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An essay on Space Law
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WHERE IS OUTER SPACE? Space Law Essay
By Cristina Rizzi Mullin
This brief essay intends to be a proposal to the UN COPUOS for a clear legal demarcation of airspace and outer space. Much has been debated on whether, and why, we should untangle the problematics connected to the need for a legal separation of the two realms. To understand why a legal distinction is of importance, we must first take a step back in time to look at how the advent of innovative technologies and the requirements of modern life created the conditions which urged the coming into force of space law. The arguments hereby presented attempt to clarify the reasons behind the necessity to define these celestial areas. They will not concentrate on details, rather they will seek to provide a more general view and understanding of their weight in the equation of normative application of current laws, and their interrelations with the demarcation sought. This essay will now focus on three fundamental matters endorsing the requirement of such a frontier boundary: sovereignty and effective control of a nation’s territory, liability, and prevention of activities contrary to the Outer Space Treaty 19671 principles.
Putting things into context The first passenger-carrying airline flight happened in 1914.2 Prior this event, aircrafts were essentially used to carry mail and cargo; however, with the coming of World War I the skies became suddenly populated by aircrafts bearing international insignia, transporting at this point in time also military assets. Sovereignty, or how to secure it over a nation’s territory including airspace, became a concern; the Paris Convention of 19193 endeavoured to solve the numerous political complexities related to international aviation. Its aim was to create common standards which every country could refer to and, hopefully, adopt to regulate international airspace traffic; the result it produced was cemented into principles to regulate
1
Hereinafter referred to as OST St. Petersburg–Tampa Airboat Line (SPT Airboat Line) < http://www.iata.org/about/Pages/flying-100years.aspx> accessed 28th December 2017 3 http://www.spacelaw.olemiss.edu/library/aviation/IntAgr/multilateral/1919_Paris_conevention.pdf accessed 28th December 2017 2
this new arena of activities, with the backing of the International Commission for Air Navigation.4 The launch of the first satellite 5 in 1957 though raised several legal issues. The official approach adopted by the Paris Convention presumed that a nation’s sovereignty extended vertically to the space above its territory, ad infinitum. 6 The assumption, accepted subsequently as customary international law, implied that existing regulations in international airspace law would qualify in the future for both areas of the space above a nation. 7 Once mankind would have reached the further realm, rules governing airspace would simply extend upward to the Earth orbit and outer space. However, if airspace regulations governed also outer space, then in launching a satellite into an orbit that passed over many countries, without having obtained permission from them for the overfly, the Soviet Union would have breached international laws of sovereignty. With the tensions of the Cold War pressing, and having in sight to have satellites overflying Soviet areas someday, President Eisenhower quietly accepted the orbiting of Sputnik over U.S. territory.8 In the race to outer space America had come second, but it had no intention to lose influence, weight and control over the next steps towards the new frontier; accordingly, it was established that different laws should govern space.
To the core of the matter Space law is therefore relatively young, but for now sixty years it has provided the only reference to anyone working in a variety of fields connected with it. Business related to outer space activities follows the basic rules of any other business on ground; regulations need to 4
Precursor of International Civil Aviation Organization Sputnik 6 Francis Lyall and Paul B. Larsen, “Space Law – A treatise” (Ashgate Publishing Company, 2009) p 159: “… [T]his legal regime is maintained in the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Chicago 1944” 7 Ibid p 160 8 Matthew J. Kleiman, “ Space Law 101: An Introduction to Space Law” (American Bar Association) https://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_practice_series/space_law_ 101_an_introduction_to_space_law.html accessed 28th December 2017 5
cover liability, safety, co-operation and contractual agreements. Peculiarly, although an immediate demarcation of airspace and outer space would have been necessary to ‘fence’ this new working environment, it was thought to be not a matter of urgency. Sixty years on it is still to be established how to identify, legally speaking, one space from the other. Manfred Lachs probed the refusal to address this core issue with a question: having established that outer space is a distinct dimension, possessing a special legal status, where are its frontiers?9 How can we allocate liability, or establish with certainty who is responsible for the safety of people working in outer space, if we do not know exactly where outer space begins, and airspace ends? The two areas are governed by different laws, and yet the confines of one of this operational environment have been compartmentalised from the other, but never legally set. Naturally, those operating in outer space do know the answer to such question, and yet, it cannot be said to be correct legally speaking. So why there is no legal demarcation of these two zones?
Sovereignty One likely reason behind the refusal to demarcate outer space from airspace in the legal ambit could be linked to sovereignty. Historically, nations have always sought to establish control over their territories in a way which would be recognised and accepted by other states. Borders are not only a way to enclose legal identity and property, but a way to ensure control can be exerted efficiently over them. Also, without boundaries it would be difficult to know whether we are to obey the specific set of rules that governs a territory; we confine things to deal with them separately from others. The default position of air space law since the Paris and Chicago Conventions is that a nation sovereignty extends upwards to the infinite; thus, said nation maintains the right to prevent 9
Manfred Lach, “The Law of Outer Space – and experience in contemporary law making” (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010 – Reissued on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the International Institute of Space Law) p 53
any other nation from using that space. Nonetheless, space law stipulates that outer space cannot be appropriated.10 Consequently, it could be thought that any unwillingness to mark a neat confine to separate a space from another can be attributed to the intention of retaining influence over it, or part of it. Concessions on the use of it would become a bargaining chip, which is pretty much what occurs nowadays when countries need to send an object in orbit, or operate above another’s space.11 However, the idea that a nation could control efficiently the space above its territory to the infinite outer space is both impracticable and preposterous, as explained by the ‘lighthouse effect’ theory.12 The issue of delimitation of the two spaces and control thereof has often come to the forefront in relation to the geostationary orbit, which is the most used for communications purposes. The orbit happens to be above the equator. States along that line were faced with the prospect of having satellites of other countries permanently orbiting above their territories, without having been asked for permission to place them there. The concern associated with such likelihood, and the fact that satellites were beginning to overcrowd that part of space, led the equatorial states to make a declaration in 1976, 13 with which they intended to reclaim sovereignty of the space above their territories. Despite no one contesting their claim, at 35,786 Km of altitude the geostationary orbit was considered as belonging to outer space. The lack of boundary agreements on outer and air
10
Art. I of Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and use of Outer Space including the Moon and other celestial bodies, 1966. 11 Much of the agreements on co-operation among nations in operations in outer space rely on non-binding treaties and international customary space law. 12 Ibid No 5 p 164: If the jurisdiction of a country were to extend indefinitely, from the centre of the Earth upward and bounded by its lateral confines, celestial bodies would occasionally enter it. Art. I and II of the Outer Space Treaty 1967 stipulate that there is no sovereignty in space and that nations cannot appropriate celestial bodies by claim or occupation. 13 Bogotá Declaration 3rd December 1976, Conclusion 2(2) stipulating that “the synchronous geostationary orbit, being a natural resource, is under the sovereignty of the equatorial states.”; and 3(d) stipulating that “devices to be placed permanently on the segment of a geostationary orbit of an equatorial state shall require previous and expressed authorization on the part of the concerned state, and the operation of the device should conform with the national law of that territorial country over which it is placed.” Of note is section 3(e) where the equatorial states, despite not objecting the presence of satellites above their territories, remark that they do not condone such presence as no authorization had been given for it.
space, and the orbit special physical character made it easier to claim sovereignty over it by way of exception. 14 The geostationary orbit is mainly used to station weather and telecommunications satellites which could not be positioned elsewhere; owing to its uniqueness, it would have been unthinkable to concede such claim to the equatorial states. In fact, the COPUOS Legal Sub-Committee agenda often linked this issue to the requirement for a clear demarcation between spaces. In 2001 it considered ways to ensure an equitable use of the orbit, but in the end geopolitical reasons ensured that the equatorial states claim was never successful. It can be said that the majority’s interest in the geostationary orbit prevailed over the sovereignty of a minority of states.15 Further attempts to solve this clash of interests were made by relying on different approaches; gone was the ‘wait-and-see’ attitude embraced initially by airspace law in the Paris and Chicago Conventions, conveniently espoused by the U.S.,16 and on came the ‘spatialist’ and ‘functionalist’ stances. The suggestion of the former theory relied upon the effective control a nation could exert over the space extending vertically above its territories. As the Earth is not flat, sovereignty would have stretched at different heights for different states; the implication of this being that not all states could exercise efficient control at the same height.17 Also, satellites in low Earth orbit travel fast spending very little time above a state; the issue here would have been finding the window of opportunity to enforce such control.18
14
Frans von der Dunk and Fabio Tronchetti, “Handbook of Space Law” (Edward Elgar Publications, 2017) pp 61,62 15 Ibid p 62: mention made in reference 122 of “Historical summary on the consideration of the question on the definition and delimitation of outer space”, UN Doc A/AC.105/769; specifics of sections 21-24 and 25 Conclusion. 16 Ibid No 12 p 62 17 Ibid No 5 p 164 18 Ibid No 5 “The Spatialist approach” p 165
Other spatialist theories were advanced with focus on gravity-related positions, 19 or the gravispheres 20 and layers of the atmosphere. They all proved unviable solutions for the purpose of reconciling the clashes between sovereignty and control of the space, and were quickly set aside for future consideration.21 The functionalist approach put focus on the nature of the activities carried out, separating those related to air law from those connected with space law.22 This distinction however does not resolve the conflict between jus cogens, sovereignty and the lack of a legal boundary to define where outer space is. Furthermore, development in the activities crossing the two branches of law in object questions the application of such theory: what about the space plane? Suggestions are made that it is unlikely it will be used for both airspace and outer space operations. However, this proposition seems mere speculation as, for instance, under such submission airspace law would apply to the carriage of a Shuttle on the back of a Boeing 747. Also, objects in transit to and from outer space necessarily cross both spaces, meaning that both doctrines would apply to them during their journey, at least at some point; a complication rather avoidable if we were to concentrate on where they are going to be stationed, rather than why. Moreover, disputes could arise as to the classification of activities and other problems could result from the transit of space objects in air space, where they might interfere with aviation.23 There is quite clearly a problem linked with transit where the crossed spaces might ‘belong’ to a state other than the launching state. Last, the standpoint of airspace law is on sovereignty,
19
Langrange points are locations in space where the combined gravitational forces of two larger bodies, such as the Earth and the Moon or Sun, create a point of equilibrium for a third body. Elizabeth Howell, Space.com contributor, “Lagrange Points: Parking Places in Space” https://www.space.com/30302-lagrange-points.html accessed 30th December 2017 20 The spherical gravitational field surrounding a celestial body http://www.dictionary.com/browse/gravisphere accessed 30th December 2017 21 Ibid No 5 p 166. Gravitational forces and atmosphere density depend on numerous variable factors which cannot ensure a stable and clear demarcation between air and outer space. 22 Ibid p 170 23 Ibid No 5 p 170-171
while space law asserts that no state can put a claim on outer space. Clashes between the two doctrines are inevitable, no matter the academic conjecturing, and customary international space laws will not serve forever.24 Besides, law needs certainty; quite obviously, the lack of a set legal boundary cannot provide it. As airspace law had to adapt to the advancement of modern technologies, giving rise to a new doctrine out of necessity, likewise governments should accept that sovereignty of outer space above their territories is subjected to limitations beyond their control. Time might have come to let go of unreasonable expectations to settle for a compromise which can simplify and resolve more situations.
Liability Another good reason for wanting to set a legal boundary arises in connection with liability. Article II of the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects of 197225 stipulates that a launching state is absolutely liable for damages caused by its space object, whether on the surface of the Earth or in flight.26 For the purpose of ascertaining ownership of said object, the Registration Convention of 197527 stipulates that registration confers it; at all times it can lead us to the ‘owner’ of said object, attached to which is liability. Are these provisions enough to attribute liability? Matters get complicate when we look at the interchangeable use made of two different notions of accountability - responsibility and liability – in an outer space context.28
24
T.L. Masson-Swaan, “Air and Space Law: De Lege Ferenda – Essays in Honour of Henry A. Wassenbergh” (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992) The Aerospace Plane; An Object at the Cross-roads of Air and Space Law, Part V: Space Law p 234 25 Hereinafter referred to as Liability Convention 26 Convention on International Liability for Damages Caused by space object, Res 2777 (1971) http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/gares/ARES_26_2777E.pdf accessed 30th December 2017 27 Articles I, II, III and IV http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/registrationconvention.html accessed 30th December 2017 28 Ibid No 12 p 51
International responsibility concentrates on conformity with international law and liability, but the two concepts overlap where wrongful acts may entail the causation of damage.29 The overlapping is caused by the phrasing of two articles in the same treaty, OST. Article VI refers to states bearing ‘international responsibility for national activities in outer space’, implying A quasi-vicarious accountability for any activity carried out in outer space under the responsibility and supervision of a state. 30 Article VII assigns international liability for damages caused to another state, or its natural or juridical persons, a concept much closer to non-delegable duty of care. The difference might seem unimportant, and yet it gains significance in terms of provisions application. Firstly, article VI of OST attaches a state’s responsibility to ‘national activities in outer space’, while article VII, endorsed by article II of the Liability Convention,31 ascribes liability to the object causing damage. On a theoretical level, a victim of damage could seek reparation from a state technically responsible under article VI, but not liable under article VII of the treaty.32 Secondly, it must be remembered that outer space is a legally recognised dimension without legal boundaries: disputes on whether an activity was carried out there or in airspace may arise. They would find no resolution other than in arrangements between parties, or by interpreting article VI of OST as attaching liability whereas a minor responsibility might arise instead, if we were to apply space law.
29
Frans G. von der Dunk, “Liability versus Responsibility in Space Law: Misconception or Misconstruction?” (1992) 363 at 1. 30 “…whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty. The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty.” 31 Ibid No 26 p 52 32 Ibid No 12 p 52-53: the author here makes the example of a telecommunications satellite being launched and sold in orbit to a private operator of another state which is not involved in the launch, thus not qualifying as “launching state”. If the satellite caused damage, the launching state would remain liable even where unable to exercise jurisdiction and control over the operator liable for it. Anyone suffering damage could seek also or instead seek damages from the second state, on account of the type of activity (national).
Thirdly, what exactly amounts to ‘national activities’ as per the aforementioned article remains to be defined; once again, speculations and interpretations ad hoc will not suffice, nor provide any certainty on the matter. On a last consideration, it has been seen that the transit of an object between the two spaces can give rise to further complications on more levels than just the physical. The function of airspace law is not based on territorial concepts: jurisdiction, rather than sovereignty intended as control of a territory, is the key to the application of this doctrine.33 For example, satellites might traverse a state other than the launcher; this can lead to difficulties in establishing which state has jurisdiction over it for traffic control purposes.34 With jurisdiction, of course, comes liability. However, insurance is not a compulsory requirement for space activities in all states; global navigation satellite systems35 are mainly operated as public systems and some governments operate them on a self-insurance basis. While legal obligations in cross-border cases might arise by means of statute, duty in contract or tort laws, generally national private international law qualifies which substantive law is applied to international disputes.36 Not last, GNSS caused damages entail a whole range of additional complications; for the objective of finding a common ground of interest to all nations, it will suffice to comment that neither of these conventions has sought to regulate these types of damages. Could the setting of a legal boundary between air and outer space provide the most viable solution in reference to such circumstances? What if liability were attached to a legal dimension rather than activities, or registration of an object?
33
Ibid No 5 p 171. The author here remarks: “[A]t present launchings take place from locations such that ‘space’ (wherever that is) is reached either before the territory of the launcher state is left or the launch goes out over the High Seas. This will not remain the position as other states which cannot launch within their own air-space or into ‘free’ air- space decide to establish their own space-ports.” 34 Ibid p 172 35 Hereinafter referred to as GNSS 36 Ibid No 13 at 10.3.7 p 593 and 10.3.2 p 580
Prevention of activities contrary to the OST principles Article III of OST stipulates that State Parties shall perform activities in exploration and use of outer space in the interest of international peace and security. These activities shall also conform to international law, which, as seen, enmesh at times with private national law and cannot always deliver a satisfactory or even feasible resolution to all complications. Provisions on treaties and arm limitations agreements make a neat distinction between operating systems according to where they are located.37 This once again bring us to face the lack of legal boundaries defining location in space. Nonetheless, various technologies possessing duality of use are operated in outer space for military purposes. The operational and guidance system of launch vehicles are dual use; satellite remote sensing can be used to gather both meteorological and intelligence data; GPS and GNSS systems are currently used to operate drones, cruise missiles and even to direct bombs on target; telecommunication and solar power satellites can potentially be used, and likely are, for military purposes.38 In the struggle of nations to retain control of their territories, dual use technology has provided a convenient way to circumvent treaties, international laws and binding conventions. Notwithstanding that space law provisions are part of the over-arching context preventing military activities in outer space, we are unable to ascertain whether technologies operating somewhere above our heads are actually used to ‘maintain peaceful international relationships’. 39 A few countries have recently remarked that their national security is
37
Ibid No 5 p 162 Ibid p 500 39 This is largely due to various factors, including the inability to enforce disclosure and /or acquire any information on activities countries conduct in space, or the function of equipment they operate there. The author comments that we do not have access to military documentation for China, Russia and other states. Also, although reports might be produced at times, what they focus on depends on national security regulations and a country’s international relationships. 38
nowadays critically dependent on their space capabilities.40 Such statements and other open declarations confirm that despite treaties and international agreements, many countries are making use of their space technologies for ‘sovereignty’ purposes, or will soon embrace such use.41 Historically, the use of outer space for military purposes has been the focus of many international controversies, diplomatic and academic heated debates. Owing to the highly sensitive nature of the issues - including the unwillingness of states to accept restrictions and the fact that space technologies possess a dual nature - the regulating of military activities in outer space falls short of providing a comprehensive, internationally adopted framework.42 Although basic provisions for peaceful use of outer space are found in the two most important treaties related to this dimension, 43 other treaties comprise just provisions with indirect impact on said use.44 Article IV of OST, for instance, deals with military uses of outer space by expressly prohibits only two types of weapons: of mass destructions and nuclear. The fact that militarization of outer space is necessarily connected to its weaponization should be matter of great and general concern: anything which can be used there for military scopes poses a threat to its peaceful use, and at the same time a threat from it.
40
Section 5 “Statement on National Space Policy of the United States” (2006) https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/space.pdf accessed 3rd January 2018 AND the UK “National Space Policy” (2015) p 7-9 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/484864/NSP__Final.pdf accessed 4th January 2018 41 See Professor M.G. (Ret.) M.K. Isaac Ben-Israel and Dr Zvi Kapla, “Out of This World: Israel’s Space Program”: “[A]t present, the State of Israel is standing at a watershed. In order to leverage the already acquired achievements, it should be pursuing space technologies and space systems to further improve its position in three important dimensions: Strengthening its strategic defence status,…” http://mfa.gov.il/MFA_Graphics/MFA%20Gallery/Israel60/ch7-6.pdf accessed 3rd January 2018 42 Ibid No 13 at 6.1 p 331-332 43 OST 1967 and the Moon agreement 1979. 44 Rescue Agreement 1968, Liability Convention 1972, Registration Convention 1975.
In his “Studies in International Space Law”, Chen remarks the importance of examining if and to which extent international law as such is applicable to outer space.45 He comments that international law can only operate on auto-interpretative level: generally speaking, law represents the will of a dominant section in society, namely, the intention and capability of it to enforce its will. As the primary subjects of international law are States - own law-makers, law-enforcement officers and judges – concurrence under any rule can only be achieved with their endorsement. But what these deliberations have to do with the need for a demarcation between airspace and outer space? In the history of its developing COPUOS, by means of essentially non-binding UN Resolutions, aimed at cementing space law practices into customary international law.46 The five treaties at the core of international space law sought to provide parameters to impact and guide states on all issues related to outer space. Express reference to the UN Charter as part of the body of international law applicable to outer space provided a welcomed endorsement for demilitarization and denuclearization of space.47 These efforts served in fact as a starting point for negotiations and, surprisingly, some unexpected resolutions between military powers once at odds. As a matter of fact, during the Cold War years space security offered to the U.S. and URSS the pretext to understand the other side’s policies and manage disputes to prevent hostile acts. However, after 2001 the U.S. took a step back from demilitarization, in the belief that among new ‘space powers’ some of them could pose a threat for which military responses would be required. Analogies with the past were immediately presented by analysts to suggest that such move had paved the way for space’s weaponization.48
45
Bin Cheng, “The Extraterrestrial Application of International Law” p 71 http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198257301.001.0001/acprof9780198257301-chapter-5 accessed 4th January 2018 46 Ibid No 13 at 2.2.1.3 p 41 47 Article IV of OST 1966 48 James Clay Moltz, “The Politics of Space Security” (Stanford Security Studies, 2008) 2nd ed. pp 12,13
Great powers have always competed over new frontiers motivated partly by their profitability, and partly by the prospect of gaining national reputation and with it geopolitical influence. Outer space however is a far more hostile environment than those explored and conquered by our predecessors; any activity performed there encompasses a variety of risks, from economic to life and national security and assets loss. Any nation undertaking the performance of activities out there is reliant on the co-operation and assistance of others. Additionally, modern life requirements seem to compel more and more for a joint effort of all parties involved in the discovery of outer space potentials. For instance, developments in telecommunications led the U.S to share the newest technologies and to the formation of the International Telecommunications Consortium (Intelsat). In these regards, we have to think of satellites as indispensable to our lives; they are connected to each part of it, from security to leisure.
Conclusion The issues examined in this essay centred on three of the problems inherently connected to the lack of legal demarcation of outer space. For what concerns sovereignty, it is now clear that control of a space above a nation, ad infinitum, is a proposition which cannot find satisfaction on many levels. The evolution of telecommunications by use of ever more sophisticated satellites has furthermore impaired our ability as nations to deter such control. States also rely upon bilateral/multiple agreements and treaties to carry out any activity space related; co-operation and mutual assistance provide the ideal excuse for negotiations and gains which would otherwise not occur. A neat separation of outer space from airspace would provide the perfect compromise between sovereignty and the international right of nations to explore space, involving far less efforts, complicacies and expenditures of both time and resources. These could be spent to reach it, for the benefit of mankind.
As outer space is a legal dimension separate from all known others, the demarcation becomes relevant also in terms of liability. At present an intricate system of different doctrines is stretched to the impossible to supply for the lack of a specific legal framework. Liability attached to objects, or the nature of activities carried out in outer space, or registration, complicate matters while offering little if no advantages. Due to the nature of many agreements currently in place, the main concern here is given by the oncoming of new private business ventures connected with outer space. Generally, individuals reaching outer space are recruited among military personnel. It is the nature of this environment, hostile and unknown, which should concern anyone intending to send out there the average person. Military personnel are trained and if injured on duty can rely on government provided medical treatment and active duty pay, which parallel a private sector worker’s compensation. However, in the absence of specific statutory provisions on the transportation of civilians in outer space by part of a private company, compensation in case of injuries would have to rely on other laws.49 With so many satellites constellations orbiting the planet, and the aforementioned in mind, one can only hope for the best while preparing for the worse. The last and most controversial of the issues linked to the (lack of) demarcation of the two celestial areas is connected to the militarization and weaponization of outer space. The birth of space law and its development throughout the last sixty years had aimed at keeping this realm free from threats of destruction. Unfortunately, the lack of legally set boundaries has permitted the misuse of outer space to favour the geopolitical and commercial interests of nations. After a promising start towards a future of disarmament, the most influential global powers seem to not only disagree on the peaceful use of outer space, but to use the lack of a legal boundary as an excuse to empower themselves. These are once again times of struggle
49
R. Bender, “Space Transport Liability: National and International Aspects” (1995) p 162, 163
and tensions among many nations; it is imperative to move forward as mankind, seeking a fruitful peace for all, instead of moving backward to the worse expression of our human abilities. The achievements of space law in the past have proved that co-operation among space actors could offer the future generations a solution to many of the present problems, delivering the promise of peace. Modern technologies should work in favour of progress and for the benefit of people; the peaceful use of outer space, its exploration, could once more provide a common interest and ground for improvements in international relationships. What is left to do is to establish once and for all where exactly outer space is legally located. Theodore von Kármán, gifted us with the notion that approximately at 100Km of altitude above the sea level the atmosphere becomes too thin for aeronautical flights.50 Now we know how high is up: why not making good use of the information?
50
http://www.spaceacademy.net.au/spacelaw/splawguide.htm accessed 6th January 2018
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