddy’s aircraft landed at RAF Halesworth, which is located 7 miles west th of Southwold, Suffolk, England. They flew back to RAF Kirmington later that day 6 October. th

This was Teddy’s last Op with 166 Squadron. On 7 October he was transferred with his crew to the newly reformed 153 Squadron, he would continue to be based at RAF Kirmington for the time being. The 166 Squadron ORB recorded th

On 7 October 1944, No. 153 Squadron was reformed at Kirmington and 27 crews were posted from No. 166 Squadron to form the nucleus of the new unit, which was located at Kirmington, pending a Page 59 of 108

move to Scampton. No, 166 Squadron was therefore left with 32 crews, the intention being to build it up again to the establishment of a three flight squadron. A considerable amount of extra work fell on all sections of No. 166 Squadron in forming the new squadron. th

th

Teddy’s next operation his 15 Op on 11 October would be his first in 153 Squadron 6.

166 SQUADRON ORDERS th

6 October 7.

Squadron stood down from operations

153 SQUADRON ORDERS th

On the day of its formation, the Squadron was detailed to take part in an attack on the town of Emmerich, an important supply base for German troops in the Arnhem/Nijmegen area. 11 aircraft were detailed taking off at 1130 hours. All aircraft returned safely

th

Squadron stood down from operations

th

Squadron stood down from operations

7 October

8 October 9 October th

10 October

Squadron stood down from operations

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OPERATION No. 15 – FORT FREDERIK HENDRIK 11TH OCTOBER 1944 1.

BOMBER COMMAND 1.1. 10/11 October 1944 Minor Operations 49 Mosquitoes to Cologne, 6 each to Aschaffenburg and Pforzheim, 5 to Duisburg and 2 to Düsseldorf, 1 Liberator on an RCM sortie. No aircraft lost. 1.2. 11 October 1944 River Scheldt Gun Batteries 160 Lancasters and 20 Mosquitoes of 1 and 8 Groups attacked the Fort Frederik Hendrik battery position at Breskens, on the south bank of the Scheldt, and 115 Lancasters of 5 Group attacked guns near Flushing on the north bank. 1 Lancaster lost from the Breskens raid Walcheren 61 Lancasters and 2 Mosquitoes of 5 Group attempted to breach the sea walls at Veere on the northern coast of the island but were not successful. No aircraft lost. Minor Operations 3 RCM sorties, 1 Ranger patrol, 2 Hudsons on Resistance operations. No losses. 1.3. 11/12 October 1944 Minor Operations 46 Mosquitoes to Berlin, 8 to Wiesbaden and 4 to Heilbronn. 1 aircraft lost from the Berlin raid.

2.

FORT FREDERIK HENDRIK Fort Frederik Henrik was an old fortress near Antwerp (dating from 1878), in what was known as the Breskens Pocket, which was part of Hitler’s Atlantic Wall, a system of coastal defences and fortifications, which stretched from Spain to the top of Norway. In the Breskens Pocket on the Dutch/Belgium coast, south of the Scheldt there were six naval batteries embedded in concrete plus one railway mounted battery. Fort Frederik Hendrik was part of these fortifications and the Germans installed two batteries, one of four 7.62 cm guns and one of four 10.5 cm guns. This formed a vital part of the German defensive positions during the Battle for the Scheldt. The capture of Breskens st th and Fort Frederik Hendrik between 21 and 25 October provided positions from which Allied artillery could be brought to bear on other German defensive positions and helped in the final victory.

3.

RAF SCAMPTON Of all the RAF Bomber Command airfields, RAF Scampton is perhaps the best known. It originated as a First World War training aerodrome and Home Defence Flight station, but closed within two years of the end of the First World War. Selected under the RAF Expansion Scheme, it was built up again in the 1930s, and its squadrons were in action from the first day of the Second World War, including in the ‘Dambusters’ Raid on the Ruhr Dams (in May 1943) by Scampton’s 617 Squadron for which the base has become famous. However, by summer 1943 the grass runways were in poor condition and the airfield was closed. Scampton reopened in July 1944 having been brought up to class A standard with concrete runways and 153 Squadron was transferred at the beginning of October. RAF Scampton was retained after the war and played a major part in the Cold War and as a training establishment. Today it is famous as being the home base of the Red Arrows, the RAF aerobatic display team.

4.

FORMATION OF 153 SQUADRON th

On 7 October 1944, 153 Squadron was re-formed at RAF Kirmington, Lincolnshire, beginning operations that same night when it flew its first operational mission when 11 aircraft, escorted by Spitfires, bombed Emmerich. Detailed plans had been published (Movement Order 1/44) to transfer 153 Squadron to Scampton on th th 14 October 1944, but once more the war intervened. On 13 October 1944, when the movement order required aircrew to have their kitbags packed and put in the gymnasium, together with their

Page 61 of 108

private bicycles (all properly labelled and secured), the Squadron was required to prepare 13 aircraft for a raid on Duisburg which was then postponed following briefing. th

The postponement was only temporary and on 14 November 13 aircraft took off at 0630hrs to attack Duisburg. th

On 15 October 1944, 153 Squadron moved to Scampton. RAF Bomber Command eventually comprised of seven groups in the United Kingdom, strategically stationed near the east coast of England. On its creation as a bomber squadron, 153 Squadron became the 13th squadron in No 1 Group.

5.

153 SQUADRON th

According to Teddy’s flying log the operation to Fort Fredrick Hendrik occurred on the 12 October. However, there is a wide range of evidence to contradict this. (Not only did Teddy get the date wrong he also recorded the wrong take off times for the raid). 153 Operations Record Book (ORB) in three sections (records, summary and appendices) states that th Teddy’s crew took part in an Op on the 11 October, detailing their names on two separate occasions). As a consequence of working from Teddy’s flying log I only researched an Op on Fort th Frederick Hendrik which took place on 12 October. I fact 153 Squadron only supplied 3 aircraft for this Op and from the Squadron ORB it is unlikely one of these was Teddy’s crew. Therefore the only information currently available for this Op is taken from 153 Squadron ORBs. Although Teddy’s aircraft did not drop their bomb load at Fort Fredrik Hendrik (on the instructions of the Master Bomber) they still appear to have been credited with an Op. I can only assume this is similar to Op No. 9 on Le Havre were an Op has been counted as some aircraft manged to drop their bombs, even though Teddy’s aircraft didn’t No Battle Orders available for this Op The Squadron was detailed to provide 7 aircraft to attack Fort Fredrik Hendrik an important enemy stronghold in the Scheldt Estuary. The operation was carried out in daylight, an escort of fighters from No. 11 Group being picked up near the Dutch Coast. Of the seven aircraft detailed, only five were able to take off at 1430 hours, the remaining two not being bombed up by the take-off time, owing to shortness of time. Three aircraft, all in the first phase were ordered to abandon the mission as the target was obscured by cloud. They consequently brought their bombs back and landed safely. The two aircraft in the in second phase were able to bomb visually and bombed on the Red TIs. A concentrated attack was reported with bombing crossing the markers. Opposition consisted of very meagre light flak. No information available from 1 Group ORB In his flying log Teddy recorded taking off at 1000 hours (Squadron ORB says 1430) with a daylight flying time of 2 hours and 55 minutes he recorded ‘Fort Frederik Hendrik’. The squadron ORB recorded that the crew Mission abandoned in target area on instructions of Master Bomber

6.

AIRCRAFT MISSING 6.1. No aircraft were lost.

7.

AFTERMATH The Battle for the Scheldt would continue for a further four weeks before the Canadians could claim victory. At the end of offensive, the victorious First Canadian Army had taken 41,043 prisoners, but suffered 12,873 casualties (killed, wounded, or missing), 6,367 of whom were Canadians th

th

Teddy would next be in action on the 14 October on his 16 Op 8.

153 SQUADRON ORDERS th

12 October

The Squadron was detailed to take part in an attack on Fort Fredrick Hendrik. This attack repeated then first phase of the previous day’s attack which had been cancelled owing to cloud conditions. The operation was carried out in daylight with a dawn take off (0630 hours). Three aircraft only were detailed. All aircraft returned safely

Later in the day the Squadron was given another target and 7 aircraft plus one reserve were detailed, but the operation was cancelled shortly afterwards

Page 62 of 108

th

13 October

The Squadron was detailed to take part in an attack on Duisburg and thirteen aircraft were detailed, but the operation was postponed

All personnel were busy packing kit and getting cleared from the Station in preparation for the Squadron to move to RAF Base Scampton, on the following day

Page 63 of 108

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Page 64 of 108

OPERATION STUTTGART 1. MAP OF BOMBER COMMAND LOSSES ZUFFENHAUSEN, STUTTGART 1.1. DESCRIPTION 1.2. LOSS OF LANCASTER PB638 (P4-O) 1.3. LEGEND 1.4. MAP OF THE RAF BOMBER LOSSES DURING THE OPERATION AGAINST ZUFFENHAUSEN, TH TH STUTTGART ON 28 /29 JANUARY 1945 2. TIMELINE OF BOMBING ATTACK 2.1. DESCRIPTION 3. UNTIMED EVENTS 3.1. DESCRIPTION 4. BOMBER COMMAND LOSSES/COMBATS KORNWESTHEIM, STUTTGART 4.1. DESCRIPTION 4.2. LOSSES 4.3. COMBATS 5. BOMBER COMMAND LOSSES ZUFFENHAUSEN, STUTTGART 5.1. DESCRIPTION 5.2. LOSSES UNITED KINGDOM 5.3. LOSSES OVER GERMANY 6. BOMBER COMMAND COMBATS ZUFFENHAUSEN, STUTTGART 6.1. COMBATS 7. RAF ORDER OF BATTLE ZUFFENHAUSEN, STUTTGART 7.1. DESCRIPTION 7.2. 1 BOMBER GROUP 7.3. 4 BOMBER GROUP 7.4. 6 BOMBER GROUP 7.5. 8 BOMBER (PATHFINDER FORCE) GROUP 7.6. 100 BOMER (SPECIAL DUTIES) GROUP 8. ANTI-AIRCRAFT (FLAK) BATTERIES STUTTGART 8.1. PERSONNEL 8.2. FLAK BATTERY TACTICS 8.3. STUTTGART ANTI-AIRCRFAT POSITIONS 9. BOMBING DECOY SITES, STUTTGART 9.1. WHAT WERE BOMBING DECOYS 9.2. SCHEIN FACILITY LAUFEN (BRAZIL) 9.3. WEILIMDORF FIRE DECOY SITE Page 65 of 108

9.4. OTHER CANOUFLAGE MEASURES

10. VAIHINGEN FLAK BATTERY

Page 66 of 108

1. MAP OF BOMBER COMMAND LOSSES ZUFFENHAUSEN, STUTTGART 1.1. DESCRIPTION A total of 602 aircraft; 316 Halifaxes, 258 Lancasters, 28 Mosquitoes of 1, 4, 6 and 8 Groups took part and 11 aircraft, 6 Lancasters, 4 Halifaxes, 1 Mosquito were lost. This raid was split into 2 parts, with a 3-hour interval. The first force of 226 aircraft was directed against the important railway yards at Kornwestheim, a town to the north of Stuttgart. The second was against the north-western Stuttgart suburb of Zuffenhausen, where the target is believed to have been the Hirth aero engine factory. The target area was mostly cloud-covered for both raids and the bombing, on sky-markers, was scattered. There are some interesting local reports. Everitt, Chris. The Bomber Command War Diaries. Pen and Sword.

The map overleaf shows details of the known or assumed crash sites of the bombers that were lost during the second attack on Zuffenhausen. In total eight bombers were lost over Germany and one aircraft crashed on take-off in England. NOTE: THE CRASH SITE OF 408 SQUADRON HALIFAX NP746 EQ-E UNKNOWN SO IT IS NOT SHOWN ON MAP, IT IS PSOOSIBLE IT CRASHED CLOSE TO VAIHINGEN FLAK BATTERY. In addition to the losses suffered in the attack on Zuffenhausen two aircraft were lost in the first attack on Kornwestheim, one over Germany and the other one crashed in France. The total RAF losses for the night (including the UK accident) were eleven aircraft. 1.2. LOSS OF LANCASTER PB638 (P4-O) It is not possible to determine why Lancaster PB638 (P4-O) crashed. From the crash site it is clear that it crashed on the outward journey before the final turn to the target. It is more than likely that it was shot down by an enemy aircraft, although some kind of mechanical failure cannot be ruled out. Lancaster PB638 was in the first wave of the attack and was due over the target at 2330 hours. The crash site is some 60km north of the target or about 12 minutes at the Lancaster’s normal cruising speed of 322km per hour. Therefore, if it is assumed that the bombing stream was on time to start bombing the target at 2330 hours (as recorded in No. 1 Group Operations Record Book), PB638 could have been in the area of the crash site at Michelbach around 2315 – 2320 hours. According to a German High Command report, the Nachtjagdverbände (Night Fighter Groups) employed 14 night fighters against the bomber attack on Zuffenhausen and claimed 10 aircraft shot down. One of these night fighter groups was Nachtjagdgeschwader 6 (NJG.6). The activities of NJG.6 are well covered in the surviving documentary record, on this night, they employed seven night fighters between 2259 - 0125 hours and claimed six aircraft shot down. (It is unknown who claimed the other 4 aircraft as records are not available, although some researchers think they may be crews from I./NJG11 or II./NJG2). The two known pilots claiming victories around the time it is thought PB638 crashed are Feldwebel Gunther Bahr of 1./NJG 6 and Oberfeldwebel Heinrich Schmidt of II./NJG 6. It is known that Bahr took off at 2305 from Groß-Sachsenheim airfield approximately 50km south of the crash site. His first two recorded claims are recorded at 2332 (west of target) and 2336 hours (west south west of target), therefore it is highly unlikely he shot down PB638. The time of Schmidt’s claim is 2328 hours (possibly flying in a Ju.88G) at Stuttgart but the exact location is unknown. In addition to PB638, Halifax NP768 OW-Q, was also shot down around 2328 hours around 26km to the west so it is possible that one of these two aircraft were shot down by Schmidt. However it is quite possible that PB638 was in fact shot down by one of thn eother crews that were operational on the night. Luftwaffe records state that 14 aircraft were sent to intercept the bomber steam and that 10 claims were made (although RAF losses were only 9 aircraft in both attacks). Records of NJG.6 show that they claimed 6 aircraft. However, it should be noted that at this time Germany was close to collapse and the maintenance of accurate records was highly unlikely. Also throughout the war Allied and Axis forces often made exaggerated claims of aircraft destroyed.

Page 67 of 108

1.3. LEGEND Aircraft crash site Report of aircraft damaged Gross Sachsenheim airfield Vaihingen Flak Battery Flight path

1.4. MAP OF THE RAF BOMBER LOSSES DURING THE OPERATION AGAINST ZUFFENHAUSEN, TH TH STUTTGART ON 28 /29 JANUARY 1945

. Note crash site of HALIFAX NP746 EQ-E unknown so it is not shown on this map

Page 68 of 108

2. TIMELINE OF BOMBING ATTACK 2.1. DESCRIPTION The table below details, in chronological order, what happened on the second attack on Stuttgart th th during the evening of 28 /29 January 1945. It is based on reports from the RAF bombing crews that took part, claims by Luftwaffe pilots and reports from the internet based on research into RAF and Luftwaffe records. The red text highlights reports of attacks on bombers around the time and location where it is thought that Lancaster PB638 crashed. Time

Incident Number

Location

Aircraft

Group

1915

RAF Scampton

Lancaster 153/P4-O PB638

1

1921

Skipton on Swale, Yorkshire

Halifax 424/QB-S LW164

6

2136

49 38N 01 45E

Halifax 424/QB-T MZ356

6

2259

GroßSachsenhe im airfield (16km north west of Stuttgart)

Height

Comments

12000

Lancaster PB638 P4-O took off from RAF Scampton on the following route A – Bases; (B) – Reading; (C) – 49 00N 02 40E; (D) – 49 10N 07 25E; (E)- 49 18N 09 06E – Target; (F) – 48 40N 09 10E; (G) – 48 35N 08 30E; (H) – 49 00N 07 50E; (I) – 48 50N 05 30E; (C) – 49 00N 02 40E; (B) – Reading; (A) – Bases Rendezvous position 49 07N 06 00E, west of Metz, France. (German forces in Metz finally surrendered to th US forces on 13 December 1944). Bomber Command Loss - 424 Squadron Halifax LW164 (S) As the aircraft picked up speed on the runway it entered a swing to the right and then briefly left the ground, almost immediately it then sank back to the ground onto its starboard wing first and exploded. Outward, saw a brilliant flash on the ground which was believed to be an aircraft Between 2259 and 0125 hours seven night fighters of Nachtjagdgeschwader 6 (NJG 6) take off to attack the bomber stream. They claim six victories In total Nachtjagdverbände (Night Fighter Groups) employed 14 night fighters against the Bomber Command attack and claimed 10 aircraft shot down. It is not known who flew the remaining seven sorties and claimed the additional four aerial victories mentioned by the German High Command. This could have been crews from I./NJG 11 or II./NJG 2.

Luftwaffe NJG6

2305

48 57N 09 03E

Bf110 2Z+IH

Luftwaffe 1./NJG6

2320

49 14N 08 09E

Lancaster 103/PM-N RA500

1

Feldwebel Bahr took off from Groß-Sachsenheim airfield in Bf.110 2Z+IH. During the evening Bahr was to claim four abschusse (aerial victories). Crew FF OFw Bahr, BF Fw Rehmer, BS Uffz Riediger (See Luftwaffe section for explanation of Luftwaffe organisation and abbreviations) Enemy Fighter Combat No. 1 Halifax starboard appeared unaware of Me.410 and took no evasive action or replied when Me.410 fired hitting its wing. Our gunners opened fire hitting the Me.410. Halifax and Me.410 passed under aircraft. AIR 14/3227 Raid plots – night January 1945

Almost immediately Ju.88 fired on starboard quarter and both gunners fired. Fighter attacked from port quarter hitting cabin, port main plane and port inner engine. Eventually evaded fighter. AIR 14/3227 Raid plots – night January 1945

2327

1

49 25N 09 00E

4

19500

Aircraft reported falling in flames Location close to the crash site of Lancaster PB638

Page 69 of 108

Time

Incident Number

Location

Aircraft

Group

Height

Comments One Me.110 seen attacking a Lancaster aircraft that was taking evasive action air to air fire seen. Port wing of Lancaster blew up. Aircraft seen to go down in flames and explode on hitting the ground. AIR 14/3227 Air raids – night January 1945.

2

49 17N 08 55E

Halifax 429/AL-A NR196

6

18000

What appears to be a similar incident (same time, location and height) is reported as follows in 429 Squadron ORB. A Me.110 was seen attacking a Lancaster aircraft on the outward journey at 4917N 0855E at 2328 hours, 1800 feet.. Air to air fire was seen but no results. AIR 27/1854 429 Sq. ORB Records January 1945

Location close to the crash site of Lancaster PB638 Luftwaffe Claim No. 1 Oberfeldwebel Ludwig Schmidt of II./NJG 6 claimed a th Lancaster as his 8 victory. Probably flying in a Ju.88G.

Luftwaffe II./NJG 6

See the section on ‘Luftwaffe Methodology for Claiming Aerial Victories’. Although the location of this claim is unknown it is possible it could have been 426/Q or 153/O

2328

49 22N 08 57E

Halifax 426/OW-Q NP768

6

Lancaster 153/P4-O PB638

1

18000

3

49 15N 09 10E

1

20000

4

49 17N 09 02E

1

18000

4

20000

8

18000

2331

5 6

49 02N 09 12E 48 40N 09 10E Halifax 425/KW-F NR231

2332

6

Bomber Command Loss - 426 Squadron Halifax NP768 OW-Q Pilot W/C F.C. Carling-Kelly RCAF stated: ‘The aircraft was shot up in the air at 2328 hours on 28th January, 1945, six minutes from the target’. The Halifax crashed near the Mingolsheim railway station circa 23.28 - 23.35 hours The aircraft crashed in Planquadrat (Luftwaffe Grid Square) ‘US 1’. Bomber Command Loss - 153 Squadron Lancaster PB638 P4-O Lancaster PB638 crashed into a forest 1/2 km NNE of Michelbach. There were no survivors, the cause of loss is unknown but a night fighter attack is the most likely cause, but this is conjecture and not based on evidence. The aircraft crashed in Planquadrat ‘TS 3’. This is an estimate of the time Lancaster 153/O was shot down. Aircraft five miles starboard hit by heavy flak crashed on ground Location close to the crash site of Lancaster PB638 Half mile east twin engine aircraft seen firing on Lancaster which caught fire. Twin engine aircraft made second attack on Lancaster which spiralled down through cloud no return fire observed from Lancaster during either attack. Location close to the crash site of Lancaster PB638 Aircraft hit by flak 5 miles starboard seen in flames to hit ground Air to air tracer seen and aircraft seen to catch fire and disappear into cloud Enemy Flak Damage No. 1 Hit by heavy flak in T/A at 19000 feet, 2332 hours, 155 mph causing hole in Perspex in nose and also bomb doors. AIR 27/1839/2 420 Squadron ORB Records January 1945

Stuttgart

Halifax 432/QO-R NP694

6

18000

Enemy Fighter Combat No. 2 Pilot saw a Ju.88 on starboard, fighter dropped back to the port beam and Mid Upper Gunner fired at point blank range. Tracer hit the fighter, which dived out of view and disappeared. The fighter is claimed as damaged. AIR 27/1861 432 Sq. ORB Appendices

Page 70 of 108

Time

Incident Number

Location

West of Stuttgart

2332

Aircraft

Bf110 2Z+IH

Group

Height

Comments Luftwaffe Claim No. 2 Feldwebel (Sergeant) Gunther Bahr 1. NJG 6 Abschussmeldungen (Air Combat Reports), Handwritten index, states: 23.32h, 4-Mot, (grid square) 'AT' 262nd Abschuss (aerial victory) for NJG 6 (Nachtjagdgeschwader - night fighter wing 6), 24th victory for Ofw. Bahr 2. The handwritten Kriegstagebuch (war diary) of Stab (Staff/HQ) NJG 6 records the same victory claim as: 2330 Uhr (hour), 1 Lancaster, 5600 m über [over] Stuttgart durch (by) Ofw. Bahr der 1./6. 3. Feldwebel Günther Bahr recorded the same victory claims in his Flugbuch [flying logbook] as: 23.32h, Avro Lancaster, W. Obj. (west of target) The numbering of the claims is as recorded on the individual combat reports and the Geschwader (Squadron) tally wasn't necessarily in correct date and time order (as can be seen).

Luftwaffe 1./NJG 6

See section on ‘Luftwaffe Grid Reference System’ which explains the Luftwaffe system against the grid reference system used by the RAF. Although Gunther Bahr claimed four victories on the night it is unlikely that he shot down PB638. Taking off at 2305 hours from Groß-Sachsenheim airfield approximately 50km south of the crash site this first claim from Bahr at 2332 hours was in Planquadrat ’AT’, 153/O crashed in Planquadrat ‘TS’ which is at least 38km away. Bahr’s second claim at 2339 was west south west of target, which again must have been at least 38km away.

2334

7

Stuttgart

6

18500

8

Zuffenhaus en area

4

19000

9

49 20N 08 40E

4

2000

Stuttgart

Halifax 51/TB-R NP963 Lancaster 156/GT-T

8

18000

Unidentified aircraft dived through cloud in flames and exploded on ground Combat between four engine aircraft and two twin engine fighters sighted to port bow up (Heading 177(T)) Two short bursts of tracer fired from dead astern. No fighter seen below. No return fire Enemy Fighter Combat No. 3 Me.410 came in from port quarter opening fire and Captain dived to port. Tracer passed overhead and fighter vanished to starboard quarter. AIR 14/3227 Raid plots – night January 1945

2335 49 11N 08 57E

Halifax 415/6U-C MZ922

6

20000

Rear Gunner saw one Fw.109 approaching from starboard quarter below in a curve up pursuit attack at range of 800 yards. Gunner gave combat manoeuvre corkscrew starboard. The Fw.190 broke off attack at 200 yards going starboard without firing. Rear Gunner did not fire. No claims. AIR 27/1814 415 Sq ORB Appendices

10

Zuffenhaus en area

49 00N 09 10E 2336

Lancaster 576/UL-Y2 NG273

4

19000

1

20000

Ju.88 sighted crossing from starboard 500 yards away Enemy Fighter Combat No. 4 Twin jet fighter aircraft seen by the Rear Gunner astern, he ordered corkscrew port and opened fire. Enemy aircraft closed in and scored hits on the tailplane, flaps and wireless equipment. No hits and no claim made. AIR 27/2048 576 Sq. ORB Appendices

2336

11

Stuttgart

12

Target area

Lancaster 576/UL-I2 LM227 Halifax 429/AL-T LV860

1

18000

6

18000

Lancaster on fire fell to ground exploded From 156 Squadron ORB it is assumed that this is the incident that was witnessed by 156/I2 Enemy aircraft seen astern in the target area, at 2336 hours 18000 feet, but no action taken. AIR 27/1854/1 429 Sq. ORB Records January 1945

Page 71 of 108

Time

Incident Number

Location

48 49N 09 10E

Aircraft

Halifax 415/6U-M

Group

6

Height

19000

Comments Enemy Flak Damage No. 2 Arrived over target at 2332. Sky marking flares red with yellow stars seen behind so a complete starboard orbit executed and another run up made. Whilst making this run up at approximately 2336 hours, 19000 feet, 4849N 0910E hit by heavy Flak causing large fire in rear end of fuselage. Bombs released at 23337 hours. It appeared that the crew would have to abandon aircraft so captain ordered crew to put on parachutes. As fire was not spreading very rapidly attempts were made to extinguish it and after one hour and five minutes it was put out. Aircraft landed at Dunsfold. AIR 27/1813/16 415 Sq ORB Records January 1945

48040N 09 05E

Halifax 415/6U-V NR172

6

15000

Enemy Fighter Combat No. 5 ME-210 seen dead astern firing at another aircraft. Enemy then attacked our bomber. Rear Gunner gave Corkscrew Port, opened fire and saw strikes entering cockpit and engine, fighter was seen going down in a spin with smoke pouring from the engines. Rear Gunner claimed fighter destroyed. AIR 27/1814 415 Sq ORB Appendices

13 14 2337

49 00N 09 10E 48 40N 09 00E

Stuttgart

Lancaster 156/YG-E

4

19000

8

18000

8

18000

Small aircraft 15 miles ahead seen to catch fire. Continue flying then go down into a spin Exchange of tracer four engine aircraft fell on fire and exploded on the ground Enemy Fighter Combat No. 6 Ju.88 heading 1767 degrees on starboard quarter above - range 6000 yards opened fire enemy aircraft lost through Corkscrew. AIR 14/3227 Raid plots – night January 1945

15

Stuttgart

49 00N 09 18E 2338

100

Lancaster 153/P4-E LM754

1

20000

20000

Believed aircraft seen falling on fire and explosion seen below cloud. Cause not known Enemy Fighter Combat No. 7 Rear Gunner observed an Fw.190 attacking from the port quarter. He immediately opened fire. When corkscrewing to port the enemy aircraft opened fire and pressed home the attack before being lost from view. No claim. Slight damage to Lancaster AIR 27/1031 153 Sq. ORB Appendices

48 40N 09 10E

Lancaster 170/TC-C LM732

1

18000

Enemy Fighter Combat No. 8 Attacked three times by a Ju.88, both gunners fired at the enemy aircraft which did not open fire. When last seen item was emitting smoke from the starboard engine. Claim for damages. AIR 27/1097/1 170 Sq. ORB Summary

Stuttgart

Halifax 426/OW-L NP685 Halifax 429/AL-N MZ482

2339

16

Zuffenhaus en area

WSW of Stuttgart

2340

17

Zuffenhaus en area

6

AIR 14/3227 Raid plots – night January 1945

6

18000

Enemy Flak Damage No. 3 Aircraft sustained small flak hole in the nose Perspex at 2339 over the target. AIR 27/1854/1 429 Sq. ORB Records January 1945

4

Bf110 2Z+IH

20000

Enemy Fighter Combat No. 9 ME.410 400 yards dead astern. Rear Gunner fired short burst. Enemy aircraft disappeared. No claim

18500

Luftwaffe 1./NJG 6

4

19000

ME.109 passed 2000 feet below Luftwaffe Claim No. 3 Feldwebel Gunther Bahr 1. 4-Mot, NW Objekt (north-west of the target). 261st Abschuss for NJG 6, 25th victory for Ofw. Bahr. 2. 2337 Uhr, vermutl. (presumably) Boeing, 5500, über Stuttgart durch Ofw. Bahr der I./6. 3. 23.39h, Avro Lancaster, WSW Obj. (west-southwest of target). Twin engine jet fighter sighted

Page 72 of 108

Time

Incident Number

Location

18

48 50N 08 30E

19

Stuttgart

20

Group

Height

100

21000

100

21000

48 40N 09 10E

8

18000

21

Stuttgart area

1

19000

22

49 00N 08 00E

6

18000

23

Stuttgart

6

20000

24

Zuffenhaus en

4

20000

25

48 40N 09 00E

6

16000

2340

2342

2343

Aircraft

Halifax 192/DT-R NR272

Halifax 429/AL-J PN367

Comments Fw.109 seen at 21000 feet which passed close without action Twin jet engine aircraft seen 4000 to 5000 feet below

Aircraft seen to catch fire after canon strikes from air to air tracer go down and explode on ground Lancaster over Zuffenhausen in combat with ME.410. Lancaster went into spin and disappeared through cloud followed by explosion on ground Four engine aircraft in tight spin leveled at about 4000 feet burst into flames exploded on ground Unidentified aircraft in flames about a mile astern seen to disappear in cloud Aircraft astern hit by flak seen falling with port engines on fire At 4840N 0900Eat 2343 hours, 16000 feet, a large aircraft was seen heading towards the target about 12 miles to starboard and 10 miles from the target. It suddenly burst into flames, spiralled down and shortly after it disappeared into the clouds an explosion was seen on the ground. AIR 27/1854/1 429 Sq. ORB Records January 1945

48 45N 08 11E

Lancaster 460/UV-R PB227

1

19000

2344

Enemy Fighter Combat No. 10 Tracer was fired at the bomber; Mid Upper Gunner sighted Ju.88 port quarter, returned fire with the Rear Gunner who ordered corkscrew port. Rear Gunner fired until the fighter disappeared from view, losing height rapidly in practically vertical dive. The Rear claim of possible damage. AIR 27/1911 460 Sq. ORB Appendices

2345

2346

26

48 45N 09 10E

4

20000

27

48 35N 08 30E

8

18000

28

Stuttgart

6

20000

29

48 40N 09 00E

4

19000

30

Zuffenhaus en area

4

19000

31

Stuttgart

8

18000

8

18000

48 35N 08 30E

Lancaster 405/LQ-M ND437

Heading 321 four engine aircraft with port inner engine on fire made a turn on to reciprocal course fell and exploded on ground believed fighter action Single engine aircraft going down in a steep spin giving off long trail of smoke disappeared in cloud Aircraft 15 miles ahead burst into flames continued straight and level for two minutes then dived down into cloud Halifax seen shot down to the west after combat. Two parachutes seen Aircraft seen falling in flames and explode on the ground Enemy Fighter Combat No. 11 ME.410 made feint attack from port beam and continued to starboard beam in a masked position. Mid Upper fired short and long burst observed hits in fuselage. Enemy aircraft went out to port and disappeared. AIR 14/3227 Raid plots – night January 1945

2346 North of Ludwigsbu rg

2348

Air to air tracer seen followed by single engine aircraft falling in flames seen to crash

48 30N 08 25E

Bf110 2Z+IH

Luftwaffe 1./NJG 6

Lancaster 156/GT-E

8

18000

Luftwaffe Claim No. 4 Feldwebel Gunther Bahr 1. 4-Mot, 'AT 5'. 260th Abschuss for NJG 6, 26th victory for Ofw. Bahr. 2. 2346 Uhr, 1 vermutl. Boeing, 5400, N Stuttgart durch Ofw. Bahr der I./6. 3. 23.46h, Avro Lancaster, über Obj. (over target) Enemy Fighter Combat No. 12 Me.410 on starboard quarter opened fire evasive action taken by Corkscrewing. Enemy aircraft came in twice again on starboard and then on port then starboard again and finally on port quarter. Rear Gunner and Mid Upper Gunner fired. Fighter eventually made off, strikes seen by gunners. AIR 14/3227 Raid plots – night January 1945 Page 73 of 108

Time

Incident Number

2349

32 33

34 2352

Location

Aircraft

48 30N 08 10E 48 45N 08 00E

48 45N 07 50E

Group

Height

8

18000

1

19000

6

18000

Comments Exchange of fire seen aircraft caught fire and exploded when it hit the ground Aircraft hit heavy flak dived steeply into cloud followed by explosion Saw tracer fire from and unidentified four engine aircraft 10 miles to starboard being fired at by an unidentified aircraft presumed to be a fighter silver in colour. No return fire was seen but one of the aircraft seem to burst into flames and disappeared through cloud and explosion occurred in this area a short while after AIR 14/3227 Raid plots – night January 1945

35

36

49 00N 08 40E

48 35N 08 20E

Mosquito 157/RS-R TA397 Lancaster 576/UL-F2 PB403

100

15000

AIR 14/3227 Raid plots – night January 1945

1

19500

2353

Berneck

37

48 45N 08 03E

38

48 48N 09 00E

2354

4

17000

Luftwaffe Claim No. 5 Hauptmann Gerhard Friedrich of Stab I./NJG 6 st claimed a Lancaster as his 21 victory. It is thought that aircraft could be 300 Squadron Lancaster PB846 (K) Bomber Command Loss - 300 Squadron Lancaster PB846 (K) Crashed at Berneck (on the SE side of the Schwarzwald), about 2 km N from the small town of Altensteig. It is thought that they were probably shot down by the Luftwaffe ace Hptm. Gerhard Friedrich at 2335 hours. Note: Wildbad and Berneck are approximately 11 miles apart Air to air tracer between two aircraft 5 miles astern followed by lower aircraft falling in flames

6

19000

While on the homeward journey cannon and tracer fire were seen but no results were observed

Luftwaffe Stab I./NJG6

Lancaster 300/ZN-K PB846

Halifax 429/AL-W NA201

Lancaster engaged by single engine enemy aircraft. Lancaster port engine on fire exploded dived and hit ground. Strikes on enemy aircraft observed also its starboard wing on fire AIR 27/2047/28 576 Squadron ORB Records. It is assumed that this incident was witnessed by 576/UL-F2

2353 South of Wildbad

Saw air to air firing followed by what appeared to be an aircraft on fire diving towards ground no explosion was seen as ground was obscured by cloud

1

AIR 27/1854/1 429 Sq. ORB Records January 1945

2400

East part of Mannheim

Bf110 2Z+IH

Luftwaffe 1./NJG6

0010

49 03N 07 11E

Halifax 429/AL-Z MZ872

6

0012

39

48 52N 06 05E

0012

40

Biblis

18000

Luftwaffe Claim No. 6 Feldwebel Gunther Bahr 1. 4-Mot, 'UQ - UR'. 259th Abschuss for NJG 6, 27th victory for Ofw. Bahr. 2. 0000 Uhr, 1 vermutl. Liberator, 5400, NW Karlsruhe, Wahrscheinl Abschuss (Wahrscheinliche Abschuss = probable aerial victory) durch Ofw. Bahr. 3. 24.00h, Avro Lancaster, SO Hagen UQ bis UR (south-east of Hagen in grid squares UQ to UR). Enemy Fighter Combat No. 13 While on the homeward journey on 29-1-1945 in Halifax Z at 4902N 0711E, 18000 feet at 0100 hours an Me.109 was seen on starboard quarter, Mid Upper Gunner gave the order to corkscrew starboard. Both gunners opened fire, enemy aircraft broke away and was lost to sight. Strikes were seen on its wings but no claim is made. AIR 27/1855 429 Squadron ORB Appendices

8 Mosquito 85/NO-Q

100

18000

What appeared to be aircraft exploding on ground followed by orange/red fire Enemy Fighter Combat No. 14 Single engine aircraft on ground believed to be Fw.190 strikes observed. Claimed one single engine aircraft damaged

Page 74 of 108

3. UNITIMED EVENTS 3.1. DESCRIPTION Below are reports fro RAF bomber crews and the internet of event that occurred on the evening of th th 28 /29 January 1945 with no recorded times. Even though there are no times detailed it is possible to link some of the reports to some of the timed events above. Time

Incident Number

Location

Aircraft

Group

Unknown

Halifax 408/EQ-E NP746

6

Busnau

Lancaster 460/UV-S ND970

1

Height

Comments Bomber Command Loss -408 Squadron Halifax NP746 EQ-E Crash location unknown. McGovern, the only survivor, later reported that an enemy fighter, possibly an Fw.190, attacked three times Bomber Command Loss – 460 Squadron Lancaster ND970 UV-S Believed to have crashed at Busnau, a suburb south west of Stuttgart. In a statement Flight Sergeant Benbow reported that ‘The aircraft was attacked by Ju.88 fighters near Stuttgart’. Note Busnau is 3km from Vaihingen.

Vaihingen

Lancaster 156/GT-A PB186

8

Deufringen

Lancaster 405/LQ-U PB650

6

Gueltingen

Halifax 408/EQ-K NP743

6

Halifax 51/TB-T MZ754

4

Bomber Command Loss – 156 Squadron Lancaster PB186 GT-A Believed to have crashed at Vaihingen in the south west suburbs of Stuttgart, possibly between 2332 and 2346 hours. Cause of crash unknown, probably a night fighter Bomber Command Loss – 405 Squadron Lancaster PB650 LQ-U Believed to have crashed at Deufringen, 2km west of Aidlingen. Rear Gunner, sighted two Ju.88s one on each side of the Lancaster, following attack Lancaster fatally stricken Bomber Command Loss - 408 Squadron Halifax NP743 EQ-K Believed to have crashed near the village of Gueltingen. It is possible the aircraft was hit by a night fighter. The aircraft was attacked three times by an Me.109. The Rear Gunner (Sgt R O Fenner, No. 3000547) was killed by what is believed to have been cannon fire and the Navigator was slightly wounded by flak. AIR 27/494/2 51 Squadron ORB Records Jan 1945

Halifax 424/QB-T MZ356

578 Squadron

1

4

Saw two aircraft shot down near the target, no parachutes seen. AIR 27/1835/24 424 Squadron ORB Records January 1945

1. A Ju.88 and Me.109 were seen in T/A (twin attack). 2. Combat was also seen between two unidentified aircraft. 3. One Halifax was seen to go down in the Target area. AIR 27/2050/25 578 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945

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Time

Incident Number

Location

Aircraft

Group

Height

Comments Flak Battery Vaihingen, (situated just south of the Weilimdorf decoy fire site) A newly promoted Flak Leutnant thought with bombs falling all around his position that the raid was directed against the Flak positions. He ignored regulations about conservation of ammunition and shot his entire stock at the radar echoes of the attacking bombers. Two Lancasters and a Halifax crashed in the immediate vicinity, much to the relief of the officer, who had feared a court martial because of his prodigious use of ammunition. Bomber Command War Diaries: An Operational Reference Book 1939-1945 Martin Middlebrook, Chris Everitt

48 44N 09 06E

The location of the Flak battery on the map is an estimate based on research reported on the website identified below. It has been identified in an area between Ernst-Barlach-Weg up to the B14 in south west Stuttgart. fgut.wordpress.com/bauwerke/wk2/militarischeanlagen2/baden-wurttemberg/flakbatterie-s-vaihingen/

It is believed that Lancaster 156/A crashed at Vaihingen and Lancaster 460/S crashed 3km northwest of Vaihingen at Busnau. The crash site of Halifax 408/E is unknown. It is possible that these three aircraft could be the aircraft referred to in the above report.

4. BOMBER COMMAND LOSSES/COMBATS KORNWESTHEIM, STUTTGART TH

4.1. THIS WAS THE FIRST ATTACK ON STUTTGART ON THE EVENING OF 28 /29 1945

TH

JANUARY

The target was believed to be the important railway yards at Kornwestheim, north of the city. A total of 226 aircraft were detailed for the attack which was set for 2030 hours 4.2. LOSSES No. 428 Squadron Lancaster KB770 (D), believed to have crashed 5 miles south of the target, Stuttgart The aircraft was hit by a night fighter. Despite the fact that the air-speed indicator went u/s after take-off the bomber, thanks to excellent work by Kay (pilot) and Stapleford (navigator), reached the target on time and dropped its bombs. Then it was hit by a hail of shells, possibly from a nightfighter fitted with Schrage Musik guns. Survivor F/O Stapleford stated that the aircraft seemed to be struck by hundreds of large shells and the four motors (sic engines?) caught fire immediately and the aircraft went down quickly, F/O Stapleford, with injuries in the hip, leg, knee and hands managed to get his head out of a window (which had been smashed by the cannon shells) and he was sucked out bodily by the slipstream along with F/Sgt Ossington. Both descended by parachute and were taken Prisoners of War. Stapleford and Ossington had both been wounded in the attack on the bomber. Stapleford’s wounds did not spare him a beating at the hands of SS troopers and he was in hospital until released by the Allied victory. Schrage Musik was the German term for upward-firing autocannon that the Luftwaffe mounted in night fighter aircraft during World War II. rcafassociation.ca/heritage/history/fallen-aviators/rcaf-casualties-second-world-war/kaechele-to-korbyl/

No. C888 1895420 J40040 J35935 J95345

Name S/Ldr H L. Kay RCAF Sgt R W. Gullick RAF F/O R. Stapleford RCAF F/O G J. Liney RCAF F/O J W. Blades RCAF P/O F. L Jolicoeur RCAF F/Sgt E. Ossington RCAF

Age 32 31

Buried/Survived Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany (POW) Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany (POW) Page 76 of 108

No. 105 Squadron Mosquito ML923. crash location UNKNOWN. Cause of crash UNKNOWN It was from the first attack that F/Lt MacHardy and F/O Duncan did not return, in the never to be forgotten ‘Z Zebra’. F/Lt Mac Hardy had almost finished his tour and had naturally made many friends on the Station. He was acting as reserve the night he went missing and that makes it more difficult to assess what time things went wrong. AIR 27/828/1 105 Sq ORB Summary January 1945

No. 138688 157337

Name F/Lt G L S McHardy DFC F/Lt G R P Duncan

Age 23 31

Buried/Survived Choloy War Cemetery, France Choloy War Cemetery, France

4.3. COMBATS No. 406 Squadron Mosquito MM745 on High Level Intruder to 4950N 0830E Arrived on target at 1925 hours; patrolling at angels 15. At 2005 hours a contact was made 80 degrees to port and 45 degrees above, which was chased south in a steady climb at full throttle then on 280 degrees closing to 3000 yards. A second contact head on was then obtained but ignored. At 1500 feet a silhouette was obtained and range was closed to 200 feet to identify a Ju.188 (medium bomber) which was interrogated and challenged without response. Dropping back to 200 yards two bursts were fired, causing a large explosion in port engine and fuselage. Enemy aircraft after a port turn, turned on its back and spun down, being seen to hit the ground and explode in position 4834N 0633E. Verified by Sneezy 44 of 151 Squadron. AIR 27/1791/84 406 Sq ORB Records January 1945

5. BOMBER COMMAND LOSSES ZUFFENHAUSEN, STUTTGART 5.1. THIS WAS THE SECOND ATTACK ON STUTTGART ON THE EVENING OF 28TH/29TH JANUARY 1945 The target was believed to be the Hirth Aero Factory in Zuffenhausen which was engaged in making jet aero engines for Heinkel who were the factory owners. (Heinkel used Hirth for development of jet propulsions and subsequent engines were known as Heinkel-Hirth engines). The Bosch ignition plant may also have been a target. A total of 376 aircraft were detailed for the attack which was set for 2330 hours. 5.2. LOSSES UNITED KINGDOM No. 424 Squadron Halifax LW164 (S), accident on take-off. During the evening of 28th January 1945 the aircraft was in the process of taking off from Skipton on Swale airfield to undertake the operational flight to bomb Stuttgart. The runways were clear but the grass around the airfield was covered in snow and there was a shallow bank of snow on the edges of the runways where the snow had been pushed to. As the aircraft picked up speed on the runway in use at 1921hours it entered a swing to the right and then briefly left the ground, almost immediately it then sank back to the ground onto its starboard wing first and exploded. All five airmen at the front of the aircraft and also the mid-upper gunner were killed instantly while the rear gunner was found seriously injured. It was found that the aircraft had probably swung around on hitting the ground and part of the fuselage had crushed into the nose of one of the 2000lb bombs and detonated it in the bomb bay, as the aircraft was probably in the process of swinging around this had flung off the rear of the aircraft away from the blast saving the rear gunner's life. Sgt Tongue, P/O Nicolls, P/O Chatfield and P/O Doyle were involved in an aircraft accident on 15th October 1944, near Stillington. They took-off in 415 Squadron aircraft Halifax NA582 on an operational flight to bomb Duisburg (1005 aircraft). On the homeward leg the Mid Upper and Rear Gunner opened fire on an enemy aircraft but no hits were seen. On their approach to East Moor airfield the aircraft crashed on rising ground two miles north east of Stillington while flying in thick fog, there were no injuries. Tongue, Nicolls, Chatfield and Doyle were transferred to 424 Squadron in December 1944. The remaining four airmen on board when it crashed are all believed to have survived the War

No. C/988 2221300 J/94159

Name W/Cdr E M. Williams RCAF Sgt L. Tongue RAF P/O R. Nicolls RCAF

Age 31 26 28

Buried/Survived Harrogate (Stonefall) Cemetery, England Harrogate (Stonefall) Cemetery, England Harrogate (Stonefall) Cemetery, England Page 77 of 108

J/94103 J/94756 J/18971 J/18476

P/O R. Chatfield RCAF P/O G J. Doyle RCAF F/O W. Fleming RCAF F/O J. Tremblay RCAF

32 23 30

Newport Cemetery, Rhode Island, USA Harrogate (Stonefall) Cemetery, England Harrogate (Stonefall) Cemetery, England (Seriously Injured)

5.3. LOSSES OVER GERMANY No. 460 Squadron Lancaster ND970 (S), believed to have crashed at Busnau, a suburb south west of Stuttgart The aircraft was hit by a night fighter. In a statement Flight Sergeant Benbow reported that ‘The aircraft was attacked by Ju.88 fighters near Stuttgart. The aircraft was damaged. The order to put on chutes and abandon was given and acknowledged. The port wing was burning, and the port engine and aileron was u/s. The aircraft was more or less under a controlled dive. I landed in a forest near Stuttgart. It was freezing and I received frostbite. I walked/crawled to a village and gave myself up. Truman, Field and Symes were POWs. The Germans said that O’Hara and Wilson were killed and that the body of Birt was near the wreck’. ww2talk.com/index.php?threads/in-memoriam-those-air-force-pilots-crews-who-died-on-this-day-in-ww2.18267/page-24

No. A/427892 1894823 A/418318 A/410394 A/437488 A/433473 A/433749

Name F/O Birt P N Sgt Field A Flt Sgt Truman E G Flt Sgt Symes R S Flt Sgt Benbow D R Flt Sgt O'Hara D G Flt Sgt Wilson S G

Age 20

20 20

Buried/Survived Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany (POW) (POW) (POW) (POW) Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany

No. 405 Squadron Lancaster PB650 (U), believed to have crashed at Deufringen, 2km west of Aidlingen. The aircraft was hit by a night fighter. Aircraft took off from RAF Gransden Lodge at 2035 hrs and is. Whilst on the bombing run F/Sgt D. A. MacDougall, Rear Gunner, sighted two Ju.88s one on each side of the Lancaster. They tagged along for a time until one dropped back and opened fire. The midupper gunner replied and, according to MacDougall’s report, shot the Jerry down with one engine ablaze. But the Lancaster was also on fire and fatally stricken. Only MacDougall was able to escape; the remainder of the crew were lost. The RCAF Overseas, Volume 3: The Sixth Year, pp 118. Oxford University Press 1949, Toronto

No. J/29601 1057952 R/193951 J/38394 J/95487

Name F/O F H Cummer RCAF Sgt W McCabrey F/Sgt E R Savage RCAF F/O W B Turner RCAF F/Sgt G A Smith RCAF F/Sgt J MacCrae RCAF F/Sgt D A MacDougall RCAF

Age

24

Buried/Survived Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany (KIA) (POW)

No. 426 Squadron Halifax NP768 (Q), fighter, the Halifax crashed near the Mingolsheim railway station circa 23.28 23.35 hours. The aircraft was hit by a night fighter. Pilot W/Cdr F.C. Carling-Kelly RCAF stated, ‘The aircraft was shot up in the air at 2328 hours on 28th January, 1945, six minutes from the target’. Both gunners sighted the enemy aircraft as it attacked from the starboard quarter, and directed evasive action. The enemy aircraft opened fire killing the rear gunner F/O P. Hyde, shattering the pilot’s panel and bomb-aimer’s Perspex, wounding the pilot, the flight engineer and bomb-aimer, and starting fires in the tail and port wing. The controls also appeared to have been damaged as the bomber dived and could not be pulled out. In addition to Hyde, F/O A. L. Evans and FS S. G. Rundle were lost, but the others were able to bail out over the Black Forest. Sgt J. A. Bromley (RAF) walked for three days before the military apprehended him near Karlsruhe. Carling-Kelly and F/O H. J. Dales and F/O D. J. Bird also were captured. Dales, Bird, Hyde and Evans were all on their second tour. The RCAF Overseas, Volume 3: The Sixth Year, pp 117. Oxford University Press 1949, Toronto

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No. C/172 R/216010 J19865 J/18275 2221660 J/58788 J/19131

Name W/Cdr F. Carling-Kelly RCAF P/O S. Rundle RCAF F/O H. Dales RCAF F/O D. Bird RCAF Sgt J. Bromley RAF F/O A L Evans RCAF F/O P. Hyde RCAF

Age 21

24 23

Buried/Survived (POW) Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany (POW) (POW) (POW) Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany

No. 408 Squadron Halifax NP746 (E), crash location UNKNOWN. The aircraft was hit by a night fighter. McGovern, the only survivor, later reported that an enemy fighter, possibly an Fw.190, attacked three times and caused the heavy bomber to climb steeply, apparently out of control. McGovern was hurled backward and stunned. When he came to he was falling through the air. All that night and the next day he lay in the snow before being discovered. The RCAF Overseas, Volume 3: The Sixth Year, pp 118. Oxford University Press 1949, Toronto

No. Name J28593 F/O R M. Wallis RCAF C95228 P/O L J. Collinson RCAF J40372 F/O T. B Little RCAF F/O H. McGovern RCAF 432398 P/O P. Myerson RAAF J93944 P/O T P. Quinn RCAF J93945 P/O R L. Siewart RCAF

Age 20 33 20 20

Buried/Survived Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany (POW) Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany

No. 300 Squadron Lancaster PB846 (K), believed to have crashed at Berneck (on the south east side of the Schwarzwald), about 2 km north from the small town of Altensteig. The aircraft was hit by a night fighter. The aircraft took off from RAF Faldingworth at 1958 hours. It is thought that they were probably shot down by the Luftwaffe ace Hptm. Gerhard Friedrich of Stab I./NJG6 at 2335 hours. Those who died are buried in Durnbach War Cemetery. Flt Lt Zarebski, Polish Air Force (PAF) had made his way to England via Romania and France, going on to fly fighters 308, 303 and 306 Squadrons before converting to twins and a spell at 18 OTU. Ironically, his transfer to Bomber Command was for health reasons! He was born 11 May 1914. No. P/0845 782414 P/2377 P/1779 705689 P/706584 706090

Name Flt Lt Z E Zarebski PAF Flt Sgt J N Gerwatowski PAF P/O R A Paszkowski PAF P/O Z Wesolowski Sgt P Barzdo PAF Sgt K Cymbala PAF Sgt R Mankowski

Age 30 30

25

Buried/Survived Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany (POW) Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany (POW) (POW) Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany (POW)

No. 408 Squadron Halifax NP743 (K), believed to have crashed near the village of Gueltingen. It is possible the aircraft was hit by a night fighter. No. C/89128 1594677 J/35708 J/29718 J/89791 J/95274 J/95275

Name F/O C L. Johnson RCAF Sgt T H. Chandler RAF F/O N G. Baily RCAF F/O J A. O’Brien RCAF P/O J C. Mortley RCAF P/O F. Henry RCAF P/O B E. House RCAF

Age 23 19 31 29 20

Buried/Survived Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany th

F/O C L Johnson was involved in a training accident in the Lake District on 17 October 1944. Posted to th 408 Squadron on 4 October he was flying Halifax NP745 on a cross country exercise the aircraft began to suffer the effects of icing over its control surfaces. Unable to control the aircraft the pilot ordered the crew to bail out. All crew successfully baled out before the aircraft crashed between Penruddock and Page 79 of 108

Motherby. Although all the crew initially survived then accident the Navigator F/O J E Freeman J39402 later died in hospital. In addition to Johnson (4 Ops), P/O Chandler (1 Op), P/O Mortley (No Ops), P/O Henry (3 Ops) and P/O House (2 Ops) were also involved in the accident. http://www.yorkshire-aircraft.co.uk/aircraft/lakes/np745.html

No. 156 Squadron Lancaster PB186 (A), believed to have crashed at Vaihingen in the south west suburbs of Stuttgart, possibly between 2332 and 2346 hours. Cause of crash unknown, probably a night fighter. The aircraft took off from RAF Upwood at 2020 hours. All are buried in the local Friedhoff, since when their bodies have been removed to Durnbach War Cemetery. F/LT Freeman and P/O Kaviza were just beginning their second tours. No. J/85875 2202497 J/28953 151844 1802925 1604157 J/95377

Name Flt/Lt J H Freeman RCAF Sgt R Breaks F/O D Watson RCAF F/O N P Hibbert DFC Flt Sgt J G Shaw Flt Sgt J R Wood Flt Sgt J F Kaviza RCAF

Age 26 19 21 21 20

Buried/Survived Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany

No. 153 Squadron Lancaster PB638 (O), crashed at Michelbach, near Mosbach. Cause of crash unknown, probably a night fighter. Aircraft took off from RAF Scampton at 1925 hrs. All are buried in Durnbach War Cemetery. The London Gazette, issued 11 December 1945, carried news of Sgt Jenkinson's award. No. 176235 1826262 1603839 1549302 1567899 1684124 989177

Name F/O O M C Jones DFC Sgt P R Jenkinson DFM Flt Sgt J F Dormer Flt Sgt E W Fletcher Flt Sgt J W Milburn Flt Sgt J Coles Flt Sgt H Ferguson

Age 32 23 29 21 22 22 23

Buried/Survived Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany Durnbach War Cemetery, Germany

6. BOMBER COMMAND COMBATS ZUFFENHAUSEN, STUTTGART 6.1.

COMBATS No. 103 Squadron (Combat No. 1) Lancaster RA500 (PM-N) Observed Halifax 500 yards starboard beam with a Me.410 dead astern closing in to attack, it appeared quite unaware of its position took no evasive action and made no reply to a long burst from the Me.410 which apparently entered its wing. Our Rear Gunner opened fire followed by the Mid Upper Gunner, hits were observed in the mainplane of the Me.410. The Halifax turned to port with the Me.410 still following and passed under aircraft. AIR 14/3227 Raid plots – night January 1945

Almost immediately a Ju.88 was on the starboard quarter opening fire at 600 yards and both gunners fired. The Ju.88 broke away port quarter down and then was in again from port quarter opening fire at 600 yards scoring hits on the cabin, the port main plane and the port inner engine. Two more approaches were made by the Ju.88 but it was eventually evaded and the turn made on to the last leg down to the target. AIR 14/3227 Raid plots – night January 1945

No. 432 Squadron (Combat No. 2) Halifax NP694 (QO-R) On the bombing run about two minutes before dropping the bombs the Pilot saw a Ju.88 on starboard bow above. The fighter passed over and ahead of the bomber, dropped back to the port beam where the Mid Upper Gunner fired a burst of 200 rounds at point blank range100 yards. The

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tracer was seen by the Mid Upper Gunner and the Engineer to hit the fighter, which immediately dived out of view to port quarter down and was not seen again. The fighter is claimed as damaged. AIR 27/1861 432 Sq. ORB Appendices

No.156 Squadron (Combat No. 3) Lancaster (GT-T) ME.410 came in from port quarter slightly above. Opened fire from 4/500 yards gave burst and Captain dived aircraft to port. Enemy tracer passed overhead then vanished after passing to starboard quarter. AIR 14/3227 Raid plots – night January 1945

No. 576 Squadron (Combat No. 4) Lancaster NG273 (UL-Y2) The enemy aircraft was first seen by the Rear Gunner astern level at 500 feet and appeared to be a twin jet fighter aircraft. The Rear Gunner ordered corkscrew port and opened fire and as the enemy aircraft closed in it opened fire at 300 feet scoring hits on the tailplane, flaps and wireless equipment, breaking away on the starboard beam up. No hits were seen and no claim is made. AIR 27/2048 576 Sq. ORB Appendices

No. 415 Squadron (Combat No. 5) Halifax NR172 (6U-V) Aircraft attacked by ME-210 twin-engined fighter. The Rear Gunner F/O W. F. Griffiths, who received the DFC for the night’s work, coolly withheld his fire while he directed his captain in the necessary avoiding action. Enemy aircraft seen at 1000 yards dead astern firing at another aircraft. Enemy then turned slightly and getting into position to attack our bomber. Approximately 600 yards Rear Gunner gave Corkscrew Port. Opened fire at approximately 400 yards. Closed at 300 yards. Rear Gunner saw strikes entering cockpit and engine of enemy aircraft. Then fighter was seen to go down in a spin with smoke pouring from the engines Rear Gunner claims fighter destroyed. AIR 27/1814 415 Sq ORB Appendices

No. 156 Squadron (Combat No. 6) Lancaster (YG-E) Ju.88 heading 1767 degrees on starboard quarter above - range 6000 yards opened fire enemy aircraft lost through Corkscrew. AIR 14/3227 Raid plots – night January 1945

No. 153 Squadron (Combat No. 7) Lancaster LM754 (P4-E) As our Lancaster was commencing its bombing run, the Wireless Operator reported contact with a suspicious aircraft on Fishpond, flying port quarter and at a range of 1000 yards. Half a minute later Rear Gunner observed an enemy aircraft which he identified as an Fw.190 attacking our Lancaster from the port quarter up, at a range of 250 yards. Rear Gunner immediately opened fire and our Lancaster corkscrewed to port. When our Lancaster was in the initial dive of the corkscrew the enemy aircraft opened fire. The Lancaster Pilot observed tracer from the enemy aircraft passing over the starboard mainplane. Enemy aircraft pressed home the attack and commenced the breakaway at a range of 50 yards passing over the Lancaster from port quarter to starboard bow and was lost from view. During the whole attack, the Mid Upper Gunner failed to observe the enemy aircraft and this was unable to take advantage of a comparatively easy target. No claim. Slight damage to our aircraft. Hole in the fuselage. Rudder controls jammed. Fixed aerial U/S. Fishpond warning before and during attack AIR 27/1031 153 Sq. ORB Appendices

No. 170 Squadron (Combat No. 8) Lancaster LM732 (TC-C) Homeward. 170/TC-C was attacked three times by a Ju.88 south of the target area and both Mid Upper and Rear Gunners had a ‘go’ at the enemy aircraft which did not open fire. When last seen the enemy aircraft was going off emitting smoke from the starboard engine. It is not possible to credit the grew with more than a claim for damages, but it is interesting to note that 150/L (NG359) saw a Page 81 of 108

Ju.88 at the same time and place and 170/M (PB752) reported an aircraft going down in flames and which exploded in the air at the same position but two minutes later. AIR 27/1097/1 170 Sq. ORB Summary

No. 425 Squadron (Combat No. 9) Halifax NP685 (OW-L) ME.410 400 yards dead astern. Rear Gunner fired short burst. Enemy aircraft disappeared. No claim AIR 14/3227 Raid plots – night January 1945

No. 460 Squadron (Combat No. 10) Lancaster PB227 (UV-R) The first indication of attack was trace being fired at the bomber. The Mid Upper Gunner immediately sighted a Ju.88 at 300 yards range on the fine port quarter slightly above. He returned fire and was joined by the Rear Gunner who ordered corkscrew port. The Ju.88 ceased firing when the Rear Gunner returned fire, closing at 150 yards, and broke away port quarter down, on breakaway the Rear Gunner held the fighter in the GGS (Gyro Gun Sight), and fired continuously until the fighter disappeared from view, losing height rapidly in practically vertical dive. The Rear Gunner claims hits and in his opinion the fighter seemed to be out of control, and makes a claim of possibly damaged. Throughout the attack the Rear Gunner fired on the Ju.88 by means of GGS. AIR 27/1911 460 Sq. ORB Appendices

No. 405 Squadron (Combat No. 11) Lancaster ND437? (LQ-M) Heading 321. ME.410 made feint attack from port beam and below. Continued on to starboard beam. Remained there at masked position. Mid Upper fired short burst and he moved out another 300 yards to approximately 6/800 yards. Mid Upper gave him a long burst observed hits in fuselage. Rear Gunner also fired but could not get enough deflection. He came back underneath immediately below us went6 out to port and disappeared. AIR 14/3227 Raid plots – night January 1945

No. 156 Squadron (Combat No. 12) Lancaster (GT-E) ME.410 heading 331 degrees on starboard quarter range 800 yards - opened fire evasive action taken by Corkscrewing. Enemy aircraft came in twice again on starboard and then on port then starboard again and finally on port quarter. Rear Gunner gave burst after gun unfroze on third attack and afterwards Mid Upper Gunner gave some bursts. Enemy aircraft eventually made off - strikes seen by gunners. AIR 14/3227 Raid plots – night January 1945

No. 429 Squadron (Combat No. 13) Halifax MZ872 (AL-Z) While on the homeward journey on 29/01/1945 in Halifax Z at 4903 0711E, 18.000 feet at 0010 hours an Me.109 was seen on starboard quarter up on the curve of pursuit ay 300 yards range. The Mid Upper Gunner gave the order to corkscrew starboard. Both gunners opened fire at 250 yards firing 200 rounds each. The enemy aircraft broke away to port quarter down and was lost to sight. Strikes were seen on its wings but no claim is made. AIR 27/1855 429 Squadron ORB Appendices

No. 85 Squadron Combat No. 14) Mosquito (Q) F/Lt Mellows and F/Lt Drew observed three single engined aircraft on Biblis airfield (10 miles north of Stuttgart) and for the lack of airborne opponents came down and attacked from 1000 feet. Strikes were observed on one of the aircraft, which was claimed as damaged, and they left amid a hail of well-intentioned but ill directed light flak. AIR 27/706/25 85 Squadron ORB Records Jan 1945

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7. RAF ORDER OF BATTLE, ZUFFENHAUSEN, STUTTGART 7.1. DESCRIPTION It is believed that the main target for this second attack on Stuttgart was the Hirth Aero Engine factory which was producing jet propelled engines. 7.2. 1 BOMBER GROUP Battle Orders th

On 28 January No. 1 Group was instructed to provide 145 aircraft out of a total of 337 aircraft of 1, 4 and 6 Groups plus PFF aircraft that would attack the target. Lancasters from 12, 100, 101, 103, 150, 153, 166, 170, 300, 460, 576 and 626 squadrons were detailed to attack in three waves spread between ‘H’ and ‘H’ = 9, 43 aircraft in the first wave, 43 aircraft in the second wave and 43 aircraft in the third wave. The time of attack ‘H’ Hour was 2330 hours. The aim of the raid was to ‘destroy built up area and industries in area of aiming point which includes jet engine and ignition component factories’. The crews were told Crews are to bomb only on markers tonight and not to bomb on instruments(*this includes H2S) owing to the location of two POW camps some 5 miles north of the target. This instruction does not preclude the use of H2S for checking the position of the target and as many H2S photographs as possible are to be taken at the time of release. There is no alternative target and if markers are not seen crews are to return with their bombs H2S was the first airborne, ground scanning radar system. It was developed to identify targets on the ground for night and all-weather bombing

No fighter cover was provided The bomb load was one 4,000lb HC bomb and twelve 500lb ANM64 mines. The aiming point would be marked with Red TIs and the release point with skymarking flares Red/Yellow stars starting at ‘H’ minus 3. Other Pathfinders aircraft would keep the aiming point marked with Green TIs and the release point would be marked with skymarking flares Green/Red stars. Summary of Operations Detailed Took Off Successful ‘A’ Abortive OET (Over enemy target) Abortive NOET (Not over enemy target) Missing

150 Lancasters 148 Lancasters 138 Lancasters 3 Lancasters 4 Lancasters 3 Lancasters

Successful ‘A’ TOT (Time over Target) 2331 – 2348 Hours. 18000 to 20000 feet ‘… PFF were about three minutes late and it appeared that a few aircraft had already commenced bombing before they arrived. Release point flares were dropped at 2330 hours but these were sparse and rather scattered. Release point marking increased during the attack and though bombing was not highly concentrated a good coverage over target area was made. Large explosion were seen at 2328 hours, 2334 hours, 2337 hours and 2342 hours, and several crews reported incendiaries burning north of the main bombing concentration. Du to cloud cover assessment of results is not possible. Ground defences were slight heavy flak in barrage decreasing as the attack developed. Only two aircraft were hit. There was some fighter activity in the target area and four aircraft were engaged in combat, one of which claims to have damaged a Ju.88 which was seen to spiral down emitting smoke and flames. Missing 1. 460/S 2. 153/O 3. 300/K

F/O Birt F/O Jones O M C F/Lt Zarebski

(14) (29) (7)

nd

2 Wave st 1 Wave nd 2 Wave

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Squadron

12

No. Aircraft

6

Aircraft Type

Lancaster

Comments Six aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart and they took-off from RAF Wickenby between 1950 hours and 2000 hours. Bombing carried out between 2332 hours and 2343 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘10/10ths cloud cover over the primary and as a result the bombing was done on sky marking provided by PFF. A visibility check was therefore impossible. Pending daylight photographic cover results cannot be assessed. Ground defences were negligible and no fighters seen’. AIR 27/169/1 12 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/169/2 12 Squadron ORB Records January 1945

100

12

Lancaster

Twelve aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart and they took-off from RAF Grimsby between 1940 hours and 2005 hours. Bombing carried out between 2333 hours and 2341 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘… the primary objective was a factory engaged in the production of jet propelled aircraft fighters … Bombing was entirely on sky markers and it was impossible to assess the success or otherwise of the attack. Opposition was slight … One of our aircraft, F/Lt Ellitt, was slightly damaged (starboard inner engine hit at 2330 hours) by heavy flak and returned home on three engines. No trouble with fighters was reported by any of our crews. From our angle not one of our most successful raid’. AIR 27/798/1 100 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/798/2 100 Squadron ORB Records January 1945

101

18

Lancaster

Eighteen aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart and they tookoff from RAF Ludford Magna between 1936 hours and 2003 hours. Bombing carried out between 2330 hours and 2345 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘18 aircraft on operations. Lancaster :(LL829) ‘J’ abandoned the mission over target ‘GEE’ (radio navigation system) u/s’ AIR 27/804/1 101 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/804/2 101 Squadron ORB Records January 1945

103

16

Lancaster

Sixteen aircraft detailed for the attack on Stuttgart but only fifteen took off from RAF Elsham Wolds between 1934 hours and 2001 hours, F/O Bakers aircraft developed engine trouble and was cancelled. Bombing carried out between 2333 hours and 2340 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘… the target area was covered by 9/10ths fairly thin cloud … Only one crew bombed on TIs, the remainder used Wanganui flares (target marking by blind-dropped sky markers when ground concealed by cloud). There was very little flak but fighters were active. F/O Hart (PD281) ‘O’ was attacked once (time unknown) and hit by cannon fire, and F/Lt Newman (RA500) ‘N’ twice attacked (2320 hours) whilst [preparing to bomb. This resulted in the loss of two engines but the pilot skilfully brought the aircraft back to the country, landing at Manston. All of the other aircraft returned and landed safely without incident’. AIR 27/817/1 103 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/817/2 103 Squadron ORB Records January 1945

150

17

Lancaster

Seventeen aircraft detailed for the attack on Stuttgart but only sixteen aircraft were able to get airborne and they took-off from RAF Hemswell between 1907 hours and 1942 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘(D) (F/O Groves) a new aircraft, due to unserviceability was unable to take off … 10/10ths cloud was experienced and through ground markers were used it was necessary for sly markers to be laid before bombing was successful. Due to cloud it was difficult to assess results though several crews reported explosions and fire burning through the cloud. Little enemy opposition was experienced, no fighters seen. All crews back to base safely. AIR 27/1013/9 150 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/1013/10 150 Squadron ORB Records January 1945

Page 84 of 108

Squadron

153

No. Aircraft

17

Aircraft Type

Lancaster

Comments Seventeen aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart and they tookoff from RAF Scampton between 1920 hours and 1955 hours. Bombing carried out between 2334 hours and 2340 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘… an attack on the Marshalling Yards at Zuffenhausen. … The majority of crew bombed on Release Point Flares. Enemy defences consisted of slight to moderate heavy flak, no searchlights were encountered and fighter activity was on a moderate scale. Crews were of the opinion that the attack had been fairly successful, although not a successful as it would have been in clear conditions. One aircraft (LM550) ‘O’ flown by F/Lt Wheeler was abortive and one aircraft (PB638 ‘O’) flown by F/O O M C Jones failed to return. Another aircraft flown by Sq/Ldr Rippingdale (LM754) ‘E’ was engaged in combat with and enemy fighter (2338 hours). None pf the crew were injured. AIR 27/1029/25 153 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/1029/26 153 Squadron ORB Records January 1945 AIR 27/1031 153 Squadron ORB Appendices

166

10

Lancaster

Ten aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart and they took-off from RAF Kirmington between 1930 hours and 2010 hours. Bombing carried out between 2334 hours and 2337 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘… 10/10ths cloud prevailed at the time of bombing. Crews had to bomb on sky markers and were unable to see any results as the target was totally obscured. F/O Jenkins in ‘L’ (NG136) arrived rather late and has to abandon the mission over the target area as the markers were extinguished. Enemy opposition took the form of slight to moderate heavy flak and some fighter activity was reported. None of our aircraft was in trouble and all returned successfully to base after a disappointing sortie’. AIR 27/1089/50 166 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/1089/51 166 Squadron ORB Records January 1945

170

18

Lancaster

Ten aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart but only nine took-off from RAF Hemswell between 1920 hours and 1955 hours. Bombing carried out between 2333 hours and 2345 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘… ‘P’ (ND658) was the only one which failed to take off having taxied off the perimeter track and become bogged in a hole which was concealed by the snow. ‘W’ (PB728) F/O Close unfortunately returned early … Opposition on the whole was only slight to moderate heavy flak, with no searchlights. Taken all round there was not very much evidence of fighter activity but one or two crews did report air tracer and or three sightings of enemy aircraft. F/O Baxter (LM732) ‘C’ was attacked three times by a Ju.88 south of the target area and both the Mid Upper Gunner and Rear Gunner had a ‘go’ at the enemy aircraft which did not open fire. When last seen the enemy aircraft was going off emitting smoke from the starboard engine, It is not possible to credit the crew with more than a claim for damage, but it is interesting to note that 150/L saw a Ju.88 at the same time and place and 170/M reported an aircraft going down in flames which exploded in the air at the same position but two minutes later. AIR 27/1097/1 170 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/1097/2 170 Squadron ORB Records January 1945

300

4

Lancaster

Four aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RAF Faldingworth between 1959 hours and 2001 hours. Bombing carried out between 2338 hours and 2339 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘… (PB722) ‘J’ captained by P/O Janczur was abortive, GEE being u/s. Aircraft (PB846) ‘K’ captained by F/Lt Zarebski was missing ... Two crews were successful. Target was Stuttgart’. AIR 27/1658/30 300 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/1658/31 300 Squadron ORB Records January 1945

460

12

Lancaster

Twelve aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RAF Binbrook between 1936 hours and 2002 hours. Bombing carried out between 2331 hours and 2341 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘There was little to see of results except a whitish glow below cloud. ‘R’ (PB227) F/O Whitmarsh had combat with a Ju.88 (2334). One of our aircraft failed to return, ‘B’ ND970 F/O Birt and crew. There was also one abortive sortie, ‘M’ (ND677) F/O Hando, due to unsatisfactory H2S (airborne, ground scanning radar system) and GEE. AIR 27/1658/30 460 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/1658/31 460 Squadron ORB Records January 1945 AIR 27/1911 460 Squadron ORB Appendices

Page 85 of 108

Squadron

576

No. Aircraft

15

Aircraft Type

Lancaster

Comments Fifteen aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RAF Fiskerton between 1937 hours and 2000 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘… The attack opened three minutes late … No results of bombing could be observed; the attack according to reports seemed to be reasonably concentrated. One good red or orange explosion occurring at 2339. A moderate heavy flak barrage we encountered decreasing as the attack developed, with a light predicted flak on the run in to bomb. Night fighters were active, ‘F2’ PB403 (F/O Sowerbutts) reports seeing one our aircraft shot down and single engined enemy aircraft with its starboard wing on fire (2353). No final result was seen. ‘I2’ LM227 (F/O Dalziel) reported one bomber bursting into flames and exploding on the ground (2336). ‘K2’ PD363 (F/O Paley) sighted one Ju.88 but was not close enough to engage. F/Lt Thieme in ‘Y2’ NG273 was attacked by a jet propelled enemy aircraft (2336). The Rear Gunner, Sgt Crouch opened fire to which the enemy aircraft replied. Evasive action was taken and the attacking aircraft broke away, Upon examination Y2 was found to have been holed port main frame, flap and tail plane and the port aerial lost. None of the crew were injured’. AIR 27/2047/27 576 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/2047/28 576 Squadron ORB Records January 1945 AIR 27/2048 576 Squadron ORB Appendices

626

6

Lancaster

Six aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RAF Wickenby between 1941 hours and 2001 hours. Bombing carried out between 2332 hours and 2336 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘The original call on the Squadron for six aircraft for bombing was later increased to fourteen du e to doubtful serviceability of another airfield, and fourteen aircraft were detailed in case of need. Finally the Squadron was only asked to provide the original six aircraft … Neither fighters nor flak were encountered’. AIR 27/2145/29 576 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/2145/30 576 Squadron ORB Records January 1945

7.3. 4 BOMBER GROUP Battle Orders Check No. 4 Group Battle Orders at the National Archives for details. Halifaxes from 10, 51, 78 and 578 squadrons were ordered to attack Stuttgart, 19 aircraft in the first wave, 19 aircraft in the second wave and 19 aircraft in the third wave. Summary of Operations Check No. 4 Group ORB at the National Archives for details. Squadron

10

No. Aircraft

10

Aircraft Type

Halifax

Comments Ten aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RAF Melbourne between 1953 hours and 2008 hours. Bombing carried out between 2334 hours and 2343 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘Ten crews detailed to attack Aero Engine factory at Stuttgart. Noe crews bombe target over thon cloud on Skymarkers. The glow of fires was observed through the clouds, Opposition was negligible. F/Lt Stephens returned early owing to failure of port outer engine’. AIR 27/145/25 10 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/145/26 10 Squadron ORB Records January 1945

Page 86 of 108

Squadron

51

No. Aircraft

19

Aircraft Type

Halifax

Comments Nineteen aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RAF Snaith between 1940 hours and 2016 hours. Bombing carried out between 2333 hours and 2346 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘… Over the target flares were reported a bursting very high and owing to strong winds were soon scattered, neither were they well maintained. A number of fires were visible through the cloud but the general opinion is that the attack lacked concentration. A few scattered fighter flares were reported between the Rhine and the target on the outward journey and one combat was observed over the target area without result. (MZ754) ‘T’ F/O Brayshaw was attacked three times by an Me.109. The Rear Gunner (Sgt R O Fenner, No. 3000547) was killed by what is believed to have been cannon fire and the Navigator was slightly wounded by flak (MP963) ‘R’ reported two short bursts of tracer fired, no tracer seen AIR 27/494/1 51 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/494/2 51 Squadron ORB Records January 1945

78

16

Halifax

Sixteen aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RAF Breighton between 1943 hours and 2019 hours. Bombing carried out between 2332 hours and 2342 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘Markers were fairly well concentrated. Huge explosions seen at 2342 hours and 2347 hours. Explosions also observed at 2334, 2335 and 2337 hours. Cloud cover prevented accurate assessment of results but large fires were seen through thin stratus cloud. All aircraft safely to base with the exception of two’, (landed at alternative bases) AIR 27/622/1 78 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/622/2 78 Squadron ORB Records January 1945

578

15

Halifax

Fifteen aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RAF Burn between 1936 hours and 2010 hours. Bombing carried out between 2333 hours and 2349 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘Thirteen aircraft took off … Attack opened late and skymarkers of both colours were reported not too well concentrated. A small glow appeared through the cloud. Opposition was light, only medium heavy flak was reported. A Ju.88 and Me.109 were seen in T/A (twin attack). Combat was also seen between two unidentified aircraft. One Halifax was seen to go down in the Target area. AIR 27/2050/25 578 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/2050/26 578 Squadron ORB Records January 1945

7.4. 6 BOMBER GROUP Battle Orders Check No. 6 Group Battle Orders at the National Archives for details. Halifaxes from 408, 415, 420, 424, 425, 426, 427, 429, and 432 squadrons were ordered to attack Stuttgart, 45 aircraft in the first wave, 45 aircraft in the second wave and 45 aircraft in the third wave. Summary of Operations Check No. 6 Group ORB at the National Archives for details. Squadron

408

No. Aircraft

16

Aircraft Type

Halifax

Comments Sixteen aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RAF Linton on Ouse between 1922 hours and 2014 hours. Bombing carried out between 2331 hours and 2341 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘… Two aircraft however failed to return from this operation and nothing has been heard off or from either of these two crews. … Both crews will be sadly missed by all personnel in the squadron. … No results from ground markers observed. Some crews forced to orbit aa marking appeared to be somewhat late, Incendiaries and bomb flashes were observed which appeared to be well grouped. Two explosions reported at 2334.5 hours and one fairly large explosion at 2335.6 hours. Defence consisted of very light flak bursting between 14 to 20,000 feet generally below bombing height. No combats reported although some fighter activity took place over the target’. AIR 27/1798/25 408 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/1798/26 408 Squadron ORB Records January 1945

Page 87 of 108

Squadron

No. Aircraft

Aircraft Type

Comments Fifteen aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RCAF East Moor between 1934hours and 1952 hours. Bombing carried out between 2329 hours and 2343 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘All our aircraft returned safely from last night’s attack against Stuttgart. One of our aircraft returned early CAN/J.36972 F/O L P Minkler and crew due to a failure of oxygen equipment. Squadron Leader W/C Ball led 15 aircraft into fray and good results reported. AIR 27/1813/15 415 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/1813/16 415 Squadron ORB Records January 1945

415

15

Halifax

(MZ922) ‘C’ F/O Hyland, Rear Gunner saw one Fw.109 approaching from starboard quarter below in a curve up pursuit attack at range of 800 yards. Gunner gave combat manoeuvre corkscrew starboard. The Fw.190 broke off attack at 200 yards going starboard without firing. Rear Gunner did not fire. No claims. AIR 27/1814 415 Sq ORB Appendices

(NR172) ‘V’ S/L Brown, enemy aircraft (ME-210) first seen 1000 yards dead astern firing at another aircraft. Enemy then attacked our bomber. Rear Gunner gave Corkscrew Port, opened fire and saw strikes entering cockpit and engine, fighter was seen going down in a spin with smoke pouring from the engines. Rear Gunner claimed fighter destroyed. AIR 27/1814 415 Sq ORB Appendices

420

14

Halifax

Fourteen aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RCAF Tholthorpe between 1921 hours and 2015 hours. Bombing carried out between 2331 hours and 2338 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘Two aircraft made abortive sorties. F/Lt Shotton swung off the runway on take-off, ending up on the taxi-track and too badly shaken up to take off again. F/Sgt Bishop returned early with the port outer engine u/s which would have made him late on target. All other aircraft successfully attacked the primary target’. AIR 27/1826/23 420 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/1826/24 420 Squadron ORB Records January 1945

424

8

Halifax

Eight aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RCAF Skipton on Swale between 1918 hours and 1919 hours. Bombing carried out between 2337 hours and 2338 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘The Squadron was ordered to detail 8 aircraft for an attack tonight. All preparations were completed and take off started on schedule. Two aircraft successfully took off. The third aircraft with (LW164) ‘S’, CAN.C.588 W/C K M Williams AFC and crew was on the runway just taking off when the aircraft blew up, (W/C E M Williams was understudying the Commanding Officer). This prevented the balance of the aircraft taking off. All crew members were instantly killed except for the Rear Gunner (F/O Tremblay J/18476) who was seriously injured and rushed in to hospital’. AIR 27/1835/23 424 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945

(MZ356) ‘T’, W/C Marshall, ‘one twin engined and one single engined enemy aircraft was sighted in the target area, no action was taken. Saw two aircraft shot down near the target, no parachutes seen. At position 4938N 0145E at 2136 hours saw a brilliant flash on the ground which may have been an aircraft’. AIR 27/1835/24 424 Squadron ORB Records January 1945

425

14

Halifax

Fifteen aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RCAF Tholthorpe between 1935 hours and 1958 hours. Bombing carried out between 2333 hours and 2340 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘Fourteen aircraft attacked the primary. Aircraft NR273 ‘X’ (F/O Perrier) was abortive over enemy territory, returned from target area. Lost en route and unable to each target in time to bomb … It is difficult to assess the raid due to cloud but it is reported that a good glow was seen below … Heavy flak was only slight to moderate barrage, principally6 low with some widely scattered over a height band of 17/20000 feet. No searchlights in evidence. A few fighter flares seen on the first and second legs out of the target. No combat took place and no claim is made. NR231 ‘F’, (F/O McHale), hit by heavy flak in T/A at 19000 feet, 2332 hours, 155 mph causing hole in Perspex in nose and also bomb doors. AIR 27/1839/1 420 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/1839/2 420 Squadron ORB Records January 1945

Page 88 of 108

Squadron

426

No. Aircraft

16

Aircraft Type

Halifax

Comments Sixteen aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RCAF Linton on Ouse between 1905 hours and 1950 hours. Bombing carried out between 2332 hours and 2340 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘Sixteen aircraft took off commencing at 1905 hours and carried out a raid on Stuttgart (Zuffenhausen). CAN/J.10741 F/Lt E T Garrett flying aircraft NP808 ‘E’ was an early return due to failure of an engine which prevented him from climbing to height. CAN/C178 W/C F C Carling-Kelly Squadron Commanding Officer failed to return from this operation (NP768 ‘Q’). All other aircraft were diverted, thirteen landing at Ridgewell and one landing at Cheveston. AIR 27/1843/1 426 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945

F/O Whipple (NP685) ‘L’, was attacked by an Me.410, there was no claim or damage, ‘just after bombing forced to corkscrew to port due to enemy fighter’. AIR 27/1843/2 426 Squadron ORB Records January 1945

427

16

Halifax

Sixteen aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RCAF Leeming between 1927 hours and 2005 hours. Bombing carried out between 2334 hours and 2355 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘All aircraft got away to good start … One aircraft ‘B’ MR171 was an early return and landed at Linton on Ouse. Engine failure … The target marking appeared somewhat late. Then backers up were late ... A good stream of aircraft was maintained both into and out of the target area. In view of the cloud cover and assessment of the raid is impossible. Flak was slight to moderate mostly in barrage form’. AIR 27/1847/1 427 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/1847/2 427 Squadron ORB Records January 1945

429

15

Halifax

Fifteen aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RCAF Leeming between 1918 hours and 1919 hours. Bombing carried out between 2337 hours and 2338 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘Fourteen aircraft successfully bombed the primary; the remaining aircraft was late over target and did not bomb due to the absence of markers … crews reported a concentrated glow of fires was reflected on the cloud as well as the glow of TIs. A good stream of aircraft was maintained both into and out of the target area. An assessment of the raid cannot be given in view of cloud cover over the target. Aircraft ‘Z’ (MZ872) piloted by P/PO W Fikis (Can J/88425) was attacked by an enemy Me.109 at 4903N 0711E at 0100 hours, 18,000 feet while on the homeward journey. The Halifax corkscrewed to starboard and both gunners opened fire at 250 yards firing 200 rounds each. The enemy aircraft broke off to port quarter below and was lost. No claim is made’. (NR196) ‘A’, F/Lt Robb (Can J/5118), at 2328 hours an Me.110 was seen attacking a Lancaster. Air to air fire was seen but no results. (LV860) ‘T’, F/O Humphries (Can J/14047), at 2336 hours observed enemy aircraft but no action was taken. (MZ482) ‘N’, F/O Jones (Can J/26131), at 2339 hours sustained small flak hole in nose Perspex. (PN367) ‘J’, F/Lt Creeper (Can J/8382), at 2343 hours reported large aircraft heading towards target exploded, 12 miles to starboard and 10 miles from target, disappeared in cloud and explosion was seen on ground. (NA201) ‘W’, F/Lf Charlton (Can J/14047), at 2354 reported cannon and tracer fire but no result observed. AIR 27/1854/1 429 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/1854/2 429 Squadron ORB Records January 1945 AIR 27/1855 429 Squadron ORB Appendices

429/S ‘set course to make up for time lost due to high winds 429/T ‘late on target due to incorrect met winds

Page 89 of 108

Squadron

No. Aircraft

Aircraft Type

Comments Fifteen aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RCAF East Moor between 1910 hours and 1933 hours. Bombing carried out between 2333 hours and 2342 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘All took off and returned to diversion bases. All aircraft attacked the primary target and bombed by sky markers. PFF were late arriving over target. Flak was slight to moderate and enemy aircraft were active but no combat was claimed.

432

15

Halifax

AIR 27/1860/41 432 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/1860/42 432 Squadron ORB Records January 1945

(NP694) ‘R’, P/O McGuire (Can J/89084) reported combat with enemy. ‘On the bombing run about two minutes before dropping bombs the pilot saw a Ju.88 on starboard bow above. The fighter passed over and ahead of the bomber, dropped back to port beam where the Mid Upper Gunner fired a burst of 200 yards (sic, ‘rounds’) at point blank range 100 yards. The tracer was seen by the Mid Upper Gunner to hit the fighter, which immediately dived out of view to port quarter down and was not seen again. The fighter is claimed as damaged’. AIR 27/1861 432 Squadron ORB Appendices

7.5. 8 BOMBER (PATHFINDER FORCE) GROUP Battle Orders Check No. 8 Group Battle Orders at the National Archives for details. Lancasters and Mosquitoes from105, 156, 405 squadrons were ordered to attack Stuttgart. Summary of Operations Check No. 8 Group ORB at the National Archives for details. Squadron

7

No. Aircraft

12

Aircraft Type

Lancaster

Comments Twelve aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RCAF East Moor between 2012 hours and 2025 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘Stuttgart was the target for twelve aircraft of the Squadron … Visibility was poor and skymarkers scattered. Bombing also was scattered and the no results were seen. Enemy fighters were again active and slight heavy flak at first increased as the attack progressed. All out aircraft returned safely. AIR 27/102/1 7 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/102/2 7 Squadron ORB Records January 1945

105

6

Mosquito

Eleven aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RAF Bourn between 2118 hours and 2143 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘For a second attack, this time by 250 ’heavies’, the part of the town engaged in producing parts for jet propelled aircraft was the A/P (aiming point). … 1/6 of our aircraft marked successfully … It was from the first attack the F/Lt Mc Hardy and F/O Duncan did not return in the never to be forgotten ‘Z’ Zebra’. AIR 27/828/1 105 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/828/2 105 Squadron ORB Records January 1945

109

5

Mosquito

Eleven aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RAF Little Staughton between 2135 hours and 2150 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘Carried out night operations as detailed – landed’ One aircraft ‘released skymarkers by AR5113 from 32000 feet at 2330 hours’ a second aircraft ‘marketed target from 32000 feet by AR5113 at 2343 hours’. Two aircraft suffered technical delays whilst the fifth aircraft was not required. All aircraft reported ‘Defences Nil’. AIR 27/856/1 109 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/856/2 109 Squadron ORB Records January 1945

Page 90 of 108

Squadron

No. Aircraft

Aircraft Type

Comments Eleven aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RAF Upwood between 2009 hours and 2021 hours. Bombing carried out between 2329 hours and 2337 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘Eight aircraft detailed to attack Stuttgart – Zuffenhausen, One aircraft failed to return, F/Lt J H Freemen (PB186, GT-A) and crew. The bombing was fairly well concentrated. Enemy aircraft were active and several combats took place’. AIR 27/1043/1 156 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/1043/2 156 Squadron ORB Records January 1945

156

8

Lancaster

156/E reported two combats with enemy, at 2337 hours ‘Ju.88 heading 1767 degrees on starboard quarter above - range 6000 yards opened fire enemy aircraft lost through Corkscrew’ and 2348 hours ‘Me.410 on starboard quarter opened fire evasive action taken by Corkscrewing. Enemy aircraft came in twice again on starboard and then on port then starboard again and finally on port quarter. Rear Gunner and Mid Upper Gunner fired. Fighter eventually made off, strikes seen by gunners’. 156/T reported combat with enemy, at 2335 hours ‘Me.410 came in from port quarter opening fire and Captain dived to port. Tracer passed overhead and fighter vanished to starboard quarter’. AIR 14/3227 Raid plots – night January 1945

405

11

Lancaster

Eleven aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RAF Gransden Lodge between 2007 hours and 2038 hours. Bombing carried out between 2331 hours and 2341 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘Ten aircraft successful ‘A’ … The attack appeared to open late, possibly due to headwinds being approximately 40 knots stronger than forecast … Defence, slight to moderate heavy flak bursting from 17000 to 20000 feet. Slight light flak with tracer bursting up to 17000 feet. No searchlights. Two Ju.88’s seen. Aircraft 405/M attacked an Me.410 and hits seen and claimed as damaged … One of our aircraft is missing (PB650, LQ-U). Remainder all landed base. AIR 27/1790/1 405 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/1790/2 405 Squadron ORB Records January 1945

(ND437, LQ-M) reported combat with enemy at 2346 hours ‘Me.410 made feint attack from port beam and continued to starboard beam in a masked position. Mid Upper fired short and long burst observed hits in fuselage. Enemy aircraft went out to port and disappeared’. AIR 14/3227 Raid plots – night January 1945

Eleven aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RAF Oakington between 2115 hours and 1933 hours. Squadron ORB reported ’12 aircraft detailed for operations’. (Ten for Berlin, two for Stuttgart). AIR 27/2044/19 571 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945

571

2

Mosquito

The two aircraft reported ‘Bombed glow of Wanganui possibly saw aircraft shot down. Slight (flak) against Mosquitoes, heavy against Heavies. 1 x 4000’ (bomb). ‘Bombed red Wanganui. Slight flak at Mosquito level. Moderate against Heavies. 1 x 4000’. AIR 27/2044/20 571 Squadron ORB Records January 1945

635

692

Lancaster

2

Mosquito

nd

ORB does not records any operations in January after 22 January 1945 Eleven aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RAF Little Staughton between 2121 hours and 2122 hours. Squadron ORB reported ’12 aircraft (ten to Berlin and two to Stuttgart) detailed for operations against Stuttgart. All took off and returned’. AIR 27/2216/23 692 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945

‘Two early windowers for a ‘heavy’ raid on Stuttgart. Bothe carried cookies and after windowing across target, orbited and bombed.’ AIR 27/2216/23 692 Squadron ORB Records January 1945

7.6. 100 BOMBER (SPECIAL DUTIES) GROUP Battle Orders Check No. 100 Battle Orders at the National Archives for details. Mosquitoes from 85, 157, 192 squadrons were ordered to carry out special duties to support the bombers to Stuttgart. Summary of Operations Check No. 100 Group ORB at the National Archives for details.

Page 91 of 108

Squadron

85

No. Aircraft

3

Aircraft Type

Mosquito

Comments Eleven aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RAF Swannington one at 1820 hours and two at 2055 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘Bomber Command put in a big effort on Stuttgart to take place in two separate attacks. Six aircraft were required as High Support and two to be immediate readiness on the ground against enemy intruders’. (Three Mosquitoes supported the Zuffenhausen attack, VY-Q, VY-Y and VY-Z). At 0012 hours F/Lt Mellows and F/Lt Drew observed three single engined aircraft on Biblis airfield (10 miles north of Stuttgart) and for the lack of airborne opponents came down and attacked from 1000 feet. Strikes were observed on one of the aircraft, which was claimed as damaged, and they left amid a hail of well-intentioned but ill directed light flak. AIR 27/706/25 85 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/706/26 85 Squadron ORB Records January 1945

141

3

Mosquito

Three aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RAF West Raynham between 2015 hours and 2135 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘Eight aircraft (five in first operation and three in the second operation) were detailed for an ASH (airborne air to air radar system) high-level intruder patrol in support of the attack on Stuttgart. All contacts made were with friendly aircraft and all aircraft returned safely. Five aircraft and crews were standing by in readiness to scramble in case of enemy activity, but were not called upon’. AIR 27/971/25 141 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/971/26 141 Squadron ORB Records January 1945

157

2

Mosquito

Two aircraft (in total eight aircraft were involved in ops) were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RAF Swannington between 2110 hours and 2130 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘Eight crews were on ops in support of the two phase attack on Stuttgart. All patrols were however uneventful’. (TA391 (N) and TA993 (C) were involved in high level intruder duties) AIR 27/1046/23 157 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/1046/24 157 Squadron ORB Records January 1945

TA397 (R) at 2352 hours observed air to air firing and aircraft diving towards ground AIR 14/3227 Raid plots – night January 1945

169

1

Mosquito

One aircraft was detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RAF Great Massingham at 2100 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘F/Lt C G Endersby completed an uneventful Mk.X patrol supporting bomber attack on Stuttgart AIR 27/1094/41 169 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/1094/42 169 Squadron ORB Records January 1945

171

6

Halifax

Six aircraft were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RAF North Creake between 1929 hours and 2010 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘Eleven Halifaxes (six appear to have been detailed for the second attack on Stuttgart) were detailed for operations, two for combined Mandrel (a jammer for German ground based air search radar used by 100 Group. Several aircraft normally flew in a group to act as a screen) and Windows and nine for Mandrel. Two aircraft failed to take off and one returned early with Gee trouble. The remainder completed their mission successfully and returned to base’. AIR 27/1102/17 171 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/1102/18 171 Squadron ORB Records January 1945

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Squadron

192

No. Aircraft

4

Aircraft Type

Halifax

Comments Four Halifax aircraft (two on the first attack and four on the second attack) were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RAF Foulsham between 1950 hours and 1958 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘Seven Halifaxes (four on second attack) were detailed to carry out special duties flights – one returned early owing to engine trouble and one ‘bogged’. The following duties were carried out: MZ342 (B) Telemetering on the 200 – 250 Mc/s band NR272 (R) Centimetre search on the 3000 – 3600 Mc/s band NR180 (S) Search on the 60 – 110 Mc/s band for enemy AI signals NP970 (T) Search the 130 – 170 Mc/s band for Jadgschloss transmissions AIR 27/145/25 109 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/145/26 109 Squadron ORB Records January 1945

NR272 (R), at 2340 hours reported twin jet engine aircraft seen 4000 to 5000 feet below AIR 14/3227 Raid plots – night January 1945 AI, airborne interception radar. Jadgschloss a German early warning and battle control radar. A related system, Jagdhütte, was used for control of the Luftwaffe's own night fighters.

192

2

Mosquito

Four Mosquito aircraft (two on the first attack two on the second attack) were detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RAF Foulsham between 2141 hours and 2146 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘Four Mosquitoes (two on the second attack) carried out Special Duty flights in conjunction with the above operation (192 Squadron Halifaxes)’. The following duties were carried out: DZ491 (N), Jam enemy AI with Piperack and to record enemy radio telephony (R/T) and wireless telephony (W/T) signals DZ617 Search for 400 – 500 low frequency Wurzburg transmissions AIR 27/1156/61 192 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/1156/62 192 Squadron ORB Records January 1945 Piperack, airborne jamming radar carried by lead aircraft that produced a cone of jamming behind it Wurzburg, ground based gun laying radar used by Flak Batteries

199

1

Sterling

One aircraft was detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RAF North Creake between 2048 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘Eight aircraft (only one appears to have been detailed for the second attack on Stuttgart) were detailed to carry out a combined Mandel Screen and Window Patrol. One aircraft was detailed to form part of a second Mandrel Screen. One aircraft failed to carry out the combined Mandrel/Window Patrol owing to icing and oil leak. One aircraft returned early owing to U/S Gee. Otherwise a successful mission was carried out’ AIR 27/1172/51 199 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/1172/52 199 Squadron ORB Records January 1945

214

1

Fortress

One aircraft was detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RAF Oulton at 1945 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘Eight aircraft (only one appears to have been detailed for the second attack on Stuttgart). One aircraft failed to take off and one returned early’. AIR 27/1324/1 214 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945

‘One aircraft detailed to carry out a Jostle (airborne high powered jammer to jam German night fighter control channels) Patrol to Stuttgart but abandoned mission … at 2250 hours and returned with turbo trouble’. AIR 27/1324/2 214 Squadron ORB Records January 1945

223

1

Liberator

One aircraft (it appears that five aircraft supported the first attack) was detailed for the attack on Stuttgart took-off from RAF Oulton at 1945 hours. Squadron ORB reported ‘F/Lt Croft in (S) completed Jostle Patrol No. 2 over Stuttgart in (S). Everyone did an excellent job since the weather was not all that might be expected and we were operation from a short 1400 yard runway’. AIR 27/1376/9 223 Squadron ORB Summary January 1945 AIR 27/1376/10 223 Squadron ORB Records January 1945

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8. ANTI-AIRCRAFT (FLAK) BATTERIES STUTTGART 8.1. PERSONNEL At the start of the war the Luftwaffe Flak units were a very substantial part of the Luftwaffe's total force of around 1.5 million men, it is estimated that between one third and two thirds of Luftwaffe Forces were in Flak units. However, as the war progressed and the tide turned against Germany more of the regular soldiers were withdrawn for front line action. This meant that the ‘gaps’ on the Home Front had to be filled by others, mainly soldiers not fit for active duty, members of the German Home Guard and foreigners (prisoners of war etc.). th

Due to the rapidly decreasing numbers on 25 January 1943, the "Ordinance on the Military Aid Service of German Youth in the Air Force" was issued, whereby the regular Wehrmacht soldiers were replaced by anti-aircraft helpers. Whole classes of children were assigned to serve on antiaircraft positions, including 15 year olds. It is estimated there were around 20,000 schoolchildren aged 15 to 17 who fought against the increasingly large bomber forces in the last two years of the war, led by older soldiers. While the official term for these children was Luftwaffenhelfer (HJ), the term more commonly used was ‘Flakhelfer’ (female: Flakhelfer). School continued parallel to military service, barrack instead of classroom, in the mornings the teachers tried to teach the children, in the evening they defended the city. At Christmas we played under the Christmas tree railroad, in January we were moved in - to the parents' horror. th

The work was extremely dangerous, for example on 29 July 1944, the fourth of four consecutive nights of attack, a British bomber dropped an air mine over a command centre at Degerloch, eight 15 rd and 16 year-old child soldiers and ten soldiers died. On 3 August there was a massive air raid, in which 23 young air force helpers were killed. 8.2. FLAK BATTERY TACTICS German flak gunners employed three methods of fire control against heavy bombers. Continuously Pointed Fire

This relied on good visual or gun-laying radar acquisition of the bomber formation. Shells were placed directly in front of the lead aircraft in the formation, giving a continuous pattern of bursts along the bombers course. When the bombers moved out of range the next batteries took over. This was the most dangerous and accurate form of heavy anti-aircraft fire.

Predicted Concentration Fire

This was less effective. It was used at night, through cloud cover or when radar information was of minimal quality. The system needed the bomber formation to fly straight band level for about 90 seconds in order to achieve success. A master command post directed the fire of several batteries at the same time. A prediction was made of the bomber flight path and batteries fired shells to strike the point of prediction at then given time. Then new prediction would be calculated and a new concentration shells slavoed.

Barrage Fire

This was the least effective measure, use at night or when cloud prevented a good visual sighting. It was designed to put as much flak as a possible into a certain area of the sky ‘the box’; this was usually just outside the expected bomb release line of the incoming formation. If properly places the bomber crew had no option but to fly through it. German Flak Defences vs Allied Heavy Bombers: 1942–45, Donald Nijboer, pp 61-62

Bind and Confuse

The Germans used a large number of searchlights. Although the searchlights were not particularly successful in illuminating high-flying bombers, they were used to produce dazzle or glare to blind and confuse the bomber aircrews. The main searchlights used were 60cm and 150cm-diameter parabolic glass reflectors. Dazzle and glare made locating targets difficult and lessened the accuracy of bombing, and keeping beams direct on an Allied plane helped defending fighters approach the plane unobserved. Heavy searchlights usually used sound locators to find bombers, while light searchlights relied on picking up targets by means of search patterns. warfarehistorynetwork.com/2016/06/15/german-antiaircraft-defenses

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8.3. FLAK GUNS Flak worked by using fuses to set off explosive ordnance. There were two types, a timed fuse which, after so many seconds, would detonate the shell, the other was a barometric fuse which was triggered (by measuring air pressure) when a certain altitude was reach. The explosive ordinance was made up of a high explosive compound that was ignited by the fuse. The explosive compound would either operate on its own or be paired with other designs to increase the effectiveness of the shell versus certain targets. Some shells would have built in sleeves, fragment shards, ball bearings or rails that would all be propelled by the blast of the war head. Other shells were incendiary, the explosive would contain things like barium nitrate or phosphorous; with the aim of basically tossing super-hot fire within an area of the aircraft in order to burn it. Flak was a very effective defence system. In 1944 Flak accounted for 3,501 American planes destroyed, 600 less than planes lost to enemy fighters in the same period. German Flak accounted for 50 of the 72 RAF bombers lost over Berlin on the night of 24th March 1944. An incredible 56 bombers were destroyed or crippled by flak during a B-17 raid on Merseburg in November 1944. The 8.8 cm Flak 18/36/37/41 was 88mm anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery. It was widely used by Germany throughout World War 2 and was one of the most recognized German weapons of that conflict. Flak is a contraction of German Flugabwehrkanone (also Fliegerabwehrkanone) meaning ‘aircraft-defence cannon’, the original purpose of the weapon. In English, "flak" became a generic term for ground anti-aircraft fire. In informal use, the guns were universally known as the Acht-acht by Germans and the ‘eighty-eight’ by the Allies. Air defence units were usually deployed with either a Kommandogerat fire control computer or portable Würzburg radar, which were responsible for its high level of accuracy against aircraft. 8.4. STUTTGART HEAVY ANTI-AIRCRAFT POSITIONS (AS OF 1944) Location

Battery no.

Armament

radar

Sulzgries

3s/436

6 x 8.8 cm

Yes

Cheeks

1s/436

4 x 10.5 cm

Yes

Luginsland

2s/436

6 x 8.8 cm

Yes

Weilimdorf/Hausen

2s/241; 3s/460 (Bofors)

6 x 8.8 cm

Yes

Gerlingen (Doppelb.)

3s/460

12 x 8.8 cm

Yes

Degerloch

New installation.

6 x 8.8 cm

Yes

Stammheim

3s/241

6 x 8.8 cm

Yes

Birch head

4s/241; 3s/241

4 x 10.5 cm

Yes

Forging

4s/436

6 x 8.8 cm

Yes

Kornwestheim/Gleisd.

4s/241

12 x 8.8 cm

Yes

Feuerbach

New installation.

4 x 8.8 cm

Yes

Killesberg/Mühlbachhof

Staff z, BV/436

4 x 8.8 cm

Yes

Vaihingen

6 x 8.8 cm

Yes

4 x 8.8 cm

No

Real things

7s/241; 4s/460 1s/460; 5s/436 5s/460 Hei 206 XII

6 x 8.5 cm

No

Korntal

Hei 206

6 x 8.8 cm

Yes

Haydn

Doggenburg

Hei/RAD anti-aircraft gun

4 x 8.8 cm

Yes

Sillenbuch

6s/241; 2/906

4 x 8.8 cm

Yes

Light Anti-Aircraft Gun Positions Location

Unit

Gun type

Command post

Hirth works

III/4/54

3 x 4 cm

Keller Hirth

Porsche plant

III/1/54

3 x 3.7 cm

Basement, old work

Neuwirtshaus

III/2/54

3 x 3.7 cm

Bunker embankment

Werner and Pfleiderer

III/5/54

3 x 4 cm

Basement in the factory

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Location

Unit

Gun type

Command post

Bosch Feuerbach

II/5/54

3 x 2 cm

Siegelbergstollen

Foehrich, Feuerbach

IV/5; I/54

3 x 2 cm four

Earth bunker

Norma works

III/2/858

3 x 3.7 cm

Norma Keller

Mahle and Eckard

II/3/858

3 x 2 + 2 x 3.7

Factory air. room

Freight depot

I/5/54

3 x 4 cm

?

Burgholzhof

IV/2/858 3 x 2 cm four

Assmann/Stocker

?

2 x 2 cm

?

Cannstatt Viaduct

Hey Flak

3 x 3.7 cm

Towers

Cheeks

III/2/858

3 x 2 cm

LS basement

Barrack bunker

Cannstatter Wasen

IV/2/858 3 x 2 cm four

Daimler Benz

I/2/858

2 x 4 cm

High level

Maschinenfabr.Essl.

V/2/858

3 x 3.7 cm

?

Untert Mönchberg

2/858

3 x 3.7 cm

Linden School UT

Uhland height

3/858

2 x 3.7 cm

turret

Central Station

2/4/54

1 x 2 cm

tower

Rotebühl barracks

I/54

1 x 2 cm

High level

Banzhalde Feuerb.

Hei23/VII

3 x 4.0 cm

Kornwestheim Bahnh.

Hei30/VII

3 x 3.7 cm

Pragsattel Bunker

?

3 x 3.7 cm

tower

Hotel Schönblick

?

2 x 3.7 cm

tower

Hasenberg

?

2 x 2.0 cm

Waldschenke

Collection building Feu

3 x 2.0 cm

Leibniz high school

Flak was part of the air defence system around Stuttgart, the heavy anti-aircraft positions were mostly set up on the hills around Stuttgart. The light anti-aircraft positions such as the 20mm and 37mm guns, used for protection against low-flying aircraft, were installed on exposed buildings or separately built anti-aircraft towers. The heavy anti-aircraft gun with its 88mm guns was able to record considerable successes against bomber streams. By 1944, Stuttgart was defended by 11 heavy (88 mm) and 38 light (20 mm to 40 mm) anti-aircraft gun batteries.

9. BOMBING DECOY SITES STUTTGART 9.1. WHAT WERE BOMBING DECOYS Bombing decoys were used to confuse enemy aircraft as to the location of their target. The decoys were sophisticated and required a lot of manpower. They were also very effective, ensuring that the enemy bombs fell away from military and civilian targets. 9.2. SCHEIN FACILITY LAUFEN (‘BRAZIL’) Stuttgart was extremely vulnerable to bombing attacks as it was not only an important hub in the rail network but also a prominent industrial centre. Important industrial targets included the Bosch plant which made generators and injection pumps, SKF ball-bearing plant, Hirth (Heinkel) aero engineering factory, various Daimler-Benz factories which made aero-engines, marine engines, cylinder camshafts and valve for military vehicles. A bombing decoy site called "Brazil" was constructed 15 miles north of Stuttgart between Lauffen am Neckar and Nordheim. The bend of the Necker River was similar to that at Bad Cannstatt (location of the second largest rail station in Stuttgart). In order to support the authenticity, a train station was built with brick walls, straw mats and slatted frames, flashes of lights simulated the of overhead tram conductors, dummy gas boilers were also built. It has been suggested that the site was defended by up to 35 searchlights and 50 Flak guns; however this is unlikely. The operating team (Luftwaffe Command Laufen) consisted of a sergeant and twelve men. They marked fires after bombs were dropped to distract bombers from their main target. rd

Laufen was bombed for the first time on 23 August 940, an attack before Stuttgart itself experienced th th its first attack, the actual target was Karlsruhe. Another attack on 12 /13 October destroyed around 40 houses in Lauffen, this led to deep resentment amongst the locals who thought they were being sacrificed to protect urban facilities in Stuttgart. In 1941 alone 1,500 fragmentation bombs and about 100 explosives bombs were dropped in Lauffen. However, with the advent of radar systems (and being 15 miles north of Stuttgart), the system was Page 96 of 108

no longer effective as a bombing decoy and was dismantled in 1943, it was estimated that the site had ‘intercepted’ around forty air raids destined for Stuttgart. In total there were thirty seven attacks on Lauffen throughout the war, twenty attacks before the plant was dismantled. Many of the bombs dropped in fields and caused little or no damage to buildings and people. Laufen experienced its worst attack in 1944, at a time when the facility had long been dismantled. 9.3. WEILIMDORF FIRE DECOY SITE In 1943, after the introduction of RAF Pathfinder Forces (PFF) to mark target areas, the Germans developed new measures to mislead the attackers. In the autumn 1943, a fire decoy system was built in the Stuttgart suburb of Weilimdorf. The facility was designed to induce the attacking bombers to drop the bombs on the decoy site which only contained uninhabited and undeveloped areas of the city. This system was only really effective at night, in contrast to the mock system in Laufen, and to ensure it remained secret camouflage measures such as branches and nets were used during the day to hide it from reconnaissance flights. To simulate the RAF target indicators (TIs) dropped by the PFF bombers the decoy installation would fire rockets, of the same colour as the TIs, into the sky. The rockets which were called SSR were about two meters long and reached a height of about 2000 meters, from where they slowly floated down on parachutes, thereby having a similar appearance to the target indicators. Combat instructions stated that the rockets should only be fired in suitable weather/wind direction and not over-illuminating the area, especially with yellow or white light bombs, so that the attackers did not recognize the deception. The idea was to confuse the bomber stream with two target areas where they could drop their bombs. In order to make the decoy site even more realistic, decoy fires were established, the aim being to simulate burning buildings caused by incendiary bombs and encourage the bombers to drop their bomb load on the decoy site. These decoy fires consisted of corrugated iron gratings (approximately 1m x 2.5m) which were strung together on concrete pyramids. On the grates lay tar soaked wood, special tar briquettes, demolition wood and other combustible materials. The fires were started with the briquettes as they didn’t create too much smoke. It was important that the fires on the ground were clearly visible to the aircraft and also they were not so bright that the deception was recognisable. These fire spots were spread over the entire area of the decoy system. Any bomb damage in or around the decoy system was often filled in immediately after the attack in order to give enemy reconnaissance pilots as little clues as possible about the previous night's attack. Fireworks feigned explosions to contribute to the effectiveness of the decoy site. RAF bomber target markers were called ‘Christmas trees’ in Germany and were imitated by the SSR rockets. fgut.wordpress.com/bauwerke/wk2/militarische-anlagen2/baden-wurttem http://www.schutzbauten-stuttgart.de/

9.4. OTHER CAMOUFLAGE MEASURES Other Decoy Sites In addition to the Laufen decoy site and the Weilimdorf fire decoy site, there were false airfields in Maichingen/Böblingen, in the Struttal near Betzenried/Göppingen, on the Jagstwiesen, Möckmühl/Heilbronn, between Etzlinsweiler and Fessbach/Landkreis Öhringen. Landing strips for the aircraft were simulated by night landing lights. Nebulisation Stuttgart's topographic location provided an opportunity for nebulisation, where an area would be covered in ‘fog’ to disguise the target areas. The first chemical used was Chlorosulfonic acid, however an exercise in the Neckar valley in April 1942 had serious consequences as it caused severe damage to vegetation, killing of fish as the chemicals dripped into rivers and corrosion of metal parts in some industries. Page 97 of 108

In September 1942 the exercise was repeated with a new chemical, ammonium chloride, with the result that corrosion and vegetation damage no longer occur. In an exercise in October 1942 forty seven fog sources were used to cover the valley basin with a thick veil of fog. Towards the end of 1942 and early 1943 the number of fog machines were increased. The last attack where nebulisation th was effective was on 20 December 1942. However, despite the fogging, Stuttgart was still ‘visible’ to the bombers due to the new radar technology. Nebulisation was therefore no longer effective as camouflage and was discontinued. Demolition of towers th

After an air raid on 11 March 1943, the 37-meter-high observation tower on Hasenberg blown up along with the Degerloch lookout tower. Shot down Allied pilots had said that these towers served as a guide. In truth, the towers were meaningless as guides for the bombers as the new radar system offered the possibility for exact localisation without visual observation. Draining of the Max Eyth See The lake was pumped empty at the beginning of the war and covered with camouflage nets, to ensure bomber pilots one less opportunity to locate Stuttgart (the Neckar River already provided a good indication). Plans for Camouflage Painting of Buildings Buildings were painted so they blended in with the local topography of the surrounding area. From the air, the Stuttgart gas boiler was camouflaged to look like a hill with buildings, the roofs of the airport buildings were integrated into the surrounding fields, industrial buildings should became residential buildings.

The Stuttgart gas boiler with camouflage painting

10. VAIHINGEN FLAK BATTERY It is thought that the Vaihingen battery was initially built as a dummy system to deceive enemy aircraft about the strength and locations of German air defences. It was equipped with dummy guns made from tree trunks; it may also have included devices for firing false anti-aircraft fire. As part of a regrouping of the flak defences in Stuttgart, it was made operational at the beginning of 1943 and increased the firepower of the heavy anti-aircraft gun on the southeast flank of Stuttgart between. Regroupings were common in anti-aircraft guns during the war. The batteries used in positions changed several times. Despite the increasing threat to the large cities from air raids, the Luftwaffe and Wehrmacht repeatedly viewed flak at home as a reserve for the front. For example, at the start of the African campaign, several batteries were moved from the Stuttgart area to the North African desert. In 1943 there were 3 batteries in Vaihingen, each with six heavy 88mm calibre th guns (Flakbatteries 7./s.241, (7 heavy anti-aircraft battery 241 – stationary), 1./s.460 and 4./s.460). The 7./s.241 guns were withdrawn in March 1944 and the 4./s.460 guns moved to Auschwitz (to protect the chemical plants not the concentration camp) in July 1944. The 1./s.460 guns (six 88mm Flak 37 cannons) remained in Vaihingen until the end of the war. This withdrawal of batteries to the east or west fronts, including entire batteries in some cases, created a vacuum in the defences which the Allied airmen could operate freely. If the reports about the Flak Leutnant on the Vaihingen Flak Battery witnessing aircraft crashing are correct then from reports of known crash sites it is likely that Lancaster 156/A which crashed at Vaihingen and Lancaster 460/S which crashed 3km north-west of Vaihingen at Busnau are the two Page 98 of 108

Lancasters. There are no other crash sites reported in the area, so it is possible that the ‘Halifax’ could be Halifax 408/E.

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AFTERMATH 1. ROYAL AIR FORCE 1.1. NOTIFYING NEXT OF KIN 1.2. CAPTURED AIRCREW 1.3. LOCATING WAR GRAVES 2. STUTTGART th

th

2.1. AFTERMATH OF THE OPERATION 28 /29 JANUARY 1945 2.2. NUMBER OF ALLIED BOMBING ATTACKS ON STUTTGART 2.3. REBUILDING STUTTGART

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1. ROYAL AIR FORCE 1.1.

NOTIFYING NEXT OF KIN Deeply regret to inform you that your (name of relative) is missing and believed to have lost his life on (date) as a result of air operations. Letter follows. Please accept my profound sympathy. Wording on the official telegram notifying the next of kin

For generations of service families the most dreaded sight was a telegram. The small buff envelopes would, with the Air Ministry’s condolences, inform them that their relative had been killed, wounded, was ill, or was missing. Considering the circumstances, the Air Ministry system was surprisingly swift and efficient. The telegram would be followed by a confirming letter from the Air Ministry, officially to arrive two or three days later. However, a longer delay was usual as it had been decided that it was better to send out a late letter than one devoid of news, and so the letter was often delayed until news was received from the German authorities. At busy times, for example after a particularly bad air raid this could take anything up to two or three weeks. Likely to arrive at the same time would be a letter from the commanding officer of the casualty. Air Ministry regulations stated that these should be sent as soon as possible, and should be as personal as possible. Stock phrases or the use of standard templates were to be avoided. Again, at times these could fall behind the ideal schedule. Although not required officially in regulations, this was to be a common and much appreciated gesture, perhaps as these letters usually focused on the personality of the individual, rather than their professional abilities. Over the next few weeks and months more letters and forms would follow. The Air Ministry accounts offices at Worcester would be in contact over any allowances that the family may be due, or the settling of the deceased’s accounts (including the payment of death duties). Personal effects would be forwarded by the unit to the RAF Depository at Colnbrook, near Slough, until death was confirmed, when non-service items would be returned to the family. The Royal Air Force Benevolent Fund would be in contact to offer their services, be it either financial assistance or advice on the casualty procedure as a whole. If the casualty was deceased and their body in the UK, further paperwork would concern the fate of their mortal remains. Families could claim the body for burial at their local cemetery, or leave it to the unit to organise a funeral at the closest cemetery to their station. Either way, the Imperial War Graves Commission would write to the family. Initially they would arrange for the temporary marking of the grave with a wooden cross, and lay out their responsibility for the care of the grave. Later, further forms would concern the permanent marking of the grave with a headstone, and the family’s choice of personal inscription. When men were simply missing the above process would be much more drawn out, with the presumption of death following anything from six months to a year later. Only then could outstanding accounts be settled and personal effects be sorted, in the meantime, all the family could do was wait. Likewise, the further the casualty was from the UK, the longer the process could take. Human nature is to cling to false hopes and any glimmer of relief. Hopes of administrative errors or oversights could keep families in unrealistic conditions of optimism for years after their loved one had been listed as killed or missing, or even after the end of hostilities. Hadaway, Stuart. Missing Believed Killed. Pen and Sword

Notification from German Authorities with regard to Lancaster PB638 In April 1945 the International Red Cross Committee (IRCC) informed the Air Ministry, that they had been informed by the German Authorities that F/O Jones, F/Sgt Fletcher, F/Sgt Dormer, F/Sgt Milburn, F/Sgt Coles and one unknown other had been killed following the crash of a Lancaster. This was followed by an extract from the official Totenliste (Death List) No. 266, again submitted via the IRCC stating that those named had been buried in the Parish Cemetery of Michelbach nd on 2 February 1945, following the crash of a Lancaster near th Michelbach (21km ESE of Heidelberg) on 28 February. Following this, the crew were posted as Missing Believed Killed. In October 1945 the crew were reclassified as Missing Presumed Killed. Until death could be formally confirmed by British Authorities, for official purposes, it was necessary to make a presumption of death to enable the Air Ministry to provide a certified notification of death to relatives so that they might obtain the release of personal effects, the settlement of the service estate and fro pension purposes. In November 1946, a team from No. 16 Missing Research and Enquiry Service (MRES) visited Michelbach Cemetery and established from burial returns that the entire crew, seven bodies, five Page 103 of 108

named and two unknowns, had been buried in the North West corner of the cemetery and that the local population had erected a monument over the grave saying ‘Here rest seven British airmen th Killed in Action January 28 1945’. Following this visit the graves were exhumed and the bodies formally identified. They were then moved and re-interned at Bad Tolz (Durnbach) British Military Cemetery in the Following graves: No.

Name

Plot

Row

Grave

176235 1826262 1549302 1603839 1684124 989177 1567899

F/O O M C Jones DFC Sgt P R Jenkinson DFM Flt Sgt E W Fletcher Flt Sgt J F Dormer Flt Sgt J Coles Flt Sgt H Ferguson Flt Sgt J W Milburn

V V V V V V V

H H H H H H H

19 20 21 22 23 24 25

Method of Burial Once in the correct cemetery the airmen were laid out in specific ways. Where individuals had been identified they were marked with their own headstone, properly spaced. Where the bodies had been identified as a specific crew, several actions could be taken based on the condition of the bodies, each with the headstones grouped closer together. • • • 1.2.

Where none of the individual crew members had been identified, headstones were set out in alphabetical order. Where some of the crew members had been identified, they were given their own markers, with the rest of the names being on individual markers laid out in alphabetical order. If the bodies of one crew were inseparable, they would be buried under shared headstones.

CAPTURED AIRCREW Probably the two biggest fears of bomber aircrew if they survived a crash were fire and the reaction of German civilians to aircrew that had been bombing their towns and cities. The fear of fire was probably greater than any of their other worries, oxygen starvation, extreme cold, fatigue, frostbite, enemy fighters and flak. But if they survived all of this there was a fear of what reaction they would get from civilians if they survived the crash. (Only 25% of airmen safely exited Halifaxes and Stirlings, a mere 15% from Lancasters. Landings were often perilous). If the airman was lucky once they were captured they would be safely handed over to the Luftwaffe and after a period of interrogation, they would be sent to a Luftwaffe Prisoner of War Camp. If they were unlucky they could be killed by the SS, the Gestapo or angry civilians. As early as 1940, Hitler's deputy Rudolf Hess had demanded that enemy parachutists should be ‘arrested or rendered harmless’. Three years later, in August, 1943, Heinrich Himmler sent out a circular to all Higher SS and Police Leaders that denied parachuted men the ‘protection against acts of violence’ to which they were entitled under the Geneva Convention. At end of May 1944, Minister of Propaganda Dr. Joseph Goebbels wrote: It is only with the assistance of the armed forces that it would be possible to preserve the lives of shot down enemy pilots after such (sic. air) raids, because otherwise they would be beaten to death by the afflicted populace. Who is within his rights here: The murderers who after having committed their cowardly misdeeds still expect humane treatment on the part of their victims, or the victims who want to strike back following the doctrine of “an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth”? These questions are not hard to answer. It does not seem possible nor bearable any more to use German police or army against the German people when they treat murderers of children like they deserve.

Field Marshal Keitel wrote down that Hitler decided, end of May 1944, that the army should shoot to death downed Allied airmen in certain cases without even so much as a drumhead court-martial, to wit, if they had fired at German airmen while they came down with a parachute, or at crash-landed German planes while there were still crew members on board, or at public transport railway trains, or, in low altitude raids, at civilian individuals. Hitler's party secretary Martin Bormann sent out a secret circular in May 1944 for verbal communication to local Nazi party leaders. He wrote that during the past weeks low altitude fliers had repeatedly attacked non-military targets such as playing children, ploughing farmers etc., that in several cases the pilots of such planes who had to crash land or bail out were lynched on the spot by the enraged populace, and that (hint, hint) it had been decided not to prosecute the German nationals involved.

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th

Perhaps the most famous lynching of downed airmen occurred at Rüsselsheim on 26 August 1944. Eight capture US airmen were being marched through Rüsselsheim (some say deliberately to attract civilians). They were surrounded by an angry mob, six were killed but two eventually escaped and survived the war. After the war five civilians and one soldier were executed following war crime trials. st

Other instances of murder will still occurring in 1945. On 1 February, just two days after Teddy died, F/Lt J K Livingstone after parachuting from his damaged aircraft was captured by German civilians and physically assaulted. He was then handed over to a SD (the SS and the Nazi Party's Independent Intelligence Service) Unit commanded by SS Obersturmbannfuhrer Wilhelm Wiebens, who was more than happy to assist in the disposal of another Terrorfliger. That night ‘a limping, beaten, bleeding and dishevelled airman’ was taken into custody by Unterscharfuhrer Kornelius Kayser. After Kayser was finished the body was left where it fell for several days, before being taken to the local cemetery where it was then dumped into an unmarked or numbered grave that was already open for someone else. This unit of the SD was responsible for the murder of at least three Allied aircrew but some researchers believe this figure is substantially higher. After the war Kornelius Kayser was found guilty following a trial and was sentenced to death. But the killing of airmen by civilians was not just carried out by Germans; one example is that of th Oberleutnant Robert Zehbe. On 15 September 1940 his Dornier Do17Z of 1 Staffel, Kampfgeschwader 76 was shot down over London, it crashed on Victoria Station after some of the crew baled out. Zehbe landed by parachute in Kennington, near the Oval Cricket Ground and was suspended in his parachute from some cables. The attacks on London were now a week old and feelings were running high, regrettably he was set upon by an angry mob, including several women armed with pokers and kitchen knives. Zehbe was rescued by the Home Guard and driven away but died of his wounds the next day. 1.3.

LOCATING WAR GRAVES During WW2 over 40,000 airmen from the RAF and Allied Air Forces were reported as missing on operations or routine flights. Establishing what had happened to these men was enormous task made particularly difficult due to the nature of air operations where an aircraft might be lost at any point from take-off to landing back at base. During the war years, investigation of missing aircraft and crews was hampered because of the difficulty in obtaining information from overseas in occupied countries. Sources of information included the International Red Cross telegrams, reports from France, Holland and Norway forwarded by the Red Cross, reports from Allied agents as well as reports from Air Attaches and others in neutral countries. A list issued by Germany, the Totenliste, also helped by supplying additional details such as place of burial in some cases. They did not, however, include the details about where the aircraft had crashed. After D-Day and the liberation of parts of Europe, it was possible to make fuller investigation; it was possible to receive reports directly from the areas where the aircraft had crashed. Some captured German records helped, as did the many relics and personal effects that had been rescued from a crash scene by locals. In early 1945 a RAF Missing Research and Enquiry Service was founded. Working initially in France, Search Officers were despatched to the places where aircraft were believed to have crashed to interview anyone who might have any information that would help. To begin with, the Casualty Branch sent Casualty Enquiry forms, detailing all known information to date about a particular aircraft and crew. The Search Officers worked with this information, adding to it where possible before writing a report to send back to London. Once all the facts and the burial place were known the MRES arranged for the Graves Registration Directorate to register and mark the grave. When this was completed a case would be considered closed. Eventually it was realised that due to the number of crashes to be investigated a more methodical approach to locating and investigating them would be required. After dealing with the Casualty Enquires from London, Search Officers would then search in their area village by village and district by district.

2. STUTTGART 2.1.

th

th

AFTERMATH OF THE OPERATION 28 /29 JANUARY 1945 Bombs fell in many parts of Stuttgart’s northern and western suburbs. The important Bosch works, in the suburb of Feuerbach, was hit. The attack on Kornwestheim was the worst suffered by that town during the war; the Kornwestheim local report shows that the local people felt they had been bombed by mistake and that the main target was in Stuttgart. 14 high-explosive bombs fell in the industrial area of the town and in the railway yards. Fires burned for up to 12 hours. 123 people were killed in Page 105 of 108

Stuttgart and 41 in Kornwestheim. A large number of bombs fell outside Stuttgart, particularly in the east around the Weilimdorf decoy fire site which was also firing dummy target-indicator rockets into the air. The village of Weilimdorf, situated not far away, complained bitterly about its damage and casualties. This was the worst attack that the decoy fire site had to endure; approximately 300 explosive and 20,000 incendiary bombs were counted in the grounds of the fire decoy site. schutzbauten-stuttgart.de/enus/geschichte2weltkrieg/luftschutzinstuttgart2weltkrieg/tarnenundtäuschen/brandanlageweilimdorf.aspx

This was the last large R.A.F. raid on Stuttgart. The city had endured 53 major raids, most of them by the R.A.F., during which 32,549 blocks of flats or houses were destroyed (67.8% of the total). After the war, 4.9 million cubic metres of rubble had to be cleared. 4,562 people died in the air raids, among them 770 prisoners of war or foreign workers. Stuttgart’s experience was not as severe as other German cities. Its location, spread out in a series of deep valleys, had consistently frustrated the Pathfinders and the shelters dug into the sides of the surrounding hills had saved many lives. (a shelter in Stuttgart. Everitt, Chris. The Bomber Command War Diaries, Pen and Sword

From February 1940 all civil construction projects were stopped and only war-relevant buildings such as bunkers were built. In August 1941 there were sufficient air raid shelters for about five percent of the population. An order was issued for the expansion of 6170 cellars into air-raid shelters employing a mix of German workers and prisoners of war. On May 23, 1944 the Mayor Karl Strölin reported to a council meeting that around 477,000 shelter spaces were available for the 352,000 residents of Stuttgart. schutzbauten-stuttgart.de/de-de/geschichte2weltkrieg/schutzraumbau2weltkrieg/schutzraumbauinstuttgart.aspx

2.2.

NUMBER OF ALLIED BOMBING ATTACKS ON STUTTGART The bombing of Stuttgart in WW2 was a series of 53 air raids that formed part of the strategic air offensive of the Allies against Germany. The first bombing (by 20 aircraft of the RAF) occurred on th 25 August 1940, and resulted in the destruction of 17 buildings. The city was repeatedly attacked over the next four and one-half years by both the RAF and the 8th US Air Force as it had significant industrial capacity (including the Daimler and Porsche automotive factories) and several military bases, and was also a centre of rail transportation in southwestern Germany. Stuttgart endured 18 th large-scale attacks by the RAF during the war (the first and last of which were on 5 March 1942 and th 13 February 1945 respectively), during which 21,016 long tons (21,353 tons) of bombs were dropped on the city. However, the RAF concluded that its attacks against Stuttgart were not as effective as they could have been. Stuttgart's experience was not as severe as other German cities. Its location, spread out in a series of deep valleys, consistently frustrated the Pathfinders and the shelters dug into the sides of the surrounding hills had saved many lives. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Stuttgart_in_World_War_II # 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

9

10 11[c] 12 13

DATE AND TIME 25 August 1940 00:16–01:24 8 November 1940 21:16–24:00 10 February 1941 00:28–01:43

AREA(S) DAMAGED Gaisburg, Stuttgart-East; Untertürkheim

Castle Solitude

No casualties

5 May 1942 00:33–02:43

Zuffenhausen; Bad Cannstatt

13 killed, 37 injured

6 May 1942 01:51–01:53 29 August 1942 01:45 22 November 1942 21:30–22:45 11 March 1943 22:46–23:50

Kräherwald

No casualties

Dinkelacker brewery, Stuttgart-South Rohr, Vaihingen; Möhringen; Plieningen Vaihingen; Kaltental, Stuttgart-South

15 April 1943 00:42–01:52

Bad Cannstatt; Münster; Mühlhausen

17 April 1943 01:10 6 September 1943 10:44–11:10 8 October 1943 00:02–00:53 26 November 1943 20:25–21:12

Stuttgart Centre

Stuttgart-West Stuttgart West; Stuttgart South Karlshöhe, Stuttgart-South Bad Cannstatt; Untertürkheim; Daimler plant

CASUALTIES Four killed, five injured None killed, three injured

No casualties 28 killed, 71 injured 112 killed, 386 injured 619 killed, 705 injured; 400 prisoners of war killed in Gaisburg One killed, 58 injured 107 killed, 165 injured 104 killed, 300 injured 31 killed, 156 injured

FORCE Est. 20 planes Est. 20 planes One plane 121 planes: 69 Wellingtons, 19 Hampdens, 14 Lancasters, 12 Stirlings, 7 Halifaxes 77 planes: 49 Wellingtons, 13 Stirlings, 11 Halifaxes, 4 Lancasters One plane 222 planes: 97 Lancasters, 59 Wellingtons, 39 Halifaxes, 27 Stirlings. 314 planes: 152 Lancasters, 109 Halifaxes, 53 Stirlings. 462 planes: 146 Wellingtons, 135 Halifaxes, 98 Lancasters, 83 Stirlings. One plane 262 planes: All Boeing B-17s 343 planes: All Lancasters 178 planes: 157 Halifaxes, 21 Lancasters. Page 106 of 108

# 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

21

22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30[d] [d]

31

32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 [e]

42

43[e] 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

DATE AND TIME 21 February 1944 03:57–05:09 25 February 1944 14:25–15:00 2 March 1944 02:51–04:01 15 March 1944 23:10–00:13 28 April 1944 01:50–02:20 16 July 1944 10:09–10:25 21 July 1944 11:04–11:12 25 July 1944 01:35–02:10 26 July 1944 01:38–02:35 28 July 1944 01:22–01:50 29 July 1944 01:48–02:30 5 September 1944 11:15–11:54 10 September 1944 11:21–11:40 12 September 1944 22:59–23:30 3 October 1944 22:01 14 October 1944 04:35–04:56 19 October 1944 20:25–21:10 19 October 1944 00:55–01:38 5 November 1944 20:00–20:30 5 November 1944 23:32–23:48 21 November 1944 19:10–19:16 26 November 1944 01:57–02:00 4 December 1944 14:48 9 December 1944 12:25–13:15 11 December 1944 11:51–11:52 7 January 1945 21:49 20 January 1945 11:50–12:05 21 January 1945 12:58–13:00 28 January 1945 20:35–20:54 28 January 1945 23:30–23:48 1 February 1945 19:47 12 February 1945 19:30–19:46 3 March 1945 14:32–14:42 4 March 1945 10:20–10:28 9 March 1945 15:02–15:03 12 March 1945 21:02 25 March 1945 07:55

AREA(S) DAMAGED Bad Cannstatt; Feuerbach Feuerbach; Bad Cannstatt; Bad Cannstatt; the New Palace

CASUALTIES 160 killed, 977 injured

FORCE 598 planes: 460 Lancasters, 126 Halifaxes, 12 Mosquitoes.

10 killed, 56 injured

50 planes: All B17s

125 killed, 510 injured

557 planes: 415 Lancasters, 129 Halifaxes, 13 Mosquitoes 863 planes: 617 Lancasters, 230 Halifaxes, 16 Mosquitoes

Vaihingen, Möhringen

86 killed, 203 injured

Stuttgart Centre; Feuerbach; Bad Cannstatt Bad Cannstatt; Winterhalde

None killed, 9 injured

13 planes

42 killed, 94 injured

Est. 100 planes

Zuffenhausen

31 killed, 29 injured

25 planes

Stuttgart Centre

884 killed, 1916 injured, 14 missing during the period of July 25 to July 29

614 planes: 461 Lancasters, 153 Halifaxes

Stuttgart Centre

see 25 July

550 planes: 412 Lancasters, 138 Halifaxes

see 25 July

30 planes: All Mosquitoes

see 25 July

496 planes: 494 Lancasters, 2 Mosquitoes

Untertürkheim; Wangen

37 killed, 70 injured

Est. 200 planes

Zuffenhausen; Feuerbach; Stammheim

28 killed, 113 injured

Est. 200 planes

Stuttgart West

957 killed, 1600 injured

217 planes: 204 Lancasters, 13 Mosquitoes

Weilimdorf

No casualties

One plane

Zuffenhausen

Two killed, 40 injured

Four planes: All Mosquitoes

Surrounding area; Stuttgart North Feuerbach; Botnang; Ostheim and Gablenberg, Stuttgart-East

Bad Cannstatt; Feuerbach; Gaisburg Bad Cannstatt; Feuerbach; Gaisburg

No casualties

Unknown

338 killed, 872 injured

583 planes: 565 Lancasters and 18 Mosquitoes

Bad Cannstatt; Münster

24 killed 46 injured

132 planes

See last entry

65 planes: All Mosquitoes

Bad Cannstatt; Münster

One killed, one injured None killed, 10 injured One killed, two injured

Nine planes: All Mosquitoes

Bad Cannstatt

24 killed, 55 injured

Est. 350 planes

Untertürkheim

Three killed, 11 injured

Four planes

Feuerbach

No casualties

Unknown

Bad Cannstatt

One killed, 12 injured

Est. 30 planes

Münster; Hofen

No casualties

12 planes

No casualties

226 planes

123 killed, 78 injured

376 planes

Bad Cannstatt

None killed, 13 injured

One plane

Bad Cannstatt

68 killed, 139 injured

Est. 30 planes

Stuttgart-North

One killed, one injured

Est. Eight planes

Bad Cannstatt; StuttgartWest

50 killed, 135 injured

Est. 40 planes

Bad Cannstatt

None killed, four injured

Est. 150 planes

Feuerbach

Six killed, 11 injured

One plane

Weilimdorf

No casualties

Two planes

Stuttgart-South Bad Cannstatt Hofen, Mühlhausen

Feuerbach; Weilimdorf; Botnang Feuerbach; Weilimdorf; Botnang

29 planes: All Mosquitoes

One plane

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2.3.

DATE AND TIME 25 March 1945 13:35–13:37 1 April 1945 07:17–09:45 19 April 1945 22:12

AREA(S) DAMAGED Stammheim; Zuffenhausen Weilimdorf Stuttgart-North

CASUALTIES None killed, four injured Two killed, 16 injured One killed, seven injured

FORCE Eight planes Eight planes One plane

REBUILDING STUTTGART nd

For Stuttgart WW2 ended with a quiet surrender on 22 April 22 1945. The city’s mayor officially handed the city over to the commander in chief of the French troops following their arrival just a day earlier. At Bosch and throughout the city, industrial production, which had already virtually ground to a halt, was shut down immediately.

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