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The evolution of REDD+: An analysis of discursive-institutional dynamics Jan Willem den Bestena,b,*, Bas Artsa, Patrick
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environmental science & policy 35 (2014) 40–48
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/envsci
The evolution of REDD+: An analysis of discursiveinstitutional dynamics Jan Willem den Besten a,b,*, Bas Arts a, Patrick Verkooijen c a
Forest and Nature Conservation Policy Group, Wageningen University and Research Centre (WUR), 6708 PB Wageningen, The Netherlands b International Union for Conservation of Nature National Committee of the Netherlands, Plantage Middenlaan 2K, 1018 DD Amsterdam, The Netherlands c The World Bank, Washington DC, USA
article info
abstract
Article history:
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+1) is a policy that
Received 30 November 2011
developed under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
Received in revised form
and is based on the idea that climate funds and carbon markets can be used to incentivise
25 November 2012
developing countries to reduce tropical deforestation. This paper analyses the development
Accepted 19 March 2013
of REDD+ from 2004 to 2011 through Discursive Institutional Analysis (DIA). DIA seeks to
Available online 26 April 2013
analyse how new discourses become institutionalised in plans, regulations and guidelines, while including and excluding issues, (re)defining topics, and (re)shaping human interac-
Keywords:
tions. The analysis of policy documents and 32 in depth interviews with actors involved in
REDD+
the climate negotiations illustrates how discursive and institutional dynamics influenced
Climate change
each other. Competing discourse coalitions struggled over the definition and scope of
Sustainable development
REDD+, the use of markets and funds, and the issue of social and environmental safeguards.
Forest governance
The rapid development of the REDD+ discourse has nonetheless culminated in new
Discursive institutionalism
institutional arrangements. The working of a ‘discursive-institutional spiral’ is revealed
Indigenous Peoples
where discourse coalitions respond to the inclusion and exclusion of ideas in institutions and practices. The institutional contexts at the same time shape the boundaries within which actors can bring in new ideas and concepts. # 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1.
Introduction
Deforestation and forest degradation contribute to 12–17% of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Van der Werf et al., 2009; IPCC, 2007; Stern, 2006). Hence, forest protection can play
an important role in mitigating climate change. Experts have argued that the target to limit global warming to 2 8C or less cannot be reached without incentivising the protection of tropical forests (Stern, 2006; IPCC, 2007). Reducing Emissions from Deforestation (RED) was proposed at the 11th Conference of Parties (COP) of the United Nations Framework Convention
* Corresponding author at: International Union for Conservation of Nature - National Committee of the Netherlands, Plantage Middenlaan 2K, 1018 DD Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Tel.: +31 20 6261732. E-mail addresses: [email protected], [email protected] (J.W. den Besten). 1 REDD+ in this article refers to ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation in Developing Countries and the Conservation, Sustainable Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks’ (REDD+), paragraph 1.b.iii of the Bali Action Plan agreed by parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 2007. When the text refers specifically to the discourse used between 2005 and 2006 which referred to the narrower scope of deforestation but not forest degradation, the term ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation’ (RED) is used. 1462-9011/$ – see front matter # 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2013.03.009
environmental science & policy 35 (2014) 40–48
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2005 as a forest-based mitigation strategy for a post-2012 climate regime. The central idea was that finances could be generated for the protection of forests in developing countries by creating forest carbon credits. These credits could then be traded or exchanged within carbon markets linked to a post-2012 climate deal (UNFCCC, 2005; Humphreys, 2008). The introduction of REDD+ responded to the fact that incentives for tropical forestry under the Kyoto Protocol were limited to plantation forests only under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (UNFCCC, 2002). Besides carbon stocks, forests are important storehouses of biodiversity (Myers et al., 2000; Wilson, 2006) and provide for the livelihoods of an estimated 1.2 billion often poor people worldwide (World Bank, 2004). Biodiversity conservation and the interests of Indigenous Peoples and local communities are therefore important issues in global discussions on forest and climate and they have played a key role in the development of REDD+. Given the overall slow pace of international climate negotiations the evolution of REDD+ and its recognition in policies, plans and programmes has occurred surprisingly quickly. This paper analyses the development of REDD+ from 2004 to 2011 through a Discursive Institutional Analysis (DIA). This approach looks at the relations between discourses and institutions, how actors shape discourses, and how discourses are institutionalised (partly so, or not at all). Actors involved in the global REDD+ debate have struggled over ideas, concepts and meanings but have nonetheless reached some compromises. The implementation of REDD+ in agreements and institutions, and how that process in turn influenced the continuing development of the discourse, is analysed. This research seeks to answer the following questions: 1) What actors or groups of actors took part in the negotiation process that culminated in the REDD+ agreements? 2) What ideas and concepts did these actors introduce or contest in this process? 3) To what extent did the REDD+ discourse contribute to changes in institutional arrangements and how did the institutional context in turn influence the further development of the discourse?
2.
Discourses and institutions
2.1.
Discursive approaches
Attention to the role of discourses – generally described as language practices that give meaning to reality – has grown over the past decades within theories on policy analysis (Fischer, 2003; Hajer and Versteeg, 2005). In particular, studies on the development of environmental policy have revealed how the ‘naming and framing’ of environmental problems are the result of discursive processes (Jasanoff, 1990; Hajer, 1995). Thus, the analysis of discourses can help us to understand how certain policy ideas and concepts gain legitimacy over others and how struggles over meaning ultimately define a policy problem. Some argumentative approaches focus on the agency of actors as the entry point of analysis (Scho¨n and Rein, 1994; Snow and Benford, 2000). They analyse how actors, coalitions and networks frame policy issues differently, thus
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structuring issues through strategic action and contests over elements of the discourse (Fischer, 2003; Arts and Leroy, 2006). Other discourse approaches focus on the working of scientific paradigms, societal institutions and technologies of power through language practices and systems of meaning (Foucault, 1994; Hajer, 1995, p. 264). Such approaches prioritise structures over agencies and analyse how discourses – as a disciplining force – shape subjects, identities and interests.
2.2.
Discursive institutionalism
Discursive institutionalism (DI) considers discourses not only as ideas and language, but takes into account the institutional context in which discourses emerge and the way in which they are institutionalised in social practices (Schmidt, 2008; Arts and Buizer, 2008). The distinction between ideas, discourses and institutions is important. In discursive institutionalism, ideas are considered to be the carriers of the content of a discourse. Ideas can be cognitive or normative, and therefore can also convey interests (Schmidt, 2008). Discourses in this approach are defined as communicative processes through which actors structure and exchange their ideas, often through contestation with others. Discourses are then ‘the how, when, why and where’ ideas are conveyed. Institutions in this line of thinking are seen as norms, laws, conventions and procedures that both enable and constrain discourses (Schmidt, 2008; Arts and Buizer, 2008). But actors may also simultaneously bring about change in institutions through their discursive practices. According to DI, actors may alter or maintain, through their discursive abilities and the logic of communication, the institutions of which they are a part. They can deliberate about institutional rules, even while using them, and they can urge others to maintain or change those institutions of which they themselves are part (Schmidt, 2008). By analysing actors and the ideas they bring to discourses, it is thus possible to explain change and continuity in institutions and social practices. In this paper, we introduce the concept of the ‘discursiveinstitutional spiral’ to discursive-institutional theory. This term refers to the dynamic process of institutionalisation of discourses on the one hand and the opening up of discourses in response to these institutionalisation processes on the other. It suggests the ‘spiralling’ of a discourse through expanding constellations of actors and ideas that contribute to discourse development, and subsequent moments of discourse institutionalisation in arrangements and practices. The discourse then narrows down, including and excluding certain ideas in new rulemaking. Such spiralling is also an expression of power, because some actors and ideas will ‘win’ over others in this discursive-institutional process.
2.3.
Methodological framework
The development of REDD+ was analysed using the Policy Arrangement Approach (PAA) (Arts and Leroy, 2006). The PAA is characterised by four analytical key dimensions of discourses, actors, power and rules in a policy field and its focus on the broader institutional context of policy making. It has also been used as an operationalisation of DI in order to better analyse how discourse coalitions emerge in policy fields, fight
42
environmental science & policy 35 (2014) 40–48
for dominance and push for formal or informal rule making (Arts and Buizer, 2008). Here, power is conceptualised as ‘discursive hegemony’, which occurs when dominant discourse coalitions are best able to structure and mainstream their discursive positions (Hajer, 1995). Together with the emergence of new rules, this process of gaining dominance indicates the institutionalisation of a discourse. Inspired by this approach, we looked at actors, their ideas and concepts, their formation of coalitions, their fight for discursive hegemony and, consequently, new rulemaking in the development of REDD+ between 2004 and 2011. In doing so, we took the wider pre-existing institutional context into account, notably the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol, to investigate whether a discursive-institutional spiral had formed. Thirty-two in-depth interviews formed the empirical foundation of this research. Respondents included government representatives from Brazil, Costa Rica, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, European Union, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Japan, Nigeria, Norway, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines and Surinam. Four intergovernmental organisations (IGO), four environmental nongovernmental organisations (ENGO), four Indigenous Peoples’ and community organisations, two forestry experts and two private sector actors were interviewed. In addition, more than 50 submissions of parties to the UNFCCC and position papers of non-state actors were analysed, and approximately two dozen formal and informal negotiation sessions were observed during meetings of the UNFCCC, Forest Investment Programme (FIP) and Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) between 2009 and 2011. The interviews, documents and observations offered building blocks for the reconstruction of discourses, coalitions, power and rules through comparative content analysis and based on the methodological principle of triangulation (Van den Brink and Metze, 2006). The following section examines REDD+ discourse development between 2004 and 2007 and the way it became institutionalised in policy arrangements and social practices. Section 4 provides a similar assessment for the period 2008 to 2011. Section 5 describes how a discursive-institutional spiral was at work as part of the development of REDD+ between 2004 and 2011. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper.
3. 2004–2007: the development and early institutionalisation of REDD+ 3.1.
Forests in the Kyoto Protocol
When RED was proposed at the UNFCCC in 2005, the issue of forests was not popular in the climate negotiations. The issue had stalled the negotiation process in the run up to the Kyoto Protocol. Several reasons have been identified for this (Fearnside, 2001; Humphreys, 2008). First, developed nations with large expanses of forests dominated the debate at this time. They wanted to be allowed to credit the protection of their forests and use these credits to offset part of their carbon dioxide (CO2) emission reduction obligations. This led to protracted discussions with other developed countries and the complete disengagement of developing countries from the
mitigation debate. Second, the proponents of RED suggested that forests should be credited even if they were not under threat of deforestation. The idea was that forests would continuously remove CO2 from the atmosphere and function as carbon ‘sinks’. There was widespread doubt whether it was technologically possible to account for incremental increases in carbon stocks. Experts moreover argued that if forests were not under direct threat of deforestation, the credits generated would not represent real-time reductions in CO2 emissions. Most of these controversies could not be resolved. Eventually the Marrakesh Accords (UNFCCC, 2002) afforded limited options for the crediting of forests. Developing countries could credit plantation forests as part of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (UNFCCC, 2002) but natural forests could not be credited.
3.2.
2004–2005: inception of RED
After the Marrakesh Accords, some experts and ENGOs argued that the UNFCCC should permit the use of climate funds to reduce or avoid deforestation (Niesten et al., 2002; Santilli et al., 2005). It took, however, until 2004 before a larger, international group of actors promoted this idea more. A coalition of high-level policymakers, academics, ENGOs and private sector representatives emerged. The group included luminaries such as academics Joseph Stiglitz and Jeffrey Sachs, and former Prime Minister Somare of Papua New Guinea. The network met regularly at Columbia University in New York and on the sidelines of ministerial meetings at the UN Commission on Sustainable Development. Here, they were able to float their ideas with international policymakers. They pointed at the failure of the CDM because it did not incentivise developing countries to protect natural forests (Somare, 2005; Stiglitz, 2005). Both cognitive and normative arguments were put forward. First, the idea was that Reduced Emissions from Deforestation – or RED with just one ‘D’, as it was called at that time – could be a cost-effective way to address climate change. Second, the argument was given legitimacy by stressing that it would contribute to ‘co-benefits’ such as poverty reduction, biodiversity conservation and sustainable development (Somare, 2005; Stiglitz, 2005). In 2005, Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica presented a submission for RED. COP11 adopted the submission and called upon countries to present ideas on approaches to address technological and political issues to the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) (IISD, 2005). The submission was made on behalf of the Coalition of Rainforest Nations (CRfN). This organisation was specifically set up to promote the issue and prominent persons from within the network of RED proponents took positions on its board and directorate. In the following years, the CRfN played an active role in bringing together developing countries with common interests in an attempt to achieve broad country participation in RED, and later REDD+.
3.3.
2005–2006: rapid expansion from RED to REDD+
In the SBSTA, countries with similar forest dynamics started to work together to make sure that a future RED policy would include options for them to participate too and to have access
environmental science & policy 35 (2014) 40–48
to RED finance. What forest dynamics and activities could be covered, according to the various players, depended on their countries’ remaining forest cover and the rate of deforestation. As part of this debate, two discourse coalitions emerged from among the countries working with the CRfN. First, countries that were mostly affected by forest degradation, and not deforestation, argued for RED to be expanded to address degradation. Countries in the Congo Basin took the lead and convinced others that it was technologically possible to account for carbon credits from reducing forest degradation. As a consequence, mainstream language changed from RED to ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation’, or REDD with double D. This conceptual shift was officially adopted at COP14 in 2008 (UNFCCC, 2008; 2007a, p. 36; 2007b, p. 63; 82; 2007c, pp. 14–15; UNFCCC, 2006a; UNFCCC, 2006b). Second, a discourse coalition formed around a group of countries with low but relatively stable forest cover, such as India, or even with expanding cover, such as China. They too promoted the inclusion of conservation, sustainable forest management and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in REDD (Fry, 2008; UNFCCC, 2007a,b). Their ideas, however, received strong opposition from countries with high deforestation rates, notably from Brazil and other countries in South America. These countries thought that payments should not be provided for forests that were not under imminent threat (UNFCCC, 2007b, pp. 23–25). Agreement was nevertheless reached over the broad scope of what was now called REDD+. Article 1(b) iii of the Bali Action Plan (BAP) called for policy approaches and positive incentives on REDD, and on conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries (UNFCCC, 2008). These last three elements became the ‘+’ in REDD+. A consensus was partly possible because donors started to make financial commitments to REDD+ preparations and instilled confidence in countries that REDD+ enjoyed their support. COP13 did not, however, resolve the issue of the financial architecture of REDD+. The CRfN promoted the idea that REDD should be financed through (early) donor finance through public funds and that long term finance could be raised through the carbon markets. Carbon markets had been created under the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and included options for the trading of emission reduction ‘allowances’. This meant that countries or companies would be permitted to trade part of their emission reduction targets as ‘carbon credits’ to entities that could achieve the equivalent of these reductions at a price that was low enough to make the transaction profitable. Meanwhile countries such as China, Brazil and other South American countries opposed the role of markets (Fry, 2008; UNFCCC, 2007a).
3.4.
2007–2008: early institutionalisation of REDD+
By the end of 2007, the formal institutionalisation of REDD+ began. The decisions of COP13 laid down a roadmap for a postKyoto 2012 climate agreement and REDD+ became an integral part of it. The language on REDD+ in the BAP provided guidance for subsequent rulemaking under the UNFCCC including on scope, the need for national level strategies and carbon accounting, and the need for early action (UNFCCC, 2011a,
43
2010a, 2009a). Most REDD+ countries were by 2011 at various stages of developing national REDD+ strategies and in many cases were incorporating REDD+ in new or revised legislation. In line with the urgency stressed in the BAP, rules governing REDD+ evolved rapidly and developed simultaneously as part of multilateral and bilateral REDD+ financial arrangements. These included the World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) and Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative, both of which were announced at COP13. The FCPF was set up to guide developing countries with forests to prepare for REDD+ through piloting and capacity building, also referred to as ‘REDD readiness’. Norway’s initiative made funds available for immediate action and for promoting the inclusion of REDD+ under the UNFCCC (Government of Norway, 2011). In 2008 and 2009 the United Nations Collaborative REDD Programme was set up and the World Bank initiated the Forest Investment Programme. In 2009, donor countries and REDD+ countries formed the Informal Working Group on Interim Finance for REDD+ that became the REDD+ Partnership in 2010. Various donor countries committed to considerable amounts of funds and totals consigned reached billions of dollars (World Resources Institute, 2010). The institutionalisation of REDD+ marked a narrowing down of the various ideas that had been promoted over the previous years. Funds were mostly directed to the building of institutional and technical capacity. Monitoring, Reporting and Verification and deforestation reference scenarios were also prioritised. As a consequence, policy arrangements that needed to tackle the drivers of deforestation received considerably less attention (Angelsen and Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2008; Karsenty, 2008). In addition, programmes such as Norway’s focused on areas with high carbon in the humid tropics, with less attention given to low-carbon areas in drytropical landscapes (Phelps et al., 2010; Karsenty, 2008).
4.
2008–2011: expansion of actors and of ideas
The early institutionalisation of REDD+ triggered a response from large numbers and varieties of actors. Actors introduced new ideas, reframed concepts and contested aspects of the mainstream REDD+ discourse, a discourse that was continually evolving and being reshaped. Based on our research we define three broad discourse coalitions that emerged. First, a coalition of what we call ‘critical’ actors formed. These included ENGOs, rights-based organisations, Indigenous Peoples’ Organisations (IPOs) and countries such as those of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) (Fry, 2008; UNFCCC, 2007a). Second, a coalition emerged of what we call ‘reformist’ actors such as conservation NGOs, research organisations and groups focused on dialogue. Third, there was the coalition of ‘REDD+ advocates’ that included countries, IGOs, large conservation organisations, private sector actors and investors in the voluntary carbon market.
4.1. Concern over markets and an overemphasis on carbon and techno-centric solutions ‘Critical’ actors condemned the proposed role of markets and the perceived over-emphasis on carbon and technocratic
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solutions. Markets and the trade in credits were, for example, seen to be inappropriate ways to finance the protection of forests. The fear was that they would harm the ecological and social functions of forests (Climate Action Network, 2009; Greenpeace International, 2009; UNFCCC, 2010b, 2009b). Moreover, the possibility that developed countries could finance REDD+ projects to help reach their emission reduction targets was seen as presenting these countries with an alibi to avoid reducing CO2 emissions at home (Climate Action Network, 2009). Furthermore, REDD+ and the REDD+ preparatory schemes were seen to focus too much on technocratic solutions such as carbon accounting while assuming that social and environmental co-benefits would automatically materialise in the course of REDD+ implementation. REDD+ critics feared co-benefits would not materialise unless social and environmental issues were fundamental prerequisites for REDD+. Many therefore called for a rejection of REDD+ unless the interests of people and biodiversity were guaranteed (Greenpeace International, 2009; Global Witness, 2009; IPGSCC, 2009; Griffiths, 2008; FOE, 2008). The rights of Indigenous Peoples, for example, became a key issue and support for REDD+ was made conditional on the inclusion of Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) (United Nations, 2008). Critical actors similarly demanded the limiting of the roles of actors and practices that were seen to represent mainstream development and market thinking. The involvement of the World Bank was, for example, rejected unless it was ready to change its rules, such as those laid down in their operational guidelines on the engagement of Indigenous Peoples. Similarly, discussions emerged over the interpretation of ‘sustainable management of forests’. This was an important component of the broad scope of REDD+ in the 2007 Bali Action Plan. In 2009, however, the EU and others introduced the term ‘Sustainable Forest Management (SFM)’ in the REDD+ negotiating texts (UNFCCC, 2009a; Global Witness, 2009). Critical actors interpreted this as a way to promote corporate interests through REDD+. Commercial practices of SFM have not always had a good track record and with social and environmental sustainability challenged in many cases. For this reason, critical actors rejected the inclusion of SFM in REDD+. They also rejected the inclusion of ‘enhancement of forest carbon stocks’ if there were no guarantees that industrial plantations would be excluded (Global Witness, 2009; Greenpeace International, 2009). The ‘reformist’ coalition shared critical ‘actors’ concerns over possible market failures and over social and environmental issues. They did not, however, translate this into a rejection of REDD+ or particular elements. They structured their argument around a call for safeguards to be put in place to protect biodiversity and communities’ interests (The Forest Dialogue, 2009, 2008; IUCN, 2009; The Nature Conservancy, 2009; WWF, 2009; Care International, 2009). They also stressed the need for policy reform, multi-stakeholder engagement, the strengthening of the rights of Indigenous Peoples and the need for equitable mechanisms for benefit sharing (The Forest Dialogue, 2009, 2008). However, many parties under the UNFCCC initially opposed safeguards. Biodiversity conservation and the rights of Indigenous Peoples were considered to be outside the mandate of the UNFCCC and it was feared that
talk of safeguards would stall progress on REDD+ in the negotiations.2
4.2. Convergence of ideas and the strengthening of governance, social and environmental safeguards in the institutionalisation of REDD+ readiness In the run up to COP15 in Copenhagen 2009 several developments indicated that REDD+ needed a longer preparation phase. First, it became clear that COP15 might not be able to agree a binding decision with new, binding emission reduction targets. This meant that implementing functioning carbon markets with REDD+ credits by 2012 would not be possible (CAN, 2009). Second, experience with REDD+ preparatory activities in REDD+ countries showed that ‘readiness’ preparations needed more time and resources. The building of governance capacity emerged as a particularly important issue. In anticipation of markets, such activities would have to be financed through public funds. Norway supported such an approach and commissioned a report that argued for the introduction of a ‘phased approach’ in 2009. This report suggested an early phase for REDD+ preparations and governance reform, a second phase for the development of policies and measures and a third phase for the implementation of markets (Angelsen et al., 2009). Organisations that promoted social and environmental safeguards then used the phased approach as an entry point. Language linking safeguards to the phased approach can be traced in policy documents and advisories of various actors over the course of 2009 (World Bank, 2009; IWG-IFR, 2009; The Forest Dialogue, 2009, 2008; IUCN, 2009; UNFCCC, 2009a; 2009b p. 58; La Vin˜a, 2010). Eventually, language on safeguards was laid down in the Copenhagen Accord and in subsequent UNFCCC agreements (UNFCCC, 2011a, 2010a, 2009a). The FCPF, FIP and UN REDD also strengthened work on the alignment of their safeguards through a ‘‘Common Approach’’ (FCPF, 2011; World Bank, 2010). Funds made available through these arrangements and through bilateral programmes encouraged REDD+ countries to use readiness funds to reform legal and legislative frameworks, organise stakeholder consultation, build systems for the sharing of benefits and for the implementation of safeguards as part of their national REDD+ strategies. In addition, the growing share of forest carbon projects in voluntary markets led to the development of standards for biodiversity and communities which were considered essential as a means to reduce investment risks (Diaz et al., 2011). This process of institutionalisation once more represented a narrowing down and exclusion of some ideas. Agreement was not, for example, reached on the inclusion of agricultural soils, a proposal which by 2008 some actors had begun referring to as REDD++. As REDD+ initiatives developed, the realisation also grew that its implementers lacked the capacity to tackle the drivers of deforestation, in particular international drivers associated with commercial agriculture (Karsenty, 2008). Finally, many countries found that the coordination of REDD+ with other sectors such as energy, food and commodity agriculture proved difficult (The Forest Dialogue, 2012). 2
Interview, NGOs; IGOs; non-Annex I Parties; Annex-I Party.
environmental science & policy 35 (2014) 40–48
5.
A discursive-institutional spiral
The analysis of the development of REDD+ from 2004 to 2011 reveals a discursive-institutional spiral. Over this period, there was twice an expansion of actor involvement leading to the development of new ideas and concepts. This increasing involvement of actors and ideas was a response to the direction of earlier institutionalisation processes. In turn, the expansion of actors and ideas was followed by a new progression towards institutionalisation.
5.1. Actors and ideas in response to earlier institutionalisation Both the inception of RED between 2004 and 2007 and the emergence of critical actors between 2008 and 2011 responded to moments of institutionalisation. In both cases the inclusion or exclusion of specific practices or actors in the institutionalised arrangement triggered an important response. Responding to these wanted or unwanted elements, actors put forth ideas and contributed to adjustments in the proposed arrangement. Around 2004, actors introduced RED in response to what they saw as a lack of options under the CDM for developing countries to access climate funds to
45
protect their forests. In 2008–2009, after the early institutionalisation of REDD+, critical actors expressed concern that the REDD+ arrangement concentrated too much on the working of markets, carbon and techno-centric solutions. In both cases concerns over biodiversity, poverty reduction and the interests of forest communities played an important role in the debate. In both cases, however, actors targeted very specific elements in the institutional arrangements. Critics of the CDM were specifically concerned that plantation forests were eligible for climate funds whereas the protection of natural forests was not. The institutionalisation of REDD+ after COP13 in 2007 triggered general criticism on the dominance of carbon, markets and technological solutions as part of REDD+. Critical actors built their discourse around a limited number of specific elements of the REDD+ institutional arrangements. The involvement of the World Bank was, for example, strongly criticised as an example of how not to implement REDD+. Also, the inclusion of particular practices such as SFM or monoculture plantations triggered a reaction, as this was perceived as representing specific business interests such as the logging and fibre industries. The underrepresentation of specific, preferred but underrepresented practices, such as FPIC and the adherence to the rights of Indigenous Peoples and local communities, also provided entry points for critical debate.
Fig. 1 – The Discursive-Institutional Spiral in the development of REDD+ from 2004 to 2011.
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5.2.
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Moments of institutionalisation
Each of the two periods during which groups of actors introduced or reframed ideas between 2004 and 2007 and 2008 and 2009 were followed by moments of institutionalisation. In both cases, the dynamic interaction between discursive and institutional dynamics is revealed. First, while REDD+ was anchored in the Bali Action Plan at COP13 in 2007, new rules and funds had already started to be created for early REDD+ financial arrangements. In Bali intensive discussions took place over the question of whether the scope of REDD should be broadened to REDD+. Agreement over the broad scope of REDD+ was reached because (1) there was enthusiasm over the progress that had been made with bridging the differences among developing countries with regard to forests; (2) the REDD+ debate had also bridged the north–south divide in the UNFCCC and for the first time had fully engaged developing countries in the climate mitigation debate; and (3) these developments in relations between countries under the UNFCCC had in turn led to a commitment from donor countries to provide financial resources. The second crucial moment of institutionalisation took place in the period 2009–2011. During this period, ‘critical’ and ‘reformist’ actors promoted greater attention to social and environmental benefits for an effective and fair REDD+. This led to the unprecedented adoption of safeguards in the UNFCCC agreements negotiated at COP15, COP16 and COP17 (UNFCCC, 2011a, 2011b, 2010a). The early institutionalisation of REDD+ helped pave the way for this development in four respects. First, bilateral and multilateral REDD+ financial arrangements such as the FCPF, UN-REDD had by 2009 funded preparatory REDD+ activities in many developing countries. Second, as these activities took place, the overall architecture of new financial arrangements such as the FIP and REDD+ Partnership were being laid out. Informal negotiations over the design of these arrangements took place in parallel to the UNFCCC negotiations. Third, and importantly, many of the people involved in the design of these financial REDD+ arrangements also took part in the formal UNFCCC negotiations on REDD+. As a result, progress in the former influenced the latter, and vice versa. Fourth, the preparatory activities in REDD+ countries took place at national and local levels and brought actors from those levels into the loop. They generated important insights through practice on the ground that informed the REDD+ project officers at the international level. This learning confirmed that REDD+ had to urgently direct attention to social, environmental and governance issues. Because many of these project officers were also involved in the UNFCCC negotiations over REDD+, realisation of the importance of social and environmental safeguards took hold in the UNFCCC debates and contributed to broad agreement among negotiators over safeguards (UNFCCC, 2011a, 2010a, 2009a) (Fig. 1).
6.
Conclusion
The rapid development of REDD+ between 2004 and 2011 took both the global climate and forest communities by surprise.
An initially small group of actors set out to develop and promote RED around 2004. They presented RED as a costeffective climate mitigation option and raised its legitimacy by arguing that it would contribute to poverty reduction, biodiversity conservation and sustainable development as well. RED later developed into REDD+ as the outcome of debate among developing countries with different deforestation dynamics. The SBSTA between 2006 and 2007 provided a conducive context within which developing countries could bridge their divisions. This progress prompted financial commitments from donor countries that in turn instilled further confidence among developing countries to reach a consensus over the broad scope of REDD+. For the first time developing countries were fully engaged in the climate mitigation debate. After the embedding of REDD+ in the 2007 Bali Action Plan, institutional arrangements emerged, including on funds and capacity building in REDD+ countries. This early institutionalisation once more triggered discussions involving more actors introducing more ideas. A critical discourse coalition drew attention to concerns of forest communities and biodiversity conservation resulting in the embedding of social and environmental safeguards in UNFCCC agreements after 2009. The supply of financial resources for early REDD+ capacity building and the resulting preparatory activities on the ground played a decisive role in producing a consensus. The development of REDD+ shows a rich and dynamic interaction between discursive and institutional elements. This paper has argued that a ‘discursive-institutional spiral’ is at work. This model represents how an established arrangement triggers debate in which an increasing numbers of actors introduce new ideas and reframe existing ideas. Over time this may culminate in a new key moment of institutionalisation. Between 2004 and 2011, REDD+ went through two complete ‘loops’. Each loop started with a particular state of institutionalisation. In response to this, the discourse expanded, engaging more actors and germinating new ideas. Subsequently, it ‘moved back’ to institutionalisation again, the discourse narrowing down, mainstreaming as well as excluding certain ideas and concepts, and empowering and disempowering some actors more than others. However, each moment of institutionalisation is only temporarily and the evolving discourse is never fully fixed. The development of REDD+ illustrates how the production of ideas and concepts by actors on the one hand and their institutionalisation in arrangements and practices on the other are mutually constitutive. Ideas do not emerge out of a void and an expansion of ideas and actors is needed to come to new institutionalisation processes. Hence, ideas and institutions are symbiotic and cannot exist separately.
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