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The President, Politics, and the Police: Consequences of the 1970 ‘Stoning’ of Richard M. Nixon at the San Jose Civic Au
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The President, Politics, and the Police: Consequences of the 1970 ‘Stoning’ of Richard M. Nixon at the San Jose Civic Auditorium
An Essay Presented to the California Pioneers of Santa Clara County
by Kathryn Collins Philp April 15, 2005
Acknowledgments This paper is dedicated to Donald Ewing, my mentor on this project, who provided the inspiration for it, and although a retired San Jose Police Department Lieutenant, never stopped asking the questions for which I have tried to find the answers. His guidance has been of immeasurable help. From the beginning, Don advised me to be aware of “the many voices that night.” During conversations with Harry Farrell, the longtime political editor of the San Jose Mercury News, and through reading his voluminous news coverage of the Nixon “episode,” I came to deeply appreciate his descriptive, concisely-worded, and unbiased manner of reporting as well as his vast knowledge of political events. His willingness to share his insight with me has been greatly appreciated. Jennifer Evans, Steve Greene, and Allen Rice, archivists with the Nixon Presidential Materials staff located at the National Archives, generously gave of their time and provided numerous primary source materials for which I am most appreciative. Ron Burda, a cub photographer for the Spartan Daily on the night of the rally, graciously granted me permission to use his photographs from the Civic Auditorium parking lot that have helped to document “the episode” for history. Gloria Alicia Chacon, Executive Assistant to the Santa Clara County Civil Grand Jury, and Dennis Aldycki, Court Secretary, thoroughly searched through the records of the Grand Juries of 1970-1973 and located valuable information. Consuelo Chaidez Avitia, Records Supervisor in the Office of the City Clerk, promptly located the very important File #1053 in the City of San Jose’s archive which contained documents that other departments had since discarded or
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lost. The efforts of District Attorney George W. Kennedy and his staff in conducting a thorough search through their records must also be gratefully acknowledged here. Nearly thirty-five years have passed since President Nixon’s appearance at the San Jose Civic Auditorium, and I was fortunate to interview ten people who were there that night and thus serve as the ever important witnesses to the event: Gordon Abbott, Ron Burda, the late Bobby Burroughs, Vic Eastman, Don Ewing, Harry Farrell, Bob Moir, Jim Geiger, Gary Leonard, and Larry Stuefloten. An eleventh witness appeared in a letter from Donald J. Wickham (the manager of the parking lot behind the auditorium) to the President courtesy of the Nixon Presidential Materials Staff. The insights and recollections of all of these men have been of invaluable help in piecing together the strands of this story. Finally, I am very thankful to my husband, Paul Philp, and to Dorothea French, Ph.D., retired Professor of Medieval History from Santa Clara University, for their invaluable help in reading my outlines and drafts.
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Table of Contents
Page Introduction.......…………………………………………………………………….……..4 The Status Quo, 1970: A Historical Background...………………………………………6 The San Jose Police Department: 1970...……………………………………………...10 Preparations for the Civic Auditorium Rally…………………………………………..11 President Nixon’s Arrival in San Jose ……………………………………………….15 The ‘Episode’ at the Civic Auditorium...……………………………………………...17 The President’s Departure from San Jose……………………………………………...27 White House News Conference #793: (El Toro, California)…………………………..28 Political Repercussions of the Rally……………………………………………………31 The City Under Siege…………………………………………………………………...36 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………….42 Appendixes......…………………………………………………………………………..44 Notes.........………………………………………………………………………………49 Selected Bibliography…………………………………………………………………...57
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Introduction President Richard Nixon’s appearance at the Republican Party rally at the San Jose Civic Auditorium on October 29, 1970, proved to be a defining moment in San Jose’s history. In spite of songwriter Burt Bacharach’s 1968 hit, “Do You Know the Way to San Jose?” the city had little in the way of attraction for tourists and was undergoing a quiet transformation from an agricultural to a manufacturing center with a heavy emphasis in the aerospace and electronics industries. The steady rise in population was accommodated by growing suburbs of ranch houses. The “stoning” of the President generated both national and international coverage resulting in considerable negative, unfair publicity for the City of San Jose, the students at San Jose State College (SJSC), and particularly the San Jose Police Department (SJPD).
It sparked national debate over the role it played in the outcome of the
Congressional election and over the security measures in place that night. Additionally, it caused great consternation for local officials and polarized the community.
Harry
Farrell observed in 1994, that it was “perhaps the wildest political event ever in San Jose.” (1) William Safire, then a speechwriter with the Nixon staff, described the events surrounding the President’s appearance in San Jose as “a mob attack upon a U.S. President – unique in our history.” (2) Many records from the events of that night have already been publicly scrutinized. This paper brings together for the first time additional sources including documents located in the Office of the City Clerk for the City of San Jose, the ClerkBoard of Supervisors for the County of Santa Clara, and The Nixon Presidential Materials Library. The Santa Clara County Grand Jury’s Final Report, 1970, and, most
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importantly, anecdotal information obtained from recent interviews also provide new insight into the “stoning” of President Richard M. Nixon.
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The Status Quo, 1970: A Historical Background “…a historical phenomenon can never be understood apart from its moment in time.” -Marc Bloch, Professor of Medieval History In 1970, San Jose – like the rest of the United States – was deeply polarized over the war in Vietnam which had already become the longest in American history. Richard M. Nixon, elected President in November 1968, had inherited the war from Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson and was seeking a way to extricate United States forces from Southeast Asia. He therefore sought to quiet the growing concern over Vietnam by announcing his policy of “Vietnamization” which was aimed at withdrawing the 540,000 troops in South Vietnam over an extended period. One of Nixon’s first priorities was to focus on the activities in neutral Cambodia and how to destroy the Communist buildup in that country. On April 30, 1970, the President explained in a 9:00 p.m. speech to an “anxious” American public that “the actions of the enemy in the last ten days clearly endanger the lives of Americans who are in Vietnam now.” (3) The invasion of Cambodia with the aim of destroying Vietcong and North Vietnamese sanctuaries in that country had thus begun. This declaration consequently provoked bitterness between the “hawks” and the “doves” in the United States and resulted in a nationwide furor over the Cambodian invasion. Student protests accelerated across the country, and on May 4, 1970, four students at Kent State University were killed by rifle fire from National Guardsmen dispatched by Ohio Governor James Rhodes to maintain order on the campus. (4) On May 9, 1970, an estimated 75,000-100,000 demonstrators gathered on the Ellipse near the White House to protest the Cambodian invasion. (5)
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Indeed, campus disorders and violence were common occurrences in 1970 and the San Francisco Bay Area was a hotbed of radical activity. (See Figure 1). The Radical Triangle, as it became known to local law enforcement officials, encompassed the area including San Francisco State College, the University of California at Berkeley, San Jose State College, and Stanford University. Violence and mob rule were becoming the norm although San Jose State College was considered to be much quieter than Berkeley and San Francisco State where President Dr. S. I. Hayakawa gained national prominence by standing up to demonstrators on a number of occasions. Dr. Glenn S. Dumke, the Chancellor of the California State College system, pointed out that there were two kinds of campus activists: idealistic students who were deeply interested in affairs of the world, as opposed to the militant, destructive activism practiced by only a tiny minority of students (and faculty) who sought to overthrow the establishment. (6) The consensus at that time was that campus demonstrations were not spontaneous but were carefully orchestrated by groups such as the Weathermen (a splinter group of the Students for a Democratic Society which had begun a campaign of terror aimed at killing people as well as blowing up buildings), the Revolutionary Union (a Maoist organization which sought to overthrow the country), and the Black Panthers who had declared open war on the police. Therefore, a hotly debated topic was how to control violence on campuses without repressing the freedom to think and study. The primary targets of the aforementioned groups were the symbols of the Establishment: the military, corporations, universities, and the police. Police officers were “pigs” and corporations were “capitalist pig outfits” running America. “Kill the cop” was the battle cry in the street, and in the first eight months of 1970, at least a dozen
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police officers were murdered and more than 100 wounded in terrorist attacks. (7) Nationwide, there were nearly 3,000 bombings and more than 50,000 threats of planted bombs at the previously mentioned symbols of the Establishment. (8) These attacks prompted Senator James O. Eastland (D-Mississippi), Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, to declare that the late-summer attacks on police may well have been “the opening shots of a new American revolution.”
Meanwhile, Philadelphia’s Police
Commissioner Frank L. Rizzo stated: “This is no longer crime. This is revolution.” (9) Rizzo’s sentiments translated to the Bay Area during the first week of August 1970. Early Thursday morning, August 6, thirty-five-year-old San Jose Police Officer Richard Eugene Huerta was shot in the head as he sat in his patrol car using the dashboard light to write out a traffic ticket. Emile Aubert Thompson, a San Jose State College student, shoved a pistol through the passenger window and fired point blank at Officer Huerta without ever saying a word. Investigating officers subsequently found Black Panther literature in Thompson’s car nearby. (10) Police Chief Ray Blackmore termed Huerta’s death “an assassination of the star and uniform” and Huerta’s mother, Helen Dreschel, lamented that “if this tragedy will awaken the American people to support law enforcement, then it will not be a total loss.” (11) The following day, August 7, Marin County Superior Court Judge Harold J. Haley and three others were killed in a courthouse shootout involving the Black Panthers at the Marin County Hall of Justice in San Rafael. The Congressional elections of 1970 were set for November 3, and by midSeptember it was apparent to President Nixon that “we were in serious trouble in almost every race…we had peaked too early on the Social Issue.” (12)
Nixon therefore
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embarked on a campaign during the next three weeks which encompassed seven full days of campaigning for candidates in twenty-two states. Alameda County and Santa Clara County were the two most populous counties in Northern California, and Santa Clara County with its potential voter turnout was viewed by both parties as the more crucial of the two in the election. (13) As the fourth largest city in California, San Jose was thus selected as the Northern California site to boost the lagging campaign of incumbent Republican Senator George Murphy, 68, who was trailing in the polls against his challenger, Democratic Congressman John Tunney, 36, who represented Riverside and Imperial Counties. Nixon’s appearance was also expected to boost the campaigns of 19th District Representative Charles S. Gubser of Gilroy and Mark Guerra, the Republican candidate for Congress in the 9th District. In addition to the debate over the war in Vietnam, many Santa Clara County residents were concerned about the economic downturn in the valley. The period of intense industrialization that California had experienced in the postwar period was beginning to wind down in the 1960s while Japan and other Asian countries had emerged as new industrial powers. (14) During the last days of the campaign, Tunney charged that President Nixon had “secret plans” to close down Ames Research Center in Mountain View (a major National Aeronautics and Space Agency facility employing 3,000 people) and that Murphy had not said or done anything about it. (15) Thus, some of the demonstrators who rallied at the San Jose Civic Auditorium on the night of the GOP rally represented the 10,000 unemployed aerospace engineers, scientists, and workers who believed that their jobs were going elsewhere. (16)
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The San Jose Police Department: 1970 In 1970, the San Jose Police Department had a well-established record of professionalism throughout the United States and led the nation in many innovations in law enforcement. (17) San Jose State College was the home of the nation’s first degreegranting program in criminal justice in the United States (established in 1930), and there was close interaction between the college and the San Jose Police Department. Chief of Police Ray Blackmore, Chief of Detectives Bart Collins, Uniform Division Chief Elmer Klein, and Records Captain Joe Azzarello had all been on the staff in the college’s Department of Administration of Justice since the 1950s. In 1958, San Jose became the first city in the United States to set a minimum educational standard of two years of college work for police recruits – a practice that was later adopted by many other cities across the nation. (18) By December 1969, 78 percent of the 520 sworn members of the SJPD had two or more years of college and 28 percent had at least an AB degree. (19) Many of the SJPD officers thus had connections with the students and the college. Some of the younger officers (as well as the reserve officers) were still part-time students, and some of the older officers had children who were students at the college. (20) The officers of the SJPD were able to separate between the rights of free speech on the part of the college demonstrators and the actions of the known radicals. In sum, the officers were well-trained and were on duty to “serve and protect” on the night of October 29, 1970. President Nixon’s anticipated arrival into the already politicallycharged atmosphere was not anticipated to generate a situation beyond the expertise of the SJPD.
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Preparations for the Civic Auditorium Rally Richard Nixon had visited San Jose several times since 1950, but his appearance at the San Jose GOP rally was his first visit as President of the United States. Mike Cobb, the county campaign chairman for Senator Murphy, was in charge of the event and announced that enough tickets had been printed to fill all three major halls at the Civic Auditorium which seated 3,300 in the main hall. An additional 1,800 were to be accommodated by closed-circuit television monitors set up in the adjoining McCabe Hall and Montgomery Theater. (21) Plans were also in order to set up a public address system in the Civic Center Plaza Park outside the auditorium for those who did not have tickets to the rally. Meanwhile, the SJPD and the Secret Service, aware of public calls for antiwar demonstrations to take place at the rally, were quietly coordinating their security measures for the Presidential visit. As Police Chief Ray Blackmore later stated in his reports to Members of the City Council and City Manager Thomas W. Fletcher: “When the President of the United States makes a visit to a community, members of the Secret Service make contact with the local police agency indicating what they want in the matter of security and from that point on keep in constant contact with the Chief of Police and members of his staff.” (22) “The Secret Service simply points out what they want in number and the bases to be covered and then it becomes the responsibility of the Department to decide what we are going to do over and above this.”(23) In 1970, the office of the San Jose Chief of Police did not have an Intelligence Unit whose responsibility was to gather information “of the known criminals, radicals, revolutionary activist groups, organized crime activities, and potential for disorder from radical students or political groups.” (24) Therefore, in preparation for the San Jose rally, the Secret Service worked through the Detective Bureau as Chief of Detectives Bart
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Collins had detectives specifically assigned to an Intelligence Unit which had a reputation for being the best in the Bay Area.
The local office of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) had recommended Detective Sergeants Donald Ewing and Bruce Moore to work with the Secret Service in advance of the President’s visit. Unexpectedly, as part of their advance preparations, the two detectives found it a part of their duty to escort the advance man from the Secret Service to the Paul Masson winery to purchase wines for the White House. (25) Local news reporters and photographers were also gearing up for their assignments that night and had been forewarned that violence was anticipated at the rally. Ron Burda received the assignment from the Spartan Daily to cover the story with his camera and was given credentials by the Secret Service which allowed him access to the press section inside the Civic Auditorium. (26) Jim Geiger, a photojournalist with the San Jose Mercury News, also received notice that he was assigned to cover the rally that night. Geiger, owing to his imposing stature, was often called in to cover anticipated demonstrations on the San Jose State College campus. Harry Farrell (who first met President Nixon when he covered his 1962 campaign for governor of California) wrote a number of articles in preparation for the upcoming Presidential visit. Local protesters were also organizing for the rally. As soon as the President’s visit was announced, five militant campus groups including the Revolutionary Union, the Radical Action Movement, the Santa Clara County Workers Committee, the Peace and Freedom Party, and the San Jose Liberation Front, joined to plan the demonstration and displayed UNWANTED posters charging the President with “crimes against the vast
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majority of the people of the world” around the campus. (27) Ted James, spokesman for the latter group, announced that demonstrators from throughout the Bay Area were expected to attend the rally. (28) To law enforcement personnel that was a red flag: bus loads of the loyal from within the Radical Triangle intended to mobilize the forces to support their cause as the radicals believed that whenever they could get 300 of their own together they could probably get a riot started. (29) Approximately one week prior to the rally, the aforementioned groups sought and were denied a parade permit from the San Jose Police Department on the basis that parades were prohibited by City ordinance on Thursday evenings. Subsequently, several representatives from these groups along with their Attorney Earl Hedemark met with members of the Police Department including Chief Blackmore, and as a result police officials agreed to allow the students to either walk on the sidewalk or to walk in the street as long as they did not impede traffic. (30) Blackmore later recalled: “I honestly believe they intended this thing to be peaceful.” (31) On October 29, 1970, the Spartan Daily ran an article announcing the plans for the rally, march, and demonstration in protest of the President’s appearance that evening. On Wednesday night, young Republicans decorated the Civic Auditorium with posters and balloons in red, white, and blue colors. Several local bands including the Cupertino High School band practiced for their part in the evening’s festivities. (32) On Thursday, the auditorium was sealed off as officers swept through it looking for bombs. At 5:30 p.m. on Thursday, October 29, 1970, approximately 1,000 student protesters gathered at Seventh and San Carlos Streets for the rally and heard speakers from the Peace and Freedom Party, the Iranian students, United Farm Workers, and the Revolutionary Union voice their opposition to Nixon’s policies on the Vietnam War, the
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Mideast situation, and domestic issues. (33) Other speakers reminded those gathered that it was to be a peaceful march and demonstration and that “anyone who throws a rock will be considered a police provocateur.” (34) Monitors wearing red armbands controlled the students as they marched west on San Carlos Street to the site of the Civic Auditorium. By then, two helicopters – one a special bomb disposal squad from San Francisco and the other a Marine Helicopter brought in by the Secret Service – circled high over the rally. (35) Their presence was clear evidence that violence was anticipated. And so, the infamous evening thereafter referred to as “the episode,” “the visit,” the “disturbance,” and “the stoning,” began.
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President Nixon’s Arrival in San Jose By all accounts, President Nixon’s arrival in San Jose went according to plan. Bob Moir, then a Uniform Sergeant in charge of Patrol, had the airport detail that evening and “was anticipating a low-key presidential event.” (36) Two hours prior to the President’s arrival, a giant Air Force cargo plane landed and the Presidential limousine and Secret Service vehicles were unloaded. Secret Service men were positioned all over the airport – in the terminal, in the control tower, on the roof, and mingling with the crowd and the press. (37) At precisely 6:40 p.m., Air Force One (a C-137C with the tail number 26000) landed. The President exited the plane to the greetings of a friendly crowd of about 1,500 people and worked the “rope line” for a few minutes before climbing into his limousine. (38) The motorcade proceeded down Guadalupe Parkway and onto the Market Street overpass, then south on Market, winding around City Plaza to the auditorium. Security precautions proved adequate to control the early part of the evening. Between ten and fifteen officers were stationed at the airport and another eight to ten served as motorcycle escorts.
There were also three traffic car escorts plus units
stationed at all the intersections and overpasses along the planned route. (39) The mood changed, however, as the caravan neared the Civic Auditorium. In his report to the City Council received on November 23, 1970, Chief Blackmore reported that “we arrived going South on Market, turned in back of the Auditorium and there the Tact Squad made a corridor between the buildings of the Auditorium and the crowd. There was some chanting when we arrived at the Auditorium.” (40) William Safire, then a speechwriter for President Nixon, later wrote:
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The motorcade rolled into San Jose with the advance car of photographers shooting back at the President’s limousine…followed by the Greyhound buses filled with press and White House staff. I was in the next to last bus and could hardly believe what I saw. Obscene signs were nothing new, and the chant of ‘One, two, three, four, we don’t want your fuckin’ war’ had long since lost its shock value; demonstrators had plagued both parties since the late Sixties and were beginning to seem more a drag than a dread. Ordinarily, they worked their disruptive schtick in groups of twenty or thirty, popping up in an otherwise friendly crowd, but that night in San Jose was different. Slowing down, as we approached the civic auditorium, we were treated to the screams, howls, and roars of the representatives of the outer fringes of the counterculture….This was a lynch mob, no cause or ideology involved, only an orgy of generalized hate. (41) A careful distinction needs to be made about the crowd that William Safire observed. By this point, the white-collar pickets carrying signs protesting the valley’s 7.2 percent unemployment rate, the peaceful protesters from San Jose State College, the militant demonstrators, and the overflow crowd who had not been able to get tickets into the rally were all co-mingled outside the Civic Auditorium.
Once again, the “Radical
Triangle” had successfully mobilized their troops and infiltrated the crowd of demonstrators, and to the outside observer, they appeared to dominate the scene. The aforementioned groups were “left speechless” as they witnessed the jeers and cursing aimed at the squads of helmeted officers protecting the President as he arrived at the Civic Auditorium. (42)
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The ‘Episode’ at the Civic Auditorium “We didn’t appreciate this [the President’s ascendance onto the limousine], and I doubt if the Secret Service appreciated it. But the Secret Service explained to us before we started that this is a political year and if he sees something he thinks will get votes, he’ll stop. If he saw a little old lady on a crosswalk and decided to get some publicity, he’d stop, they said. It is a perfect description of the Nixon tactic.” - Capt. Lewis Haller, San Jose Police Department (43) The capacity audience inside the Civic Auditorium proved to be a well-organized and orderly group. Dignitaries on the platform that evening included Lieutenant Governor Ed Reinecke, State Controller Houston Flournoy, Secretary of State candidate James Flournoy, Congressional candidate Mark Guerra, and Representative Charles Gubser. Governor Ronald Reagan said a few words, and the party faithful applauded President Nixon and Senator Murphy for one and a half minutes when they walked on stage. In so doing, they drowned out the growing chants of a vocal minority outside. The President delivered his comments without a formal text or live television coverage, and as Harry Farrell reported, “the hard kernel of news in Nixon’s address” was the repudiation of Tunney’s assertion that the Ames Laboratory was to be closed. [It remains open as of this writing]. The President further defended his policy of gradual withdrawal from Vietnam and said that the war was being brought to an end. With regard to the demonstrators, he stated, “Our men in Vietnam are fighting so those men outside, shouting obscene slogans, won’t have to fight in Vietnam or anywhere else.” (44) Nixon received his loudest applause when he stated that young Americans “are getting a bum rap...because night after night on television what you see are the violent, radical youth” who were responsible for the bombings and bank burnings – the ones trying to shout down speakers and break up meetings. (45)
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There were nearly 300 officers on duty at the auditorium that night, and Chief Collins was in charge of the eighty plainclothes officers assigned to provide security within the Civic Auditorium. (46) The detectives worked in teams and carried photographs and identity cards of suspected and known radicals.
Don Ewing was
working alongside Collins and carried what was most likely one of the only two police radios (then referred to as hand-packs) on the scene within the auditorium that night. The auditorium itself was surrounded by foyers (also referred to as concourses) which served as buffers to the main hall, and most of the radical action during the rally was aimed at breaking into the foyers. (See Figure 2) Detective Sergeant Bruce Moore, who carried the other police radio inside the auditorium, was circulating throughout the foyer, and the two men remained in touch on the Surveillance Channel #4. In retrospect, communications between law enforcement agencies that night proved to be woefully inadequate due to the lack of coordination and integration of the equipment used by and between them. The FBI personnel had no hand-held radios, and the Secret Service which was housed on the fourth floor of the De Anza Hotel operated on its own system. The San Jose Police Department was operating on a radio system with three radio frequencies for police and one additional channel used for surveillance. The first three channels were easily accessed by the local media, but Channel 4 could be accessed only within the police department in order to protect its communications from the press. (47) The system was often hampered by “dead spots” and was overall deemed ineffective. (48) Within the SJPD communications, Captain Howard Donald who was in charge of Patrol Units outside the auditorium was in one of the two helicopters that night and had no contact with either Chief Blackmore or Chief Collins. Chief Blackmore had
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no radio access and was thus not in contact with either Chief Collins or Captain Donald. In sum, there was no radio communication between the three agencies that evening and only limited radio contact within the SJPD. During the President’s speech, demonstrators tried to pull open the front doors while officers inside struggled to hold them closed with ropes. (49) Several dozen of the militant protesters kicked out several wooden panels in the front doors and others squirted mace through the cracks at police inside. (50) At the same time, the fire marshall on the scene was expressing considerable concern over the size of the crowd and the locked doors. (51) Although the inside of the auditorium remained peaceful for the most part, midway through the rally Ewing received word by police radio from Sergeant Moore that one of the Nixon campaign staff was trying to unlock the doors to allow the demonstrators inside. Ewing relayed the message to Collins who responded with an expletive. (52) Throughout Nixon’s speech, chants of the demonstrators could be heard within the auditorium. At that point, William Safire was seated inside the auditorium and observed that: Inside the hall, five thousand tense and worried supporters made up the auditorium ‘rally’…even before the President came on, the sound of a battering ram was heard. The hall was actually, not figuratively, besieged….The people in that hall, ourselves included, were at once defiant and fearful.... (53) At the conclusion of the rally, instead of exiting the auditorium immediately as had been planned by the security forces, the Nixon group went to the adjoining McCabe Hall for a brief appearance. (54) H. R. Haldeman, Nixon’s Chief of Staff, recorded in his diary entry of October 29, 1970: “San Jose turned into the real blockbuster…We wanted some confrontation and there were no hecklers in the hall, so we stalled
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departure a little so they could zero in outside and they sure did.” (55) In a 1994 reflection, Harry Farrell described the setting for what was to come: To comprehend the riot’s climax...one must know that in 1970 the Civic Auditorium stood alone on its block. To its rear was a vast, unfenced parking lot extending north to Park Avenue, in which the president’s caravan waited— limousine, dignitaries, cars, police cars, motorcycles and press buses. (56) A number of detectives along with the Secret Service accompanied the President as he finally exited the Civic Auditorium through the stage door into the parking lot. There they encountered the Presidential convoy (which was well-lit by television lights) hemmed in by hundreds of boisterous demonstrators who had overrun the police cordon. Detective Lieutenant Larry Stuefloten described it as “a whole wall of radicals.” (57) Ron Burda, Jim Geiger, and Don Ewing all concur that at this point, although the crowd was noisy, they were not throwing things at the President. Protesters behind the wooden police barricades were chanting their usual rhymes when the fifty-seven-year-old President who was about to enter his limousine suddenly climbed onto its hood and flashed his familiar V sign at the demonstrators. In his Memoirs, Nixon stated that, upon seeing the demonstrators “I could not resist showing them how little respect I had for their juvenile and mindless ranting.” (58) Detective Sergeant Vic Eastman recalled being “startled” to see the President make such a bold move. (59) Without a doubt, everyone involved in the President’s security that night was aghast at this move as the potential consequences for the safety of both the President and those around him could have been disastrous. The assassinations of President John F. Kennedy (1963), Medgar Evers (1963), Malcolm X (1965), The Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. (1968), and Senator Robert F. Kennedy (1968) were fresh in the minds of law enforcement officials across the
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nation. The situation was momentarily out of their control, however, and the President’s provocative action was to have a profound impact.
Chief of Detectives Bart Collins (in glasses) is to the immediate left of the President. Lieutenant Larry Stuefloten (in glasses) is to his immediate right. (Photo Courtesy of Ron Burda) There followed a brief and furious attack. By most accounts, the President was on the hood of the limousine for less than one minute during which time a cacophony of voices - his supporters cheering and his detractors jeering – resonated throughout the parking lot. At that point, the demonstrators began throwing an assortment of rocks, eggs, and other assorted missiles (including solid plastic balls slightly larger than golf
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balls) in the direction of the President. Detective Sergeant Gary Leonard and his partner Sergeant Jim Smith were also among those trying to get Nixon and his entourage into their limousines. “We were within ten feet of Nixon when a large rock came at us and [we] both ducked out of the way.” (60) Ewing was the unlucky recipient of one of the flying eggs intended for the President.
Detective Sergeant Donald Ewing carrying a Motorola, battery-operated, hand-held police radio (also referred to as a hand-pack). Egg intended for the President landed on his right sleeve. (Photo courtesy of Donald Ewing)
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A surprised Chief Blackmore, who by then was seated in the lead car along with three Secret Service agents, looked back to see the President on top of the limousine. (61) Nervous and stunned detectives and Secret Service agents quickly stuffed the President into his limousine along with Senator Murphy and Governor Reagan. Deputy Special Agent Arthur Godfrey who was in charge of the Presidential Protective Division was riding in the right front seat of the presidential limousine and the driver was Special Agent Andrew Hutch.
Police officers, members of the Sheriff’s Department, Secret Service, and local Press who were known to the SJPD surround the armoured, bullet-proofed, glasstopped Presidential limousine as the President is ushered into it. The trunk of the limousine is open (note hand holding it at the extreme right of the photo) probably for Secret Service communications equipment. (Photo Courtesy of Ron Burda) The violence continued to mount as the Presidential limousine made its exit. At that point, a flying wedge made up by helmeted members of the SJPD and Santa Clara County Sheriff’s Department Tact Squads drove a corridor through the crowd which
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allowed the motorcade consisting of the pilot car, the lead car, the Presidential limousine, the Secret Service backup car, the control car (which contained members of the Nixon staff), and the wire cars to proceed through the lot to Park Avenue where they turned west. (See Figure 3) In the meantime, Lieutenant Stuefloten’s detail of approximately seven or eight detectives including Sergeant Eastman formed a cordon around the limousine to help shield it from the demonstrators and ran alongside the Presidential vehicle as it made its way to Park Avenue. Once the limousine turned west on Park Avenue, the detectives found themselves in what Stuefloten recalled as “truly the most dangerous situation” of his twenty-eight-year career with the SJPD. At that point, the men were cut off from other security forces and found themselves besieged by violent protesters who were attacking them from all sides. Rocks from piles of construction debris located at the back of the parking lot had become missiles in the hands of the demonstrators, and Stuefloten described it as “a ferocious battle with protesters throwing rocks, bottles and even attacking us with boards from the broken barricades.” The officers were forced to defend themselves with their clubs as they moved in a circle in order to avoid being jumped from behind, and they worked their way toward the safety of Park Avenue. “We were lucky to escape the mob without injury.” (62) Coverage of the event in one San Jose Mercury article on the following day, however, was offered from the perspective of the demonstrators: Several youths were knocked to the ground by a wedge of officers armed with long clubs. One youth was clubbed in the stomach and had to be carried away. Another was maced in the face as he tried to break through the cordon and swing at pressmen in an open convertible following the presidential limousine. (63)
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As the motorcade exited the parking lot, the presidential limousine and all of the cars and buses behind it were hit by the flying objects. Jim Geiger recalled hearing “the tinkle of glass as the caravan took off.” (64) H. R. “Bob” Haldeman, Nixon’s Chief of Staff, was riding in the control car which was hit by a rock causing the driver to slam on the brakes which caused the engine to stall, and subsequently, “This produced a chain reaction crash of six cars—none seriously damaged—that brought a loud cheer from the crowd pushing in on each side.” (65) The five staff and press buses, which were the last to exit, were the hardest hit. William Safire and Rose Woods, the President’s secretary, were in the staff bus, and when rocks began to hit the bus, Woods (who had been with Nixon in Venezuela in May 1958 where he was the victim of a mob attack) exclaimed “’Just like “Caracas…’ and hit the deck in the aisle, shouting to the rest of us to do the same.” (66) Harry Farrell was on a press bus that had its windshield shattered. As the motorcade turned right onto Almaden Boulevard, Chief Blackmore who was in the lead car received word asking them to slow down as a member of the Secret Service had fallen off one of the cars and was injured. (67) It was later estimated that the mobbing of the Nixon motorcade lasted about five minutes. (68) At this point, the melee was in full swing. Demonstrators were jumping up and down on cars parked in the lot, and Donald J. Wickham, General Manager of AMPCO Auto Parks, was engaged in a heated discussion with about fifty of them. Wickham later wrote the President that he told the “radicals” that they had all the actions of degenerates. To their queries as to what right the police had to mace some of them…I told them that they lost their rights when they started hurling obscenities and destroying private and public property.
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Wickham also related that “Some people, as they drove out of the parking lot, had their windows smashed by clubs.” (69) A number of people left the Civic Auditorium that night in a mood far removed from their initial expectations of the presidential event. Gordon Abbott and his family had attended the rally, exited the front of the Civic Auditorium, and walked around to the parking lot in the back. Along with many other rally attendees, they found themselves encountering protesters, bystanders, smoke from mace used to disperse the crowd, and police and demonstrators everywhere. “It was scary,” he recalled, “especially with three young children.” (70) Additionally, many young protesters left the auditorium in tears as they had not anticipated confrontations with police, damage to property, and the hatefilled atmosphere. (71)
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The President’s Departure from San Jose Meanwhile, Sergeant Bob Moir who was still on duty at the airport, received message by police radio that “all hell was breaking loose downtown.” (72) Upon return to the airport, the President did not mingle with the crowd which had remained from earlier in the evening, and prior to boarding Air Force One, he shook hands with the motorcycle escort officers at the foot of the stairs to the plane. There were no negative events at the airport. Chief Blackmore shook hands with the President at the airport and later reported that the President stated that he “witnessed magnificent police performance and was not disturbed….He further stated that he had never witnessed better disciplined Police Officers and wanted me to make this known to the Police Officers taking part in the security measures.” (73) Air Force One safely embarked at 8:25 p.m. for the El Toro Marine Corps Air Station (in Orange County, CA) located near the President’s San Clemente residence, but Secret Service agents remained behind examining their vehicles – some of which had sustained quite a bit of damage. (74) A reporter on the scene observed the footprints on the Presidential limousine’s hood and put out the initial report on the Associated Press that Nixon’s limousine had been trampled (when, in fact, the footprints were the President’s own) and that rocks had been thrown at him. (75) Eventually, the remaining crowd dispersed, the officers left, and the airlines resumed their normal schedules. The President had departed San Jose, but the real news of the night was just beginning.
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News Conference #793 at the White House (El Toro, California) When Air Force One landed at El Toro, the President retired to his residence at San Clemente while Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler hurriedly prepared for White House Press Conference #793 which convened at 10:50 p.m. PST. The press corps traveling with the President is grouped into two categories: the “designated core press pool” of about twelve persons who fly on board Air Force One while the majority fly on a second plane known as the press charter. Sometimes the White House makes an official statement while we’re airborne and then we make what is known as a ‘pool call’ back to the home office. The [desk editors in Washington] in turn file a story with the dateline “Aboard Air Force One.” (76) As the news conference convened, Press Secretary Ziegler introduced John Simmons “Sim” Fentress, (a political correspondent with Time), who had prepared the pool report from Air Force One. Fentress related that Secret Service agent Arthur Godfrey (riding in the presidential limousine) had said that “rocks as well as eggs had hit the vehicle…and that hard objects struck the windows of the limousine as it drove through the lane between the ranks of demonstrators.” (77) Fentress further described H. R. Haldeman’s account of the six-car pileup and relayed that Ziegler, when asked by a reporter if the President had “taunted” the demonstrators, disagreed and replied that “…the President ‘thought he was only doing the normal thing’ in waving at the crowd [from atop the hood of his limousine].” (78) Fentress stated that in an interview after Air Force One landed, Senator Murphy said, “They [rocks] must have been at least the size of half a brick…I just think it is shocking. I am goddam mad about it….This was as vicious a crowd as I have ever
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seen in my life.” When asked if he thought the night’s events would help his campaign, Murphy replied: “I don’t see how it could hurt it any. These are the things I have been working against.” Murphy also added that he had not seen similar concern on Tunney’s part. (79) As the news conference continued, Press Secretary Ziegler read a statement by the President which began with these words: “The stoning at San Jose is an example of the viciousness of the lawless elements in our society.” Henceforth, the reference to the “episode” became known at both the national and international levels as the “stoning” of the President. The President went on to say that these were the actions of a violent few and that “the time has come to take the gloves off and speak to this kind of behavior in a forthright way.” (80) Following the reading of the President’s statement, Ziegler was peppered with questions about the security arrangements at the auditorium, who bore the responsibility for them, why the demonstrators were allowed to get so close to the Presidential limousine, whether the San Jose Police had taken adequate precautions, and if the President was planning to ask the Justice Department to investigate the matter. Ziegler noted that while the demonstrators “were generally well contained… there was a period where the crowd simply, as I have understood and what I viewed in the car I was in, broke out of the security areas and were able to throw the rocks” at the motorcade. (81) In reply to the question of who was in direct charge of the security, Ziegler stated: The Secret Service, of course, is in charge of the security of the President and the perimeter around the President. The city officials, the county officials, and the state police are in charge of the security of the area surrounding the hall or surrounding the area where the President is.
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I think those of you who observed the situation tonight noted that those who became unruly were behind barricades, which is traditional in these circumstances, as the normal security precaution, and that the crowds in this case simply became unruly to the extent that many of them broke from behind these barricades and were able to merge upon the motorcade, the President’s car and those cars which followed in the motorcade. (82) At 11:32 PM PST, the news conference concluded with Ziegler’s words to the press: “That is it. You can file.” (83) By midnight, reporters were filing their stories, and on Friday, October 30, 1970, the story line of newspapers across the country as well as abroad carried the news of the “stoning” of the President of the United States. (See Figure 4) Damage control on the part of San Jose officials started as the news began to hit the wires. Shortly after midnight, Detective Sergeants Moore and Ewing - after working a full day shift and staying on for the rally – were awakened by phone calls from the local FBI agents who requested they come immediately to their office to help fill out reports regarding the evening’s events. (84)
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Political Repercussions of the Rally “The stoning of President Nixon’s car…underscores the Republican emphasis through the campaign on campus unrest and violent protest. It couldn’t have worked out better if Republican strategists had planned the San Joe [sic] incident….” Carl P. Leubsdorf, The Tampa Tribune (85) The fallout and finger-wagging following President Nixon’s visit to San Jose on October 29, 1970, began later that night and would continue for years to come. Much of the media coverage over the next several weeks focused on who was responsible for the violence and to what extent it affected the outcome of the election. Over the next few days, the presidential staff worked on their talking points and decided how or whether to respond to the many letters received by the President from San Jose’s citizens and from “grieved police and fire officials…apologizing to the President for the treatment he received.” (86) Domestic policy assistant John Ehrlichman suggested to the President that he refer to the rocks as “small boulders” and that he “show them how big they were with [his] hands.” (87) On Friday, October 30, San Jose State student body president Bill Langan issued a statement seeking to separate the sincere dissenters from the radicals: Responsible campus leaders in the anti-war movement—the dedicated SJS activists – weren’t at the demonstration. [Radicals] ruin the image of the entire campus. The public must distinguish between students committed to change and the handful of juvenile delinquents out there for a lark. (88) Langan added that many of the persons at the demonstrations were not San Jose State students. In response, President Nixon sent Langan a telegram on October 31 in which he expressed his appreciation for Langan’s comments and his “great faith in young Americans because of their idealism.” The President also asked Langan to “extend my
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very best wishes to all the members of the San Jose State student body.” (89) In an opinion piece for the Spartan Daily, Langan astutely noted: I also doubt that individuals rushed out to the corner market to buy eggs and pick up a few bottles once they saw Mr. Nixon stand on his automobile. This certainly does not justify the President’s actions, but it does indicate the few individuals who did throw objects (two bottles almost hit me) might have come with that in mind…. (90) San Jose State College President John H. Bunzel commented: “This type of protest, whatever its underlying motivation, is unpardonable and in some ways obscene in itself.” He estimated that less than half the demonstrators who marched from the rally at Seventh and San Carlos Streets to the auditorium were San Jose State students. Bunzel also said that fifteen student body leaders were inside the auditorium attempting to “keep the situation calm” and noted that “24,000 of our students…did not enter into that form of protest.” (91) Political attacks from the opposition began almost immediately. Jess Unruh, the Democratic gubernatorial challenger, held a news conference on the following day and hinted that Republicans may have inspired the violence that greeted the President since “Whenever the Republicans are in trouble, the violence [issue] appears to come out.” (92) Two local labor leaders charged that Nixon had provoked the San Jose students for political purposes and that the disorder was a conspiracy involving the President, Senator Murphy, and Governor Reagan. (93). John Tunney deplored the attack on the President and predicted that the incident would not have any effect at all on the election’s outcome as “the senator and I feel the same way about respect for the law and the need for an end to violence.” (94).
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The President’s campaign speeches for the remaining days of the campaign invariably turned to the events in San Jose and focused on law and order. On October 31, at a noon rally at Sky Harbor Airport in Phoenix, the President was greeted by a large sign which read, “We Don’t Want to Know the Way to San Jose!” He reminded the crowd that “the creeping permissiveness in our legislatures, in our courts, in our family life and in our colleges and universities” was eroding the strength of freedom in our society. (95) Attorney General John N. Mitchell condemned the “’anarchistic, nihilistic’ California protesters” who had attacked the Presidential limousine, but said he doubted that the Republicans would gain sympathy votes from it. (96).
President Nixon at Sky Harbor Airport, Phoenix, Arizona, on October 31, 1970. (Photo Courtesy of Nixon Presidential Materials Staff)
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On Saturday, October 31, the President telephoned his friend Joe Ridder, Publisher of the San Jose Mercury, to “make some hay” over the episode. The call was placed to the newspaper’s City Desk from aboard Air Force One.
The staff had
instructions not to give out Ridder’s phone number although he was listed in the phone book. Consequently, the President was put on hold while the staff member called Ridder to get permission to release his phone number. (97)
On Sunday, November 1, a letter
from President Nixon addressed to J. B. Ridder, publisher of the San Jose Mercury & News, appeared on the front page of the newspaper. The President assured his friend that “the ugly incident at the rally…will not reflect on the good names of San Jose and the fine people in that community.” (98). State Senator Alfred E. Alquist (D-San Jose) also announced on Sunday that he had sent a telegram to Ernest Renzel, foreman of the Santa Clara County grand jury, demanding a full scale grand jury investigation into the events surrounding the outbreak that followed the President’s speech due to “the many suspicious circumstances…and conflicting stories of the extent of the violence.” Alquist added that, “When hundreds of police and Secret Service agents allow a handful of juvenile delinquents to create an international incident, we need to find out why.” (99). He later issued a statement in which he asserted that the evidence was mounting that the incident was “deliberately staged…to provide a phony ‘law and order’ smokescreen.” (100) The controversy swirled on endlessly.
On Monday, November 2, Chief
Blackmore spoke at a noon rally in the San Jose State College Union and made the unfortunate statement that ”The ‘barrage’ on President Nixon was verbal, it was not physical…This so-called riot has been exaggerated.” (101) Blackmore’s comments
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subsequently caused Press Secretary Ziegler to invite a group of newsmen to inspect the presidential limousine in San Clemente at noon on November 3 and to talk with Secret Service Agents Hutch and Godfrey who were in the limousine that night and verified that a number of rocks as well as eggs and other objects had indeed hit the limousine in which they were riding. (102) “The San Jose incident” provoked a conversation across the nation as to what extent the President should appear in public places. Violent encounters, it was pointed out, also endangered the White House officials who accompanied the President as well as local dignitaries, the police, press, and bystanders. The elections were held on Tuesday, November 3, 1970, and shortly thereafter, the political pundits opined that at the national level neither party could claim a major victory. In California, Republicans swept all but one of the statewide offices; however, Senator Murphy with 45 per cent of the vote was defeated by Congressman Tunney who received 54 per cent. Tunney, in reference to Murphy’s last-minute ads which tried to link him with the violence, credited his success to “a rejection of the politics of fear.” (103)
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The City Under Siege “This is definitely a black eye for the City of San Jose…”
-James C. Malone (104) Although the election was over, there were a lot of unanswered questions about the security arrangements for the GOP rally. The City and the SJPD were under attack from all sides. Reports and memoranda flew back and forth between the offices of the Police Chief, City Manager Thomas Fletcher, and the City Council.
Letters from
indignant citizens were sent to the City Council and to the local newspapers asking – among other questions – why the protesters were allowed to parade along the streets. James Malone, Chairman of the Host Committee for the Association of Metropolitan San Jose, wrote to the City Manager: “We very well know what is going to happen when an uncontrollable mob is allowed to congregate on the street.” (105) On Monday, November 2, 1970, the San Jose City Council received the first of Chief Blackmore’s reports on the disturbance, and Councilman David Goglio moved that the Council adopt “a resolution of apology and transmit it to the President of the United States and to the Governor of the State expressing regret for the incident.” After considerable debate, the Council decided to issue a letter of “regret” as use of the word “apology” might imply that the citizens of San Jose were involved when, in fact, only a small number of those involved were residents of the City. (See Figure 5) Councilman Walter Hays noted that the initial report received from the Chief of Police did not indicate precautions he would take at future events and requested a supplementary report stating what those might be. (106) City Manager Fletcher reported to the City Council on the damages incurred to City-owned property during the disturbance and estimated the total cost to repair City-owned vehicles to be estimated at $2,200.00. (107) This did not,
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however, include damage to the City car assigned to Mayor James or to a number of privately owned vehicles also involved in the parking lot melee. The damage to the glass in the buses was estimated to be approximately $550.00. (108)
Repairs were also
anticipated to the Civic Auditorium itself including the broken doors. (109) On November 4, the Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors also voted to send a letter to the President expressing regret over the incident. In a letter dated November 6, 1970, Chief Blackmore and the SJPD received some much-needed positive affirmation in a letter from the United States Secret Service in which the Special Agent in Charge, Tom H. Hanson, stated: We have observed in news media reports an inference that the security arrangements at the Auditorium for the President’s recent visit to San Jose were inadequate. This matter has been the subject of much discussion within our organization. Our Director, James J. Rowley, believes that the security arrangements…were more than satisfactory. [He] joins me in extending thanks for the excellent effort and cooperation offered by…your entire Department during the event. (110) There were questions as to why the SJPD had not attempted to clear the parking lot of the demonstrators during the rally.
Department officials pointed out that the
composition of the crowd, numbering from 1500 to 2000 at that point, was a mix of persons who had tickets for the rally but were denied entrance as the auditorium was overbooked, people (including children) who had come simply to have a glimpse of the President, peaceful demonstrators, and the radicals. Chief Blackmore deemed it unsafe to send officers into the crowd to take out this many people and feared serious injury or even death might occur. (111) With regard to why there were only four arrests made that night (none of whom were students at San Jose State College), Chief Blackmore replied that “To arrest
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persons throwing rocks was impossible as most rock throwers stand in back of the crowd and throw over the crowd, and we could not identify the persons responsible.” (112) The Chief maintained that, “The rock throwing damage was of minor consequence to the motorcade.” (113) It might be well to consider here that the Chief was at the head of the motorcade and was on his way to the airport before the violence in the parking lot reached its peak. Most of the rock-throwing took place at the rear of the parking lot near Park Avenue between Almaden Avenue and Almaden Boulevard. According to plan, Chief Blackmore explained that this block was not covered by Police Officers as “We were instructed [by the Secret Service] in no way to put men there or in anyway indicate that this would be the exit the President was to take.” (114) Although the SJPD was in charge of security of the area surrounding the Civic Auditorium that night, there was at least one instance where they were forced to deviate from their plan. In a memorandum dated November 5, 1970, Chief Blackmore stated that at the last minute, the Secret Service decided to turn left on Park Avenue instead of the right turn planned by the SJPD. (115) In a 1983 interview with Harry Farrell, Blackmore related that he was in the lead car with a Secret Service agent who picked up a microphone and ordered the motorcycle escort which was leaving the parking lot to turn left onto Park Avenue. “No, right…” Blackmore protested. “All our strength is to the right.” The Secret Service agent replied, “We know that. We want to feed the press to the wolves. We’re not getting along with them during this trip.” The agent explained to Blackmore that the first cars in the motorcade would escape by turning left, but that the
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press buses which were bringing up the rear with no police protection would be “clobbered.” (116) Citizen concern was high. Morris Friedman addressed the City Council at its November 9 regular session to take exception to the Council’s letter of apology to the President of the United States and suggested that the Council recommend to City Manager Fletcher that he expedite replacement of the Chief of Police [whose retirement was already scheduled for March 1971]. (117)
In a lengthy letter directed to the San
Jose City Council dated November 10, Henry Wagner called for a bi-partisan Congressional ad hoc Committee to be sent to San Jose to investigate the facts surrounding the “episode.” In Wagner’s opinion, “Condemnation without investigation is ignorance or deception, both threats to good government.” (118) On November 19, 1970, after “an exhaustive series of inquiries” and preliminary study of the police reports and letters from concerned citizens, the Criminal Complaints Committee of the Santa Clara County Grand Jury recommended to the full Grand Jury that “evidence indicated that felonies were committed on the night of the Nixon rally.” District Attorney Louis Bergna was thus instructed to conduct a full investigation to determine the identities of the perpetrators and to apprehend them. (119) The Grand Jury also released a statement that night which criticized authorities responsible for the crowd control and said that “better planning and foresight …could have avoided the bulk of property damage and that more manpower could have resulted in better crowd control.” (120). County Grand Jury Foreman Ernest Renzel added that the jury was not trying to blame any one agency in particular but was suggesting that better coordination between agencies would have been helpful.
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In early January 1971, the Santa Clara Valley chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union called for the Grand Jury to open its probe of the “Nixon incident” to the public “in order to prevent the hearings from turning into a political witch hunt.” (121) On January 12, 1971, a three-sentence article appeared at the bottom of Page One of the San Jose Mercury announcing that the Grand Jury had concluded its investigation: We are satisfied that we have acquired by investigation those facts that represent what happened at the San Jose Civic Auditorium the night of President Nixon’s visit. We are further satisfied that those identifiable persons who committed crimes have been charged for their actions. This completes our Grand Jury investigation. (122) After discharging the 1970 Grand Jury, Superior Court Judge O. Vincent Bruno spoke out publicly about the investigation and said that “the Grand Jury [was] not the proper vehicle for such an investigation as it did not have the power, authority, or jurisdiction.” Bruno further stated that since no special commission was convened to investigate the events at the national level, “I assume this two-minute incident was a tempest in a teapot and was blown all out of proportion. I’m not pointing a finger at anyone in particular, but certain people best know why that was done.” (123) Ernest Renzel, foreman of the outgoing Grand Jury, had asked the judge to clarify the jury’s role in view of the heavy criticism it received for not making public its investigation. Bruno concluded his remarks by saying ”I trust this will be the final word on this matter.” (124). It was not to be, however, as State Senator Alquist called for the 1971 Santa Clara County Grand Jury to reopen the probe. (125) In 1973, he asked the Senate Watergate Committee to investigate the incident but was turned down on grounds that it was limiting its investigation into events of the 1972 presidential campaign. (126) Archibald Cox was sworn in as special Watergate prosecutor on May 25, 1973, and four months
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later Alquist wrote to him asking that “he probe the recurrent rumors that the Republicans or the White House itself instigated the 1970 demonstration for purposes of sympathy.” (127) There were subsequent whispers that Alquist was on a fishing expedition. Republican County Chairman Mike Cobb emphasized that the local GOP welcomed any reopening of the probe. (128) In September of 1973, Chief Collins, in a talk before the Small Business Association, said that he gave the City Manager and the Chief of Police an intelligence report a month before the 1970 “stoning” of President Nixon which outlined how radicals were planning the violent demonstration against the President. Collins was of the opinion that the charge that Republicans planned the violence that erupted at the GOP rally in October 1970 was groundless. (129) Ray Blackmore retired in March 1971 after forty-two years with the SJPD. He characterized the Nixon episode as “the one real disappointment” of his career and noted that “we [policemen and Secret Servicemen] made a lot of enemies throughout the United States. Overnight we ended up being the target of criticism that was entirely unfair.” (130)
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Conclusion “Everybody was working in order to keep things going smoothly – especially wanting to protect dignitaries when they came to town. You flew by the seat of your pants in those days and did whatever was necessary.” -Detective Sergeant Bobby Burroughs (131) Although the events at the Civic Auditorium on the night of October 29, 1970, were relatively brief, the consequences were longstanding.
As much as a city might
desire a presidential visit, the fallout can be unpredictable and not necessarily positive. This was the case for San Jose on the night of President Nixon’s appearance at the GOP rally. The City’s reputation was tarnished and it was left to cover some unexpected expenses resulting from the damages incurred. The San Jose State College student body received negative publicity, and the reputation of the San Jose Police Department – one of the finest in the nation – was tainted. The responsibility for the “stoning” of the President can be shared by all of the parties involved. The “radicals” viewed the President as part of the hated Establishment, and they organized well in advance and brought their missiles to the rally in preparation for an attack.
The San Jose Police Department would have benefited from better
planning, a more technologically advanced system of communications, and more personnel on duty at the Civic Auditorium. There was mass confusion that night and plenty of work for all staff on duty. The President, a skilled politician who made frequent use of the V sign and had previously climbed on hoods of cars for political purposes, sensed the possibility for a photo opportunity and made the most of it. In view of the charged atmosphere, he served as a catalyst in an already potentially explosive situation. His provocative action was not scripted into the evening’s program by the White House staff, and neither he nor anyone involved in the planning of the rally could have
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anticipated the extent of the violence and anger that appeared on that night. However, both the President and his staff worked mightily to exploit the event in the remaining days of the campaign as did some members of the opposition. The interaction between national and local politics is not always recognizable, but the 1970 “stoning” of President Richard Nixon in San Jose is a classic example of what can transpire when the two levels meet. What was most probably intended as a minor machination on the President’s part turned into a major “black eye” for the City of San Jose.
43
44
45
46
47
48
Notes 1. Harry Farrell, “How Nixon Incited 1970 San Jose Riot,” San Jose Mercury News, 22 May 1994, p. 1C. 2. William Safire, Before the Fall: An Inside View of the Pre-Watergate White House (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1975), p 332. 3. Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), p. 504. 4.
Ibid., p. 511.
5.
Ibid. p. 512.
6. Dr. Glenn S. Dumke, “Campus Violence – Crackdown Coming,” U.S. News & World Report, 23 September 1968, p. 48. 7. “Killing Cops: The New Terror Tactics,” U.S. News & World Report, 31 August 1970, p. 11. 8.
“The City as Battlefield: A Global Concern,” Time, 2 November 1970,
p. 22. 9. “Bolder ‘Cop Killers’ Hitting More Often,” U. S. News & World Report, 14 September 1970, p. 26. 10. Bill Romano, “San Jose Officer Slain in Assassination: Suspect Son Of A Cop,” San Jose Mercury News, 7 August 1970, p. 1. 11. Bob Skillicorn, “Stirring Last Tribute To Slain S.J. Officer,” San Jose Mercury News, 11 August 1970, p. 1. 12. Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), pp. 491-492. 13. Lou Cannon, “Tunney, Murphy Sweat Out ‘San Jose Incident,’” San Jose Mercury, 2 November 1970, p. 25. 14. A. G. Block and Claudia Buck, eds., 1999-2000 California Political Almanac, California Journal, 1999, p. 21. 15. Larry Stammer, “’Ames Closure Sure’ – Tunney,” San Jose Mercury, 29 October 1970, p. 8.
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16. William Endicott and Stuart H. Loory, “Rock Almost Hits Nixon at San Jose: Chief Executive Met by Barrage Following Rally,” Los Angeles Times, 30 October 1970, p. 1. 17. “San Jose Leads Way In Professional Trend,” San Jose Mercury, 12 February 1967, p. 1F. 18.
Annual Report, San Jose Police Department, 1969, p. 9.
19.
Ibid.
20.
Donald Ewing, interview by author, 16 March 2005.
21. Harry Farrell, “President To Visit San Jose on Thursday,” San Jose Mercury, 24 October 1970, p. l. 22. J. R. Blackmore, “To Mayor James, Members of the City Council and City Manager Thomas W. Fletcher,” Report of 23 November 1970, p. 1, Archival File No. 1053, Office of the City Clerk, photocopied. 23. J. R. Blackmore, “Memorandum to City Manager Thomas W. Fletcher 30 October 1970, p. 2, Archival File No. 1053, Office of the City Clerk, photocopied. 24. The Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, The San Jose Police Department: Management Survey, (State of California, 1971), p. 3-29. 25. California.”
Donald Ewing, interview by author, 28 April 2004, Santa Clara,
26.
Ron Burda, interview by author, 14 September 2004.
27.
“Mr. Nixon and the Politics of Danger,” Newsweek, 9 November 1970,
28.
Cliff Matoi, “”Protest Nixon Speech,” Spartan Daily, p. 1.
29.
Donald Ewing, interview by author, 1 October 2004, San Jose, California.
30.
Blackmore, 23 November 1970, p. 2.
31.
“Mr. Nixon and the Politics of Danger,” p. 21.
p. 21.
32. Harry Farrell, “S. J. Readies Red Carpet For President,” San Jose Mercury, 29 October 1970, p. 1.
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33. Tom Harris and Jim Larimore, “Young Militants Hurl Epithets at President,” San Jose Mercury, 30 October 1970, p. 1. 34.
“Mr. Nixon and the Politics of Danger,” p. 21.
35.
“Young Militants Hurl Epithets at President,” p. 1.
36.
Bob Moir, interview by author, 3 September 2004.
37. Frank Sweeney, “Security Abounds At Airport,” 30 October 1970, San Jose Mercury, p. 1. 38.
Ibid.
39.
Moir.
40.
Blackmore, 23 November 1970, p. 3.
41.
Safire, pp. 327-328.
42.
“Young Militants Hurl Epithets at President,” p. 1.
43.
“The Anatomy of San Jose,” Nation, 16 November 1970, 211:482.
44. Harry Farrell, “Nixon Rips Tunney In San Jose Speech: Denies Ames Closing,” San Jose Mercury, 30 October 1970, p. 1. 45. John Keplinger, “Mob Hits Nixon’s Car: Cheers, Jeers, Rocks” Palo Alto/Peninsula Times-Tribune, 30 October 1970, p. 1. 46.
Blackmore, 23 November 1970, p. 1.
47.
Ewing, interview by author, 16 February 2005.
48.
The San Jose Police Department: Management Survey, p. 6-102.
49.
“Mr. Nixon and the Politics of Danger,” p. 1.
50.
“Young Militants Hurl Epithets at President,” p. 1.
51.
Ewing, interview by author, 30 June 2004.
52.
Ibid.
53.
Safire, p. 328.
51
54.
Blackmore, 23 November 1970, p. 4.
55. H. R. Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1994), p. 205. 56.
“How Nixon Incited 1970 San Jose Riot,” p. 1C.
57.
Larry Stuefloten, interview by author, 1 March 2005.
58.
Nixon, p. 492.
59.
Vic Eastman, interview by author, 1 March 2005.
60.
Gary Leonard, interview by author, 18 December 2004.
61.
Blackmore, 23 November 1970, p. 4.
62.
Stuefloten.
63.
“Young Militants Hurl Epithets at President,” p. 1.
64.
Jim Geiger, interview by author, 27 October 2004.
65. “Nixon Target of Missiles Thrown by ‘Unruly Mob’: Scorns ‘Worst People’,” Tallahassee Democrat, 30 October 1970, p. 1. 66.
Safire, p. 330.
67.
Blackmore, 23 November 1970, p. 4.
68. “Nixon Target of Missiles Thrown by ‘Unruly Mob’: Scorns ‘Worst People’,” p. 1. 69. Donald J. Wickham, San Jose, to The President, The White House, 2 November 1970, White House Central Files: Subject Files, TR60/ST5 [EX], Box 47. 70.
Gordon Abbott, interview by author, 2 August 2004.
71. Ray Tessler, “Violent Action Splits The People,” Spartan Daily, 2 November 1970, p. 1. 72.
Moir.
73.
Blackmore, 23 November 1970, p. 4.
74.
Moir.
52
75.
Ewing, interview by author, 23 February 2004.
76. Helen Thomas, Front Row at the White House: My Life and Times (New York: A Lisa Drew Book/Scribner, 1999), p. 176. 77. News Conference #793, At the White House (El Toro, California), 29 October 1970, p.1, White House Special Files: Staff Member and Offices File, Ziegler, San Jose Incident 133, Box 22. 78.
Ibid., pp. 2-3.
79.
Ibid., p. 4.
80.
Ibid., p. 6.
81.
Ibid., p. 5.
82.
Ibid., pp. 7-8.
83.
Ibid., p. 11.
84.
Ewing, 23 February 2004.
85. Carl P. Leubsdorf, “Stoning Incident May Help Republicans,”The Tampa Tribune, 31 October 1970, p. 1. 86. Bud Krogh, “Memorandum for John Dean,” 4 November 1970, White House Special Files: Subject Files, TR60/ST5 [EX], Box 47. 87. John D. Ehrlichman, “Memorandum for the President,” 30 October 1970, White House Central Files: Subject Files HU 3-1/LG/L-Z, Beginning-12/31/70 [EX], Box 32. 88. Jim Larimore, “San Jose Police Poised, Praised,” San Jose Mercury, 31 October 1970, p. 1. 89. Richard Nixon, President, telegram released at Phoenix, Arizona, to Bill Langin [sic], President of the Student Body of San Jose State College, 31 October 1970, White House Central Files, Subject Files, TR60/ST5 [EX], Box 47. 90. 1970, p. 2.
Bill Langan, “Langan’s Views on Violence,” Spartan Daily, 5 November
91. Harry Farrell, “City Violence Deplored By Both Parties,” San Jose Mercury, 31 October 1970, p. 1.
53
92 1970, p. 24.
“Unruh Hints GOP Stirred S.J. Violence,” San Jose Mercury, 31 October
93. “Thursday Incident Provoked? Mercury, 3 November 1970, p. 4.
Some Demos Claim So!,” San Jose
94. Lou Cannon, “Tunney, Murphy Sweat Out ‘San Jose Incident’,” San Jose Mercury, 2 November 1970, p. 25. 95. Office of the White House Press Secretary (Phoenix, Arizona), “Remarks of the President At Sky Harbor Airport,” 31 October 1970, p. 4, White House Central Files: Subject Files, SP 3-104/ST#, Campaign 1970 (2 of 2) [EX], Box 126. 96.
“Mitchell Slams S.J. Assault,” San Jose Mercury, 31 October 1970, p. 10.
97.
Harry Farrell, interview by author, 2 September 2004.
98. Richard Nixon, “A Letter From The President,” San Jose Mercury, 1 November 1970, p. 1. 99. “Alquist Demands Jury Probe Of Nixon Rally,” San Jose Mercury, 2 November 1970, p. 19. 100.
“Thursday Incident Provoked? Some Demos Claim So!,” p. 4.
101. Judi Schultz, “’Violence Exaggerated,’ Chief Says,” San Jose Mercury, 3 November 1970, p. 13. 102. “Transcript Accompanying Pool Report,” 3 November 1970, pp. 2-3, White House Special Files: Staff Member and Offices Files, Ziegler, San Jose Incident, 133, Box 22. 103. “’Nixon, GOP Politics Of Fear Backfired,’” San Jose Mercury, 5 November 1970, p. 1. 104. James C. Malone [Chairman of the Host Committee for the Association of Metropolitan San Jose], San Jose, California, to Thomas Fletcher, City Manager, 30 October 1970, Archival File No. 1053, Office of the City Clerk, photocopied. 105.
Ibid.
106.
“Minutes of the San Jose City Council,” 2 November 1970, p. 19.
107. T. W. Fletcher, “Memorandum to City Council: Report on Disturbance at Civic Auditorium,” 2 November 1970, Archival File No. 1053, Office of the City Clerk, photocopied.
54
108. J. R. Blackmore, “Questions directed to the City of San Jose Police Department,” 5 November 1970, p. 2, Archival File No. 1053, Office of the City Clerk, photocopied. 109.
Fletcher.
110. Tom H. Hanson, Special Agent in Charge [United States Secret Service], San Francisco, California, to J. R. Blackmore, San Jose, California, 6 November 1970, Archival File No. 1053, Office of the City Clerk, photocopied. 111.
Blackmore, 23 November 1970, p. 3.
112.
Ibid. p. 5.
113.
Ibid., p. 6.
114.
Ibid., p. 4.
115.
Blackmore, 5 November 1970, p. 1.
116.
“How Nixon Incited 1970 San Jose Riot,” p. 1C.
117.
“Minutes of the San Jose City Council,” 9 November 1970, p. 10.
118. Henry Wagner, San Jose, letter to City Council, San Jose, 10 November 1970, Archival File No. 1053, Office of the City Clerk, photocopied. 119.
County of Santa Clara, “Grand Jury Final Report,” 1970, p. 17.
120. Joe Frein, “D.A. Slates Probe Of Nixon Visit,” San Jose Mercury, 21 November 1970, p. 1A. 121. “ACLU Wants Grand Jury Probe Of Nixon’s Visit Open To Public,” San Jose Mercury, 10 January 1971, p. 29. 122.
“Jury Closes Probe Of Nixon Visit,” San Jose Mercury, 12 January 1971,
123.
“Nixon ‘Riot’ Exaggerated,” San Jose Mercury, 20 January 1971, p. 1.
124.
Ibid.
p. 1.
125. “Sen. Alquist Isn’t Satisfied With Nixon ‘Incident’ Report, San Jose Mercury, 21 January 1971, p. 4.
55
126. Harry Farrell, “Nixon’s S.J. Melee Faces Cox Probe,” San Jose Mercury, 25 September 1973, p. 1. 127.
Ibid.
128.
Ibid.
129. Ben Hawkins, “Detective Says He Warned Of Anti-Nixon Violence,” San Jose Evening News, 26 September 1973, n.p. 130. 1971, p. 4. 131.
“The Blackmore Years in Public Service,” San Jose Mercury, 3 March Bobby Burroughs, interview by author, 29 August 2004.
56
Selected Bibliography Interviews Abbott, Gordon, Treasurer, Santa Clara County Republican Party. Interview by author in San Jose, 2 August 2004. Burroughs, Bobby, retired Sergeant, San Jose Police Department. Interview by author. 29 August 2004. Burda, Ronald, retired photojournalist with the San Jose Mercury News. Interview by author, September through October, 2004. Eastman, Vic, retired Captain, San Jose Police Department. Interview by author by telephone March 2005. Ewing, Donald, retired Lieutenant, San Jose Police Department. Interview by author on a continual basis since May, 2003, San Jose, California. Farrell, Harry, retired political editor with the San Jose Mercury News. Interview by author in San Jose on 17 November 2003, 29 November 2003, and 2 September 2004. Geiger, James, retired photojournalist with the San Jose Mercury News. Interview by author in Santa Clara on 27 October 2004. Moir, Robert, retired Lieutenant, San Jose Police Department. Interview by author by telephone 3 September 2004. Stuefloten, Larry, retired Deputy Chief, San Jose Police Department. Interview by author by
telephone, March 1, 2005. Books Block, A. G. and Claudia Buck, eds. 1999-2000 California Political Almanac. California Journal, 1999. Haldeman, H. R. The Ends of Power. New York: Times Books, 1978.
_____________. The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1994. Kissinger, Henry. White House Years. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979. Nixon, Richard. The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978.
57
Safire, William. Before the Fall: An Inside View of the Pre-Watergate White House. New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1975. Thomas, Helen. Front Row at the White House: My Life and Times. New York: A Lisa Drew Book/Scribner, 1999. Articles and Periodicals “The Anatomy of San Jose.” Nation. 16 November 1970. Behrens, Earl C. “Crowd Pelts Nixon’s Car After a Rally in San Jose.” San Francisco Chronicle. 30 October 1970. “Bolder ‘Cop Killers’ Hitting More Often.” U. S. News & World Report. 14 September 1970. 26. “The City as Battlefield: A Global Concern.” Time. 2 November 1970. 22. Dumke, Glenn S. “Campus Violence – Crackdown Coming.” U.S. News & World Report. 23 September 1968. “Killing Cops: The New Terror Tactics.” U.S. News & World Report. 31 August 1970. 11. Leubsdorf, Carl P. “Stoning Incident May Help Republicans.” The Tampa Tribune. 31 October 1970. Los Angeles Times. 30 October 1970 – 4 November 1970. McDonald, Ian. “Mr. Nixon Seizes on Stoning to Call for ‘Strong’ Justice.” Times (London). 2 November 1970. “Nixon Target of Missiles Thrown by ‘Unruly Mob: Scorns ‘Worst People,’” Tallahassee Democrat. 30 October 1970. Palo Alto/Peninsula Times-Tribune. 30 October 1970 – 25 September 1973. San Jose Mercury News. 24 October 1970 – 22 May 1994. Spartan Daily. 29 October 1970 – 10 November 1970. Other Sources Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training. The San Jose Police Department:
Management Survey. State of California, 1971.
58
Correspondence and reports of the San Jose Police Department, the San Jose City Council, and City Manager Thomas Fletcher. Archival File #1053. Office of the City Clerk, San Jose, California. County of Santa Clara. Grand Jury Final Report, 1970. Ehrlichman, John D. “Memorandum for the President.” 30 October 1970. (Nixon Presidential Materials Staff), White House Central Files, Subject Files HU 3-1/LG/L-Z, Beginning-12/31/70 [EX], Box 32. Hanson, Tom H., San Francisco, California, to J. R. Blackmore, San Jose, California. 6 November 1970. Archival File #1053. Office of the City Clerk, San Jose, California. Malone, James C., San Jose, California, to Thomas Fletcher, City Manager, San Jose. 30 October 1970. Archival File #1053. Office of the City Clerk, San Jose, California. Minutes of the San Jose City Council. Office of the City Clerk, San Jose, California. 2 November 1970 – 14 December 1970. Minutes of the Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors. Minute Book 58: August 25, 1970 – December 29, 1970. Nixon, Richard. “Telegram released at Phoenix, Arizona, to Bill Langin [sic], President of the Student Body of San Jose State College. 31 October 1970. (Nixon Presidential Materials Staff), White House Central Files, Subject Files, TR60/ST5 [EX], Box 47. Office of the White House Press Secretary (Phoenix, Arizona). “Remarks of the President At Sky Harbor Airport,” 31 October 1970, p. 4. (Nixon Presidential Materials Staff), White House Central Files, Subject Files, SP 3-104/ST#, Campaign 1970 (2 of 2) [EX], Box 126. “Transcript Accompanying Pool Report.” 3 November 1970. (Nixon Presidential Materials Staff), White House Special Files: Staff Member and Offices Files, Ziegler, San Jose Incident, 133, Box 22. Wagner, Henry, San Jose, California, to City Council, San Jose Wickham, Donald J., San Jose, to The President, The White House. 2 November 1970. (Nixon Presidential Materials Staff), White House Central Files, Subject Files, TR60/ST5 [EX], Box 47.
59